

SIGAR

Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction

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2016

QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS





The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008 (Pub. L. No. 110-181) established the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR).

SIGAR's oversight mission, as defined by the legislation, is to provide for the independent and objective

- conduct and supervision of audits and investigations relating to the programs and operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.
- leadership and coordination of, and recommendations on, policies designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of the programs and operations, and to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse in such programs and operations.
- means of keeping the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operation and the necessity for and progress on corrective action.


Afghanistan reconstruction includes any major contract, grant, agreement, or other funding mechanism entered into by any department or agency of the U.S. government that involves the use of amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

Source: Pub. L. No. 110-181, "National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008," 1/28/2008.

(For a list of the congressionally mandated contents of this report, see Section 3.)

Cover photo:

The new, U.S.-funded Ministry of Defense headquarters in Kabul appears well-built, but SIGAR found several construction issues to be assessed. (U.S. Air Force Civil Engineer Center photo)



■ Provinces where SIGAR has conducted audit, inspection, and investigation work



SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

I am pleased to submit to Congress, and the Secretaries of State and Defense, SIGAR's 31st quarterly report on the status of the U.S. reconstruction effort in Afghanistan.

With the new commander of the NATO-led Resolute Support mission and U.S. forces in Afghanistan reviewing U.S. military plans, SIGAR has summarized some of its main findings on security issues in this quarterly report. Security is a necessary precondition to firmly establish a widely supported and sustainable Afghan government. Without effective security, insurgents will continue to mount violent attacks on people and programs essential for economic and political development. Yet a little over a year after the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) took responsibility for combat operations, Afghanistan remains under increasing threat from the Taliban and other insurgents.

As the essay in Section One, "Security: The Eroding Bedrock," argues, "Providing effective security is indeed essential for the survival of the Afghan state—and for the success of the reconstruction effort. Neither can deliver lasting gains without the other." SIGAR's completed and ongoing work indicates that five major challenges confront U.S. efforts to develop the ANDSF into a force capable of defending the country: (1) limited oversight visibility, (2) questionable force-strength numbers, (3) unreliable capability assessments, (4) limited on-budget assistance capacity, and (5) uncertain long-term sustainability.

Afghanistan's lack of security also hinders SIGAR and other agencies in providing oversight for the reconstruction effort. Like other U.S. government personnel, SIGAR's U.S. staff members are limited in their ability to travel in country. However, SIGAR is working with its Afghan staff, building partnerships with Afghan civil society, and using geospatial data to conduct fieldwork and perform its mission.

This quarter, President Ashraf Ghani requested SIGAR's assistance with his government's efforts to repatriate funds stolen from Kabul Bank. Before its near-collapse in 2010, Kabul Bank had been Afghanistan's largest private bank, distributing most civil salaries on behalf of the Afghan government. Over 92% of the \$935 million known at that time to be stolen went to 19 individuals and companies associated with the bank.

In February, SIGAR was asked to participate in a new task force President Ghani plans to create that will include the Ministry of Finance, the Attorney General's Office, and the Kabul Bank Asset Recovery Commission. The president said SIGAR would have full access to relevant banking and financial records. President Ghani's request gives SIGAR an opportunity to assist in the strong anticorruption effort needed to bolster government effectiveness and credibility, and reflects the regard in which reform-minded Afghans hold SIGAR's work.

During this reporting period, I testified before Congress three times on SIGAR's completed and ongoing work examining U.S. efforts to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANDSF; SIGAR's inspections of facilities and infrastructure built and renovated by the Department of Defense (DOD) using reconstruction funds; and SIGAR's work examining DOD's Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) in Afghanistan. I also submitted written testimony concerning SIGAR's fiscal year 2017 budget request, recent

successes, challenges to accomplishing its mission, and steps taken to overcome or mitigate these challenges.

SIGAR issued 17 audits, inspections, alert letters, and other products this quarter. SIGAR work to date has identified over \$2 billion in savings to the U.S. taxpayer.

A performance audit examined the extent to which the Departments of Defense and State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have identified their efforts and accounted for funding to support primary and secondary education in Afghanistan. SIGAR completed seven financial audits this quarter of U.S.-funded contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements to rebuild Afghanistan. SIGAR also announced seven new financial audits of USAID awards and a financial-statement audit of TFBSO, bringing the total number of ongoing financial audits to 24 with nearly \$3.6 billion in auditable costs.

This quarter, SIGAR's Office of Special Projects wrote to the USAID Administrator about a health facility that appears to have structural damage that could put lives at risk. The Office of Special Projects also reported on the process DOD follows when disposing of excess real property in Afghanistan and on the monetary value of the property provided to the Afghan government.

During the reporting period, SIGAR investigations achieved significant results. Cost savings to the U.S. government amounted to \$3.1 million; a civil settlement totaled nearly \$3.7 million; and fines, forfeitures, and restitutions amounted to over \$400,000. Additionally, there was one arrest, one indictment, one conviction, and six sentencing. SIGAR initiated 17 new investigations and closed 38, bringing the total number of ongoing investigations to 288.

The accomplishments of the quarter bring the cumulative total in criminal fines, restitutions, forfeitures, civil-settlement recoveries, and U.S. government cost savings from SIGAR's ongoing investigations to \$951 million.

In addition, SIGAR's suspension and debarment program referred 25 individuals and 21 companies for suspension or debarment based on evidence developed as part of investigations conducted by SIGAR in Afghanistan and the United States.

SIGAR remains the largest and most capable U.S. audit and investigative entity operating in Afghanistan. SIGAR staff have more experience on the ground in Afghanistan than any other oversight organization. Our deployed personnel average more than 2.5 years in country, versus less than a year for other entities' staff. Among oversight organizations, SIGAR maintains unequalled access to Afghanistan's senior leadership and members of the diplomatic community. SIGAR's work is widely known to Afghan government, civil society, and business leaders, and is regularly discussed in Afghan media.

My staff and I are determined to keep working with Congress and other stakeholders to achieve our national objectives and safeguard U.S. taxpayers' investment in Afghanistan.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'John F. Sopko', with a long, sweeping horizontal line extending to the right.

John F. Sopko
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report summarizes SIGAR’s oversight work and updates developments in the three major sectors of Afghanistan’s reconstruction effort from January 1 to March 31, 2016.* It also includes an essay on the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan and the five major challenges confronting U.S. efforts to develop the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: (1) limited oversight visibility, (2) questionable force-strength numbers, (3) unreliable capability assessments, (4) limited on-budget assistance capability, and (5) the uncertain long-term sustainability of Afghan forces. During this reporting period, SIGAR published 17 audits, inspections, alert letters, and other reports assessing the U.S. efforts to build the Afghan security forces, improve governance, and facilitate economic and social development. These reports identified a number of problems, including a lack of accountability, failures of planning, deficiencies in internal-controls, and noncompliance issues. The cost savings to the U.S. government from SIGAR’s investigative work amounted to over \$3.1 million; civil settlement recoveries totaled \$3.7 million; and fines, forfeitures, and restitutions amounted to \$400,000. SIGAR investigations also resulted in one arrest, one indictment, and six sentencing. Additionally, SIGAR referred 25 individuals and 21 companies for suspension or debarment based on evidence developed as part of investigations conducted by SIGAR in Afghanistan and the United States.

SIGAR OVERVIEW

AUDITS

SIGAR produced one performance audit, seven financial-audits, and three inspection reports.

The **performance audit** found the Department of Defense, Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have not adequately assessed their efforts to support education in Afghanistan.

The **financial audits** identified \$922,628 in questioned costs as a result of internal-control deficiencies and noncompliance issues. These deficiencies and noncompliance issues included exceeding the approved budget without prior agency approval, failure to adhere to policies on payroll records, failure to adhere to federal regulations related to government-owned equipment and travel expenses, failure to properly monitor subcontractors, inadequate oversight of overtime and timekeeping policies, and inadequate documentation for invoices and non-payroll costs.

NEW AUDITS AND INSPECTIONS

This quarter, SIGAR initiated two new performance audits. One will examine U.S. government efforts to increase the supply, quantity, and distribution of electric power from the Kajaki Dam, and the other will review all the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations’ (TFBSO) programs and activities in Afghanistan from 2010 through 2014. This brings the total number of ongoing performance audits to 16.

SIGAR also announced seven new financial audits of USAID awards and a financial statement audit of TFBSO, bringing the total number of ongoing financial audits to 24 with nearly \$3.6 billion in auditable costs, and one new inspection, which is a follow-up to an earlier inspection of the Pol-i-Charkhi prison.

SPECIAL PROJECTS

During this reporting period, the Office of Special Projects issued two products, one alert letter and one report, addressing:

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- Extreme structural damage at a health facility in Badakhshan Province.
- The Department of Defense process for disposing of foreign excess real property in Afghanistan, as well as the monetary value of the property provided to the Afghan government.

LESSONS LEARNED

During this reporting period, the Lessons Learned Program and the U.S. Institute of Peace co-hosted a two-day conference on “Lessons from the Coalition: International Experiences from the Afghanistan Reconstruction.” The Lessons Learned Program also worked with a team of graduate students from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University on an academic policy workshop that culminated in the publication of “Lessons from the U.S. Civilian Surge in Afghanistan, 2009–2014.”

INVESTIGATIONS

During the reporting period, SIGAR investigations resulted in cost savings to the U.S. government of over \$3.1 million; fines, forfeitures, and restitutions amounted to over \$400,000; and civil settlement recoveries totaled nearly \$3.7 million. Criminal investigations resulted in one arrest, one indictment, one conviction, and six sentencing. SIGAR initiated 17 new investigations and closed 38, bringing the total number of ongoing investigations to 288. SIGAR’s suspension and debarment program referred 25 individuals and 21 companies for suspension or debarment.

Investigations highlights include:

- A U.S. contractor was sentenced to 46 months’ incarceration, followed by 36 months’ supervised release, and ordered to forfeit \$51,000 for receipt of bribes and conspiracy to structure financial transactions to avoid currency reporting requirements.
 - A criminal complaint was filed against an Afghan national, charging him with conspiracy and giving, offering, and promising gratuities to public officials in exchange for preferential treatment in the award of U.S. government contracts. In connection with the same investigation, two U.S. military members have already pled guilty for their roles in the conspiracy.
 - An investigation related to aviation contracts has led to the sentencing of a U.S. Army contract officer for obstruction of a federal audit, and the indictment of a U.S. Army contract officer for filing a false tax return.
 - An Afghan national’s attempt to extort money from a U.S. contractor operating in Afghanistan was thwarted due to SIGAR’s intervention, and \$1.5 million in equipment and \$200,000 in vehicles were released back to the contractor for use in a U.S. embassy project.
 - A civil investigation involving U.S. government contracts and forged documents yielded a \$3.6 million recovery for the U.S. government.
 - A U.S. Army sergeant was sentenced to 21 months’ incarceration, followed by three years’ supervised release, 104 hours community service, and ordered to forfeit \$113,050 for bulk cash smuggling and theft of government property.
 - A retired U.S. Army National Guard sergeant was sentenced to 12 months and a days’ incarceration, followed by 12 months’ supervised release, and ordered to forfeit \$16,200 for conspiracy to receive and accept bribes. As part of the same investigation, a retired U.S. Navy officer was sentenced to 24 months’ incarceration, followed by 24 months’ supervised release, fined \$5,000, and ordered to forfeit \$25,000 for receiving and accepting illegal bribes.
 - A fuel theft investigation led to a U.S. Army sergeant entering a plea of guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit bribery and one count of bribery.
 - A theft investigation resulted in an approximate \$1.4 million recovery for the U.S. government after 12 missing U.S. government-owned containers and their contents were recovered.
- * SIGAR may also report on products and events occurring after March 31, 2016, up to the publication date.

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“In 2016, Afghanistan is being as severely tested as it was in 2015, by the task of managing its difficult transition with its interrelated political, economic and security challenges. ... For 2016, survival will be an achievement for the National Unity Government.”

—*Nicholas Haysom, UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan*

1 SECURITY: THE ERODING BEDROCK



SECURITY: THE ERODING BEDROCK

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Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Joseph F. Dunford Jr. (USMC) and Brigadier General Michael Howard (U.S. Army) walk to the flight line at Forward Operating Base Fenty in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. (DOD photo by D. Myles Cullen)

SECURITY: THE ERODING BEDROCK

This quarter, the incoming commander of the Resolute Support (RS) mission and U.S. forces in Afghanistan, General John W. Nicholson, told lawmakers that he planned to review American military plans in his first 90 days to assess “what amount of capability is necessary given the current conditions.”¹ The “current conditions” prompting the general’s review involve continuing widespread assaults by the Taliban and other insurgents in Afghanistan, and concerns about the strength, capability, sustainability, and support needs of the Afghan military and police. The general’s assessment is expected to be ready at the end of May and to result, according to RS, in “a very frank and candid dialogue with his chain of command.”²

Since fiscal year 2002, the United States Congress has appropriated more than \$68 billion to recruit, train, equip, house, feed, supply, and pay the salaries of a force authorized up to 352,000 soldiers and police in the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), plus 30,000 members of the Afghan Local Police (ALP).³ (The actual assigned strength of these forces is lower; verifying their real strength has long been one of SIGAR’s main concerns.) That security-related funding represents fully 60% of the 15-year total of \$113 billion devoted to reconstructing Afghanistan.

Since January 1, 2015, the ANDSF has had the lead responsibility for the country’s security, while the U.S. military presence in the country has declined to fewer than 10,000, with further reductions to about 5,500 planned by the end of the year. The change reflects the RS mission’s primary function to train, advise, and assist the ANDSF, although U.S. forces are authorized to defend themselves and to take unilateral action against terrorists.

