

3 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS



RECENT DEVELOPMENTS CONTENTS

Recent Developments in Brief	33
International Engagement with the Taliban	35
Security	40
Taliban Governance	45
Humanitarian Crisis Update	48
Migration and Refugees	51
Public Health	55
Education	57
Economy	57
Counternarcotics	61
Recent Developments Endnotes	62

Photo on previous page

Afghan men walk in front of graffiti in Kabul. (Photo by Lucille Kanzawa/Flickr)



RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BRIEF

Section 3 of this quarterly report summarizes the key events of the reporting period.

Taliban Attend UN's Doha III Meeting

- For the first time, the Taliban joined a meeting of UN special representatives for Afghanistan in Doha, Qatar, June 30–July 1. The agenda included counternarcotics and private sector investment, and excluded the political process and human rights, although State said nearly every envoy raised the issue of human rights anyway.
- Afghan women and other civil society representatives were not invited, sparking criticism from the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and others.

Taliban Abuses May Constitute Crimes Against Humanity

- UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Afghanistan Richard Bennett said in his annual report to the UN Human Rights Council that the Taliban's human rights abuses may constitute crimes against humanity, due to the systemic acts of violence perpetrated against the population, including extrajudicial execution, torture, arbitrary arrest, gender-based discrimination, corporal punishment, and other inhumane acts.

Taliban Increase International Engagement

- The Taliban broadly increased international engagement this quarter, including visits to the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia by UN-sanctioned interior minister Sirajuddin Haqqani. Haqqani is barred from entering UN member states and previously had not left Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover in 2021. Taliban representatives also attended the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in Russia, and signed a number of economic agreements with regional countries.

1,000 Days of the Education Ban

- This quarter marked 1,000 days since the Taliban's ban on girls and women's education, with no sign of schools reopening for girls beyond the sixth grade.

Al Qaeda Leader Calls for Fighters to Migrate to Afghanistan

- Al Qaeda leader Saif al-Adl called for foreign fighters to migrate to Afghanistan and train to attack Western targets. A UN sanctions monitoring team said that "al-Qaida remains strategically patient, cooperating with other terrorist groups in Afghanistan and prioritizing its ongoing relationship with the Taliban."

Taliban Security Forces Strength Questioned

- The Taliban report 380,000 personnel in their security forces, which is larger than the last, also questionable, reported Afghan National Defense and Security Forces strength. The Afghanistan Green Team, an anti-Taliban group, claimed the Taliban have 100,000 ghost soldiers, lowering their army size to nearly 77,000. A UN sanctions monitoring team reported that the Taliban are struggling to pay their security forces, and cited concern among member states about the Taliban's intentions for its security forces.

Dissolution of Community Development Councils

- The Taliban dissolved all community development councils (CDCs) nationwide, forcing international organizations to give more control of all international aid and development projects to Taliban. CDCs have had a long history of working with local authorities to coordinate development planning and facilitate community participation and involvement in the implementation of projects at the local level.

Floods Worsen Ongoing Humanitarian Crisis

- In May, a series of flash floods struck the northern, northeastern, and western regions of Afghanistan. The heavy rainfall and flooding killed at least 225 people, injured another 217, and destroyed 2,800 homes.

Humanitarian Funding Gap Persists

- The UN is seeking \$3.06 billion for its 2024 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) to assist 17.3 million of an estimated 23.7 million Afghans in dire need. About \$710.1 million (23%) is funded, as of July 2024.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN



KEY ISSUES & EVENTS

For the first time, the Taliban joined a meeting of UN special representatives for Afghanistan in Doha, Qatar, June 30–July 1, to discuss counternarcotics and private sector investment.

On May 22, the Taliban's so-called emir dissolved all community development councils nationwide, forcing international organizations to give more control of all international aid and development projects to the Taliban.

Al Qaeda called on its supporters to migrate to Afghanistan and train for “special operations” against Western countries.

INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT

Doha III Includes the Taliban, Excludes Afghan Women and Civil Society

This quarter, the UN convened a third meeting of the special representatives for Afghanistan in Doha, Qatar, June 30–July 1, with the Taliban participating for the first time.¹ While the UN has not confirmed the specific preconditions that convinced the Taliban to join Doha III after refusing to attend Doha II in February, the official meeting agenda did not include the Afghan political process or human rights. Afghan women and other civil society representatives were also excluded from the talks, sparking harsh criticism from human rights advocates. However, UN Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo, who chaired Doha III, later said human rights issues were an integral part of the discussions.²

Sahar Fetrat, a researcher at Human Rights Watch, wrote, “those most impacted by Taliban abuses are being sidelined.”⁷³ Afghan women’s rights activist Shahrazad Akbar told Radio Free Europe, “removing issues like the rights of girls and women from the agenda is a big betrayal.”⁷⁴ Tirana Hassan, executive director of Human Rights Watch, said excluding women “risks legitimizing the Taliban’s abuses and triggering irreparable harm to the UN’s credibility as an advocate for women’s rights and women’s meaningful participation.”⁷⁵ The UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women also issued a press release that said, “excluding women and girls from these discussions will only serve to undermine the credibility and effectiveness of the Doha meeting and give way to the conduct of the de facto authorities in excluding women and girls from public life.”⁷⁶

U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Thomas West and U.S. Special Envoy for Afghan Women, Girls, and Human Rights Rina Amiri both attended Doha III.⁷⁷ A State spokesperson told reporters that the United States agreed to participate in Doha III only after receiving assurances from the UN that any discussion with the Taliban would address human rights.⁷⁸ Following the meeting, State told SIGAR, “Human rights, especially the rights of women and girls, are at the forefront of our engagement with Afghans—including in any meeting with representatives of the Taliban,” and that “the Taliban heard directly from nearly every envoy in Doha about the centrality of human rights and inclusivity to the international community.”⁷⁹ Amiri said on X (formerly Twitter) that, “We will continue to consult widely during & following Doha 3 to support an inclusive framework for women & civil society participation. Ultimately, Afghanistan’s peace, security, and sustainability challenges cannot be resolved without their inclusion.” However, Amiri did not specify how civil society will be included in future political processes if the Taliban refuse to meet with those stakeholders.⁸⁰

Days ahead of Doha III, Roza Otunbayeva, UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), stressed in remarks to the Security Council at its quarterly meeting on the situation in Afghanistan that “this sort of engagement is not legitimization or normalization.”⁸¹ Yet, she maintained it was “essential” for the Taliban to participate in Doha III.⁸² Otunbayeva warned that the international community remains in “crisis management mode,” and Afghanistan is still “beset by massive poverty” despite an influx of \$7 billion in humanitarian aid since the Taliban takeover in 2021.⁸³ According to Otunbayeva, instability in Afghanistan cannot be addressed without engaging the Taliban.⁸⁴ “We hope that in Doha, key stakeholders... speak to each other face to face, reinforce the principles underlying the consensus to engage, and agree on next steps to alleviate the uncertainties that face the Afghan people,” she said.⁸⁵

While Doha III was not an immediate solution to Afghanistan’s challenges, Otunbayeva said it was part of the process of incentivizing the Taliban to adopt policies that would “allow for their reintegration into the international community.”⁸⁶ She concluded that any forward action to alleviate the many issues in Afghanistan will require “greater flexibility” and “a clearer political willingness” from all

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS



UN Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo at a press conference in Doha, Qatar. (Photo by UN Department Political and Peacebuilding Affairs)

stakeholders.¹⁷ Indeed, in advance of the meeting, several foreign delegations visited Kabul to encourage Taliban participation, including UN Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo.¹⁸ The Deputy Foreign Minister of Qatar, a delegation from the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and EU Special Representative Tomas Niklasson also visited Kabul in May.¹⁹

The Taliban refused to join Doha II in February because the UN insisted on including other members of Afghan civil society, denying the Taliban status as the sole representative body for Afghanistan.²⁰ Following the February meeting, a Russian foreign ministry spokesperson told the press that “any initiative... is doomed to failure without the support of Kabul and regional states.”²¹

No Clear Consensus on Future Engagement

On July 1, UN Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo told the press that discussions with the Taliban on the recommendations set forth in the UN independent assessment were “frank,” and that the decision to meet with the Taliban was a “very tough, maybe impossible choice,” but one that may lead to “resolving some of the problems that are having such a devastating impact on the Afghan people.”²² Regarding any sort of structured action moving forward, DiCarlo noted, “we are still at the beginning of this process,” though the special representatives may create smaller groups on key issues raised in the independent assessment for future discussions.²³ State confirmed that no special envoy (per the independent assessment recommendation) was elected during Doha III, and that they are awaiting next steps on possible focus groups.²⁴

Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid, who led the Taliban’s delegation in Doha, praised the discussions on economic development, and urged western countries to “engage in a realistic and practical manner, just like regional countries.”²⁵ Mujahid decried outside efforts to shape Taliban

UN's Independent Assessment on Afghanistan Engagement

During February's Doha II, the special representatives discussed UN Security Council Resolution 2721, adopted in December 2023, which requested the appointment of a special envoy for Afghanistan to help implement the recommendations put forth in an independent assessment for a coherent international engagement strategy. The UN's November 2023 independent assessment on international engagement with Afghanistan identified five unresolved issue areas underpinning the impasse between the international community and the Taliban: human rights, counterterrorism/

counternarcotics/security, economic and social development, inclusive governance, and political representation. Moving forward, the assessment recommended increased economic, humanitarian, and political engagement, participation in confidence-building measures, continued cooperation on security, creating a roadmap for Afghanistan's reintegration into the international system, and ensuring there are sufficient support mechanisms for this process, including the appointment of a UN special envoy to focus on diplomacy at the intra-Afghan and international levels.

Source: UN, Report of the independent assessment pursuant to Security Council resolution 2679 (2023), S/2023/856, 11/9/2023, pp. 3, 7–14, 18–19; UN Security Council, Resolution 2721 (2024), 12/29/2023; UN, Report of the independent assessment pursuant to Security Council resolution 2679 (2023), S/2023/856, 11/9/2023, p. 2; Reuters, "Taliban refuses to join UN-sponsored meeting on Afghanistan," 2/19/2024.

domestic policy through economic, security, and political pressure, and said the international community must separate what he called Afghanistan's "internal matters" from foreign relations.²⁶

Nevertheless, stakeholders continued to express their concern over Taliban domestic policy. The government of Canada issued a statement on June 30 that said, "Canada is extremely disappointed that the UN organizers have excluded non-Taliban Afghan participants," and noted Canada had advocated for weeks to include civil society. The statement concluded, "none of the goals that Afghans are seeking to achieve are possible without the full participation of women."²⁷ UN Special Rapporteur Richard Bennett echoed those sentiments, writing that "if these exclusions are the price of the Taliban's presence in Doha, the cost is too high."²⁸

In response to criticism aimed at the UN, DiCarlo told the media, "running through all the discussions was the deep international concern—from special envoys and from me—about the ongoing and serious restrictions on women and girls. Afghanistan cannot return to the international fold, or fully develop economically and socially, if it is deprived of the contributions and potential of half its population." DiCarlo added that "the concerns and views of Afghan women and civil society were front and center," despite their exclusion from the Doha III agenda. She noted, "while women and civil society were not sitting across from the de facto authorities the last two days, they made their voices heard."²⁹ The special envoys and DiCarlo met separately with members of Afghan civil society on July 2, following Doha III. DiCarlo said in a second press conference that human rights will "continue to be an integral part of all our discussions."³⁰

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Regional Engagement

According to the most recent UN Secretary-General's report on the situation in Afghanistan from June, regional cooperation with the Taliban continued this quarter, primarily on economic development, trade, and transit. On May 12, the Taliban head of the Afghanistan Railway Authority signed a memorandum of understanding with Uzbekistan's rail authority to establish a commercial logistic port in Balkh Province. On May 21, Turkish Airlines resumed flights to Kabul. Additionally, representatives of the Taliban foreign ministry attended the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation's Islamic Summit Conference; the minister of hajj and religious affairs attended the Consultative Summit of Islamic Scholars in Turkey; and the minister for commerce and industry traveled to Russia for the "Russia-Islamic World" economic forum.³¹