After nearly 15 years of effort, thousands of U.S., allied, and Afghan lives lost, and many billions of dollars spent, what are the prospects for the ANDSF from the standpoint of Afghan security and of U.S. geopolitical objectives? Some indicators are troubling:

- Insurgents took and briefly held a provincial capital last fall, have seized various district centers, and in the space of a few days in late March assassinated an Afghan army general in Kandahar Province and a judge in Ghazni Province, and fired rockets at the new Afghan parliament building.⁴



General John Nicholson takes command of the Resolute Support mission, Kabul, March 2016. (Joint Staff photo)

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- Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified before the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee in March that “fighting in 2016 will be more intense than 2015, continuing a decade-long trend of deteriorating security.”⁵
- The UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan told the Security Council in March that “For 2016, survival will be an achievement for the [Afghan] National Unity Government.”⁶
- On April 12, the Taliban announced the start of another spring offensive, pledging assaults against government strongholds and suicide and guerrilla attacks.⁷ This year’s offensive may reflect a new dynamic. An RS spokesman said the Taliban is developing a relationship with al-Qaeda elements, who can “serve as an accelerant” because of their “very special skills.”⁸

Providing effective security is indeed essential for the survival of the Afghan state—and for the success of the reconstruction effort. Neither can deliver lasting gains without the other. As Ohio State University military-history professor and retired Army colonel Peter Mansoor has observed: “Military victory alone did not ensure that Germany, Italy, and Japan would emerge from [World War II] as liberal democracies committed to prosperity and human rights at home and a liberal world order abroad. It was, rather, the presence of US military forces, economic aid, and a political commitment from American policymakers to rebuild and restore these nations that ensured an enduring peace.”⁹

A similar engagement is under way in Afghanistan. The 2015 White House *National Security Strategy* notes that the United States has “transitioned to a dramatically smaller force”—and immediately adds that the force is “focused on the goal of a sovereign and stable partner in Afghanistan that is not a safe haven for international terrorists.”¹⁰ That goal is more than a purely military matter. A March 2016 conference on Afghanistan hosted by the U.S. Institute of Peace, Stanford University, and the UK’s Royal Institute for International Affairs produced a consensus that securing and securing gains in Afghanistan “starts but does not end” with the ANDSF. Conferees, who included officials, scholars, and former U.S. Ambassador James Dobbins, recommended “long-term, predictable support,” adding that “Throughout history, Afghan governments have fallen when external support has been withdrawn.”¹¹

Given the bedrock importance of security to Afghanistan reconstruction—especially as reductions in international support and advisory forces continue—continuing these examinations is a critical mission in itself. Since SIGAR was created in 2008, it has released 74 reports examining how funds appropriated for the ANDSF have been used. That work continues in an atmosphere of deteriorating security.



Afghan National Army noncommissioned-officer candidates stand in formation. (ISAF photo by MC2 Eliezer Gabriel)

DETERIORATING SECURITY

General John F. Campbell, until recently commander of the RS mission and U.S. forces in Afghanistan, has warned that “Afghanistan is at an inflection point,” adding, “If we do not make deliberate, measured adjustments, 2016 is at risk of being no better, and possibly worse, than 2015.”¹²

According to the United Nations, Afghanistan experienced record-high civilian casualties from the ongoing hostilities in 2015: more than 3,500 killed—a quarter of them children—and nearly 7,500 wounded.¹³ As of late January 2016, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) reports 287 (70.5%) of Afghanistan’s 407 provincial districts were “directly under [government] control or influence,” while 26 districts (6.4%) were under insurgent control or influence, and another 94 (23.1%) were “at risk.”¹⁴

Describing the security situation quantitatively can be difficult. Many numbers are generated, but they are often essentially qualitative assessments using questionable or shifting definitions. And many data points are reported by Afghan ministries with no practicable means of verification. Dr. Anthony Cordesman at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has cautioned that “There is no way to be sure of any figure like 70% [government-controlled territory], or to accurately estimate the size and location of the Afghan population.” Among other problems, he explained, “We no longer have a forward presence and Afghan government estimates cannot be trusted.”¹⁵

Reliance on encouraging data made the fall of the capital of Kunduz Province in 2015 a surprise for some observers. Yet a Department of Defense (DOD)-funded January 2014 report by the Center for Naval Analyses had predicted the Taliban would keep pressure on the ANDSF, expand its influence in areas vacated by Coalition forces, encircle key cities, and conduct high-profile attacks in Kabul and other cities.¹⁶ The Kunduz attack also laid bare capability gaps within the Afghan security forces. Government forces were able to clear the city of insurgents, but required U.S. close-air and other support in the operation.

The precarious situation of the ANDSF in Helmand Province in southern Afghanistan is another concern. In late December, as insurgents occupied the Sangin district, Helmand’s deputy governor warned President Ghani that Taliban fighters were positioned to take control of the province, the lead producer of Afghan opium that provides insurgents with considerable revenue.¹⁷ An RS officer said the Afghan National Army’s 215th Corps, heavily battered in Helmand fighting, suffered from “a combination of incompetence, corruption, and ineffectiveness.”¹⁸ Recognizing the mounting problems in Helmand, the ANDSF has begun to replace failed leaders, provide reinforcements, and dedicate other resources such as armed aircraft to the province.¹⁹

As for the Afghan National Police (ANP), more numerous but less heavily armed than the army, DOD notes that “The ANP have sustained a

disproportionately higher number of casualties than the ANA due to inadequate training and equipment, poor planning processes, and a suboptimal force posture that leaves ANP forces vulnerable at static checkpoints.”²⁰ Other vulnerabilities fester within the ranks: in late February, Afghan military personnel detained and disarmed 30 police officers suspected of having links to the Taliban. Those arrested included the acting police chief of the Sangin district in Helmand Province.²¹

Corruption—an issue where Afghanistan has long stood near the bottom of global rankings—is another threat to ANDSF effectiveness. As DOD has reported, “Corruption affects . . . the effectiveness of the MOD [Ministry of Defense] to support the ANA corps, AAF [Afghan Air Force], and other force components, [and] counter-corruption efforts are essential to maintaining international donor support.” For that reason, DOD says, increasing Afghan ministry accountability “remains a critical part” of the RS mission.²² Afghan police are also involved. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime has reported that 42% of Afghans surveyed had paid a bribe to a police officer, that the average bribe paid to an ANP officer was over \$100, and that more than 50% of ANP officers surveyed thought asking for bribes or procuring goods or services based on family ties or friendship was usually or sometimes acceptable.²³



Afghan soldiers patrol in wintry countryside. (CJTF 101 photo by SGT Cooper Cash)

Meanwhile, challenges for security forces are multiplying. Not only did the Taliban step up attacks during the past winter—usually a relatively quiet season—but other groups expanded their presence in Afghanistan. They include al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent—a relatively new offshoot of al-Qaeda that operates primarily in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India—and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan Province.²⁴ Even if these factions are competing within the same pool of potential recruits that the Taliban draw upon, their higher profiles can pose additional credibility challenges for the Kabul government and complicate attempts at political reconciliation and peace negotiations.

SIGAR has had direct experience with the worsening security situation. When SIGAR began staffing its office at the Embassy in Kabul in 2009, its personnel could access many areas of the city and the countryside; drive themselves in Kabul, Herat, and Mazar-e Sharif; meet Afghans in their workplaces; and take ground transportation between the airport and the Embassy. Now, SIGAR and other oversight personnel are largely restricted to the Kabul embassy compound and the few remaining Coalition military bases, and for the past year have had to take helicopters to and from the Kabul airport because of the growing security risk.

The security threat has made it increasingly difficult for many U.S. and even some Afghan officials to get out to manage and inspect U.S.-funded reconstruction projects. SIGAR, the largest U.S. oversight organization in Afghanistan, has managed to continue its work of overseeing U.S. programs and projects, partly through the creative use of local Afghan staff, building

partnerships with Afghan civil society, and with the assistance of the U.S. military when available. Still, the security situation is a real constraint on both programs and oversight.

ANDSF DEVELOPMENT FACES STERN CHALLENGES

Recitals of concerns should not obscure the fact that the United States and its Coalition partners have accomplished a good deal in developing the ANDSF over the past 15 years. Upon the overthrow of the al-Qaeda-harboring Taliban regime in 2001, Afghanistan had no organized military or police forces. Now it has a sizable army, air force, and police force that report to a democratically elected government. Facing a determined insurgency largely on their own now, those forces have been fighting hard and taking significant casualties. The ANDSF had 6,637 personnel killed and 12,471 wounded in 2015; more than 2,000 additional casualties occurred in the first two months of 2016.²⁵

Nonetheless, recent developments and persistent institutional weaknesses raise doubts whether Afghanistan is on a course consistent with achieving and sustaining U.S. national-security objectives.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marine Corps General Joseph Dunford, commanded U.S. forces in Afghanistan in 2013–2014. “When we looked at [Afghan capability] in 2013” he recently told reporters, “we assumed a certain progression, of ministerial capacity, core-level capabilities, the intelligence enterprise, special operations, and aviation. And many of the assumptions we made didn’t obtain.”²⁶ Meanwhile, General Nicholson has said, heavy combat and high casualties among the ANDSF, and a changing threat, have put U.S. and NATO training efforts for the Afghans behind schedule.²⁷

Progress has indeed been delayed and uneven. Further, SIGAR has found many instances when U.S. funding dedicated to the ANDSF was wasted, whether inefficiently spent on worthwhile endeavors or squandered on activities that delivered no apparent benefit. SIGAR’s completed and ongoing work indicates five major challenges confront U.S. efforts to develop the ANDSF:

1. Limited oversight visibility that makes it difficult to assess the effectiveness of assistance and to identify changing needs.
2. Questionable force-strength numbers that can lead to misestimating capability.
3. Unreliable capability assessments that can affect operational planning.
4. Limited capacity to use on-budget assistance that can prevent donor assistance from achieving intended results.
5. Uncertain long-term sustainability that can undermine the entire reconstruction effort.



An Afghan sergeant trains to be a machine-gun team leader. (1st Marine Division photo by CPL Reece Lodder)

OVERSIGHT VISIBILITY IS LIMITED

With fewer forces in theater, the United States military has lost much of its ability to make direct observations, provide tactical mentoring, and collect reliable information on ANDSF capability and effectiveness.

USFOR-A reports that U.S. advisors have little or no direct contact with ANDSF units below the level of army corps—that is, not at the battalion or brigade levels that are the main maneuver units—and regional police headquarters.²⁸ Previously, many international advisors were embedded with ANDSF tactical units, enabling them to offer real-time advice and make detailed observations of performance. In heavily contested, high-casualty areas like Helmand Province, RS trainers have provided Afghan tactical units with “very hands-on training, everything from shooting rifles to being able to maneuver at the squad and platoon level.”²⁹ But such low-level contact and attention can no longer be spread across the entire ANDSF.

The contraction of “touch points” to mostly corps and police headquarters levels is a serious concern. SIGAR and other U.S. oversight agencies have long questioned the reliability and accuracy of ANDSF assessments, even during the period when assessments had far more granularity than is possible today.

RS mission advisors now rely almost exclusively on data provided by the Afghan ministries to evaluate the operational readiness and effectiveness of the ANDSF. SIGAR has seen the effect of the U.S. and NATO drawdown on data quality first-hand. Incoming information, especially regarding the capability and effectiveness of the ANDSF, is less detailed and has less analytical value than in the past. With U.S. force numbers expected to decline further in coming years, the information problem may grow, and with it, the threat to an effective train-advise-assist mission.

FORCE STRENGTH NUMBERS ARE QUESTIONABLE

For years, the authorized strength of the ANDSF has been 352,000 soldiers and police. The ANDSF’s reported actual strength has at times approached that goal, but never reached it. More troubling is SIGAR’s assessment that neither the United States nor its Afghan allies know how many Afghan soldiers and police actually exist, how many are in fact available for duty, or, by extension, the true nature of their operational capabilities. For example, an infantry unit short of radio operators, mortar crews, medics, or reconnaissance scouts is not nearly as capable as one that is up to strength in those and other skill areas.

Testifying before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee in February, General Campbell said the ANDSF still suffers from capability gaps in aviation, combined-arms operations, and military intelligence, then added, “Those capability gaps notwithstanding, I still assess that at least 70% of the problems facing the Afghan security forces result from poor leadership.”³⁰

SECURITY: THE ERODING BEDROCK



An Afghan National Police member, left, assists an Afghan Local Police recruit training in the use of handcuffs. (USMC photo by SGT Pete Thibodeau)

The general noted that dozens of poor performing officers have been replaced. But even the best of leaders cannot do their jobs without a clear understanding each day of how many personnel, and with what skills, are present for duty.

The problem is at least a decade old. In 2006, before SIGAR was created, the DOD and Department of State inspectors general warned of inflated numbers among the ANP. A subsequent attempt by the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) to verify the Ministry of Interior's (MOI) payroll records by conducting a physical count of police personnel was unable to verify 20% of Afghan Uniformed Police and 13% of Afghan Border Police carried on the rolls.³¹ In 2009, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and U.S. contractors were unable to validate the existence or active status of 29,400 MOI and ANP personnel—representing more than a third of both groups at that time—due to a lack of cooperation from ANP commanders.³² At that time, GAO reported that a State Department cable said that police chiefs were inflating their numbers by “creating ghost policemen” in order to obtain illegal payments for those “ghost” personnel.³³ A 2011 SIGAR audit of ANP personnel systems found that various sources of personnel data showed total reported numbers of ANP personnel ranging from 111,774 to 125,218—a division-sized discrepancy of 13,444 personnel.³⁴

Since that time, DOD and CSTC-A responses to SIGAR requests for information on ANDSF numbers have raised even more questions. Over

the course of several quarters, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) told SIGAR that ANDSF personnel numbers sometimes included civilians and sometimes did not. Moreover, large quarterly changes in the numbers of Afghan Army personnel at the headquarters level, as well as discrepancies in the data, further raised concerns. A January 2015 SIGAR audit found that more than \$300 million in annual, U.S.-funded salary payments to the ANP were based on data that were only partially verified or reconciled.³⁵

In an April 2015 audit, SIGAR found that there was still no assurance that ANA personnel and payroll data—tracked and reported by the Ministry of Defense and the Afghan Army—are accurate.³⁶ U.S. and Coalition officials are not present during the attendance-taking process, and command officials told SIGAR that they have limited knowledge of or influence over it.

Having reasonably accurate reports on ANDSF strength is important for protecting the U.S. funds that support them, for judging their aggregate capabilities, and for calibrating the details of the RS train-advise-assist mission. Unfortunately, that knowledge remains elusive.

CAPABILITY ASSESSMENTS ARE UNRELIABLE

SIGAR is also concerned that measures of ANDSF capabilities and effectiveness have never been very reliable and are getting worse. The RS mission's predecessor, ISAF, used several assessment tools to measure ANDSF unit capability in areas including leadership, command and control, equipment, and attrition. These assessments are important gauges for U.S. and Afghan stakeholders in security reconstruction. Over the years, however, detail and quality of these assessments have declined.

For example, a 2010 SIGAR audit found that top-rated ANDSF units—those deemed capable of operating independently—could not sustain the gains they had made. The rating system overstated their operational capabilities and actually created disincentives for ANDSF improvement. SIGAR auditors found significant levels of regression, or backsliding, in the capability levels of army and police units, due, in part, to the fact that once a unit achieved a top rating, Coalition forces withdrew assistance such as force protection, supplies, and expertise.³⁷

Following SIGAR's audit, ISAF Joint Command (IJC) changed its system for rating the ANDSF. The previous system's top rating was "fully capable," but the new system's top rating changed over time from "effective with advisors" to "independent with advisors."³⁸ Unfortunately each new system seemed to provide less detail than the one before—and lower thresholds for determining the success of Afghan units.

In July 2012, the GAO raised concerns that the change of the title of the highest rating level from "independent" to "independent with advisors" was, in part, responsible for an increase in the number of ANDSF units rated at the highest level—suggesting that achieving independence proved

too difficult, whereas achieving “independence” but with advisors was an attainable goal.³⁹

In February 2014, SIGAR again audited the system and again found the assessment tool was inconsistently applied and not useful. The rating system did not provide clear guidance on the level of detail necessary to support a team’s rating, or on what the team’s subjective assessments should contain. This lack of clear guidance led to disparities in information across assessments, and to inconsistencies in evaluations of ANDSF units’ capacity to staff, train, and equip its forces.⁴⁰ Unfortunately, as the discussion of MOD and MOI ministerial assessments in the Section 3 “Security” portion of this report makes clear, the overall weakness of the Afghan security ministries raises concerns about their ability to process and apply RS counsel.