Sanctioned Taliban Minister Visits UAE and Saudi Arabia

On June 4, Taliban interior minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, a U.S. Specially Designated Terrorist, left Afghanistan for the first time since the group gained power in 2021 to meet with Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed al Nahyan, president of the United Arab Emirates, in Abu Dhabi. The two reportedly discussed bilateral cooperation, regional stability, and economic development and reconstruction in Afghanistan.³² Following his trip to the UAE, Haqqani traveled to Mecca in Saudi Arabia to perform Hajj.³³ Both the UAE and Saudi Arabia are U.S. allies and host U.S. military bases, and as the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies' *Long War Journal* noted, it raised questions that someone with known ties to al Qaeda was freely traveling to allied countries, especially as concerns about global terrorism rise.³⁴

Haqqani is the leader of the Haqqani Network, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization responsible for deadly attacks on Afghan civilians, coalition forces, foreign embassies, and the former Afghan government.³⁵ Haqqani has been sanctioned by the UN since 2007 for his association with al Qaeda and the Taliban, pursuant to resolutions 1735 (2006) and 1988 (2011).³⁶ Resolution 1988, which the Security Council voted to uphold in 2021, stipulates that all UN member states are required to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories by designated individuals.³⁷

The State Department continues to offer a reward up to \$10 million for information leading to Haqqani's arrest.³⁸ State did not confirm if Haqqani obtained a waiver for entry to the UAE, but told the Associated Press that the UAE "is an important partner in support of the Afghan people, including for the rights of Afghan women and girls, and for Afghans who fled their country seeking resettlement." When questioned on the travel ban, State said, "We understand the complex relationship countries have with the Taliban... we remain in active communication with all of our partners on how to constructively engage the Taliban."³⁹

Russia Considering Delisting Taliban as a Terrorist Entity

On May 27, Russian news agency TASS reported that the Russian Foreign and Justice Ministries proposed to President Vladimir Putin the delisting of the Taliban as a terrorist organization. Russian Special Presidential Envoy for Afghanistan Zamir Kabulov said delisting the Taliban “must be done,” but acknowledged “there are still a few hurdles to overcome, after which the Russian leadership will make a decision.”⁴⁰ The following day, Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev told TASS that conditions had changed since Russia first listed the Taliban as a terrorist group 20 years ago. “Now the Taliban are in power, and we are close to establishing full-fledged relations with them,” he said.⁴¹

While their final decision about the Taliban’s status has not yet been issued, Russia continued to engage with the Taliban on economic matters. On June 5, a Taliban delegation arrived in Moscow to attend the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum.⁴² TASS also reported in June that Moscow would support Afghanistan’s accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation if the Taliban are officially recognized. In response, Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid said, “These are positive steps being taken, and the only solution to the issues between Afghanistan and regional countries is that expanding economic and diplomatic relations will benefit both sides.”⁴³

SECURITY

Terror groups continued to operate from Afghanistan this quarter amid ongoing U.S., UN, and regional concerns that the country is once again becoming a terrorist haven, notwithstanding the Taliban’s counterterrorism commitments in the 2020 Doha Agreement. While the Taliban have moved against Islamic State in Iraq and Syria-Khorasan (ISIS-K) and other anti-Taliban groups, they remain tolerant of terror groups such as al Qaeda and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).⁴⁴ A UN sanctions monitoring team reported in July that Afghanistan “continues to be perceived as permissive or friendly territory by terrorist groups, which also aspire to project threats globally.”⁴⁵ State said it “remains unclear whether the Taliban have the will and capability to fully eliminate terrorist safe havens or control the flow of foreign terrorist fighters in and through Afghanistan.”⁴⁶

In June, President Joseph R. Biden said that “U.S. military personnel remain postured outside Afghanistan to address threats to the United States homeland and United States interests that may arise from inside Afghanistan.”⁴⁷

Al Qaeda

The U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence has assessed that “al Qaeda has reached an operational nadir in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” but the Taliban remain tolerant of al Qaeda and permit the group to maintain safe haven in Afghanistan.⁴⁸ Earlier this year, a UN sanctions monitoring

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

team reported that al Qaeda’s general command has about a dozen senior leaders in Afghanistan, while another UN sanctions monitoring team added that “al-Qaida remains strategically patient, cooperating with other terrorist groups in Afghanistan and prioritizing its ongoing relationship with the Taliban.”⁴⁹

Al Qaeda Calls for Fighters to Migrate to Afghanistan

This quarter, al Qaeda leader Saif al-Adl called for fighters to migrate to Afghanistan. Citing the ongoing conflict in Gaza, al-Adl, who reportedly resides in Iran, said that those who travel to Afghanistan can train “to strike” Western interests. He said they should look to the Taliban as a role model for future Islamic states.⁵⁰ His call followed an increase in al Qaeda media products aimed at recruiting new militants and helping “restore credibility” to the organization, said a January 2024 UN sanctions monitoring team report.⁵¹ As this quarterly report went to press, there was no indication of the extent to which foreign fighters have migrated to Afghanistan in direct response to al Qaeda’s message. However, the prospect of foreign fighters migrating to Afghanistan and causing greater regional instability has long been a concern for neighboring countries, the UN, and the United States.⁵²

Al Qaeda Settlements in Afghanistan

This quarter, Hasht-e Subh, an Afghan media outlet, reported that the Taliban ministry of interior, led by Sirajuddin Haqqani, a U.S. Specially Designated Global Terrorist, was overseeing the construction of several settlements for al Qaeda and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan in Ghazni Province. According to their reporting, the settlement for al Qaeda will be a training center and residential space. The Taliban have denied this, saying the settlements are being constructed for Afghan returnees expelled from Pakistan.⁵³ SIGAR is unable to verify the findings of the Hasht-e Subh report. A UN sanctions monitoring team reported in January 2024 that al Qaeda established up to eight training camps in Ghazni, Laghman, Parwan, and Uruzgan Provinces and five madrassas in Laghman, Kunar, Nangarhar, Nuristan, and Parwan Provinces.⁵⁴

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan

The Afghan Taliban support Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP (the so-called “Pakistani Taliban”), which has an estimated 6,000–6,500 fighters mostly based in eastern Afghanistan and aims to regain territorial control of portions of northwest Pakistan.⁵⁵ The UN Secretary-General reported in June that tensions along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border “continued owing to the reported presence of Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) members on Afghan territory.”⁵⁶ A UN sanctions monitoring team reported that al Qaeda provides TTP with Afghan fighters and training camps and the Taliban

provide weapons permits, guest houses, and allow freedom of movement in Afghanistan.⁵⁷

TTP Attacks Spark Taliban-Pakistan Border Clashes

This quarter, TTP claimed 119 attacks against Pakistani forces and civilians, according to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project, a nongovernmental organization.⁵⁸ A UN sanctions monitoring team said the TTP's attacks into Pakistan have intensified since 2021.⁵⁹ In May, a cross-border attack from TTP members in Afghanistan into Pakistan led to several days of clashes between Pakistani and Taliban security forces, "large-scale displacement" from Pakistani villages, multiple casualties, and the destruction of some border infrastructure. Pakistani and Taliban security forces later clashed in June. Pakistan claimed to have killed nearly a dozen TTP militants in Afghanistan's Paktika, Khost, and Kunar Provinces, in addition to several casualties in Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. Pakistani and Taliban security forces previously clashed in March.⁶⁰

Afghanistan International, a news outlet based in the United Kingdom, reported that the Taliban were planning to relocate TTP members from Afghan border provinces to other provinces, including Ghazni. This comes after several months of negotiations between the Taliban, Pakistan, and China, and ahead of Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar's visit to Afghanistan—the first from a Pakistani foreign minister in three years.⁶¹ The Taliban have said that TTP threats are a domestic Pakistani issue and no militant groups operate on Afghan soil. Pakistan has stated it will continue to launch attacks into Afghanistan until the militant threat is neutralized.⁶² A UN sanctions monitoring team reported that the TTP is "too big a challenge for the Afghan Taliban to manage, even if they wanted to."⁶³ State has previously said, "It is unclear the extent to which the Taliban are able or willing to restrict the TTP."⁶⁴

ISIS-K

A UN sanctions monitoring team reported that ISIS-K continued to pose the greatest threat to Afghanistan and the region, encompassing an estimated 2,000–3,500 members and with an affiliate strength of 6,000 fighters. However, it does not threaten Taliban control.⁶⁵ General Michael E. Kurilla, commander of U.S. Central Command, testified that ISIS-K also maintains the "capability and will to attack U.S. and Western interests abroad in as little as six months."⁶⁶ A June UN Secretary-General report said ISIS-K propaganda "continued to threaten the international community while also promoting attacks in the wider region."⁶⁷

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

ISIS-K Activity Outside Afghanistan Increases Fears of Global Terrorist Threats

U.S. law enforcement and intelligence officials continue to worry about ISIS-K's spread beyond Afghanistan. On April 11, FBI Director Christopher Wray testified before the U.S. House Appropriations Committee saying, "Increasingly concerning is the potential for a coordinated attack here in the homeland, not unlike the ISIS-K attack we saw at the Russia concert hall back in March." Director Wray also spoke of ISIS-K affiliates drawing inspiration from the ongoing conflict in the Middle East. ISIS-K has repeatedly called for attacks against Western and U.S. interests, including the Olympic Games in Paris in July and August 2024.

This quarter, 23 alleged ISIS-K affiliates were arrested in the United States and Kyrgyzstan. In June, eight Tajikistan nationals with alleged ties to ISIS-K were arrested in Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and New York on immigration charges after

arriving through the U.S.-Mexico border. On June 14, Kyrgyzstan announced it detained 15 people connected to ISIS-K, saying they were recruited by an ISIS-K member in Afghanistan. Jerome Drevon, an International Crisis Group senior analyst, said that as the Taliban's campaigns against ISIS-K decreased domestic attacks, ISIS-K has become more dependent on their international networks.

On June 23 in southern Russia, attacks on a synagogue, two churches, and a police station in Dagestan killed at least 20 people and wounded dozens more. No group has claimed responsibility for the attacks, but Russia called them "acts of terror" and a Dagestan official said NATO and Ukraine were behind the attacks. ISIS-K said the attacks were carried out on behalf of the Islamic State organization, but did not claim responsibility for them.

Source: NPR, "In Russia, Dagestan mourns and suspicions mount after deadly attacks," 6/25/2024; FBI, "Director Wray's Opening Statement to the House Appropriations Committee," 4/11/2024; Washington Post, "After attack in Dagestan, Russian officials minimize Islamic State claim," 6/24/2024; New York Times, "The Southern Border, Terrorism Fears, and Eight Tajik Men," 6/25/2024; VOA, "Terror attacks headline threats to upcoming Paris Olympics," 6/4/2024; Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, "Central Asia in Focus: ISKP Members Detained in Kyrgyzstan," 6/18/2024; Financial Times, "How the Taliban's return made Afghanistan a hub for global jihadis," 3/26/2024.

ISIS-K Attacks

This quarter, ISIS-K conducted eight attacks across Afghanistan, according to ACLED.⁶⁸ One attack on a Shi'a mosque in Herat Province on April 29 killed at least six civilians and added to the UN's concern over ISIS-K's increased targeting of the Shi'a community in the last year. On May 17, an ISIS-K attack killed several foreign tourists and Afghan nationals in Bamyan Province, the first attack targeting foreigners since their Longan Hotel attack in December 2022 that killed five Chinese nationals.⁶⁹

ISIS-K also claimed several attacks on Taliban security forces. On May 8, ISIS-K attacked a Taliban police convoy in Badakhshan Province, capitalizing on local unrest over the Taliban's opium ban implementation in the province.⁷⁰ ISIS-K also claimed an attack on Taliban security forces in Kandahar Province—its second attack in the province this year—prompting Taliban so-called emir Haibatullah Akhundzada to demand Taliban security forces "seriously investigate" ISIS-K's presence there.⁷¹

Taliban Attempts to Counter ISIS-K

While the Taliban remained intent in “meeting what they perceive as an existential threat [ISIS-K], their counter-terrorism capabilities are deficient to meet the nature of the threat,” said a July UN sanctions monitoring team report.⁷² This quarter, the UN reported that the Taliban arrested alleged ISIS-K members and the Taliban reported killing one ISIS-K commander following clashes in Nangarhar Province in July.⁷³ “It is not clear if the Taliban’s crackdown can alter ISIS-K’s external attack ambitions and sufficiently weaken its capabilities,” added a United States Institute of Peace senior study group on counterterrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan.⁷⁴

Taliban Security Forces

The Taliban ministry of defense X account claimed that 3,783 individuals joined the army this quarter, which brought their total reported, but unverified strength to 177,890. Additionally, the ministry of interior’s X account reported 279 individuals completed police training across the country this quarter, bringing the total Taliban-reported police strength to 211,024, as seen in Table R.1.⁷⁵

A July UN sanctions monitoring team reported that the Taliban’s armed forces strength has “raised concerns among Member States about the Taliban leadership’s true intent for these forces.” The same monitoring team added that the Taliban are struggling to pay the armed forces’ salaries, despite the reportedly large percentage of the Taliban’s national budget dedicated to security.⁷⁶ The Afghanistan Green Trend (AGT), an anti-Taliban resistance group led by former head of the National Directorate of Security and politician Amrullah Saleh, questioned the Taliban’s reported strength. AGT said that the Taliban have about 100,000 ghost soldiers in their military, lowering their army strength to about 73,000. The AGT report did not say if the Taliban police force has ghost police officers.⁷⁷ SIGAR is unable to independently verify the Taliban’s security forces data or the AGT report, but the presence of ghost soldiers is plausible. Prior to the Taliban takeover, SIGAR repeatedly warned about **ghost soldiers** in the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF).⁷⁸ State is also unable to independently verify the Taliban’s data and DOD said it does not track Taliban security force strength.⁷⁹

Ghost Soldiers: fabricated records of individuals who never existed or served, records for individual soldiers or police who in fact exist but do not serve at their expected duty station, and records for individual soldiers and police who may have once served but have since left the service.

Source: SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 7/3/2020, pp. 3–11, 202; DOD, CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 6/23/2020.

TABLE R.1

TALIBAN SECURITY FORCES AND ANDSF STRENGTH				
	Ministry of Defense	Ministry of Interior	Total	As Of
Taliban	177,890	211,024	388,914	6/24/2024
ANDSF*	182,071	118,628	300,699	4/29/2021

*Data as of April 29, 2021. DOD/CSTC-A reported 300,699 ANDSF personnel in the Afghan Personnel and Pay System on April 29, 2021. Source: SIGAR analysis of Taliban ministry of defense on X, 6/24/2024; SIGAR analysis of Taliban ministry of interior on X, 6/24/2024; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 10/30/2021, p. 82.

Taliban Opposition Groups

This quarter, various anti-Taliban resistance groups claimed responsibility for 68 attacks against Taliban security forces, compared to 43 last quarter, according to ACLED.⁸⁰ Since January 2024, both the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF) and the National Resistance Front (NRF) have increased attacks on Taliban security forces in Kabul.⁸¹ In April, the AFF and NRF held their first joint event—on the anniversary of an AFF commander’s death—to encourage unity among resistance groups in Afghanistan. The UN Secretary-General’s June report on Afghanistan said that resistance groups did not “pose a significant challenge to the Taliban’s hold on territorial control.”⁸² Other opposition groups, such as the Afghan United Front, the National Resistance Council for the Salvation of Afghanistan, the Afghanistan Green Trend, and the Afghan Liberation Movement, primarily focus on intelligence collection and political resistance against the Taliban.⁸³

TALIBAN GOVERNANCE

This quarter, the Taliban increased outreach to “bridge gaps” between them and various communities in Afghanistan, with multiple ministers delivering speeches on national unity. At the same time, the Taliban continued to restrict civil society and political activism. On April 7, the ministry of justice reiterated its ban on political parties and social organizations, and announced that 77 such entities had been referred to Taliban security forces.⁸⁴

On June 4, the Taliban’s supreme court announced that 63 people, including 14 women, were publicly flogged at a sports arena in Sar-e-Pul in northern Afghanistan for the alleged crimes of homosexuality, adultery, and other “immoral relations.” UNAMA issued a statement in response, condemning corporal punishment and calling for respect for international human rights obligations.⁸⁵

According to democracy advocate Freedom House’s 2024 Freedom Index, which rates civil and political rights on a scale of 0–100, Afghanistan scored one out of 40 on political rights and five out of 60 on civil liberties, for a total score of six out of 100. On most metrics, Afghanistan scored zero points, including on the following questions:⁸⁶

- Was the current head of government elected through free fair elections?
- Do people have the right to organize in different political parties?
- Are the people’s political choices free from domination?
- Do various segments of the population have full political rights and electoral opportunities?
- Does the government operate with openness and transparency?
- Are there free and independent media?
- Is there academic freedom free from extensive political indoctrination?
- Is there an independent judiciary?
- Do individuals enjoy personal social freedoms?
- Do people have freedom of movement?

In summarizing the sociopolitical atmosphere in Afghanistan, Freedom House said, “The Taliban leader exercises unlimited political authority and rules by decree in absence of a constitution... the Taliban have suspended all political and civic rights and have demonstrated their intolerance for political opposition. Women and religious and ethnic minority groups have faced the most severe curbs on freedoms, while journalists are restricted by harsh edicts and the threat of violence.”⁸⁷



UN Special Representative for Afghanistan Roza Otunbayeva meets with Afghan women journalists in Logar Province on World Press Freedom Day. (Photo by UNAMA)

Human Rights

UN Reports Decry Systemic Taliban Abuses

This quarter, two UN reports condemned the Taliban for their gross human rights abuses. On July 9, UNAMA released its report on the Taliban ministry for the propagation of virtue and the prevention of vice, an entity responsible for policymaking and enforcement related to the values compatible with the Taliban’s so-called Islamic Emirate and its interpretation of sharia law.⁸⁸ According to UNAMA, the ministry negatively affects human rights and fundamental freedoms, especially for women, who face restrictions on their employment, access to public spaces, movement, and healthcare. Through its unclear instructions, inconsistency, unpredictability, and the severity of its punishments, the ministry has created a “climate of fear and intimidation” in Afghanistan.⁸⁹

The ministry also attacks cultural life, UNAMA said, noting prohibitions on music, artistic expression including images of people or animals, and the celebration of the Persian new year Nowruz. Enforcement measures include verbal intimidation, arbitrary arrest and detention, corporal punishment (including public lashing), random searches, and record-keeping at

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

mosques to ensure attendance. Since the Taliban takeover in 2021, UNAMA has recorded at least 1,033 instances of such abuses.⁹⁰

Taliban Abuses May Constitute Crimes Against Humanity

On June 18, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan Richard Bennett, in conjunction with the Office of the High Commissioner and Secretary-General, publicly released their annual report on the status of human rights in Afghanistan.⁹¹ When presenting his report to the UN Human Rights Council, Bennett described the Taliban's human rights violations as "so severe and extensive" that they "may amount to crimes against humanity."⁹² Of the situation, Bennett said:

The system of discrimination, segregation, disrespect for human dignity and exclusion institutionalized by the Taliban is motivated by and results in a profound rejection of the full humanity of women and girls. It is pervasive and methodical, and is institutionalized through and, in turn, reinforced by edicts and policies sanctioning the severe deprivation of fundamental rights... these deprivations do not exist independently of each other. Rather, each deprivation systematically informs and interacts with others, creating a mutually reinforcing architecture of oppression.⁹³

Since the last annual report in June 2023, the Taliban issued an additional 52 edicts restricting the rights of women and girls in Afghanistan. As a result, the Special Rapporteur found that women and girls are being forced into "increasingly narrow roles where the deep-rooted patriarchy, bolstered and legitimized by Taliban ideology, deems them to belong," as child-producers and objects for exploitation, whether domestic servitude, sexual exploitation, and/or debt bondage.⁹⁴

While the report acknowledged that the unequal treatment of women in Afghanistan predates Taliban rule, misogyny was now "radicalized and institutionalized in a governance project that the Taliban claims to be the unfolding of sharia but is unparalleled in other Muslim-majority countries." The UN found that the Taliban knowingly perpetrate gender persecution, murder, enforced disappearances, torture, rape and other acts of sexual violence, enslavement, and other inhumane acts against the civilian population in an effort to maintain their system of oppressive governance.⁹⁵ Without intervention, the Special Rapporteur predicted that gender oppression will increase, with greater violence perpetrated against resisters.⁹⁶ The report noted that, regardless of gender, anyone who challenges the Taliban "risks suffering any number of inhumane attacks," as the Taliban also arrest, detain, and inflict physical violence on boys and men who question their governance.⁹⁷

In response to the UN Special Rapporteur's report, Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid posted on X that the Special Rapporteur was "attempting to tarnish perceptions" ahead of Doha III, and called the

conclusions in the report “distorted.” Mujahid said, “constructive and positive engagement with the Islamic Emirate is essential.”⁹⁸

The report’s release aligned with the 56th session of the UN Human Rights Council in June, where Special Rapporteur Richard Bennett hosted a dialogue on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan. At this meeting, the NGO International Federation for Human Rights said that under Taliban rule, “the human rights situation has not ceased to deteriorate,” with the oppression of women and girls “unparalleled anywhere in the world.” Therefore, the Federation recommended codifying the crime of gender apartheid into international law, to reflect the previously unforeseen level of institutionalized discrimination.⁹⁹ Human Rights Watch also issued a statement ahead of the dialogue, urging states to consider codifying gender apartheid as a crime against humanity, and decrying the exclusion of Afghan women from Doha III as a violation of UN Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security.¹⁰⁰

HUMANITARIAN CRISIS UPDATE

Nearly three years after the Taliban takeover, Afghanistan continues to experience one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises.¹⁰¹ To alleviate the suffering, the UN aims to assist 17.3 million of an estimated 23.7 million Afghans in dire need. The UN has sought \$3.06 billion for its 2024 Humanitarian Response Plan but has received only \$710.1 million (23%) of the amount requested, as of July 12.¹⁰² According to UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Martin Griffiths, this funding shortage is forcing UN agencies to make “increasingly painful” decisions to cut life-saving food, water, and health programming, and to “ruthlessly” restrict assistance to only those Afghans most urgently in need.¹⁰³

Heavy Floods Kill Hundreds, Destroy Thousands of Homes

In May, a series of flash floods struck the northern, northeastern, and western regions of Afghanistan. The heavy rainfall and flooding killed at least 225 people, injured another 217, and destroyed 2,800 homes. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) said more than 59,100 people were affected by the heavy rainfall and flooding. Additionally, six health facilities were destroyed in Badghis, Baghlan, Faryab, and Takhar Provinces, with 18 others partially damaged or destroyed. UN OCHA reported that in May, 45 public schools and 30 community-based education classes were destroyed or damaged in Baghlan, Badakhshan, Faryab, and Takhar Provinces. Although damaged roads hampered access to these provinces, UN OCHA said it continued to coordinate with partners to support affected communities, including taking field missions to identify and allocate needed support.¹⁰⁴

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

TABLE R.2

Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)		
Food Insecurity Phase	Technical Description	Priority Response Objective
1 - None/Minimal	Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income.	Resilience building and disaster risk reduction
2 - Stressed	Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies.	Disaster risk reduction and protection of livelihoods
3 - Crisis	Households either: · Have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; OR · Are marginally able to meet minimum food needs, but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies.	URGENT ACTION REQUIRED to protect livelihoods and reduce food consumption gaps
4 - Emergency	Some households either: · Have large food consumption gaps which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; OR · Are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps, but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation.	URGENT ACTION REQUIRED to save lives and livelihoods
5 - Catastrophe/ Famine*	Households have an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution, and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. (For Famine classification, area needs to have extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality.)	URGENT ACTION REQUIRED to avert/prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods

* Some households can be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) even if areas are not classified as Famine (IPC Phase 5). In order for an area to be classified Famine, at least 20% of households should be in IPC Phase 5. Source: FAO and WFP Hunger Hotspots FAO-WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity – June to September 2022 Outlook, 6/6/2022, p. 7.

Food Insecurity Predicted to Remain High

Afghans continued to suffer from food insecurity, with nearly three out of 10 children facing crisis or emergency level of hunger in 2024.¹⁰⁵ This quarter, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) identified four factors as key drivers of the continued food insecurity: climatic shocks, economic stagnation, high prices, and unemployment. IPC predicted that between May and October 2024, despite a “marginal improvement in food security,” largely because of the harvest season, 12.4 million Afghans will likely experience high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above).¹⁰⁶ IPC defines acute food insecurity as food deprivation that threatens lives or livelihoods.¹⁰⁷ Table R.2 provides a detailed description of IPC food insecurity phase classifications.