CAPACITY TO HANDLE ON-BUDGET AID IS LIMITED

SIGAR has long been concerned about the risk to U.S. funds provided to the ANDSF in the form of on-budget assistance, which include direct assistance (bilateral or government-to-government assistance) and assistance provided through multi-donor trust funds before reaching the Afghan government. The major multi-donor trust fund for the ANDSF is the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), managed by the United Nations Development Programme to pay police salaries. Since 2002, the United States has contributed \$1.6 billion to LOTFA.

Since 2010, the United States has been gradually increasing the amount of on-budget assistance to the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior. In 2015, DOD provided approximately \$2 billion in on-budget assistance to the ANDSF. On-budget assistance is intended to allow the Afghans more freedom to manage their own budget and to build their capacity for doing so. Carrying out the commitment to increase on-budget assistance, however, also reduces U.S. control and visibility over these funds.

SIGAR has reviewed DOD’s safeguards for funds provided to the MOD and MOI, and has identified a number of weaknesses. These weaknesses increase the risk that on-budget funds provided to the ANDSF through a Ministry of Finance account at Afghanistan’s central bank are vulnerable to waste, fraud, and abuse. At the time of SIGAR’s review, CSTC-A’s process did not provide its trainers and decision makers with an overall understanding of each ministry’s financial management capacity, or help them identify risks associated with capacity weaknesses. CSTC-A uses audits designed to detect and correct improper spending to monitor high-risk areas such as fuel and pay, and has used agreed-upon conditions to hold funds until Afghan ministries demonstrate that they have corrected identified weaknesses. Nevertheless, SIGAR’s work has uncovered several cases in which the MOD and the MOI were incapable of managing on-budget assistance,

such as incomplete and inaccurate data on large fuel purchases for military vehicles, electrical generators, and power plants.⁴¹ Earlier, a SIGAR investigation had found that CSTC-A's lack of record retention meant the U.S. government could not account for \$201 million in fuel purchased for the Afghan Army.⁴²

Despite these difficulties, CSTC-A has since turned responsibility of managing ANA fuel over to the MOD. Unfortunately, SIGAR's work has identified new problems with the MOD's ability to manage and account for on-budget assistance used to pay for fuel. In 2015, a SIGAR investigation uncovered corruption—price-fixing, bid-rigging, and bribery by four Afghan vendors—prior to the award of a nearly \$1 billion, multi-year Afghan MOD fuel contract. The vendors' actions criminally increased the contract's potential cost to the Afghan government and the American taxpayer by more than \$214 million. After a briefing by SIGAR, President Ghani immediately suspended the MOD officials involved in the fuel contract award, cancelled the entire contract, warned the contractors of possible debarment, and assigned an independent Afghan investigator to look into various contract awards.⁴³

Afghanistan now has lead responsibility for its own security and is handling increasing proportions of international assistance through its own budget process. Given Afghanistan's longstanding weaknesses in institutional capacity, however, it is important for DOD to maintain effective visibility into MOD's and MOI's use of U.S.-provided funds and equipment, and to ensure that legal requirements and negotiated conditions are observed.

LONG-TERM SUSTAINABILITY IS UNCERTAIN

Maintaining the ANDSF at an authorized strength of 352,000 personnel costs about \$5 billion a year, with some 80% of that amount coming from the United States. General Campbell has recommended continuing that funding at least until 2020, and has said Afghanistan cannot foot the bill before 2024.⁴⁴ In fact, Afghanistan has trouble meeting its current level-of-effort commitment. According to DOD, the Afghan government has increased its contributions to the security budget, but still has not reached the \$500 million per year level it agreed to at the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago. With its economy under great stress and facing years of low growth, Afghanistan's difficulty in contributing significantly to its security costs will persist.

The United States and its allies plan to meet to discuss how to share the burden of financing the ANDSF in Warsaw this summer. But this year the United States contributed \$4.1 billion, and even with U.S. funding of this magnitude, SIGAR's work shows that the ANDSF is unable to sustain itself in many areas.

For example, the ANDSF relied for many years on the U.S. military for air support to its fighting forces. In 2016, the Afghans still lack the air assets



An Afghan Air Force A-29 Super Tucano flies over rugged terrain. (USAF photo by CPT Eydie Sakura)

they need to protect and support their own forces. The impact of the lack of a well-equipped and capable Afghan Air Force (see the AAF highlight in the security section of this report) became all too clear during the aftermath of the September 28, 2015, fall of Kunduz to the Taliban. Despite the end of U.S. combat operations and a transition to a mission focused on training, advising, and assisting, U.S. forces were once again called upon to provide air support to Afghan forces.⁴⁵

Both the United States and Afghanistan have long recognized the importance of developing air power. However, despite the fact that this was pointed out as a critical capability gap, the Afghan Air Force is still far from fully capable, let alone self-sustaining.

One of DOD's plans to close the Afghan Air Force's capability gaps was to provide it with 20 A-29 Super Tucanos. The Tucano is a single-prop, aerial reconnaissance aircraft that can be armed to provide fire support for ground troops. While a contract was signed to build these A-29s in November 2011, a legal challenge from another company prevented the winning contractor from meeting the initial delivery date of April 2013.⁴⁶ Because of this, the first four A-29s were not delivered to Afghanistan until January 2016—a year after the drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan.⁴⁷ Another four arrived in late March.⁴⁸ Moreover, as General Campbell said recently, it takes about three years to train a pilot.⁴⁹

SIGAR has found significant instances of waste and squandered opportunities in building up the Afghan Air Force. One of the most egregious was DOD's \$486 million purchase of 20 G-222 medium-lift cargo planes for the

Afghan Air Force. Due to poor planning, poor oversight, poor contract management, and a lack of critical spare parts, those aircraft could not be kept flightworthy. The program was ended in March 2013 after experiencing continuous and severe operational difficulties, including a lack of spare parts. Sixteen of those 20 aircraft were sold for scrap metal for six cents a pound or \$32,000.⁵⁰

Ensuring that the ANDSF will be a sustainable security force—including appropriate enablers and advisors—will require considerable improvements and constant attention in funding, recruiting and retention, materiel and supply procurements, training and maintenance, and program management. That will be a heavy lift.

FORCE MISUSE AND ENEMY REACTION COMPLICATE THE PICTURE

The ANDSF has fought hard over the past year, and DOD says it has continued to improve integration of indirect-fire and close-air attack capabilities. But its performance has been uneven, with numerous, high-profile tactical and operational setbacks detracting from overall success in preventing the Taliban from achieving strategic goals. And capability gaps persist in aviation, intelligence, logistics, maintenance, operational planning, and leadership.⁵¹

Even if ANDSF capability gaps were filled and performance made more consistent, however, two variables remain: how well the force is employed, and how its adversaries adjust to the changing calculus of comparative advantages.

The ANDSF, according to DOD's latest semiannual report to Congress, remains "reactive," allowing insurgents to pick and choose targets on their terms.⁵² "Though checkpoints and a fixed ANDSF presence, rather than patrols or a rotational presence, is consistent with Afghan perceptions of security—especially in rural areas—the ANDSF reliance on defending static checkpoints has come at a cost of increased ANDSF casualties," DOD says. Consequently, "the ANDSF are being out-manuevered by an overall numerically-inferior insurgent force. Furthermore, broadly emplaced checkpoints compound existing logistics and supply challenges."⁵³ In addition, over-running small outposts can allow insurgents not only to inflict casualties, demoralize ANDSF units, discourage potential recruits, and undermine government control, but also to capture equipment, ammunition, and uniforms to use in other operations.

Another aspect of questionable use of ANDSF personnel, according to DOD, is that Afghan National Police members "are often . . . misemployed as personal bodyguards."⁵⁴ SIGAR has also heard of Afghan special-forces personnel assigned to defensive posts, and of trained medical personnel assigned to non-medical positions. Meanwhile, despite the ANDSF's

SECURITY: THE ERODING BEDROCK



An Afghan National Police patrolman searches a farmer at a checkpoint as an American rifleman stands by, January 2012. Such small-scale contact has become atypical following the U.S. drawdown of forces. (USMC photo by CPL Reece Lodder)

numerical and equipment advantages, DOD reports that “they remain reluctant to pursue the Taliban into their traditional safe havens.”⁵⁵

But reducing the numbers of ANDSF assigned to outpost or checkpoint duty, stopping their diversion to bodyguard work, and motivating units to do active patrols and seize operational initiative would not automatically improve the outcome against the insurgents. The Taliban, DOD assesses, react to changing facts on the ground:

The insurgency’s strategy will continue to be to exploit vulnerabilities in ANDSF force posture by conducting massed attacks against checkpoints, stretch the reach of the ANDSF into rural areas, isolate areas by staging smaller attacks in the surrounding areas, and impede ground lines of communication ahead of attacks against district or provincial centers. The Taliban-led insurgency has likely been emboldened by the coalition’s transition from direct combat operations to a TAA [train, advise, and assist] role and the accompanying reduction of coalition combat enablers. As a result, the Taliban will continue to test the ANDSF aggressively in 2016.⁵⁶

Several DOD witnesses at congressional hearings have made the point—correctly—that the Taliban have been unable to hold populated areas like Kunduz or other strategic ground for very long. On the other hand, they do not have to. As DOD also says, “Even when the ANDSF are able to regroup and reclaim key population centers and symbols of Afghan governance, this undermines public confidence that the government can protect the Afghan people and overshadows the numerous successes the ANDSF have had in clearing insurgent sanctuaries.”⁵⁷

Further, even if insurgents feel compelled to avoid open battles with government soldiers and police, they can still do a great deal to damage their adversary and undermine its popular support. Electric-power systems, for example, are a tempting target with a big payoff for insurgents. As the congressionally chartered National Research Council noted in a 2012 report on U.S. electric infrastructure, “The power grid is inherently vulnerable physically because it is spread across hundreds of miles, and many key facilities are unguarded.” The transformers that adjust voltage at transmission and distribution substations are a “particular concern,” the Council warned, as well as system sensors and controls.⁵⁸ Even bullets hitting power-line insulators can cause outages, create electrocution hazards, and require expensive repairs.⁵⁹ These are serious concerns for power companies in the United States; Afghanistan’s security and economic situation magnify the threat and the impact of sabotage there.

In January 2016, for example, insurgents destroyed one electric-transmission tower and damaged two others, temporarily cutting off much of Kabul’s already-sparse electricity service and affecting several other provinces. A spokesman for the national power company reported that insurgents had also cut cables or damaged transmission towers in southwestern Afghanistan more than 2,000 times in 2015, reducing or interrupting the flow of Kajaki Dam hydropower into Helmand and Kandahar Provinces.⁶⁰

Insurgents can also direct their antigovernment energies into less dramatic channels. For example, in 1944, the American Office of Strategic Services published a *Simple Sabotage Field Manual* advising citizens of Nazi-occupied European countries on ways to undermine the occupiers. They included nonviolent techniques such as breaking tools, “displaying surliness or stupidity” in the workplace, adding abrasives to engines or sawdust to fuel, and referring all questions to committees of “never less than five” to delay action.⁶¹

Taliban infiltrators or sympathizers in Afghan government agencies or businesses could increase use of such wrecking or obstructing techniques to undermine government, military, or economic processes without giving themselves away. The prospect of adversaries’ changing strategy and tactics requires the Kabul government and its RS advisers to be ready to adjust their own measures, such as bolstering police and intelligence services if their military and paramilitary forces find they are facing fewer active opponents in the field. Doing so, of course, requires accurate information, cooperation, and ability to execute change.

The frustrating realities of the asymmetrical warfare typical of insurgencies impose some serious limits on what effective reconstruction programs and vigorous oversight can accomplish. An essential factor in the outcome will be ministerial, military, and police leadership that can be supplied only by the Afghans themselves.

CONCLUSION


The five challenges of limited oversight visibility, questionable force-strength, unreliable capability assessments, limited on-budget assistance capacity, and uncertain long-term sustainability of Afghan forces identified through SIGAR's body of work, call into question the capability and effectiveness of the ANDSF—both now and in the future—and raise concerns about our efforts to give them the tools and resources they need to fight on their own. The U.S. ability to influence operational outcomes on the ground is constricting, while ANDSF capability has not correspondingly risen.

The United States and its allies have promised continued financial assistance for the ANDSF, but under the current plan to make further reductions in U.S. force strength, the ANDSF will be increasingly left not only with their own capability gaps in air support, signals, intelligence, and other areas highlighted by U.S. commanders, but without the ability to call on U.S. and Coalition military components for help. Furthermore, without the strong monitoring and mentoring arm of U.S. and Coalition troops, it is increasingly questionable whether the ANDSF will develop into a robust and sustainable force.⁶²

Security is the bedrock component of U.S. efforts to rebuild Afghanistan. But as noted earlier, the security and other elements of reconstruction depend upon and must reinforce one another. British military doctrine made this point more than 20 years ago: “There has never been a purely military solution to revolution; political, social, economic and military measures all have a part to play in restoring the authority of a legitimate government.”⁶³

In like spirit, DOD told Congress, “The U.S. and Afghan governments agree that the best way to ensure lasting peace and security in Afghanistan is reconciliation and a political settlement with the Taliban.”⁶⁴ A purely military strategy may have the appeal of simplicity, but a RAND Corporation study found “strong evidence” against the “crush them” approach, which failed in 23 of 33 counterinsurgency campaigns that tried it.⁶⁵

Unless the ANDSF can provide an effective shield for other aspects of reconstruction such as electoral reform, anticorruption measures, rule of law, and economic development, Afghan insurgents may never feel the need to compromise their agenda. Without serious and sustained pressure to compromise, insurgents could block the official U.S. goal of “a sovereign and stable partner in Afghanistan that is not a safe haven for international terrorists.” That prospect makes intensified attention to the fighting power, use, and adaptability of the ANDSF a necessity for reconstruction to withstand the violent forces eroding security.



A U.S. serviceman heads back to base. (Navy Visual News Service photo by Michael Watkins)

“The reconstruction effort in Afghanistan is in a perilous state. Afghanistan has had the lead responsibility for its own security for more than a year now, and is struggling with a four-season insurgency, high attrition, and capability challenges.”

—*Special Inspector General John F. Sopko*

2 SIGAR OVERSIGHT



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Special Inspector General John Sopko, back left, President Ashraf Ghani, back right, and staff members meet in Kabul in February. (Arg Palace photo)

SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

This quarter SIGAR issued 17 audits, inspections, alert letters, and other products. SIGAR work to date has identified over \$2 billion in savings for the U.S. taxpayer.