Taliban Interference in Humanitarian Operations

Dissolution of Community Development Councils

On May 22, the Taliban ministry of rural rehabilitation and development sent a letter to UN OCHA notifying international organizations that, based on a verbal decree from the Taliban’s so-called emir, Haibatullah Akhundzada, all 13,000 Community Development Councils (CDCs) in Afghanistan have been dissolved.¹⁰⁸ CDCs, created under the Karzai government’s National Solidarity Program, worked with local authorities to coordinate development planning, and facilitate community participation and involvement in the implementation of projects at the local level.¹⁰⁹ Before CDCs were formally established, Afghanistan had a longstanding history of “grassroots,

collective, decision-making and problem-solving bodies called the shuras or village councils,” according to the Afghanistan Analysts Network.¹¹⁰

Now, based on the Taliban’s letter to UN OCHA, instead of CDCs, humanitarian and development organizations must seek the approval of the Taliban’s religious scholars “in selecting the work plan (project) in the region.”¹¹¹ A source interviewed by Hasht-e Subh, a local Afghan news outlet, said that village-level CDCs served “as the only platform in the absence of a government for the execution of World Bank and NGO programs” since the fall of the former Republic.¹¹² But according to the Afghanistan Analysts Network, the Taliban had diminished and marginalized the councils, “in many cases, rendering them inactive,” even before the formal decree.¹¹³ USAID told SIGAR that the USAID Mission’s programs have not reported any impact on their regular operations, as the decree has not yet been implemented and enforced.¹¹⁴

SIGAR AUDIT

A SIGAR audit issued this quarter found that over half of State, USAID, and U.S. Agency for Global Media’s implementing partners surveyed (38 of 65) reported paying a combined \$10.9 million of U.S. taxpayer money in taxes, fees, duties, or public utilities to the Taliban-controlled government since August 2021. This amount likely represents only a fraction of the total amount of U.S. assistance funds provided to the Taliban because UN agencies receiving U.S. funds did not collect data or provide relevant information about payments made by their sub-awardees. SIGAR also found that the Taliban have disrupted implementing partner activities in a variety of ways, including attempts to divert aid or infiltrate NGOs and interfere with their activities. For more details, see page 98.

Additional Taliban Incidents of Interference

UN OCHA’s May 2024 Humanitarian Access Snapshot said that Taliban interference in humanitarian aid implementation remained “the main driver of access impediments in 2024,” in addition to dissolving CDCs. UN OCHA reported 64 access incidents related to Taliban interference in May, including 26 directing affecting program implementation, 20 incidents of requests for sensitive information, 10 incidents restricting women humanitarian workers’ participation, four incidents of occupation of facilities and arrests for illegal taxation, and one case of disrupting staff recruitment.¹¹⁵

In April, UN OCHA reported 96 incidents of Taliban interference in the implementation of humanitarian activities. The UN also reported another 16 incidents of Taliban demands in April, including from the “directorate of monitoring” of the so-called emir’s decrees, seeking “sensitive information, such as project and staff data.”¹¹⁶ USAID told SIGAR that it “continues to receive reports of implementing partner staff detentions by the [Taliban] General Directorate of Intelligence when carrying out their program implementation work.”¹¹⁷

MIGRATION AND REFUGEES

Afghanistan’s Returnee Crisis

According to the UN’s International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2.6 million Afghans have been displaced since the Taliban takeover in August 2021, driving humanitarian need in Afghanistan and the region. Another 6.3 million people are experiencing long-term displacement. In its 2024 Crisis Response Plan, IOM estimated that over \$451 million is needed to provide life-saving services to displaced people this year, while another \$177 million is required to address the root causes of displacement.¹¹⁸ The majority of lifesaving assistance funds support access to shelter, basic needs like food, health care, and water, sanitation, and

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

hygiene. Displacement prevention funding primarily addresses community stabilization, livelihoods and economic recovery, and disaster risk reduction.¹¹⁹

The number of newly displaced people is expected to reach 900,000 in 2024, an increase of 400,000 compared to 2022. Many of the most vulnerable are returnees from Iran and Pakistan. According to IOM, returnees from Pakistan are the “primary focus” of humanitarian partners due to the high volume of returns since Pakistan’s government announced its intent to deport Afghan migrants in late 2023. However, IOM noted that returns from Iran are increasing, and a surge of deportations would strain resources in Afghanistan and call for an updated humanitarian response plan.¹²⁰

Returns from Pakistan

As of June 27, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that 469,500 Afghans have returned to Afghanistan since Pakistan’s “Illegal Foreigners’ Repatriation Plan,” which aims to repatriate over a million foreigners residing in Pakistan without valid documents, went into effect on November 1, 2023.¹²¹ At that time, daily Afghan returnees from Pakistan increased from less than 200 per day in October to over 25,000 daily in November.¹²² While the number of returnees stabilized in early 2024, according to UNHCR, returns have ticked upward since March 2024.¹²³

In May, over 40,000 Afghans returned from Pakistan, compared to 26,000 in April.¹²⁴ In June, USAID’s Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) told SIGAR that humanitarian partners are expecting the number of returnees to increase after July, when a temporary renewal on Afghan Citizen Cards (registration cards that temporarily allow residence in Pakistan) expired.¹²⁵ However, on July 10, Pakistan announced its plan to extend the validity of Proof of Registration cards (a separate visa category) for a year, allowing 1.45 million cardholding Afghans to stay in Pakistan until June 2025, reducing the number of expected returnees. The decision followed discussions between Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and UNHCR head Filippo Grandi in early July.¹²⁶

The UNHCR’s Returns Emergency Response report in June said that it was scaling up protection activities at the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. From January to May 2024, 55% of returnees reported harassment on Pakistan’s side of the border, 19% reported detention, 22% reported being forced to pay bribes, and 18% reported extortion.¹²⁷

For an in-depth look at Afghan immigration to Pakistan, Pakistan’s repatriation plan, and the related humanitarian crisis, see SIGAR’s October 2023 *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*.¹²⁸

Iran’s Deportations Continue to Rise

According to IOM, Iran hosts about 4.5 million refugees, the majority of whom come from Afghanistan. As poverty rates and inflation continue to rise in Iran due to sanctions, risks to the refugee population are increasing.¹²⁹ As of June 30, a total of 526,800 Afghans have returned from Iran this year,

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS



UN Women Representative Alison Davidian meets with a UN Women biometrics officer at a Kandahar border station. (Photo by UN Women)

Special Immigrant Visa (SIV): SIV program established by Congress in 2009 for Afghans who worked on behalf of the United States in Afghanistan and experienced an ongoing and serious threat as a result. Limited numbers of SIVs are accepted each year.

Priority 1 (P1): Eligible Afghans include those who did not meet the requirements for an SIV but were referred by designated entities such as an embassy, designated NGO, or the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

Priority 2 (P2): Eligible Afghans include those who did not meet the minimum time-in-service requirement for an SIV but worked as employees of contractors, locally employed staff, interpreters, and translators for the U.S. government; Afghans who worked for a U.S.-funded program or project; and Afghans who were employed by a U.S.-based media organization or NGO.

Source: State OIG, Information Report on Afghan Special Immigrant Visas, AUD-MERO-22-38, 9/2022; USCIS, USRAP Consultation and Worldwide Processing Priorities, accessed 3/29/2024; USCIS, Asylum Information, accessed 3/29/2024; State, USRAP Priority 2 Designation for Afghan Nationals, 8/2/2021.

and rates of return were increasing.¹³⁰ IOM tracked nearly 30,000 returns in May compared to 18,000 in January.¹³¹ As a result, the State Department Bureau of Population, Refugee, and Migration (PRM) told SIGAR that humanitarian partners have scaled up assistance at border reception and transit centers on the Afghan side of the border. The immediate needs of the returnees include health care, psychological support, shelter, food, protection, and livelihoods assistance.¹³²

Resettlement Update

State PRM reported that 9,975 refugees from Afghanistan have been admitted to the United States through the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program in FY 2024, as of June 30.¹³³ Another 23,315 **special immigrant visa (SIV)** applicants have been resettled to the United States in FY 2024.¹³⁴

As of June 17, SIGAR has submitted 292 applications for **Priority 1 (P1)** and **Priority 2 (P2)** referral. Three individuals have had their applications for resettlement accepted; 61 cases have been rejected; 228 cases are still in process; and one application is marked as incomplete. Afghans awaiting resettlement are currently located in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and a number of European countries.¹³⁵

AFGHAN RESETTLEMENT IN CANADA

SIGAR’s April 2024 *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress* included an essay, *Voices of the Diaspora*, that highlighted the experiences of Afghan refugees who have resettled in the United States based on direct interviews. Several themes emerged: bureaucratic hurdles to resettlement, difficulty in adapting, and unstable legal statuses for many who have not been entitled to citizenship or permanent residence.¹³⁶ This quarter, SIGAR spoke with members of the Afghan diaspora in Ottawa and Toronto, Canada, to compare the resettlement processes in the United States and Canada and identify any relevant lessons.

SIGAR interviewed 11 members of the diaspora living in the Toronto metropolitan area and 18 living in Ottawa. Most had served in the former Afghan government in various capacities.¹³⁷ Others were human rights advocates, journalists, or NGO staff.¹³⁸ Several had experience working directly for or with the United States, and mentioned their previous eligibility for SIVs or P1 referral. Despite their eligibility for resettlement in the United States, these Afghans told SIGAR that they heard U.S. processing times were too long to endure. When faced with multiple years waiting in an Albanian refugee camp, for example, or resettling in Canada sooner, they chose the latter.¹³⁹

Since 2021, Canada has instituted a number of immigration programs, including a special humanitarian program for vulnerable Afghans, in order to help resettle Afghans fleeing the Taliban.¹⁴⁰ These special programs fall under the broader Government-Assisted Refugee Program, which processes refugee resettlement requests. Afghans who resettle in Canada through this pathway are legal permanent residents, and are allowed to access social services, work, and attend school.¹⁴¹ Afghans are eligible to apply for Canadian citizenship after three years of living in Canada as permanent residents.¹⁴² The Afghans SIGAR interviewed were all either citizens, or permanent residents who will eventually be eligible to apply for citizenship, if they continue to live in Canada for three out of the next five years. This differs from many of the Afghans SIGAR spoke with in the United States, who were more uncertain about their future legal status.

The Afghans SIGAR spoke with in Canada described the initial resettlement process as fairly smooth and agreed that their host communities were welcoming.¹⁴³

One Afghan was especially appreciative of Canada’s policy of allowing successful applicants to bring additional family members (outside the traditional nuclear family parameters) on one visa.¹⁴⁴ A former Republic official living in Ottawa agreed that the fast processing times for permanent residence cards positively impacted their resettlement experience, but noted other challenges.¹⁴⁵

After refugees arrive, the Canadian government provides them with a stipend to help with necessities like rent for their first year. But, after the initial year, “you’re on your own,” said one interviewee.¹⁴⁶ Another Afghan noted, “once you’re kicked out of the hotel, you have to find a place to live,” but with very little support from the Canadian government.¹⁴⁷ Several described this as challenging emotionally and financially.¹⁴⁸ A former member of the Afghan parliament said that landlords won’t rent to refugees because they have not established credit scores. Covering rent without the government stipend can be very difficult after only one year in Canada.¹⁴⁹ A former NGO employee told SIGAR, “finding a proper job is going through hell,” and that even doctors are forced to drive for Uber.¹⁵⁰ Some Afghans expressed dissatisfaction with the Canadian economy, saying that they perceived more job opportunities and associated financial contentment in the United States.¹⁵¹

The inability to transfer professional or educational experience was echoed by several interviewees.¹⁵² For example, one former PhD candidate told SIGAR that her credits did not transfer and she is restarting her education at the high school level in order to work her way back to the higher education she was pursuing.¹⁵³ One man’s daughter was unable to transfer medical degree credits and is therefore pursuing a Canadian undergraduate degree.¹⁵⁴ Another former professional said, “the environment here is torturing us,” referring to the economic situation. He currently works at Walmart, despite his previous experience in the parliament in Afghanistan.¹⁵⁵ Another man told SIGAR that despite his master’s degree and 20 years of professional experience, he has been unable to find a job that recognizes and values his background.¹⁵⁶ According to multiple interviewees, only previous job experience in Canada is considered in the hiring process for many jobs.¹⁵⁷ As a result, the most successful refugees are those with