A performance audit examined the extent to which the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have identified their efforts and accounted for funding to support primary and secondary education in Afghanistan.

SIGAR completed seven financial audits this quarter of U.S.-funded contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements to rebuild Afghanistan. SIGAR also announced seven new financial audits of USAID awards and a financial statement audit of the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO), bringing the total number of ongoing financial audits to 24 with more than \$3.6 billion in auditable costs. Three inspection reports were also completed.

This quarter, SIGAR's Office of Special Projects wrote to the USAID Administrator about a health facility that appears to have structural damage that will likely put lives at risk. Additionally, the Office of Special Projects issued a report about the process DOD follows when disposing of excess real property in Afghanistan as well as the monetary value of the property provided to the Afghan government.

During the reporting period, SIGAR investigations achieved significant results. Cost savings to the U.S. government amounted to \$3.1 million; a civil settlement totaled nearly \$3.7 million; and fines, forfeitures, and restitutions amounted to over \$400,000. Additionally, there was one arrest, one indictment, one conviction and six sentencing. SIGAR initiated 17 new investigations and closed 38, bringing the total number of ongoing investigations to 288.

This quarter, SIGAR's suspension and debarment program referred 25 individuals and 21 companies for suspension or debarment based on evidence developed as part of investigations conducted by SIGAR in Afghanistan and the United States. Three of these individuals were referred for suspension based on criminal charges being filed against them alleging misconduct related to or affecting reconstruction contracting in Afghanistan. These referrals bring the total number of individuals and companies referred by SIGAR since 2008 to 743, encompassing 393 individuals and 350 companies to date.

TESTIMONY GIVEN

- Testimony 16-17-TY: Assessing the Capabilities and Effectiveness of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
- Testimony 16-18-TY: Challenges to Effective Oversight of Afghanistan Reconstruction Grow as High-Risk Areas Persist
- Testimony 16-24-TY: Oversight of Department of Defense Reconstruction Projects in Afghanistan
- Testimony 16-29-TY: DOD Task Force For Business and Stability Operations in Afghanistan: Review of Selected Expenditures Highlights Serious Management and Oversight Problems

COMPLETED PERFORMANCE AUDIT

- Audit 16-32-AR: Primary and Secondary Education in Afghanistan

COMPLETED FINANCIAL AUDITS

- Financial Audit 16-20-FA: USDA's Soybeans for Agricultural Renewal in Afghanistan Initiative
- Financial Audit 16-21-FA: USAID's Irrigation and Watershed Management Program in Afghanistan
- Financial Audit 16-25-FA: Department of State's Demining Activities in Afghanistan
- Financial Audit 16-27-FA: USAID's Support for the American University of Afghanistan
- Financial Audit 16-28-FA: Department of State's Demining Activities in Afghanistan
- Financial Audit 16-30-FA: Construction of the Special Forces Kandak in Kandahar
- Financial Audit 16-31-FA: USAID's Health Care Improvement Project

COMPLETED INSPECTION REPORTS

- Inspection Report 16-16-IP: Afghan Ministry of Defense Headquarters
- Inspection Report 16-22-IP: Department of Defense Reconstruction Projects
- Inspection Report 16-26-IP: Afghan Air Force University

COMPLETED SPECIAL PROJECT PRODUCTS

- Alert Letter 16-19-SP: Structural Damage at Health Facility
- Report 16-23-SP: Department of Defense Base Closures and Transfers in Afghanistan: The U.S. Has Disposed of \$907 Million in Foreign Excess Real Property

Performance audits: provide assurance or conclusions based on an evaluation of sufficient, appropriate evidence measured against stated criteria. Performance audits provide objective analysis so that management and those charged with governance can use the information to improve the program performance and operations, reduce costs, and facilitate decision-making by parties with responsibility to oversee or initiate corrective action for public accountability. Performance audits are conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards (GAGAS) and the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) Quality Standards for Federal Offices of Inspector General.

Inspections: are systematic and independent assessments of the design, implementation, and/or results of an agency's operations, programs, or policies. SIGAR conducts inspections, in accordance with CIGIE Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, to provide information to Congress and the public on the quality of construction of facilities and infrastructure throughout Afghanistan; and generally, to provide an assessment of the extent to which the facilities were constructed in accordance with the contract requirements, used as intended, and are being maintained.

Financial audits: provide an independent assessment of and reasonable assurance about whether an entity's reported condition, results, and use of resources are presented in accordance with recognized criteria. SIGAR performs financial audits in accordance with GAGAS, which includes both requirements contained in the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants Statements on Auditing Standards and additional requirements provided in GAGAS. SIGAR also reviews financial audits conducted by independent public accountants (IPA). When an IPA conducts a financial audit, SIGAR conducts reasonable procedures to ensure compliance with GAGAS, based on the intended use of the IPA's work and degree of responsibility accepted by SIGAR with respect to that work.

AUDITS

SIGAR conducts **performance audits, inspections, and financial audits** of programs and projects connected to the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan. Since its last report to Congress, SIGAR has issued one performance audit, seven financial audits, and three inspection reports. This quarter, SIGAR also began two new performance audits, bringing the total number of ongoing performance audits to 16.

Performance Audit Reports Published

This quarter SIGAR published one performance audit report. The report examined the extent to which DOD, State, and USAID have identified their efforts and accounted for funding to support primary and secondary education in Afghanistan since fiscal year (FY) 2002; defined strategies to support primary and secondary education in Afghanistan; and assessed their overall progress towards their goals and objectives to support primary and secondary education in Afghanistan.

Audit 16-32-AR: Primary and Secondary Education in Afghanistan

Comprehensive Assessments Needed to Determine the Progress and Effectiveness of over \$759 Million in DOD, State, and USAID Programs

Since 2002, the U.S. government, through DOD, State, and USAID, has implemented numerous programs to support the development of primary and secondary education in Afghanistan. These efforts have focused on areas such as constructing and refurbishing schools, distributing textbooks, and training teachers.

The objectives of this audit were to determine the extent to which DOD, State, and USAID have: (1) identified their efforts and accounted for funding to support primary and secondary education in Afghanistan since FY 2002; (2) defined strategies to support primary and secondary education in Afghanistan; and (3) assessed their overall progress towards their goals and objectives to support primary and secondary education in Afghanistan.

Together, DOD, State, and USAID spent approximately \$759.5 million on 39 programs to support primary and secondary education in Afghanistan from FY 2002 to FY 2014. SIGAR's analysis of State and USAID data showed that the agencies were able to identify their efforts and the amount of funds (approximately \$617.9 million) or the percentage of each program that directly supported primary and secondary education. SIGAR found that DOD spent at least \$141.7 million on Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) projects to support primary and secondary education. However, SIGAR found limitations in DOD's tracking of certain CERP projects that prevented SIGAR from determining how much DOD spent on about 1,000 CERP projects. Although DOD subsequently corrected the two limitations on its tracking of CERP funds, DOD spent additional money on

SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

CERP beyond the \$141.7 million that SIGAR was able to identify. In addition to the information that DOD provided on CERP, SIGAR collected anecdotal evidence from, for example, an independent web search, that DOD spent other funds unrelated to CERP on primary and secondary education in Afghanistan since 2002.

Since 2005, USAID's efforts to support primary and secondary education in Afghanistan has been guided by its *USAID/Afghanistan Strategic Plan 2005–2010*, which the mission has not updated and continues to use. SIGAR determined that USAID/Afghanistan's strategy aligned with agency-wide, global education strategies, as USAID guidance suggests. While USAID had a defined strategy, DOD and State did not. DOD officials stated that its primary focus was the counterinsurgency mission, and any efforts to develop Afghanistan's education system were intended to further the counterinsurgency. State officials told us that State recognized USAID as the primary U.S. agency implementing primary and secondary education programs and deferred to USAID for strategies related to these efforts. However, State does not specifically follow USAID's strategy.

USAID/Afghanistan created long-term strategic plans for its education programs in Afghanistan, in accordance with USAID's Automated Directives System (ADS) Chapter 201 guidance. However, as the primary agency conducting U.S. education development efforts in Afghanistan—as formally designated in 2010 by Presidential Policy Directive 6: U.S. Global Development Policy—and as the only agency to have an education strategy, it did not articulate other agencies' roles and responsibilities, or how their education efforts supported its strategies and objectives. USAID does not require its missions to explicitly address the roles of other U.S. agencies in their strategies, but best-practice standards make it important to do so. For example, a U.S. Government Accountability Office best practice states that a strategy should address who will be implementing the strategy, what their roles will be compared to others, and mechanisms for them to coordinate their efforts. The more detail a strategy provides, the easier it is for the responsible parties to implement it and achieve its goals.

DOD, State, and USAID have not adequately assessed their efforts to support education in Afghanistan. DOD has provided limited assessments through its semiannual *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, which describes combined U.S. government efforts in education, including State and USAID efforts to build capacity and improve overall education. However, SIGAR determined that most discussions in these reports had little to do with DOD education-related efforts and were limited to USAID efforts, including outputs such as the numbers of teachers trained and numbers of schools constructed. DOD officials told us the department does not have specific primary and secondary education strategic objectives against which to evaluate the success of its programs, projects, and other efforts in support of Afghan education. Moreover, State

COMPLETED PERFORMANCE AUDIT

· Audit 16-32-AR: Primary and Secondary Education in Afghanistan

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and USAID's *Evaluation Guidelines for Foreign Assistance* calls for program evaluations, which focus on a program area in a country and cover multiple activities, to give a total understanding of U.S. government programs in a thematic area, such as education. State did not evaluate progress at this level. Instead, based on documentation provided by State, SIGAR determined that State evaluated the progress of its individual programs—as required by U.S. Embassy Kabul guidance—but did not aggregate these evaluations into one overall assessment of its efforts.

Since 2008, USAID has aggregated and assessed performance across its education programs in Afghanistan through its required portfolio reviews and annual Performance Plan and Report submissions. However, SIGAR's analysis showed that these assessments did not reflect a complete study of overall progress in the sector. USAID officials acknowledged that they do not assess the overall performance of the education sector but noted that they do assess the performance of individual education programs to determine if they are on track to achieve their intended results, as called for in USAID guidance. Best practices and State and USAID guidance call for compiling monitoring and evaluation data from individual programs into agency-level assessments of the impact of those efforts overall. If USAID already assesses data on progress at the individual program level, the agency should already have relevant data available to help compile into an overall assessment of its progress in the education sector. Without comprehensive assessments of the work performed in education, DOD, State, and USAID will be unable to determine the impact that the approximately \$759.5 million they have spent has had in improving Afghan education.

To help demonstrate and report on its overall progress in the education sector, USAID uses education statistics that are not always based on USAID performance data and cannot be linked to its specific education programs. For example, in USAID's 2014 fact sheet on education in Afghanistan, USAID cited Afghan government data showing increased student enrollment—from 900,000 students in 2002 to 8 million in 2013—as evidence of overall progress in the sector. Importantly, USAID is not able to demonstrate how its specific education programs are linked to supporting these Afghan-reported results and cannot verify whether this Afghan data is reliable. Both the Afghan Ministry of Education (MOE) and independent assessments have raised significant concern that the MOE's education data may be inaccurate. SIGAR has previously reported on the risks associated with the U.S. government relying on unverified data provided by the Afghan government. Accurate and reliable accounting of data is necessary to ensure full accountability of U.S. funds and inform decision-making on programming and funding. Because the agency relies on Afghan education performance data that is not solely and directly attributable to specific USAID programs and is unreliable, USAID may be inaccurately portraying its program contributions to the education sector in Afghanistan.

SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

Based on the results of the audit, SIGAR recommends that:

1. As the lead U.S. agency for development efforts, the USAID Administrator update, as appropriate, USAID Mission for Afghanistan's strategic education plan to provide clear descriptions of other U.S. agencies' roles, responsibilities, and accountability for helping to implement the strategy.
2. The Secretaries of Defense and State assess the extent to which the education efforts funded by their respective departments, to include primary and secondary education, have led to improvements in education or increased stability in Afghanistan.
3. The USAID Administrator use existing program-level monitoring and evaluation data and reports, as well as annual performance plan and report submissions and portfolio review information, to develop and issue a sector-wide assessment of the agency's efforts to support education in Afghanistan, including primary and secondary education, with specific consideration of outcomes and impacts.
4. The USAID Administrator, when reporting on progress in the Afghan education sector, acknowledge the source and reliability of data, focus on the direct results of USAID's efforts, and clearly explain whether there is a causal connection between USAID efforts and documented progress.

New Performance Audits Announced This Quarter

This quarter SIGAR initiated two new performance audits. One will examine U.S. government efforts to increase the supply, quantity, and distribution of electric power from the Kajaki Dam, and the other will review all the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations' programs and activities in Afghanistan from 2010 through 2014.

U.S. Efforts to Increase the Supply, Quantity, and Distribution of Electric Power from the Kajaki Dam

The Kajaki Dam, located 100 miles northwest of Kandahar City on the Helmand River, holds more than 1.7 billion cubic meters of water and has long been recognized as a potential source of irrigation and hydropower for southern Afghanistan. The dam was built in 1953 with funding assistance from the United States. In 1975, USAID commissioned the installation of two 16.5-megawatt turbine generators at the dam and left space for a third turbine. However, plans to install the third turbine were abandoned after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, which eliminated a vital financial pipeline for the project. Despite the lack of financing, the Kajaki Dam continued to operate and provided electricity to Helmand and Kandahar provinces through the Soviet occupation, the civil war, and Taliban rule. As a result of decades of war and neglect, the Kajaki Dam has not had sufficient, periodic upgrades and maintenance.

NEW PERFORMANCE AUDITS

- U.S. Efforts to Increase the Supply, Quantity, and Distribution of Electric Power from the Kajaki Dam
- Task Force for Business and Stability Operations' Programs and Activities in Afghanistan

SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

For more than 10 years, DOD, including the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), and USAID have implemented several concurrent projects associated with the Kajaki Dam. The focus of these efforts was to help the Afghan government improve electricity generation and distribution to southern Afghanistan in order to promote stability, economic development, and public confidence in the Afghan government. These projects include construction and structural repairs of the dam, rehabilitating the existing turbine generators, installing an additional turbine generator, and connecting transmission lines and substations to improve the dam's capacity to deliver reliable and sustainable electric power. Despite the significant investment the U.S. government has already made, and the loss of scores of U.S. and Coalition lives in the process, the Kajaki Dam has been plagued by problems, remains incomplete, and has yet to provide sufficient and sustained power to southern Afghanistan, particularly Helmand and Kandahar Provinces.

This audit will examine U.S. government efforts to increase the supply, quantity, and distribution of electric power from the Kajaki Dam. Specifically, the audit will:

1. Identify the projects the U.S. government has implemented since 2001, and any planned projects, to increase the supply, quantity, and distribution of electrical power from the Kajaki Dam, and their associated costs;
2. Assess the extent to which the completed and ongoing projects related to the Kajaki Dam have achieved or are achieving their expected outcomes and broader U.S. objectives;
3. Assess the extent to which U.S. agencies monitored and evaluated the progress and quality of the work performed to enhance the power generation capacity of the Kajaki Dam;
4. Determine the extent to which the enhancement of the Kajaki Dam remains economically and strategically viable; and
5. Assess the extent to which U.S. agencies and the Afghan government have planned and implemented efforts to operate, maintain, and sustain the Kajaki Dam over the long-term.

Task Force for Business and Stability Operations Programs and Activities in Afghanistan

The Task Force for Business and Stability Operations was a DOD organization that administered initiatives to assist the Commander of U.S. Forces–Afghanistan and the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan in supporting U.S. security interests. TFBSO pursued three broad objectives: (1) restoring productive capacity in the Afghan economy wherever possible, across all industrial sectors; (2) stimulating economic growth; and (3) serving as a catalyst for private investment in Afghanistan by linking the international business community with Afghan business leaders and government

SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

officials. Between 2010 and 2014, TFBSO disbursed nearly \$640 million to support its initiatives in Afghanistan, which included efforts to facilitate foreign investments and develop various industries that the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, determined would strengthen stability or provide strategic support to the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. TFBSO concluded operations in Afghanistan in December 2014.

In April 2015 and January 2016, SIGAR released two performance audits reviewing U.S. efforts to develop Afghanistan's oil, gas, and minerals industries, collectively referred to as the "extractive" industries. These audits reviewed more than \$215 million in disbursements made by TFBSO for the development of those industries. SIGAR found that TFBSO did not effectively coordinate its activities with the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Department of State, did not adequately plan for the sustainment of its projects following the conclusion of TFBSO operations in December 2014, and failed to transition any of its activities to another U.S. agency. SIGAR also found that TFBSO's efforts to develop the extractive industries achieved mixed results. In January 2016, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction testified before the Senate Armed Services' Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee on TFBSO's programs, operations, and oversight. Following this hearing, the chair of the subcommittee requested that SIGAR perform a review of all of TFBSO's programs and operations in Afghanistan. The chair of the Senate committee on the Judiciary has also requested that SIGAR perform such a review.

This audit will review all of TFBSO's programs and activities in Afghanistan from 2010 through 2014. Specifically, the audit will determine the extent to which:

1. TFBSO created and followed an overall strategy and programmatic plans for its programs and activities within Afghanistan;
2. TFBSO coordinated its programs and activities within Afghanistan with other government agencies and donor organizations;
3. DOD conducted oversight of TFBSO's programs and activities within Afghanistan; and
4. TFBSO's programs and activities within Afghanistan achieved their designed programmatic outcomes and are sustainable.

Financial Audits

SIGAR launched its financial-audit program in 2012, after Congress and the oversight community expressed concerns about oversight gaps and the growing backlog of incurred-cost audits for contracts and grants awarded in support of overseas contingency operations. SIGAR competitively selects independent accounting firms to conduct the financial audits and ensures that the audit work is performed in accordance with U.S. government auditing standards. Financial audits are coordinated with the federal

SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

TABLE 2.1

SIGAR'S FINANCIAL AUDIT COVERAGE (\$ BILLIONS)	
71 Completed Audits	\$4.4
24 Ongoing Audits	3.6
Total	\$8.0

Note: Numbers have been rounded. Coverage includes auditable costs incurred by recipients of U.S.-funded Afghanistan reconstruction contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements.

Source: SIGAR Audits and Inspections Directorate.

Questioned amounts: the sum of potentially unallowable questioned costs and unremitted interest on advanced federal funds or other revenue amounts payable to the government.

Questioned costs: costs determined to be potentially unallowable. The two types of questioned costs are ineligible costs (violation of a law, regulation, contract, grant, cooperative agreement, etc., or an unnecessary or unreasonable expenditure of funds) and unsupported costs (those not supported by adequate documentation or proper approvals at the time of an audit).

Special Purpose Financial Statement: a financial statement that includes all revenues received, costs incurred, and any remaining balance for a given award during a given period.

inspector-general community to maximize financial-audit coverage and avoid duplication of effort.

This quarter, SIGAR completed seven financial audits of U.S.-funded contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements to rebuild Afghanistan. SIGAR announced it will soon initiate, in accordance with two congressional requests, a financial statement audit of TFBSO activities related to Afghanistan reconstruction. This is the first of multiple planned SIGAR financial audits of TFBSO. The future audits will focus on specific TFBSO reconstruction contracts in Afghanistan. SIGAR also announced seven new financial audits of USAID awards with combined incurred costs of nearly \$390.2 million, bringing the total number of ongoing financial audits to 24 with more than \$3.6 billion in auditable costs, as shown in Table 2.1.

These audits help provide the U.S. government and the American taxpayer reasonable assurance that the funds spent on these awards were used as intended. The audits question expenditures that cannot be substantiated or are potentially unallowable.

SIGAR issues each financial-audit report to the funding agency that made the award(s). The funding agency is responsible for making the final determination on **questioned amounts** identified in the report's audit findings. Since the program's inception, SIGAR's financial audits have identified over \$283.1 million in **questioned costs** and \$289,880 in unremitted interest on advanced federal funds or other revenue amounts payable to the government. As of April 30, 2016, funding agencies had reached a management decision on 57 completed financial audits and over \$16.8 million in questioned amounts are subject to collection. It takes time for funding agencies to carefully consider audit findings and recommendations. As a result, agency management decisions remain to be made for several of SIGAR's issued financial audits. SIGAR's financial audits have also identified and communicated 239 compliance findings and 268 internal-control findings to the auditees and funding agencies.

SIGAR's financial audits have four specific objectives:

- Express an opinion on whether the **Special Purpose Financial Statement** for the award presents fairly, in all material respects, revenues received, costs incurred, items directly procured by the U.S. government, and balance for the period audited in conformity with the terms of the award and generally accepted accounting principles or other comprehensive basis of accounting.
- Evaluate and obtain a sufficient understanding of the audited entity's internal control related to the award; assess control risk; and identify and report on significant deficiencies including material internal-control weaknesses.
- Perform tests to determine whether the audited entity complied, in all material respects, with the award requirements and applicable laws and regulations; and identify and report on instances of material

SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

noncompliance with terms of the award and applicable laws and regulations.

- Determine and report on whether the audited entity has taken adequate corrective action to address findings and recommendations from previous engagements.

A list of completed and ongoing financial audits can be found in Appendix C of this quarterly report.

Financial Audits Published

This quarter, SIGAR completed seven financial audits of U.S.-funded contracts and cooperative agreements to rebuild Afghanistan. These financial audits identified \$922,628 in questioned costs as a result of internal-control deficiencies and noncompliance issues. These deficiencies and noncompliance issues included exceeding the approved budget without prior agency approval, failure to adhere to policies on payroll records, failure to adhere to federal regulations related to government-owned equipment and travel expenses, failure to properly monitor subcontractors, inadequate oversight of overtime and timekeeping policies, and inadequate documentation for invoices and non-payroll costs.

Financial Audit 16-20-FA: USDA's Soybeans for Agricultural Renewal in Afghanistan Initiative

Audit of Costs Incurred by the American Soybean Association

On September 30, 2010, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) entered into a 3-year, \$12 million agreement with the American Soybean Association (ASA) to implement the Soybeans for Agricultural Renewal in Afghanistan Initiative (SARAI). Through SARAI, ASA distributed soy flour to Afghan women and implemented activities funded by monetizing soybean oil provided by the CCC. Among other objectives, these activities were intended to increase knowledge of nutrition and available protein sources in Afghanistan, increase the quantity of soy grown and consumed in Afghanistan, and establish a sustainable and profitable protein processing facility. After three modifications, program funding was increased to \$16.8 million. SIGAR's financial audit, performed by Williams, Adley & Company-DC LLP (Williams Adley), reviewed \$13,070,152 in expenditures charged to the agreement from October 1, 2010, through September 30, 2013.

Williams Adley identified two deficiencies in ASA's internal controls, one of which was significant, and one instance of noncompliance with the terms and conditions of the agreement. Specifically, Williams Adley found that ASA exceeded the approved budget for professional services by \$61,700. ASA did not receive prior USDA approval for this cost, which exceeded the \$50,000 pre-approval threshold for allowable adjustments to flexible spending items. Williams Adley also found that ASA did not adhere to its internal

COMPLETED FINANCIAL AUDITS

- Financial Audit 16-20-FA: USDA's Soybeans for Agricultural Renewal in Afghanistan Initiative
- Financial Audit 16-21-FA: USAID's Irrigation and Watershed Management Program in Afghanistan
- Financial Audit 16-25-FA: Department of State's Demining Activities in Afghanistan
- Financial Audit 16-27-FA: USAID's Support for the American University of Afghanistan
- Financial Audit 16-28-FA: Department of State's Demining Activities in Afghanistan
- Financial Audit 16-30-FA: Construction of the Special Forces Kandak in Kandahar
- Financial Audit 16-31-FA: USAID's Health Care Improvement Project

policies related to payroll records. Williams Adley identified two instances where the employee's signature was missing from a timesheet, and one instance where the employee's timesheet did not have the employee's name on it.

As a result of the internal-control weakness and instance of noncompliance relating to the budget overage, Williams Adley identified \$61,700 in questioned costs, consisting entirely of ineligible costs. Williams Adley did not identify any unsupported costs—costs not supported with adequate documentation or that did not have required prior approval. No costs were questioned in connection with the payroll finding, as it was found to be only an internal control issue.

Williams Adley reviewed prior Office of Management and Budget Circular A-133 audit reports that could have had a material impact on ASA's Special Purpose Financial Statement. In these reports, Williams Adley identified and followed up on six audit findings related to the scope of this audit. After reviewing and assessing documentation, Williams Adley determined that ASA had taken adequate corrective actions on all six prior findings. Williams Adley's fieldwork and testing revealed no exceptions or noncompliance issues within the areas previously identified as deficient in the prior A-133 audit reports.

Williams Adley issued an unmodified opinion on ASA's Special Purpose Financial Statement, noting that it presents fairly, in all material respects, program revenues and costs incurred for the indicated period audited.

Based on the results of the audit, SIGAR recommends that the responsible agreement officer at USDA:

- Determine the allowability of and recover, as appropriate, \$61,700 in questioned costs identified in the report.
- Advise ASA to address the report's two internal-control findings.
- Advise ASA to address the report's one noncompliance finding.

Financial Audit 16-21-FA: USAID's Irrigation and Watershed Management Program in Afghanistan

Audit of Costs Incurred by Perini Management Services, Inc.

On December 21, 2012, USAID awarded a 5-year, \$129.9 million task order, with an initial obligation of \$10 million to Perini Management Services Inc. (PMSI) to support the Irrigation and Watershed Management Program (IWMP) in Afghanistan. The program was intended to expand and strengthen Afghan government and community-level capacity to manage water resources to improve agricultural production and productivity. The IWMP included four components: (1) governance and capacity building, (2) water-supply management, (3) water-demand management, and (4) Afghanistan government implementation of on-budget irrigation and watershed management activities.

The task order underwent modifications, and its obligated funding decreased from \$26 million to \$16 million. Also, during implementation of the IWMP, USAID recognized performance problems and programmatic difficulties and terminated the program for convenience. SIGAR's financial audit, performed by Mayer Hoffman McCann P.C. (MHM) reviewed \$14,944,730 in expenditures charged to the task order from December 21, 2012, through July 31, 2015.

Overall, MHM found PMSI had good internal controls in place and had supporting documentation for most of the expenditures charged to the task order. However, MHM identified one significant deficiency in PMSI's internal controls, and five instances of noncompliance with the terms and conditions of the task order. Specifically, MHM found that PMSI did not adhere to federal regulations related to government-owned equipment. MHM also determined that PMSI could not provide supporting documentation for the transfer of damaged equipment to USAID. In addition, MHM found that PMSI did not properly monitor its subcontractors and did not require subcontractors to submit any supporting documentation with their invoices. Finally, PMSI did not adhere to federal regulations related to travel expenses, which resulted in PMSI overbilling the U.S. government.

As a result of the internal-control deficiency and instances of noncompliance, MHM identified \$838 in total questioned costs, consisting of \$748 in unsupported costs, and \$90 in ineligible costs.

MHM did not identify any prior audits, reviews, or evaluations related to PMSI's work to support the IWMP. PMSI and USAID also indicated that there were no prior audit reports issued on this program.

MHM issued an unmodified opinion on PMSI's Special Purpose Financial Statement, noting that it presents fairly, in all material respects, revenues received and costs incurred for the period audited.

Based on the results of the audit, SIGAR recommends that the responsible contracting officer at USAID:

1. Determine the allowability of and recover, as appropriate, \$838 in questioned costs identified in the report.
2. Advise PMSI to address the report's one internal control finding.
3. Advise PMSI to address the report's five noncompliance findings.

Financial Audit 16-25-FA: Department of State's Demining Activities in Afghanistan

Audit of Costs Incurred by the HALO Trust

Between April 1, 2011, and April 1, 2013, the Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement awarded five grants totaling more than \$14.7 million to the HALO Trust (HALO) to support demining activities in Afghanistan. HALO is a humanitarian organization headquartered in Scotland that has worked on mine clearance and technical innovation for more than two decades. The grants were intended to: (1) protect victims

of conflict, (2) restore access to land and infrastructure, (3) develop host-nation capacity, and (4) improve conventional-weapons stockpile security and management practices. SIGAR's financial audit, performed by Williams Adley, reviewed \$14,763,900 in expenditures charged to the five grants between April 1, 2011, and March 31, 2015.

Williams Adley identified five deficiencies in HALO's internal controls, one of which was considered material, and two others significant, and nine instances of noncompliance with grant terms and laws or regulations, one of which was considered material. Specifically, Williams Adley found that HALO used an unsupported allocation methodology to determine payroll costs for individuals working on multiple projects. Additionally, HALO could not provide adequate supporting documentation for vehicle purchase, maintenance, and fuel costs. Williams Adley also found that HALO did not obtain prior approval before exceeding State's 10% threshold for transferring funds between budget line items.

As a result of these internal-control deficiencies and instances of noncompliance, Williams Adley identified \$63,871 in ineligible costs and \$160,904 in unsupported costs.

Williams Adley obtained and reviewed three prior Office of Management and Budget A-133 reports applicable to the scope of this audit. Williams Adley identified five prior audit findings and determined that HALO had properly addressed two of the findings. HALO has not properly addressed prior audit findings related to the payroll system and procurement procedures. Williams Adley identified similar findings in this audit.

Williams Adley issued a modified opinion on HALO's Special Purpose Financial Statement due to the material weakness in the reliability of the payroll system to determine cost reasonableness and the questioned costs detailed in the statement.

Based on the results of the audit, SIGAR recommends that the responsible grants officer at State:

1. Determine the allowability of and recover, as appropriate, \$224,775 in total questioned costs identified in the report.
2. Advise HALO to address the report's five internal control findings.
3. Advise HALO to address the report's nine noncompliance findings.