English language skills and previous work experience in the country.¹⁵⁸

While finding a job and paying rent pose one set of challenges, resettling in a new country can also cause emotional turmoil and culture shock as Afghans are forced to come to terms with everything they left behind.¹⁵⁹ A former journalist said, “We are happy that we have freedom but it’s not easy to start over from zero and forget what’s left behind.”¹⁶⁰ One interviewee said the single most difficult aspect of resettlement was dealing with trauma, and the second was cultural integration.¹⁶¹ One woman told SIGAR that refugees need at least 2–3 years to adjust to life in a new country, especially in terms of learning Canadian laws. She discussed how different parenting norms can lead to interventions that separate children from their families. Given the immense stress refugees already experience, separating families can exacerbate personal struggles and lead to additional problems down the line, she said.¹⁶² Another interviewee said he believes the challenges in Canada are leading to rising extremism in youth.¹⁶³ Others described their own depression and anxiety from resettlement and the trauma of leaving of Afghanistan.¹⁶⁴ One woman told SIGAR that many Afghans hope to return to Afghanistan one day.¹⁶⁵

Like the Afghans SIGAR interviewed in the United States, those in Canada stay informed about the conditions in Afghanistan through their friends and family who remain there, despite the Taliban’s “very restrictive” controls on information flow and media.¹⁶⁶ Interviewees told SIGAR it is immensely difficult watching people suffer in Afghanistan from afar.¹⁶⁷ Many of the Afghan women SIGAR spoke with described the increasing challenges for women in Afghanistan as the Taliban “are getting stronger and bolder in their efforts to crack down on women.”¹⁶⁸ The “Taliban banished Afghan women from existence,” said one former defense lawyer, adding that “underaged, enforced marriage rate [is] increasing under the Taliban.”¹⁶⁹ A former journalist told SIGAR that her female colleagues in Afghanistan have been forced to leave their jobs because of Taliban pressure and threats of arrest.¹⁷⁰ As journalists are curbed, reports about abuses against women go underreported, said one woman.¹⁷¹

Multiple people also told SIGAR they are worried for Afghans who had fled to Pakistan and Iran, where they face threats from the local authorities.¹⁷²

One journalist expressed disappointment with how the international community, led by the United States, has dealt with the Taliban pre- and post-collapse.¹⁷³ Another interviewee told SIGAR, “there is no hope in holding [the Taliban] accountable.”¹⁷⁴ A former government official said it is hard to reconcile the “Taliban 2.0” that was “sold to the international community and the people of Afghanistan” during U.S.-Taliban negotiations with the reality on the ground now.¹⁷⁵ Another interviewee recommended that the United States end financial support to Afghanistan because of the Taliban’s treatment of women.¹⁷⁶

After hearing the experiences of Afghan refugees in the United States and Canada, it is clear that both groups face many of the same difficulties, such as a lack of support, trouble finding a job commensurate with their experience, and culture shock. Both groups expressed discontentment with the international community’s engagement with Afghanistan, and their fear for the safety of those still living there. However, one difference was apparent: while the interviewees in the United States were often most concerned about their uncertain future legal status, Afghans in Canada were comforted by their legal certainty and ability to stay permanently, although some were not sure they wanted to.

PUBLIC HEALTH

On May 28, the Taliban appointed Noor Jalal as the new minister of public health. Jalal was previously the Taliban minister of interior from 1996 to 2001. Jalal was under UN sanctions pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) from 2001 to 2012.¹⁷⁷ In 2022, a regional media outlet reported that Jalal praised Taliban suicide bomber units as an “integral part of our Jihad and our source of pride.”¹⁷⁸ He is not known to have any public health experience. USAID said it is engaging with its implementing partners to determine how Jalal’s appointment will impact health services, noting that the relationship between health actors and the Taliban is “critical for efforts to provide principled health assistance in Afghanistan.”¹⁷⁹

Epidemiological Update

Infectious Disease Outbreaks

As of June 8, the World Health Organization (WHO) has recorded the following cumulative infectious disease outbreaks:¹⁸⁰

- Measles: 30,335 cases, 133 deaths
- Acute watery diarrhea: 56,407 cases, 27 deaths
- Acute respiratory infections: 742,714 cases, 1,676 deaths
- COVID-19: 7,542 cases, 36 deaths
- Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever: 225 cases, 8 deaths.

Measles cases in Afghanistan have been increasing since the beginning of 2024, and recorded cases are higher than in the previous five years. For example, the weekly case rate in early June 2024 was approximately 1,600, versus 600 in 2023, and less than 200 in 2019. In May, the first round of an immunization campaign was conducted, and 90,323 children aged 9–59 months were vaccinated in response to the ongoing measles outbreak.¹⁸¹

Since April, acute watery diarrhea cases have been rising, likely due to the floods, said WHO. Acute respiratory rates are steadily decreasing, as are rates of COVID-19. Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever rates have been increasing weekly, though, and WHO is currently monitoring the situation to identify any potential for larger outbreaks.¹⁸²

Polio Update

There were nine confirmed cases of wild poliovirus in Afghanistan this quarter. As of July 9, there were 44 positive environmental samples (a key polio surveillance indicator) this year, 34 of them identified this quarter. Afghanistan and Pakistan, which share a 1,659-mile border, remain the only countries in the world where polio is still endemic or “usually present” and have a total of 17 recorded cases in 2024. In 2023, there were 12 confirmed wild poliovirus cases, with six cases reported in each country.¹⁸³

The Taliban ministry of public health held three polio vaccination campaigns this quarter, while a Taliban health ministry spokesman denied any recorded

polio cases so far this year. In April, the campaign planned to reach children in all of Afghanistan's 34 provinces. The June campaign aimed to reach over 11 million children.¹⁸⁴ Prior to their 2021 takeover, the Taliban had disrupted public health campaigns and expressed skepticism about vaccination campaigns.¹⁸⁵

Cholera Update

WHO reported over 46,000 cases of and 25 deaths from cholera, a waterborne disease, in Afghanistan from January 1 to May 26.¹⁸⁶ Floods in central and northern Afghanistan this quarter led to the cholera outbreak, which was exacerbated by the country's weak health system and vaccine shortage.¹⁸⁷

Afghanistan has the highest number of cholera cases reported globally this year, according to WHO. A Taliban ministry of health spokesman denied that Afghanistan has any confirmed cholera cases.¹⁸⁸

Humanitarian Health Response

WHO, in its most recent health update, reported that through its partners, over 142,000 people received emergency health care services, 9,943 people received trauma care, and 607 health workers were trained in Afghanistan in May 2024.¹⁸⁹ This quarter, WHO published data on the proportion of beneficiaries reached with various health delivery platforms versus its targets for 2024. From January to May, WHO reached:¹⁹⁰

- 732,000 people through primary health care (22% of annual target)
- 378,000 people through hospitals (37% of annual target)
- 50,000 people through trauma care (30% of annual target).

During the reporting period, WHO supported 48 health facilities for primary care in six provinces, 18 hospitals in 12 provinces, and trauma services in all regions.¹⁹¹

This quarter, health response efforts were especially focused on responding to flood-affected communities. WHO and its humanitarian health partners (collectively the Afghanistan Health Cluster) deployed 60 mobile health and nutrition teams to Baghlan, Badakhshan, Takhar, Faryab, Ghor, and Badghis Provinces. Over a two-week period in May, 38,462 flood-affected people received health care through the mobile teams.¹⁹²

The Health Cluster also continues to support the health response for Afghan returnees. As of May 29, WHO and its partners provided health services to 496,958 returnees. Regional health cluster teams were active across Afghanistan, coordinating humanitarian health services with the Taliban provincial public health directorates.¹⁹³ WHO also dispatched two public health authority teams to Torkham and Islam Qala to institute International Health Regulations best practices in infectious disease outbreak prevention. Another team was sent to Kandahar to conduct infectious disease screenings of returnees and collect samples for further lab testing. In total, 105,399 individuals were screened, and 1,309 cases of infectious diseases were detected.¹⁹⁴

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Violence Against Health Care Workers

On June 24, Insecurity Insight, a Swiss organization tracking threats in conflict-afflicted areas, released its 2023 report on violence against health care workers in Afghanistan. They recorded 109 incidents of violence or obstruction of health care in 2023, compared to 87 in 2022. Additionally, 65 health workers were arrested or detained for questioning. Insecurity Insight noted that restrictive Taliban policies make humanitarian operations “increasingly complex.”¹⁹⁵

Insecurity Insight attributed 80% of violence perpetrated against health workers in 2023 to the Taliban government, police, and intelligence forces. Incidents were recorded in 28 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, with Zabul Province having the highest number of cases. Arrests of health workers more than doubled from 2022 to 2023. Health workers were accused of immorality, and detained for not separating staff by gender, traveling without a male guardian, having alleged links to the Islamic State, and for alleged corruption. One British paramedic working for UNHCR was detained and imprisoned for 272 days by the secret police in January 2023 for possessing a pistol in his hotel room, despite his having a license for it.¹⁹⁶

The report concluded that violence against health workers will continue to negatively affect the Afghan population, as health workers increasingly flee an already under-funded and under-staffed sector.¹⁹⁷

EDUCATION

Taliban Continue to Ban Education for Girls and Women

This quarter, the Taliban maintained their nationwide ban on girls’ education, preventing girls and women from attending school beyond the sixth grade or higher education, with some limited exceptions. It has been over 1,000 days, or nearly three years since the Taliban instituted their education ban. The UN has warned previously that the Taliban’s restriction of girls’ education remains their biggest obstacle to gaining international recognition as the legitimate rulers of Afghanistan. Despite that, USAID told SIGAR this quarter that although the Taliban ministry of education has established a new curriculum for schools, “there is no indication from the Taliban that schools will reopen for girls above grade 6.”¹⁹⁸

ECONOMY

Economic Crisis Continues

Afghanistan’s economy remained weak this quarter, reflecting a decline in growth and international aid. According to the World Bank, after the Taliban seized control of Afghanistan, “the economy contracted for two consecutive

years, declining by 20.7% in 2021 and 6.2% in 2022.” Data from the World Bank point to a continued contraction. Real GDP shrank by 26% cumulatively during the last two fiscal years, “with economic activity remaining stagnant during the ongoing fiscal year 2023–2024.” Starting in April 2023, deflation has contributed to falling prices, but demand has struggled to rise, indicating a damaging economic cycle that contributes to poverty.¹⁹⁹

UN Cash Shipments: A Lifeline for the Economy

Because of the disruption to international banking transfers and liquidity challenges since the Taliban takeover, the UN transports U.S. currency to Afghanistan for use by UN agencies and its approved partners. Last October, State told SIGAR that the UN cash shipments—averaging \$80 million each—arrive in Kabul every 10–14 days.²⁰⁰ In 2022 and 2023, the UN transferred \$3.6 billion in cash to Afghanistan, \$1.8 billion each year.²⁰¹ According UNAMA, the money is placed in designated UN accounts in a private bank. UNAMA said it is carefully monitored, audited, inspected, and vetted in accordance with the UN financial rules and processes.²⁰² This quarter, SIGAR issued an evaluation finding that although UN cash shipments to Afghanistan have reportedly stabilized the Afghan economy, they also benefit the Taliban.

Evaluation 24-32-IP: U.S. Currency Shipments to Afghanistan: U.S. Currency Has Reportedly Stabilized the Afghan Economy but Benefits the Taliban

A SIGAR evaluation issued this quarter assessed (1) the impact of introducing large amounts of U.S. currency into the Afghan economy; and (2) the benefits and challenges of using direct cash assistance as a form of aid, compared to other forms of assistance. SIGAR found that Afghanistan suffers from a liquidity crisis due to its isolation from the international banking sector and its central bank’s—Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB)—lack of technical expertise within the financial sector, and its inability to print new, or replace existing, afghani banknotes. The UN’s U.S. currency shipments have had a positive economic impact, as the shipments eased Afghanistan’s liquidity crisis and have allowed the

Taliban-run DAB to implement monetary policies, such as easing cash withdrawal restrictions, and have helped alleviate the negative economic impacts of Taliban policies, such as restricting women’s ability to travel or be employed. However, due to the Afghan economy’s reliance on U.S. currency shipments, SIGAR found that a reduction or cessation of the shipments would result in a reversal of economic and humanitarian gains. SIGAR also found that UN shipments of U.S. currency provide direct and indirect benefits to the Taliban, such as revenue generation, stabilizing and strengthening the regime, and providing it access to untraceable U.S. currency. For more information, see page 97.