Financial Audit 16-27-FA: USAID's Support for the American University of Afghanistan

Audit of Costs Incurred by the American University of Afghanistan

On August 1, 2013, USAID awarded a five-year, \$40 million cooperative agreement with an initial obligation of \$10 million to the American University of Afghanistan (AUAF). The funding was intended to be used to: (1) strengthen academic and professional development, (2) enhance the quality of programs, (3) expand programs for women, and (4) increase the university's financial self-sufficiency. After six modifications, funding

has increased to \$21 million, and the period of performance is expected to continue through July 31, 2018. SIGAR's financial audit, performed by MHM, reviewed \$15,855,843 in expenditures charged to the cooperative agreement from August 1, 2013, through July 31, 2015.

MHM identified five deficiencies, three of which were considered significant, in AUAF's internal controls, and four instances of noncompliance with the terms and conditions of the cooperative agreement. Specifically, MHM found that AUAF did not have adequate management oversight and charged the agreement for non-program-related and unallowable costs. As a result, MHM questioned \$68,418 in ineligible costs. In addition, AUAF failed to obtain USAID approval and did not retain documentation related to emergency evacuation expenses, resulting in \$29,496 in unallowable costs. MHM also found that AUAF did not provide adequate management oversight of overtime and timekeeping policies, which resulted in \$9,295 in ineligible overtime costs.

As a result of these internal-control deficiencies and instances of non-compliance, MHM identified \$107,209 in total questioned costs, consisting of \$77,713 ineligible costs and \$29,496 in unsupported costs. Based on the results of the audit, SIGAR recommends that the responsible agreement officer at USAID:

1. Determine the allowability of and recover, as appropriate, \$107,209 in questioned costs identified in the report.
2. Advise AUAF to address the report's five internal control findings.
3. Advise AUAF to address the report's four noncompliance findings

Financial Audit 16-28-FA: Department of State's Demining Activities in Afghanistan

Audit of Costs Incurred by the Mine Detection Dog Center

Between April 1, 2011, and April 1, 2013, the Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement awarded six grants totaling more than \$10.5 million to the Mine Detection Dog Center (MDC) to support demining activities in Afghanistan. MDC was established in 1989 and is an Afghan nongovernmental demining organization. The grants were intended to (1) protect victims of conflict, (2) restore access to land and infrastructure, (3) develop host-nation capacity, and (4) improve conventional weapons stockpile security and management practices. SIGAR's financial audit, performed by Williams Adley, reviewed \$10,581,236 in expenditures charged to the six grants between April 1, 2011, and September 30, 2014.

Williams Adley identified three deficiencies in MDC's internal controls, one of which was considered material and another significant, and six instances of noncompliance with grant terms and laws or regulations, one of which was considered material. MDC used an unsupported allocation methodology to determine payroll costs for individuals working on multiple projects. MDC also lacked sufficient and adequate documentation for

SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

certain non-payroll costs, such as training and veterinary costs. As a result of these internal-control deficiencies and instances of noncompliance, Williams Adley identified \$98,780 in unsupported costs. Williams Adley did not identify any ineligible costs.

Williams Adley obtained and reviewed six prior audit reports, one for each of the grants. Based on its review, Williams Adley concluded that there were no recommendations from those reports that could have a material impact on the Special Purpose Financial Statement or other financial data significant to the objectives of this audit.

Williams Adley issued a modified opinion on MDC's Special Purpose Financial Statement due to the material weakness in the reliability of the payroll system to determine cost reasonableness and the questioned costs detailed in the statement

Based on the results of the audit, SIGAR recommends that the responsible grants officer at State:

1. Determine the allowability of and recover, as appropriate, \$98,780 in total questioned costs identified in the report.
2. Advise MDC to address the report's three internal-control findings.
3. Advise MDC to address the report's six noncompliance findings.

Financial Audit 16-30-FA: Construction of the Special Forces Kandak in Kandahar

Audit of Costs Incurred by Environmental Chemical Corporation

On February 28, 2011, the 772nd Enterprise Sourcing Squadron, in support of the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment (AFCEE)—reorganized in 2012 as the Air Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC)—awarded a 19-month, \$13.0 million task order to Environmental Chemical Corporation (ECC) to design and construct facilities and infrastructure for the 2nd Special Forces Kandak, a battalion-sized unit, in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The task order was intended to construct various buildings and facilities, including barracks, a power plant, and a road system, at the kandak. After seven modifications, the total cost of the task order was increased to \$21,647,410, and the period of performance was extended to April 23, 2014. SIGAR's financial audit, performed by Crowe Horwath LLP (Crowe), reviewed \$21,639,589 in expenditures charged to the task order from February 28, 2011, through April 23, 2014

Crowe identified one material weakness and four significant deficiencies in ECC's internal controls, and five instances of noncompliance with the terms and conditions of the task order. Specifically, ECC was unable to provide supporting documentation for seven petty cash transactions, leading to \$195,499 in unsupported costs. Additionally, Crowe found that ECC improperly charged \$25,392 to the task order for vehicle fuel purchase and telephone bills. ECC did not perform required annual inventory reconciliations or periodic inventories. Crowe also noted that ECC did not comply

with the task order's requirements to provide AFCEC with monthly progress reports and biweekly cost schedule status updates. Additionally, ECC was unable to provide support for the approval of key personnel changes during the period of performance.

As a result of these internal control weaknesses and instances of non-compliance, Crowe identified \$220,891 in total questioned costs, consisting of \$25,392 in ineligible costs—costs prohibited by the task order, applicable laws, or regulations—and \$195,499 in unsupported costs—costs not supported with adequate documentation or that did not have required prior approvals or authorization.

Crowe did not identify any prior audits or assessments that pertained to ECC's design and construction work for the 2nd Special Forces Kandak or were material to the Special Purpose Financial Statement.

Crowe issued an unmodified opinion on ECC's Special Purpose Financial Statement, noting that it presents fairly, in all material aspects, revenues received, cost incurred, and the balance for the period audited.

Based on the results of the audit, SIGAR recommends that the responsible contracting officer at AFCEC:

1. Determine the allowability of and recover, as appropriate, \$220,891 in questioned costs identified in the report.
2. Advise ECC to address the report's five internal control findings.
3. Advise ECC to address the report's five noncompliance findings.

Financial Audit 16-31-FA: USAID's Health Care Improvement Project

Audit of Costs Incurred by the University Research Company LLC

On September 30, 2009, the USAID awarded a 4-year, \$89.5 million task order to the University Research Company LLC (URC) to implement the Health Care Improvement (HCI) project in multiple countries, including Afghanistan. URC is a global company that works to improve the quality of health care, social services, and health education worldwide. The HCI project was intended to improve the quality of maternal and newborn care and basic package of health services, and provide strategic support to the Afghan Ministry of Public Health to improve healthcare capacity and infrastructure. After 20 modifications, the total cost of the task order was increased to \$90.7 million, and the period of performance was extended to September 29, 2014. Of the task order's \$90.7 million, \$13.9 million was for activities in Afghanistan. SIGAR's financial audit, performed by MHM reviewed \$13,121,542 in expenditures charged to the task order from September 30, 2009, through September 29, 2014.

MHM identified three deficiencies in URC's internal controls, two of which were considered significant deficiencies, and three instances of non-compliance with the terms and conditions of the task order. Specifically, MHM found that URC was unable to provide adequate support for

competitive procurement processes related to consultants, travel, vendor payments, and other direct costs. MHM also found that URC did not adhere to its internal policies and task order terms related to payroll records. Finally, MHM determined that URC could not provide sufficient support that it reviewed the Excluded Parties List System before contracting with vendors to verify the vendors were not suspended, debarred, or otherwise excluded from receiving federal funds.

As a result of the internal-control deficiencies and instances of noncompliance, MHM identified \$208,435 in total questioned costs, consisting of \$162 in ineligible costs—costs prohibited by the task order, applicable laws, or regulations—and \$208,273 in unsupported costs—costs not supported with adequate documentation or that did not have required prior approval.

MHM did not identify any prior audits, reviews, or evaluations related to URC's work to support the HCI project in Afghanistan.

MHM issued an unmodified opinion on URC's Special Purpose Financial Statement, noting that it presents fairly, in all material respects, revenues received, and costs incurred in Afghanistan for the period audited.

Based on the results of the audit, SIGAR recommends that the responsible contracting officer at USAID:

1. Determine the allowability of and recover, as appropriate, \$208,435 in questioned costs identified in the report.
2. Advise URC to address the report's three internal control findings.
3. Advise URC to address the report's three noncompliance findings.

INSPECTIONS

Inspection Reports Published

This quarter SIGAR published three inspection reports. One report examined whether the construction of a Ministry of Defense (MOD) headquarters building in Kabul, Afghanistan, was completed in accordance with contract requirements and construction standards, and whether the building was being used as intended and maintained. A second examined similar issues with respect to renovation work and new construction for the Afghan Air Force University. A third report identified common themes in 36 inspection reports dealing with DOD reconstruction projects that were issued by SIGAR from 2009 to 2015, including whether DOD had implemented recommendations made in the reports. SIGAR has 14 inspections ongoing.

COMPLETED INSPECTION REPORTS

- Inspection Report 16-16-IP: Afghan Ministry of Defense Headquarters
- Inspection Report 16-22-IP: Department of Defense Reconstruction Projects
- Inspection Report 16-26-IP: Afghan Air Force University

Inspection Report 16-16-IP: Afghan Ministry of Defense Headquarters

\$154.7 Million Building Appears Well Built, but has Several Construction Issues That Should Be Assessed

On April 21, 2009, the Air Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC), previously the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment, awarded a \$48.7 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract to Innovative Technical Solutions Inc. (ITSI) to construct a MOD headquarters in Kabul, Afghanistan. ITSI was to complete the building by October 11, 2010. After 14 modifications, the contract cost was raised to \$107.3 million. By November 2013, ITSI had requested an additional \$24.7 million to finish the project. However, due to a lack of available funds, construction work was halted on December 31, 2013.

On July 30, 2014, AFCEC awarded Gilbane Federal—the new corporate name for ITSI—a second \$47.4 million firm-fixed-price contract to complete the MOD headquarters building by July 31, 2015.

The five-story building included a national command center, administration space, dining facilities, bathrooms, secure garage, a 1,000-seat auditorium, a waste-water treatment plant, and a heating/cooling system.

The building is in an active seismic zone, so a key part of its design was separation into seven sections to avoid transfer of forces among sections. Separation joints between sections were designed to be complete breaks in the floors, walls, and ceilings that divide the building into discrete sections.

The objectives of this inspection were to assess whether (1) construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards, and (2) the building was being used as intended and maintained.

SIGAR found that the MOD headquarters in Kabul was constructed as a five-story building, which, with some exceptions, generally met contract requirements and appears well built. Originally, the cost of the headquarters building was \$48.7 million, and it was to be completed in about 18 months. However, there were problems with the contract from the outset. Not only did the Afghan National Army (ANA) refuse the contractor, ITSI, a U.S. company, access to the site for about a year, but other delays, such as weather, security, and funding issues, emerged. As a result, the cost to complete the building rose to \$154.7 million, or more than three times the original estimated cost.

Similarly, although the headquarters building is now essentially complete, it took almost five years longer to complete than originally anticipated. The Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A) transferred the building to the MOD on December 28, 2015. As of January 7, 2016, the building was not fully occupied.

On April 30, 2015, AFCEC transferred the MOD headquarters building to CSTC-A. The transfer document listed three deficiencies, including the need

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Afghan Ministry of Defense headquarters building in Kabul, January 7, 2016.
(SIGAR photo by Wilhelmina Pierce)

to install a fire-rated glass entry door. An AFCEC official told SIGAR that all three deficiencies have since been corrected.

During six inspection visits to the MOD headquarters building, SIGAR examined the roof drainage system, seismic-separation joints, exterior walls and stairwells, plumbing fixtures and mechanical equipment, auditorium seats and platform stage, electrical and water systems, windows, doors, and ceiling panels, as well as fire-suppression pumps, fire alarms, and communications lines. SIGAR found other deficiencies not identified by AFCEC that could affect the building's structural integrity during an earthquake or prolonged periods of rain. These include issues with building separation joints needed for seismic activity, lateral bracing of equipment needed for seismic activity, inadequate roof drains to remove storm water, and stairway handrails that were installed below the required height.

Specifically, SIGAR found:

- The headquarters building's separation joints, needed to counter seismic activity, were (1) not continuous or aligned vertically from the foundation up to and through the roof; and (2) were spanned with non-structural systems, such as drain pipes, on the inside of the building without the required flexible connections. For example, SIGAR found that at least three of the seven separation joints did not provide complete breaks in the floors, walls, and ceiling that would divide the building into discrete sections. As a result, it is possible that one of the building's seven sections will move more than allowed during an earthquake.
- Building equipment did not have lateral bracing needed for seismic activity. The contracts required that building standards be based on DOD's Unified Facilities Criteria. Those standards require that

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lateral bracing be provided for items suspended from the ceiling or floor above. SIGAR found items, such as mechanical duct work and a 60-pound ceiling-mounted piece of heating/cooling equipment, with no lateral bracing. In addition, the fire-suppression system's fuel tank in the basement was installed without lateral bracing or containment, so it could rupture and spill fuel in an earthquake.

- The roof was not constructed in accordance with contract and code requirements for roof drainage. For example, the installed roof drains measured 3 inches and not the required 4 inches in diameter. In addition, no secondary drains were installed. The contract design documents required a secondary emergency overflow system for the headquarters building's roof. Without a secondary system, storm water trapped on the roof could (1) damage the roof-mounted heating and cooling equipment, (2) allow water to enter the roof's access doors and damage the building, and (3) freeze in winter and damage the roof.
- The handrails on interior stairways were installed at a height of 31 inches, which does not meet the minimum 34-inch height that the International Building Code requires. A lower height could contribute to falls and injuries. SIGAR also found that Gilbane Federal received approval to substitute the originally planned mild steel pipe handrails with stainless steel thin-walled pipe handrails. The walls of the stainless steel pipe are no more than a fourth as thick as the originally required pipe. As a result, the installed handrails have multiple dents, which will increase maintenance costs. During a follow-up inspection on January 7, 2016, after completion of our fieldwork, SIGAR noted that CSTC-A had corrected the handrails.

To protect the U.S. government's investment, SIGAR recommends that the Commanding General, CSTC-A, take action and report back to SIGAR within 90 days, to:

1. Assess the building's structural integrity where separation joints are not a continuous line from the bottom to the top of the building and where the allowable building movement exceeds standards, and if needed, make deficient areas structurally sound.
2. Assess the need for the installation of seismic lateral bracing on nonstructural components suspended from the ceiling or floor above, such as heating/cooling equipment, duct work, dropped ceilings, electrical fixtures, and drain pipes.
3. Install flexible connections across all separation joints of nonstructural components, such as gypsum wall board, dropped ceilings, and drain pipes.
4. Assess the integrity of lateral bracing, anchorage, isolation, and energy dissipation of all equipment for compliance with the contract's

seismic requirements, and make deficient items compliant with the requirements.

5. Assess the installed roof drainage system for compliance with the design documents and the International Building Code, and correct any deficiencies.

Inspection Report 16-22-IP: Department of Defense Reconstruction Projects

Summary of SIGAR Inspection Reports Issued from July 2009 through September 2015

From July 2009 through September 2015, SIGAR issued 36 inspection reports examining DOD reconstruction projects. To develop this report, SIGAR reviewed each of the 36 reports, which involved 44 separate reconstruction projects with a combined contract value of about \$1.1 billion. These projects were located in 15 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces.

The objectives of this report were to analyze and identify common themes in those reports. Specifically, SIGAR assessed the extent to which (1) contractors met contract requirements and technical specifications when constructing or renovating facilities, (2) the facilities inspected were being used, and (3) DOD has implemented recommendations made in the inspection reports. Because SIGAR's inspection reports contained numerous recommendations to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of DOD's reconstruction activities in Afghanistan, this summary report contains no new recommendations.

SIGAR found that 16 of the 44 DOD reconstruction projects it inspected met contract requirements and technical specifications. These projects show that when contractors adhere to requirements and there is adequate oversight, project goals can be achieved.

The 28 remaining projects included work that did not meet contract requirements or technical specifications. Deficiencies ranged from substituting building materials without approval to not completing work required under the contract. In some cases, these actions had health and safety implications.

The construction deficiencies SIGAR identified during its inspections involved such issues as collapsible soil due to poor compaction; improperly installed heating and cooling systems; inoperable water systems; inadequate testing of mechanical systems; electrical wiring that was not up to code; use of substandard building materials; poorly mixed, cured, and reinforced concrete; and improperly installed roofs. SIGAR also found that remedying construction deficiencies sometimes resulted in additional expenditures beyond the initial cost of the contracts.

Of the 44 DOD reconstruction projects inspected, SIGAR found that 21 were complete and 23 were incomplete at the time of our inspections. Of the 21 projects that were complete, 14 were being used and seven, or one-third of the completed projects, had never been used. SIGAR found that



Building deterioration due to water penetration at a Special Police Training Center, February 2013. (National Police Training Center Mentor photo)

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usage of the 14 projects varied, some being fully used and others only partially used.

Of the 23 incomplete projects, six projects were still under construction within their originally scheduled completion dates and, therefore, would not have been ready for use at the time SIGAR inspected them. Five were incomplete due to project termination or for reasons SIGAR could not determine at the time of the inspections. Twelve were experiencing construction delays that had extended their completion past the original schedule. With respect to the 12 projects that were not completed on time due to construction delays, those delays ranged from five months to over two years and seven months beyond their originally scheduled completion dates. SIGAR noted that seven of the 23 projects, despite being incomplete, were being used to some extent at the time of its inspections.

DOD has taken steps to improve its processes to ensure control and accountability for its reconstruction projects, including hiring more engineers and changing its guidance to improve planning and oversight. Despite DOD's efforts to improve processes, serious problems continued with its reconstruction projects. Construction of the three most troubled projects SIGAR inspected—the Afghan Special Police's Dry Fire Range, Bathkhak School, and the ANA Slaughterhouse—began in 2012 or long after the first reporting on systemic oversight weaknesses in DOD reconstruction projects.

SIGAR determined that as of September 30, 2015, DOD had implemented the majority of recommendations made in its 36 inspection reports. In these reports, SIGAR made 95 recommendations to DOD; of the 90 recommendations closed, DOD had implemented 76, or 84%. The large percentage of recommendations closed shows that in response to SIGAR's inspection reports, DOD generally took action to improve efficiency and effectiveness in its reconstruction activities, and to correct construction deficiencies. For example, USACE took immediate action at the ANA garrison in Gamberi to (1) remedy possible flooding by having drainage areas examined and repaired and having the contractor conduct frequent surveys for future deteriorating conditions, (2) repair a bridge near the garrison's main entrance that SIGAR believed could collapse under heavy traffic because its deck service had been compromised, and (3) design and plan for installing a perimeter fence that SIGAR felt was needed to secure the garrison's weapons training range.

SIGAR's inspections have covered a wide range of DOD reconstruction projects in Afghanistan, from bases for the ANDSF to schools and hospitals. While some of those projects were well built and met contract requirements and technical specifications, most of the projects SIGAR inspected did not meet those requirements and had serious construction deficiencies. In many cases, poorly prepared or unqualified contractor personnel, inferior materials, poor workmanship, and inadequate oversight by both



Crumbling stairs of varying heights at Garm Ser ANP District Headquarters, June 27, 2010. (SIGAR photo)

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the contractor and the U.S. government contributed to these substandard results. Unless future projects address the deficiencies SIGAR has identified by, for example, improving project planning and design, and oversight during the construction process, substandard projects will continue to be built, resulting in a waste of U.S. taxpayer funds.



Poorly maintained facilities in bathroom at Afghan Air Force University, March 2015. (SIGAR photo by Aziz Zaki)

Inspection Report 16-26-IP: Afghan Air Force University Contract Requirements Were Generally Met, but Instances of Non-Compliance, Poor Workmanship, and Inadequate Maintenance Need to Be Addressed

On January 22, 2012, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers awarded a nearly \$10 million fixed-price, design/build contract to Technologists Inc., a U.S. company, to construct the facilities necessary to convert the National Military Academy of Afghanistan into the Afghan Air Force University. The university is located on the perimeter of Kabul International Airport and is designed to house and train 1,200 air force cadets with 400 support personnel. The contract called for construction of eight new buildings and renovation of 24 existing buildings.

Beginning in November 2012, a series of contract modifications decreased the project's scope to construction of three new buildings—a kitchen/cold storage area; an entry control point; and a depot for petroleum, oil, and lubricants—and the renovation of 15 existing buildings—four barracks, four bathroom buildings, three dining facilities, a training center, and three support structures. The modifications also decreased the contract price to about \$6.7 million.

On April 14, 2014, USACE and the Train, Advise, Assist Command–Air (TAAC-Air) transferred 8 of the 15 renovated buildings to Afghan authorities as part of a two-phased turnover strategy. The one-year warranty for these eight buildings began on April 14, 2014. On April 4, 2015, USACE and TAAC-Air transferred the 10 remaining buildings—three new buildings and the remaining seven renovated buildings—to Afghan authorities. The one-year warranty for these 10 buildings began on February 9, 2015.

The objectives of this inspection were to determine whether (1) construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards, and (2) the new and renovated buildings were being used as intended and maintained.

SIGAR found that the Afghan Air Force University's renovation work and new construction was largely completed according to the terms of the contract between USACE and Technologists Inc. This work included installing new doors and windows, new plumbing fixtures, and overhead lighting, fresh paint, and tile work in 15 buildings and new construction, which included a kitchen with multiple ranges, food preparation areas, and a series of walk-in cold storage areas that were all completed successfully. However, during the inspection, SIGAR found some instances of noncompliance with the contract, as well as some instances of poor

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workmanship. Noncompliance issues involved the lack of required plumbing insulation, missing ventilation fans, and the lack of protective metal strips on stairways. For example, plumbing work done in the renovated bathrooms of four existing buildings and the new kitchen/cold storage area did not include the required insulation. In addition, the contract required Technologists Inc. to install metal strips, called nosing, on each stair landing. Stair nosing protects the leading edge of the concrete landing from chipping. However, this was not installed in one of the barracks.

SIGAR also found that Technologists Inc. substituted lower-grade, lower-cost door handles and locks, and sink faucets in at least 14 buildings without USACE's prior approval. SIGAR estimates that about \$80,000 in cost adjustments should have been made to reflect these substitutions. Of that amount, USACE believes it may be able to recoup an estimated \$65,500 for the substituted door hardware. With regard to poor workmanship, SIGAR found inadequate ceramic tile work in some buildings. These issues can largely be attributed to USACE's failure to (1) fully monitor the implementation of its three-phase inspection process, and (2) conduct the four- and nine-month warranty inspections of the first eight buildings transferred to Afghan authorities in 2014.

Most, but not all, of the Afghan Air Force University's buildings are being used, but the Afghan government has not properly maintained the buildings that USACE has transferred to it. SIGAR found that some bathroom buildings were not being fully used due to broken sinks, faucets, and water heaters. In addition, two of the renovated barracks buildings were not being used due to multiple problems, such as plumbing leaks and broken ceiling fans. SIGAR found other building problems, which could be mostly attributed to inadequate maintenance by the Afghan government, including mold growth, filthy bathrooms, broken door locks, and broken or missing plumbing fixtures.

USACE has developed a follow-on project to address a multitude of repairs needed in various buildings at the Afghan Air Force University complex.

SIGAR's review of the project's draft requirements shows that it contains repair items for the 10 buildings transferred to Afghan authorities in April 2015 that appear to still be covered under the warranty for those buildings. For example, as part of the project, all new windows installed in two of the renovated barracks building under the original contract need to be cleaned and re-caulked with exterior-grade caulk, something which should have been done when the new windows were installed.

SIGAR recommends that the Commanding General and Chief of Engineers, USACE, take the following actions and report the results back to SIGAR within 90 days: (1) pursue all options available to have Technologists Inc. correct the issues identified in this report involving noncompliance with the contract and poor workmanship, such as a lack of required



Mold growth in bathroom at Afghan Air Force University, March 2015. (SIGAR photo by Javed Khairandish)

plumbing insulation, missing ventilation fans, and inadequate ceramic tile work in some buildings that are still under warranty; (2) pursue all options available to recoup an estimated \$65,500 in charges associated with the lower-grade, lower-cost door hardware that Technologists Inc. substituted without approval from USACE; (3) conduct a review of the follow-on repair project's draft Statement of Requirements to ensure that the U.S. government is not unnecessarily paying for items that appear to still be covered by the contract warranty; and (4) review the circumstances surrounding the contracting officer and contracting officer's representative's failure to fully document the three-phase inspection process and failure to exercise due diligence by conducting the four- and nine-month warranty inspections of the first eight buildings transferred to the Afghan government, and determine what, if any, disciplinary action should be taken against the contracting officer and contracting officer's representative.

NEW INSPECTION

· Follow-up Inspection of the Pol-i-Charkhi Prison

New Inspection Announced This Quarter

This quarter SIGAR announced one new inspection. It is a follow-up to an earlier inspection of the Pol-i-Charkhi prison.

Follow-up Inspection of the Pol-i-Charkhi Prison

In June 2009, the Department of State's Regional Procurement Support Office awarded a \$16.1 million construction contract to Al-Watan Construction Company, an Afghan firm, to renovate the Pol-i-Charkhi prison in Kabul province, Afghanistan. Through two contract modifications, the value of the contract increased to \$20.2 million. The renovation involved reconfiguring large, undivided prisoner holding areas into smaller maximum-, medium-, and minimum-security cells. Each cell was to have a sink and one or more Eastern-style toilets depending upon cell size. The contract also required improving the electrical and plumbing systems; renovating several structures, including the prison industries building and kitchen facilities; building two septic/leach-field systems; and procuring and installing six refurbished back-up power diesel generators. In November 2010, the Regional Procurement Support Office terminated the contract at the government's convenience due to Al-Watan's unsatisfactory performance, after having paid the contractor \$18.5 million for work performed.

In October 2014, SIGAR reported on our first inspection of the prison. SIGAR found that the renovation work was not complete and that the project suffered from defective workmanship. SIGAR also found that not all of Al-Watan's work was completed in accordance with contract requirements. Most notably, the contractor substituted wood for metal roof trusses without authorization, and covered the existing 30-year-old wood trusses with new roofing material rather than replacing them as required. SIGAR determined that the prison was being used as intended but was overcrowded. The security advantages of separating more serious offenders into smaller cells, per the project design plan, were lost due to the overcrowding.

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Nonetheless, SIGAR found the prison was relatively well maintained. In response to SIGAR's findings, the Department of State noted that it was committed to completing the renovation project and would award a new contract to repair all identified deficiencies. The department also stated that it planned to award a second contract to construct a sustainable wastewater treatment system for the prison.

Building on our previous work, SIGAR plans to assess the extent to which (1) progress has been made in addressing the deficiencies SIGAR previously identified, and any additional construction has been or is being completed in accordance with contract requirements and technical specifications, and (2) the prison is being used as intended and maintained.

SPECIAL PROJECTS

SIGAR's Office of Special Projects was created to examine emerging issues and deliver prompt, actionable reports to federal agencies and the Congress. The team conducts a variety of assessments, producing reports on all facets of Afghanistan reconstruction. The directorate is made up of auditors, analysts, investigators, lawyers, subject-matter experts, and other specialists who can quickly and jointly apply their expertise to emerging problems and questions.

This quarter, SIGAR's Office of Special Projects wrote to the USAID Administrator about a health facility that appears to have structural damage that will likely put lives at risk. Additionally, the Office of Special Projects issued a report about the process DOD follows when disposing of excess real property in Afghanistan as well as the monetary value of the property provided to the Afghan government.

Alert Letter 16-19-SP: Structural Damage at Health Facility

On March 1, 2016, SIGAR wrote to USAID Administrator Gayle E. Smith that a health facility in Badakhshan province appears to have extreme structural damage that will likely put lives at risk. Following a November 21, 2015, site visit conducted by SIGAR's Afghan partners, SIGAR analysts and engineers examined several photographs of the health facility and found that the damage at the facility is substantial. Portions of the health facility's primary care center have large cracks throughout the foundation that could result in structural failure or collapse due to the extreme differential soil settlement around the facility or in the event of an earthquake. The differential settlement at the facility may have happened over time as the result of environmental conditions, such as flooding, frost, poor drainage, or earthquakes.

SIGAR strongly urged USAID to immediately contact its partners in the World Bank, which administers the System Enhancement for Health Action in Transition (SEHAT) program, and the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH)

COMPLETED SPECIAL PROJECTS

- Alert Letter 16-19-SP: Structural Damage at Health Facility
- Report 16-23-SP: Department of Defense Base Closures and Transfers in Afghanistan: The U.S. Has Disposed of \$907 Million in Foreign Excess Real Property

to alert them to the damage at the facility so corrective actions to the soil and surrounding terrain may be undertaken as quickly as possible. Repairs can then be made to the building. SIGAR also urged USAID to recommend that the World Bank and MOPH examine all MOPH facilities in the areas affected by the recent earthquakes and to make repairs as appropriate. Such actions would protect the lives and safety of medical facility staff and patients.

Report 16-23-SP: Department of Defense Base Closures and Transfers in Afghanistan: The U.S. Has Disposed of \$907 Million in Foreign Excess Real Property

Between January 2010 and October 2015, DOD disposed of about \$907 million worth of foreign excess real property (FERP) in Afghanistan. Of that amount, approximately \$858 million worth of FERP was donated to the Afghan government. The purpose of this report was to inform Congress and U.S. taxpayers about the process DOD follows when disposing of FERP in Afghanistan as well as the monetary value of the property provided to the Afghan government.