Afghan Fund Update

The Afghan Fund’s Board of Trustees convened for the sixth time, on June 28 in Washington, DC. The Fund said the board was “updated about the audit process of the financial statement for fiscal year 2023,” and that it approved the budget for fiscal year 2024. The Fund’s statement confirmed that as of end of June, Afghan Fund assets reached \$3.84 billion.²⁰³

Last June, the Afghan Fund’s board agreed in principle that the Fund’s assets could be used to clear Afghanistan’s arrears with multilateral

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

development banks and thereby elicit the banks' assistance "to stabilize the financial situation and sustain macroeconomic stability in Afghanistan."²⁰⁴ According to the January 2024 meeting minutes, the Fund's board unanimously agreed to pay Afghanistan's outstanding arrears to the Asian Development Bank.²⁰⁵ The Fund's most recent meeting statement said "the Board remains open to disburse fund for arrears clearance to the Asian Development Bank intended to address Afghanistan's outstanding arrears to that institution for the benefit of the Afghan people, as appropriate."²⁰⁶ As it nears the end of its second year, the Afghan Fund has not yet made any disbursements to entities on behalf of Afghanistan.²⁰⁷

Afghan Fund Background

The Afghan Fund was established as a Swiss charitable foundation in September 2022 through the collaborative efforts of the U.S. Departments of Treasury and State, the Swiss government, and two Afghan economic experts. The Fund aims to protect, preserve, and make targeted disbursements from its over \$3.5 billion in assets, previously held by Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB), Afghanistan's central bank, in U.S.-based accounts, to help provide greater stability to the Afghan economy and benefit the people of Afghanistan.²⁰⁹

State previously announced that the Fund is "explicitly not intended to make humanitarian disbursements."²¹⁰ Instead, the Fund is intended to "protect macro financial stability on behalf of Afghan citizens," including potentially by keeping Afghanistan current on debt payments to international financial institutions to preserve its eligibility for development assistance, and pay for critically needed imported goods.²¹¹ "Over the long-term, the Fund could recapitalize Afghanistan's central bank should the conditions materialize," said Treasury.²¹² The Taliban are not involved in the Afghan Fund or the management of its assets and have protested its creation.²¹³

Taliban Appoint Second Sanctioned Official to Head Central Bank

In a July 6 statement, the Taliban's so-called emir promoted Noor Ahmad Agha, also known as Ahmed Zia Agha, who is subject to U.S. counterterrorism sanctions, to head DAB. Agha replaced former central bank governor Hidayatullah Badri, who is also subject to U.S. and UN sanctions. Badri will be the acting minister of mines and petroleum. This reshuffle came a week after the Doha III meeting, where the Taliban called for the return of the Afghan central bank's \$7 billion in frozen assets.²¹⁴

Treasury and State have said that, at minimum, DAB must meet the following criteria for the U.S. government to consider return of any of the \$3.5 billion from the Afghan Fund to DAB:²¹⁵

1. demonstrate its independence from political influence and interference,
2. prove that it has instituted adequate AML/CFT controls, and

On June 25, the U.S. House of Representatives passed, H.R. 6586, titled, "To require a strategy to oppose financial or material support by foreign countries to the Taliban and for other purposes." After an initial reporting requirement 90 days after enactment, Section 3 requires State to submit an annual report of the status of the Afghan Fund.²⁰⁸

3. complete a third-party needs assessment and onboard a reputable third-party monitor.

Last quarter, State told SIGAR that DAB has asked State for “technical assistance to implement best practices for central bank governance, but the U.S. government cannot provide such assistance at this time for legal and policy reasons.”²¹⁶

Economic Indicators

Inflation and Demand Continue to Drop

Headline inflation fell to -7.5% in April, which was less severe than the -10.2% recorded in January, when year-on-year inflation reached its lowest point. **Core inflation**, aside from volatile food and energy prices, also hit a -1.5% year-on-year change, “indicating a lack of sufficient demand for goods and services from the private and public sectors,” according to the World Bank’s May 2024 Afghanistan Economic Monitor.²¹⁷

Headline inflation: “a measure of inflation that is based on an unadjusted price index.”
Core inflation: “a measure of inflation that excludes items having volatile prices (such as fuel and food) from the price index being used.”

Source: Merriam Webster Dictionary, definition for “Core Inflation,” accessed on 7/1/2024, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/core%20inflation>; Merriam Webster Dictionary, definition for “Headline Inflation,” accessed on 7/1/2024, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/headline%20inflation>

A Struggling Banking System Leads to Distrust

Afghanistan’s banking system remained stressed, following the Taliban takeover. Dwindling assets and deposits, along with challenges with international payments and the Taliban’s efforts to make the financial system more Islamic are some of the causes, according to the World Bank.²¹⁸ Recent reports noted that the grim economic outlook and distrust of the Taliban-run banking system were leading an increasing number of Afghans to withdraw their money and close their accounts. Cut off from the international banking system, Afghanistan’s economy increasingly relies on the hawala system, an informal system of lenders.²¹⁹

Economic Development

Taliban Seek Chinese Economic Investment

This quarter, the Taliban minister of mines and petroleum met with Metallurgical China Cooperation, a Chinese state-owned enterprise, to discuss copper, lead, and zinc projects. State told SIGAR that the minister of mines and petroleum also met with the Chinese-Taliban joint venture, Af-Chin, and Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Co. (CAPEIC) to discuss potential upcoming projects.²²⁰ State previously told SIGAR that on July 8, 2023, Af-Chin opened a test well in the Qashqari oil fields in the Amu Darya basin.²²¹

The first major mining contract between China and the Taliban was signed in January 2023, a 25-year concession to drill three major mining blocks near the Amu Darya basin. Amu Darya contains the world’s third-largest oil and natural gas reserves. Only 5% of the basin is located in Afghanistan, with the remaining 95% in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.²²²

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS



UN Special Representative Roza Otunbayeva (bottom left) and UNODC officials visit the Jangalak Drug Treatment Center in Kabul in June. (Photo by UNAMA)

COUNTERNARCOTICS

This quarter, the Taliban participated in the UN’s Doha III meeting, as detailed on pages 35–38. One of the two special sessions at Doha III focused on counternarcotics, according to UN Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo.²²³

Two years after the Taliban’s narcotics ban was first announced on April 3, 2022, State said the Taliban still face challenges imposing it, including: “severe negative economic effects; opium stockpiles; the continued sale and trafficking of banned narcotics; farmer resistance to the ban in certain areas; a lack of Taliban-provided alternative livelihoods support to poppy farmers; and concerns of the ban’s sustainability, among other challenges.” Opium farmers, producers, and traders continued to resist the ban this quarter, and in April and May, violent protests in Argo and Darayim districts in Badakhshan resulted in the Taliban opening fire on protesters, killing two.²²⁴ For more information about the Taliban’s opium ban, see pages 13–26.

From April 1, 2024, to May 28, 2024, the Taliban reportedly seized at least 124.41 kilograms (kg) of opium; 66.85 kg of methamphetamine; 48.29 kg of an unspecified narcotic pills; 30 kg of unspecified precursor chemicals; 7.07 kg of Tablet K pills (a synthetic opioid/meth tablet); 0.21 kg of ecstasy; and 309.07 kg of hashish.²²⁵

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ENDNOTES

- 1 UN, Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesperson for the Secretary General, 5/21/2024.
- 2 UN Security Council, Meetings Coverage, 9,663rd meeting, SC/15740, 6/21/2024; Reuters, “Taliban refuses to join UN-sponsored meeting on Afghanistan,” 2/19/2024; UN, Remarks by Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo, 7/1/2024; Human Rights Watch, “UN Meeting Blocks Women from Agenda, Participation,” 6/24/2024.
- 3 Human Rights Watch, “UN Meeting Blocks Women from Agenda, Participation,” 6/24/2024.
- 4 Radio Free Europe, “‘A Big Betrayal’: Afghan Women Sound the Alarm Ahead of Key International Event that Will Include Taliban,” 6/20/2024.
- 5 Voice of America, “Taliban Tout Invite to UN as Proof of Regime’s Rising Importance,” 6/24/2024.
- 6 CEDAW, “Afghan women and girls must be included in upcoming Doha meeting: UN women’s rights committee,” 6/28/2024.
- 7 State, Press Briefing, 6/26/2024.
- 8 State, Press Briefing, 7/1/2024.
- 9 State, SCA, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/12/2024.
- 10 Rina Amiri, @SE_AfghanWGH, “We will continue to consult...”, X, 6/29/2024.
- 11 UN Security Council, Doha Meeting on Afghanistan Provides Critical Opportunity to Discuss Women’s Rights, Speaker Tells Security Council, Press Release, 6/21/2024.
- 12 UNAMA, Briefing to the United Nations Security Council, 6/21/2024.
- 13 UNAMA, Briefing to the United Nations Security Council, 6/21/2024.
- 14 UNAMA, Briefing to the United Nations Security Council, 6/21/2024.
- 15 UN Security Council, Meetings Coverage, 9,663rd meeting, SC/15740, 6/21/2024.
- 16 UN Security Council, Meetings Coverage, 9,663rd meeting, SC/15740, 6/21/2024.
- 17 UN Security Council, Meetings Coverage, 9,663rd meeting, SC/15740, 6/21/2024.
- 18 UN, Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesperson for the Secretary General, 5/21/2024; UN, Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesperson for the Secretary General, 6/25/2024.
- 19 TOLONews, “3rd Doha Meeting: An Evaluation of Relations Between Kabul and the West,” 6/3/2024.
- 20 VOA, “UN Seeks Taliban’s Presence at Doha-Hosted Huddle on Afghanistan,” 2/14/2024; UN, Secretary-General’s Press Encounter on the Meeting of Special Envoys on Afghanistan, 2/19/2024.
- 21 Anadolu Ajansi, “Russia calls 2-day UN-sponsored meeting on Afghanistan a ‘failure,’” 2/20/2024.
- 22 UN, Remarks by Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo, 7/1/2024.
- 23 UN, Remarks by Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo, 7/1/2024.
- 24 State, SCA, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/12/2024.
- 25 TOLONews, “Mujahid at Doha 3 Urges Enhanced International Engagement,” 7/1/2024; Zabihullah Mujahid, @Zabehulah_M33, “Today’s meeting is progressing...”, X, 7/1/2024.
- 26 VOA, “Taliban calls on West to build deeper ties, ignore curbs on women,” 6/30/2024.
- 27 Global Affairs Canada, Statement on Canada’s attendance at UN meetings on Afghanistan, 6/30/2024.
- 28 Richard Bennett, “When it Comes to Women’s Rights, Do Not Appease the Taliban,” New York Times, 6/28/2024.
- 29 UN, Remarks by Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo, 7/1/2024.
- 30 UN, Remarks by Under-Secretary Rosemary DiCarlo, 7/2/2024.
- 31 UN, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/78/914-S/2024/469, 6/13/2024, pp. 1, 5–6.
- 32 VOA, “Taliban official facing \$10 million US bounty makes rare UAE visit,” 6/5/2024.
- 33 Long War Journal, “Taliban leader Sirajuddin Haqqani becomes a statesman,” 6/12/2024.
- 34 Reuters, “Why U.S. Troops are in the Middle East,” 2/3/2024; Long War Journal, “Taliban leader Sirajuddin Haqqani becomes a statesman,” 6/12/2024.
- 35 Associated Press, “Emirati leader meets with Taliban official facing \$10 million US bounty over attacks,” 6/5/2024; UN, Haqqani Network, accessed 6/17/2024.
- 36 UN, Sirajuddin Jallaloudine Haqqani, accessed 6/17/2024, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1988/materials/summaries/individual/sirajuddin-jallaloudine-haqqani>; UN, Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1988 (2011), accessed 6/17/2024.
- 37 UN, Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1988 (2011), accessed 6/17/2024.
- 38 State, Sirajuddin Haqqani, accessed 6/17/2024, <https://rewards-forjustice.net/rewards/sirajuddin-haqqani/>.
- 39 Associated Press, “Emirati leader meets with Taliban official facing \$10 million US bounty over attacks,” 6/5/2024.
- 40 TASS, “Russian ministries propose to Putin to remove Taliban from terrorist list,” 5/27/2024.
- 41 TASS, “Russia close to establishing full-fledged relations with Taliban,” 5/28/2024.
- 42 TASS, “Taliban delegation arrives in Russia for St. Petersburg International Economic Forum,” 6/5/2024.
- 43 TOLONews, “Russia Supports Afghanistan’s SCO membership,” 6/4/2024.
- 44 ODNI, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment, 2/5/2024, p. 27; Financial Times, “How the Taliban’s return made Afghanistan a hub for global jihadis,” 3/26/2024; UN Security Council, Thirty-third report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, S/2024/92, 1/29/2024, pp. 16–17.
- 45 UN Security Council, Fifteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, S/2024/499, 7/10/2024, p. 6.
- 46 State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 12/15/2023.
- 47 White House, “Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and President pro tempore of the Senate—War Powers Report,” 6/7/2024.
- 48 ODNI, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment, 2/5/2024, pp. 27, 38; Commander of U.S. Central Command General Michael Kurilla, Testimony before

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

- the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, 3/7/2024; UN Security Council, Thirty-third report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, S/2024/92, 1/29/2024, pp. 6, 17.
- 49 UN Security Council, Thirty-third report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, S/2024/92, 1/29/2024, pp. 6, 17; UN Security Council, Fifteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, S/2024/499, 7/10/2024, p. 13.
- 50 Long War Journal, “Al Qaeda leader calls foreign fighters to Afghanistan,” 6/17/2024.
- 51 UN Security Council, Thirty-third report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, S/2024/92, 1/29/2024, p. 16.
- 52 UN Security Council, Fourteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, S/2023/370, 6/1/2023, pp. 3, 5; Commander of U.S. Central Command General Michael Kurilla, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, 3/7/2024.
- 53 UN Security Council, Fifteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, S/2024/499, 7/10/2024, p. 6.
- 54 UN Security Council, Thirty-third report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, S/2024/92, 1/29/2024, pp. 16–17.
- 55 UN Security Council, Fifteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, S/2024/499, 7/10/2024, pp. 16–17.
- 56 UN Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, Report of the Secretary-General, A/78/914/S/2024/496, 6/13/2024, p. 4.
- 57 UN Security Council, Fifteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, S/2024/499, 7/10/2024, p. 16.
- 58 ACLED, Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, Asia-Pacific data, www.acleddata.com, accessed 6/30/2024.
- 59 UN Security Council, Fifteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, S/2024/499, 7/10/2024, p. 16.
- 60 ACLED, “Asia-Pacific Overview: June 2024,” 7/5/2024; Antares, Afghanistan Open Source Report, 15–21 May 2024, p. 14; Antares, Afghanistan Open Source Report, 8–14 May 2024, p. 13.
- 61 Afghanistan International, “Pakistani Taliban To Be Transferred From Border Areas To Other Provinces,” 6/22/2024.
- 62 VOA, “Pakistan approves new operation to root out terrorism,” 6/23/2024; The Khorasan Diary, “TKD EXCLUSIVE: Operation on Afghan Soil is an ‘Aggression.’ Taliban Effectively Combating ISKP; Zabiullah Mujahid,” 7/9/2024; Al Jazeera, “No dialogue’: Pakistan says open to attacks on Afghan-based armed groups,” 6/28/2024; ACLED, “Asia-Pacific Overview: June 2024,” 7/5/2024.
- 63 UN Security Council, Fifteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, S/2024/499, 7/10/2024, p. 6.
- 64 State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 3/13/2024.
- 65 UN Security Council, Fifteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, S/2024/499, 7/10/2024, pp. 10, 15.
- 66 Commander of U.S. Central Command General Michael Kurilla, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, 3/7/2024.
- 67 UN Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, Report of the Secretary-General, A/78/914/S/2024/496, 6/13/2024, p. 4.
- 68 ACLED, Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, Asia-Pacific data, www.acleddata.com, accessed 6/30/2024.
- 69 Long War Journal, “Opium protests catalyze anti-Taliban sentiments,” 5/20/2024; Antares, Afghanistan Open Source Report, 15–21 May 2024, pp. 5–6; Antares, Afghanistan Open Source Report, 1–7 May 2024, p. 4.
- 70 Antares, Afghanistan Open Source Report, 15–21 May 2024, pp. 5–6.
- 71 Antares, Afghanistan Open Source Report, 15–21 May 2024, p. 6.
- 72 UN Security Council, Fifteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, S/2024/499, 7/10/2024, p. 10.
- 73 UN Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, Report of the Secretary-General, A/78/914/S/2024/496, 6/13/2024, p. 4; Afghanistan International, “Taliban & ISIS Clash in Nangarhar, Casualties Reported,” 7/7/2024.
- 74 USIP, “Senior Study Group on Counterterrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan: Final Report,” 5/14/2024.
- 75 SIGAR analysis of Taliban ministry of defense X, 6/24/2024; SIGAR analysis of Taliban ministry of interior X, 6/24/2024.
- 76 UN Security Council, Fifteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, S/2024/499, 7/10/2024, p. 6.
- 77 Afghanistan International, “Afghanistan’s Green Trend Exposes 100,000 ‘Ghost Soldiers’ in Taliban Forces,” 4/15/2024.
- 78 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 7/30/2020, pp. 3–11; John F. Sopko, testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Accountability, hearing on “The Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” p. 4 (April 19, 2023); SIGAR, DOD’s Salary Payments to the Afghan Ministry of Defense: DOD Did Not USE APPS as Intended and Internal Control Weaknesses Raise Questions About the Accuracy of \$232 Million in Salary Payments” SIGAR 22-34-AR, 7/22/2023; SIGAR, Police in Conflict: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, SIGAR-22-23-LL, 6/2022, p. 119.
- 79 State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 12/18/2023; DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 12/15/2023.
- 80 ACLED, Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, Asia-Pacific data, www.acleddata.com, accessed 6/30/2024.
- 81 Afghan Witness, “NRF and AFF: Joint event and increased attacks in Kabul,” 5/13/2024.
- 82 UN Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, Report of the Secretary-General, A/78/914/S/2024/496, 6/13/2024, p. 4; Afghan Witness, “NRF and AFF: Joint event and increased attacks in Kabul,” 5/13/2024.
- 83 Long War Journal, “Nascent Afghan resistance grows in strength but not a threat to Taliban rule,” 5/22/2024.
- 84 UN, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/78/914-S/2024/469, 6/13/2024, p. 2.
- 85 VOA, “Taliban publicly flog 63 Afghan men, women for crimes such as ‘immoral relations,’” 6/4/2024; UNAMA, @UNAMAnews, “63 people were publicly lashed. . .,” X, 6/5/2024.
- 86 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024: Afghanistan, 6/5/2024.

- 87 Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2024: Afghanistan*, 6/5/2024.
- 88 UNAMA, *De facto Authorities' Moral Oversight in Afghanistan: Impact on Human Rights*, 7/9/2024, p. 2.
- 89 UNAMA, *De facto Authorities' Moral Oversight in Afghanistan: Impact on Human Rights*, 7/9/2024, pp. 2–3.
- 90 UNAMA, *De facto Authorities' Moral Oversight in Afghanistan: Impact on Human Rights*, 7/9/2024, p. 3.
- 91 UN Human Rights Council, *The phenomenon of an institutionalized system of discrimination, segregation, disrespect for human dignity, and exclusion of women and girls*, A/HRC/56/25, 5/13/2024, p. 1.
- 92 UN Afghanistan: “All tools” approach needed to end systematic gender oppression, says UN expert, *Press Release*, 6/18/2024.
- 93 UN Human Rights Council, *The phenomenon of an institutionalized system of discrimination, segregation, disrespect for human dignity, and exclusion of women and girls*, A/HRC/56/25, 5/13/2024, p. 3.
- 94 UN Human Rights Council, *The phenomenon of an institutionalized system of discrimination, segregation, disrespect for human dignity, and exclusion of women and girls*, A/HRC/56/25, 5/13/2024, pp. 3–4.
- 95 UN Human Rights Council, *The phenomenon of an institutionalized system of discrimination, segregation, disrespect for human dignity, and exclusion of women and girls*, A/HRC/56/25, 5/13/2024, pp. 11–13.
- 96 UN Human Rights Council, *The phenomenon of an institutionalized system of discrimination, segregation, disrespect for human dignity, and exclusion of women and girls*, A/HRC/56/25, 5/13/2024, p. 4.
- 97 UN Human Rights Council, *The phenomenon of an institutionalized system of discrimination, segregation, disrespect for human dignity, and exclusion of women and girls*, A/HRC/56/25, 5/13/2024, p. 7.
- 98 Zabihullah Mujahid, @Zabehulah_M33, “Some members of the united nations, particularly...,” X, 6/19/2024.
- 99 International Federation for Human Rights, *Afghanistan: Oral Statement at the United Nations Human Rights Council*, 6/18/2024.
- 100 Human Rights Watch, *HRW Statement Submitted to UN Human Rights Council Interactive Dialogue on Afghanistan on June 18, 2024*, 6/17/2024.
- 101 IOM, *Afghanistan Crisis Response Plan 2024*, 5/8/2024.
- 102 UN OCHA, *Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan Afghanistan*, 12/23/2023, p. 5; UN, *Financial Tracking Services website*, accessed 7/12/2024. <https://fts.unocha.org/countries/1/summary/2024>
- 103 UN, *Global Humanitarian Overview*, 12/14/2023, p. 3.
- 104 UN OCHA, *Afghanistan Floods: Update No. 4*, 6/6/2024.
- 105 AP News, “Nearly 3 out of 10 children in Afghanistan face crisis or emergency level of hunger in 2024,” 5/29/2024.
- 106 IPC, *Acute Food Insecurity Snapshot, March – October 2024*,” 5/27/2024.
- 107 IPC, *Acute Food Insecurity Analysis: Afghanistan*, 12/14/2023, p. 18.
- 108 State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 6/12/2024.
- 109 NYU, Center for International Cooperation, “Alternative Aid Modalities: Community Development,” 10/2022.
- 110 Afghanistan Analysts Network, “The fate of the village councils: the Emirate’s efforts to institute hegemony over rural Afghanistan,” 6/27/2024.
- 111 USAID, *Dissolution of Community Development Councils*, Taliban letter to UN OCHA, 5/22/2024; State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 6/12/2024.
- 112 Hasht-e Subh, “Dissolution of Local Councils and Control of Humanitarian Aid: Taliban Move to Seize Full Control of Aid,” 5/26/2024.
- 113 Afghanistan Analysts Network, “The fate of the village councils: the Emirate’s efforts to institute hegemony over rural Afghanistan,” 6/27/2024.
- 114 USAID, Mission, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/11/2024.
- 115 UN OCHA, *Afghanistan Humanitarian Access Snapshot*, 5/30/2024.
- 116 UN OCHA, *Afghanistan Humanitarian Access Snapshot*, 4/30/2024.
- 117 USAID, Mission, response to SIGAR data call, 6/12/2024.
- 118 IOM, *Afghanistan and Neighboring Countries Crisis Response Plan*, 4/26/2024, pp. 2, 4.
- 119 IOM, *Afghanistan and Neighboring Countries Crisis Response Plan*, 4/26/2024, p. 3.
- 120 IOM, *Afghanistan and Neighboring Countries Crisis Response Plan*, 4/26/2024, pp. 4–5.
- 121 UNHCR, *Pakistan-Afghanistan Returns Emergency Response*, 6/27/2024, p. 1; IOM, *Afghanistan and Neighboring Countries Crisis Response Plan*, 4/26/2024, pp. 4–5.
- 122 IOM, *Border Consortium Emergency Border Operations*, 3/9/2024, p. 1.
- 123 IOM, *Flow Monitoring Snapshot 9–15 June 2024*, 6/15/2024, p. 1; UNHCR, *Pakistan-Afghanistan Returns Emergency Response*, 6/9/2024, p. 1.
- 124 IOM, *Returns from Pakistan April 1–May 1, 2024*, accessed 6/25/2024; IOM, *Returns from Pakistan May 1–June 1, 2024*, accessed 6/25/2024.
- 125 USAID, BHA, response to SIGAR data call, 6/18/2024.
- 126 Al Jazeera, “Pakistan says registered Afghan refugees can stay for one more year,” 7/10/2024.
- 127 UNHCR, *Pakistan-Afghanistan Returns Emergency Response*, 6/9/2024, p. 3.
- 128 SIGAR, *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, 10/30/2024, pp. 22–25.
- 129 IOM, *Afghanistan and Neighboring Countries Crisis Response Plan*, 4/26/2024, pp. 1, 5.
- 130 UN OCHA, *Afghanistan Snapshot of Population Movements*, 7/1/2024.
- 131 IOM, *Border Consortium Emergency Operations*, 6/27/2024.
- 132 State, PRM, response to SIGAR data call, 6/12/2024.
- 133 State, PRM, *Refugee Admissions Report as of 30-June-2024*, 6/30/2024.
- 134 State, PRM, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/10/2024.
- 135 SIGAR, *Investigations Directorate, P1 and P2 Referrals*, 6/17/2024.
- 136 SIGAR, *April Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, 4/30/2024, pp. 15–27.
- 137 SIGAR, *Interview 1, Toronto*, 6/10/2024; SIGAR, *Interview 5, Toronto*, 6/11/2024; SIGAR, *Interview 2, Toronto*, 6/10/2024; SIGAR, *Interview 6, Toronto*, 6/11/2024; SIGAR, *Interview 3,*

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

- Ottawa, 4/23/2024; SIGAR, Interview 1, Ottawa, 4/22/2024; SIGAR, Interview 2, 4/23/2024.
- 138 SIGAR, Interview 3, Toronto, 6/10/2024; SIGAR, Interview 4, Toronto, 6/11/2024; SIGAR, Interview 9, Toronto, 6/11/2024; SIGAR, Interview 7, Toronto, 6/11/2024; SIGAR, Interview 4, Ottawa, 4/23/2024; SIGAR, Interview 5, Ottawa, 4/23/2024; SIGAR, Interview 6, Ottawa, 4/23/2024.
- 139 SIGAR, Interview 1, Toronto, 6/10/2024; SIGAR, Interview 7, Toronto, 6/11/2024; SIGAR, Interview 9, Toronto, 6/11/2024; SIGAR, Interview 10, Toronto, 6/11/2024; SIGAR, Interview 11, Toronto, 6/11/2024.
- 140 Government of Canada, Supporting Afghan nationals: about the special programs, accessed 7/1/2024.
- 141 Government of Canada, Government-Assisted Refugee Program, 2019, accessed 7/1/2024.
- 142 Government of Canada, Canadian citizenship, accessed 7/1/2024, <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/canadian-citizenship>.
- 143 SIGAR, Interview 1, Toronto, 6/10/2024; SIGAR, Interview 3, Toronto, 6/10/2024; SIGAR, Interview 9, Toronto, 6/11/2024.
- 144 SIGAR, Interview 4, Toronto, 6/11/2024.
- 145 SIGAR, Interview 3, Ottawa, 4/23/2024.
- 146 SIGAR, Interview 2, Toronto, 6/10/2024; SIGAR, Interview 2, Ottawa, 4/23/2024.
- 147 SIGAR, Interview 1, Toronto, 6/10/2024.
- 148 SIGAR, Interview 5, Toronto, 6/10/2024.
- 149 SIGAR, Interview 3, Toronto, 6/10/2024; SIGAR, Interview 5, Toronto, 6/11/2024.
- 150 SIGAR, Interview 9, Toronto, 6/11/2024.
- 151 SIGAR, Interview 2, Toronto, 6/10/2024; SIGAR Interview 6, Toronto, 6/10/2024.
- 152 SIGAR, Interview 5, Toronto, 6/11/2024.
- 153 SIGAR, Interview 10, Toronto, 6/11/2024.
- 154 SIGAR, Interview 5, Toronto, 6/11/2024.
- 155 SIGAR, Interview 4, Toronto, 6/11/2024.
- 156 SIGAR, Interview 3, Ottawa, 4/23/2024.
- 157 SIGAR, Interview 1, Toronto, 6/10/2024; SIGAR, Interview 2, Toronto, 6/10/2024; SIGAR, Interview 3, Ottawa, 4/23/2024.
- 158 SIGAR, Interview 3, Ottawa, 4/23/2024.
- 159 SIGAR, Interview 5, Toronto, 6/11/2024; SIGAR, Interview 9, Toronto, 6/11/2024.
- 160 SIGAR, Interview 3, Ottawa, 4/23/2024.
- 161 SIGAR, Interview 3, Ottawa, 4/23/2024.
- 162 SIGAR, Interview 3, Toronto, 6/10/2024.
- 163 SIGAR, Interview 4, Toronto, 6/11/2024.
- 164 SIGAR, Interview 10, Toronto, 6/11/2024.
- 165 SIGAR, Interview 5, Ottawa, 4/23/2024.
- 166 SIGAR, Interview 4, Ottawa, 4/23/2024.
- 167 SIGAR, Interview 7, Toronto, 6/11/2024; SIGAR, Interview 11, Toronto, 6/11/2024.
- 168 SIGAR, Interview 5, Ottawa, 4/23/2024.
- 169 SIGAR, Interview 10, Toronto, 6/11/2024.
- 170 SIGAR, Interview 4, Ottawa, 4/23/2024.
- 171 SIGAR, Interview 5, Ottawa, 4/23/2024; SIGAR, Interview 4, Ottawa, 4/23/2024.
- 172 SIGAR, Interview 4, Ottawa, 4/23/2024.
- 173 SIGAR, Interview 4, Ottawa, 4/23/2024.
- 174 SIGAR, Interview 1, Ottawa, 4/22/2024.
- 175 SIGAR, Interview 2, Ottawa, 4/23/2024.
- 176 SIGAR, Interview 10, Toronto, 6/11/2024.
- 177 UN Security Council, “Security Council 1988 Committee Deletes One Entry from its Sanctions List,” Press Release, 3/12/2012; USAID, Mission, updated response to SIGAR data call, 6/20/2024.
- 178 India Bloom, “Suicide bombers are our pride, part of our security forces,” 8/29/2022.
- 179 USAID, Mission, updated response to SIGAR data call, 6/20/2024.
- 180 WHO, Afghanistan Infectious Disease Outbreaks, No. 23, 6/8/2024, p. 1.
- 181 WHO, Afghanistan Infectious Disease Outbreaks, No. 23, 6/8/2024, p. 2.
- 182 WHO, Afghanistan Infectious Disease Outbreaks, No. 23, 6/8/2024, pp. 3–8.
- 183 WHO, “Global Wild Poliovirus 2018–2024,” accessed 7/11/2024 and 3/26/2024; VOA, “WHO data contradicts Afghan Taliban’s claim of zero polio cases,” 7/9/2024; CIA World Factbook, Afghanistan, accessed 1/3/2024; VOA, “Taliban Minister Boasts Afghan Anti-Polio Gains While Addressing Global Health Huddle,” 1/10/2024.
- 184 VOA, “WHO data contradicts Afghan Taliban’s claim of zero polio cases,” 7/9/2024; Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, “Nationwide Anti-Polio Campaign Kicks Off In Afghanistan,” 4/29/2024; Amu TV, “Four-day polio vaccination campaign begins in Afghanistan,” 6/3/2024.
- 185 Washington Post, “After long banning polio campaigns, Taliban declares war on the disease,” 12/5/2023.
- 186 WHO “Multi-country outbreak of cholera,” 6/19/2024.
- 187 Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, “Cholera Outbreak Hits Afghanistan Amid Natural Disasters, Crumbling Health Care,” 6/25/2024.
- 188 WHO, “Multi-country outbreak of cholera,” 6/19/2024; Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, “Cholera Outbreak Hits Afghanistan Amid Natural Disasters, Crumbling Health Care,” 6/25/2024.
- 189 WHO, Afghanistan Emergency Situation Report, 5/2024, p. 1.
- 190 WHO, Afghanistan Emergency Situation Report, 5/2024, p. 3.
- 191 WHO, Afghanistan Emergency Situation Report, 5/2024, pp. 3–4.
- 192 WHO, Afghanistan Emergency Situation Report, 5/2024, pp. 1–2.
- 193 WHO, Afghanistan Emergency Situation Report, 5/2024, p. 2.
- 194 WHO, Afghanistan Emergency Situation Report, 5/2024, p. 7.
- 195 Insecurity Insight, Afghanistan: Violence in Health Care in Conflict, 6/24/2024, pp. 1–3.
- 196 Insecurity Insight, Afghanistan: Violence in Health Care in Conflict, 6/24/2024, pp. 4–5.
- 197 Insecurity Insight, Afghanistan: Violence in Health Care in Conflict, 6/24/2024, pp. 5–6.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

- 198 USAID, Mission, response to SIGAR data call, 6/12/2024; AP News, “1,000 days have passed since the Taliban barred girls from secondary education, the UN says,” 6/12/2024.
- 199 World Bank, Macro Poverty Outlook for Afghanistan: April 2024, 4/3/2024; World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update, 10/2023, p. 13.
- 200 UNDP, “Afghanistan Socio-Economic Outlook 2023,” p. 13; USIP, “Two Years into Taliban Rule, New Shocks Weaken Afghan Economy,” 8/10/2023; UN Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, Report of the Secretary-General, A/78/361-S/2023/678, 9/18/2023, p. 10; State, SCA, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/5/2023.
- 201 World Bank, Afghanistan Economic Monitor, 8/31/2023, p. 2; World Bank, Afghanistan Economic Monitor, 2/29/2024, p. 2.
- 202 UNAMA, “Cash shipments to the UN in Afghanistan – Info Sheet,” 1/9/2023.
- 203 Fund for the Afghan People, “Statement regarding June 28, 2024, Convening,” 7/3/2024.
- 204 Fund for the Afghan People, “Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Trustees Held Virtually on June 26, between 10:45am and 12:30pm (ET)” 6/26/2023.
- 205 Fund for the Afghan People, Meeting Minutes, 1/29/2024.
- 206 Fund for the Afghan People, “Statement regarding June 28, 2024, Convening,” 7/3/2024.
- 207 VOA, “Afghan Fund Untapped in Switzerland, Taliban Make No Demand,” 2/21/2024.
- 208 House Foreign Affairs Committee, H.R. 6586 – To require a strategy to oppose financial or material support by foreign countries to the Taliban, and for other purposes, 6/25/2024.
- 209 Treasury, response to SIGAR data call, 6/15/2023; Fund for the Afghan People, Statement, 6/26/2023. <https://afghanfund.ch/>
- 210 State, “Department Press Briefing – September 14, 2022,” 9/14/2022.
- 211 Treasury, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/12/2024; Treasury and State press release, “Joint Statement by U.S. Treasury and State Department: The United States and Partners Announce Establishment of Fund for the People of Afghanistan,” 9/14/2022.
- 212 Treasury, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/9/2024.
- 213 Treasury, response to SIGAR data call, 12/13/2022.
- 214 NBC News, “Taliban promotes sanctioned official to central bank governor,” 7/8/2024.
- 215 Treasury, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2023.
- 216 State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 3/12/2024.
- 217 World Bank, Afghanistan Economic Monitor, 5/2024, p. 2.
- 218 World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update, 4/2024, p. 12.
- 219 Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, “Distrustful of the Taliban, a growing number of Afghans ditch banks,” 5/29/2024.
- 220 State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 7/13/2024.
- 221 State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 9/15/2023.
- 222 Afghanistan Analysts Network, “Chinese Investments in Afghanistan: Strategic economic move or inventive for the Emirate?” 9/2023, p. 4.
- 223 UN, USG DiCarlo on Afghanistan: “Human rights, especially the rights of women and girls, and inclusion of all members of society will continue to be an integral part of all our discussions,” 7/2/2024.
- 224 State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 6/12/2024.
- 225 State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 6/12/2024; UNODC Laboratory and Scientific Service Portals, “Tablet K” Afghanistan’s emerging synthetic drug market, 1/2022.

سر مفتش ویژه برای بازسازی افغانستان



اداره

سنتز مفتش

افغانستان د پيار غاونو پياره د خانگري

“More than seven billion dollars have been provided by international donors for humanitarian assistance and more than four billion to support basic human needs to the Afghan people since the Taliban takeover. Yet Afghanistan remains beset by massive poverty that leaves the population even more vulnerable to the many natural disasters that we have seen over the past few years as a result of climate change.”

—*UN Special Representative for Afghanistan
Roza Otunbayeva*