In connection with a broader review of the U.S. military's efforts to retrograde and dispose of equipment, vehicles, and other property in Afghanistan, SIGAR requested information from DOD regarding the transfer and closure of former U.S. military bases there.

In particular, SIGAR requested information concerning base names, locations, and the total estimated value of transferred real and personal property associated with closed bases and those bases transferred to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF).

After analyzing the information provided by the department, SIGAR determined that DOD mainly disposed of FERP by transferring it to the ANDSF and other entities within the Afghan government. SIGAR also determined that DOD has now closed more than 200 bases that it formerly operated. The property values presented in the report conform to DOD depreciation models, which DOD uses in determining whether and how to transition a base, and do not reflect the original acquisition costs of the property.

LESSONS LEARNED

SIGAR created the Lessons Learned Program (LLP) to identify comprehensive lessons from Afghanistan reconstruction efforts from 2001 to the present. The LLP currently has six projects in development: interagency strategy and planning, coordination of international donor aid, U.S. perceptions of and responses to corruption, counternarcotics interventions, private-sector development and economic growth, and security sector reconstruction.

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In addition to those ongoing efforts, LLP worked with a team of graduate students from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University during a semester-long academic policy workshop on “Lessons Learned in Afghanistan.” The workshop, led by Professors Jacob Shapiro and Ethan Kapstein, culminated in the publication of “Lessons from the U.S. Civilian Surge in Afghanistan, 2009–2014” in January 2016. SIGAR research analysts and editors provided support, advice, and feedback to the students throughout the research process.

SIGAR LLP and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) hosted a two-day conference on “Lessons from the Coalition: International Experiences from the Afghanistan Reconstruction” from April 19 to April 20 at USIP in Washington, DC. The conference opened with remarks from Special Inspector General John Sopko, USIP President Nancy Lindborg, and Ambassador Hamdullah Mohib, Afghanistan’s ambassador to the United States. The keynote speakers were Ambassador Richard Olson, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Ambassador Franz-Michael Mellbin, Special Representative of the European Union to Afghanistan. Panelists including six current and former European ambassadors to Afghanistan as well as experts from the United States, Australia, Denmark, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the UK shared their countries’ experiences with both reconstruction in Afghanistan and efforts to institutionalize the resulting lessons.

INVESTIGATIONS

During the reporting period, SIGAR investigations achieved significant results. Cost savings to the U.S. government amounted to \$3.1 million; a civil settlement totaled \$3,659,500; and fines, forfeitures, and restitutions amounted to over \$400,000. Additionally, there was one arrest, one indictment, one conviction and six sentencings. SIGAR initiated 17 new investigations and closed 38, bringing the total number of ongoing investigations to 288, see Figure 2.1.


U.S. Contractor Sentenced for Bribery

On February 16, 2016, in the Eastern District of Texas, George E. Green was sentenced to 46 months’ incarceration, followed by 36 months’ supervised release, resulting from his guilty plea to receipt of bribes and conspiracy to structure financial transactions to avoid currency reporting requirements. Green was also ordered to forfeit \$51,000.

An investigation was initiated after USAID received allegations that Green, an employee of International Relief and Development Inc. (IRD), had solicited and received kickbacks in exchange for contract awards for the USAID Southern Regional Agriculture Development program, with a contract value of \$65 million.

FIGURE 2.1

SIGAR INVESTIGATIONS: NUMBER OF OPEN INVESTIGATIONS, AS OF APRIL 15, 2016



Source: SIGAR Investigations Directorate, 4/15/2016.

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According to the information and the plea agreement, Green served as IRD's director of contracts, procurement, and grants in connection with a cooperative agreement between USAID and IRD to strengthen economic stabilization and promote long-term agricultural development in specific areas of Afghanistan. Green admitted that in March and April 2012, he solicited and received a \$51,000 bribe from a representative of an Afghan company that provided agriculture-related products and that sought sub-contracts from IRD. To conceal his receipt of the bribe payments, Green, through an Afghan national subordinate, wired money to a personal account in Texas and to the account of a vintage-used-car dealer in Italy from whom Green arranged to purchase a used car. Between May and August 2012, after he returned to Texas, Green attempted to conceal the bribe proceeds by conspiring with others to make cash deposits of less than \$10,000 each into his bank and credit card accounts to circumvent the financial institutions' mandatory cash reporting requirements.

SIGAR was involved in every aspect of the investigation, which included numerous subpoenas and interviews, four e-mail search warrants, a physical search warrant of Green's residence, as well as forensic computer examinations.

Criminal Complaint Filed Against Contractor

On December 23, 2015, in the Eastern District of North Carolina, a criminal complaint was filed against Hikmatullah Shadman, an Afghan national, charging him with one count of conspiracy and one count of giving, offering, and promising gratuities to public officials. Based on the complaint, Shadman's arrest warrant was issued the same day.

Between 2009 and 2012, Shadman, the owner and operator of Hikmat Shadman Logistics Services Company (HSLSC), also known as Hikmat Shadman Supply and Construction Company (HSCC), was under contract with the U.S. government to transport fuel, food, water, and other items to U.S. military forces operating in Afghanistan. During that time, Shadman paid military members cash bribes in exchange for preferential treatment in the award process of transportation movement requests.

In connection with this investigation, two U.S. military members, Robert Green and David Kline, have already pled guilty for their roles in the conspiracy. Shadman paid approximately \$140,000 in cash to Green, and in return Green steered 40 contracts to Shadman's company with a combined value of \$3 million. Shadman paid approximately \$50,000 in cash to Kline in return for Kline using his position to award future contracts to Shadman's company.

Bribery Investigation Results in Sentencing of U.S. Contractor

On February 4, 2016, in the Eastern District of Virginia, Robert Gannon, a British citizen, was sentenced to 12 months and one day of incarceration

and two years' supervised probation with the conditions that he depart the United States immediately following completion of his incarceration, not return without permission, and be prohibited from employment or contracting with the U.S. government during this time. Additionally, Gannon was fined \$193,665.

On September 8, 2015, special agents from SIGAR, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) arrested Gannon at Washington Dulles International Airport as he checked in for a flight to Bangkok, Thailand. At his initial appearance before a magistrate judge, he was remanded to the U.S. Marshals until his detention hearing held on September 10, 2015.

Gannon is the former director of operations for a DOD contracting company in Washington, DC, with responsibilities that included identifying, evaluating, and monitoring subcontracts. Gannon admitted using his position to arrange for executives of a UK-based company to make kickback payments to Gannon in return for a series of purchase orders valued at nearly \$6 million and which Gannon's company awarded in August 2009. The orders called for the provision of explosive-ordnance disposal equipment to U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan. Gannon admitted that in return for his efforts, the UK company wired funds with a combined value of nearly \$200,000 from bank accounts in the UK to Gannon's account in Singapore.

Prosecutions of Former U.S. Government Officials

An investigation was initiated on August 15, 2013, upon receipt of a SIGAR hotline complaint from an individual requesting confidentiality. The investigation concerned matters associated with certain contracts handled by the Non-Standard Rotary Wing Aircraft (NSRWA) program office at Redstone Arsenal, a component of the Army's Program Executive Office Aviation. So far, that investigation has yielded the following:

Guilty Plea by (former) Colonel Norbert Vergez. On April 20, 2015, former Colonel Norbert Vergez pleaded guilty to three felony charges, two counts charging false statements, and one count charging conflict of interest. Vergez served from 2010 to 2012 as the program manager for NSRWA, a component of the Army located at Redstone Arsenal, which was responsible for contracts involving certain "non-standard" helicopters, including the Russian-made Mi-17. Vergez has not yet been sentenced.

Vergez pleaded guilty to three instances of making false statements and using false writings in communicating with the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DODIG) in connection with a DODIG audit of a Mi-17 overhaul contract administered in part by NSRWA. One aspect of the audit had to do with the role NSRWA played in certain contract disputes that involved various contractors and subcontractors in the contracting chain, including a third-tier subcontractor known as Avia Baltika Aviation

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Ltd. (AVB). Vergez admitted in his plea agreement that on two occasions he made or caused his office to make false representations to DODIG that his office had no direct contact with AVB concerning its subcontract on the Northrop Grumman contract, when, as Vergez then knew, he and his direct subordinates at NSRWA had significant direct contacts with AVB related to its subcontract.

Vergez also admitted that on Feb. 1, 2012, he directed a subordinate official to create and sign a document bearing the typed date “Dec. 5, 2011,” representing that a \$3.67 million claim by AVB under the contract was reasonable. As a result of this backdating, it falsely appeared that the subordinate official had approved the \$3.67 million payment before directions were given to Northrop to make that payment. That document was then provided to DODIG in response to its requests for supporting documentation surrounding this attempt to have Northrop pay AVB.

Vergez admitted that he engaged in a criminal conflict of interest by taking official acts as a government official to assist a helicopter-manufacturing company in negotiating a “foreign military sale” and adjusting a contract so that the company received payment faster than originally agreed upon at a time when Vergez was negotiating future employment with that company.

Finally, Vergez admitted that he made false statements in his Confidential Financial Disclosure Report, a government ethics form, for the year 2012, by not disclosing that his wife had received a Rolex wristwatch from the wife of a representative of AVB, that he had accepted an offer of employment with a private company, and that he had received a \$30,000 check from that company.

Guilty Plea and Sentencing of former U.S. Army Contract Officer Teresa Mayberry. On June 2, 2015, Teresa Mayberry pleaded guilty to obstruction of a federal audit. Mayberry was a contract officer for the Army Materiel Command at Redstone Arsenal, whose responsibilities included overseeing the Mi-17 overhaul and sustainment contracts.

According to the information and plea agreement, in late 2011 and 2012, DODIG was investigating contracts involving overhauls and purchases of spare parts, amounting to more than \$8 million, for Russian-made Mi-17 helicopters. As part of its investigation, DODIG sought to determine whether the U.S. Army paid a reasonable price for the parts, whether the parts purchased were needed, and whether proper contracting procedures were followed. On several occasions, Mayberry prepared, and directed her subordinates to prepare, a variety of false and backdated documents that she provided to DODIG in response to its requests. As an example, the information charges that Mayberry caused the creation of a backdated document, bearing her signature, that falsely represented that price negotiations had taken place on parts purchases when, in fact, there were no such price negotiations.

On January 12, 2016, in the Northern District of Alabama, Mayberry was sentenced to three years' probation and six months' home confinement, and was fined \$5,000.

Indictment of former U.S. Army Contract Officer Willis Epps. In connection with the same investigation, on January 29, 2016, Willis Epps, a former Army contract official for the Army Contract Command who handled contract matters for NSRWA at Redstone Arsenal, was indicted for making and signing a false tax return. According to the indictment, Epps failed to claim \$56,250 in income earned during the 2013 tax year. No trial date has been set.

This investigation into the conduct of several individuals arising from several complicated "non-standard" helicopter procurement and sustainment contracts, has been complex. The investigation is being conducted by SIGAR, the FBI, DCIS, and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command.

Investigation Results in \$1.7 Million Recovery for U.S. Government

On September 17, 2015, legal counsel for Contrack International, a major subcontractor for the U.S. Embassy's Camp Sullivan project, contacted SIGAR about the illegal activities of an Afghan national, Wafioullah Sharifi. Through his contacts with corrupt Afghan police and the Afghan Attorney General's Office (AAGO), Sharifi had threatened Contrack employees and was attempting to use Afghan officials to secure the seizure of Contrack's construction equipment, vehicles, and warehouses. Contrack's legal counsel had twice notified the U.S. Embassy and the AAGO of the matter, but had not received a response.

SIGAR subsequently met with embassy officials and informed them of the impending shutdown of the Camp Sullivan project. Additionally, from October 2015 until December 2015, SIGAR met with officials from the Afghan Anti-Corruption team, Afghan AAGO investigators, and Afghan Ministry of Justice officials for the purpose of stopping Sharifi from using corrupt Afghan officials in an attempt to extort money from Contrack. This effort was to prevent the seizure of nearly \$2 million of U.S. government construction property. On January 6, 2016, the Afghan Supreme Court ruled in favor of Contrack and ordered the release of Contrack's warehouses, materials, and vehicles.

On February 17, 2016, SIGAR received a letter from Contrack's security director stating that due to SIGAR's intervention, \$1.5 million in equipment and \$200,000 in vehicles were released back to Contrack for use in the Camp Sullivan Project.

Civil Investigation Yields over \$3.6 Million Recovery for U.S. Government

On March 4, 2016, Farrell Lines Incorporated (Farrell)/DAMCO USA Inc. (DAMCO) and the U.S. government entered into an agreement whereby Farrell/DAMCO will pay the U.S. government \$3,659,500.

Farrell/DAMCO, U.S. Airways, and A.G.R. Eshcol Overseas Ltd. (A.G.R.) were involved in a scheme involving other contractors in which cargo weight tickets were forged. The contracts affected were the International Heavy Lift Contract and Universal Services Contract 06, both of which were programs managed by U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). The falsified weight tickets were submitted to USTRANSCOM resulting in overpayments by the U.S. government. Because of the investigation, A.G.R. was suspended and debarred in August 2015 and U.S. Airways entered into a settlement agreement in November 2015 whereby U.S. Airways will pay the U.S. government \$528,000.

U.S. Army Reserve Staff Sergeant Sentenced for Bulk Cash Smuggling and Theft of Government Property

On February 17, 2016, in the District of Puerto Rico, U.S. Army Reserve Staff Sergeant Luis Ramon Casellas was sentenced to 21 months' incarceration, followed by three years' supervised release, 104 hours' community service, and was ordered to forfeit \$113,050 and pay a \$400 special assessment. Casellas was remanded to the U.S. Marshals for immediate incarceration. The sentencing was the result of his guilty plea to three counts of bulk cash smuggling and one count of theft of government property. The plea includes an admission to smuggling \$113,050 and theft of \$6,302 in government property while serving with the U.S. Army in Afghanistan.

In April 2013, Casellas was deployed to Kandahar Airfield (KAF) and was responsible for helping to break down smaller bases in preparation for the retrograde and withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Afghanistan. This included retrieving U.S. government property for future use and selling unsuitable material as scrap to Afghan contractors. Between June 17, 2013, and August 9, 2013, Casellas was the leader of a three-person Army team that went to forward operating bases to help break them down. During this time, Casellas stole tools and equipment, including laptops, belonging to the DOD. In July 2013, he sent approximately eight boxes from a forwarding operating base to his wife in Puerto Rico. The boxes contained some of the stolen property and undeclared U.S. currency totaling \$50,500.

Additionally, in August 2013, Casellas sent two boxes from KAF to his wife in the United States marked as "gifts for family." In connection to his plea, Casellas admitted that, although he declared the items inside the boxes were valued at \$700 and \$400, respectively, one box contained some of the stolen government property as well as \$41,750 in U.S. currency, while

the other box contained \$20,800 in U.S. currency. The boxes were intercepted by U.S. Customs in Louisville, Kentucky.

Two U.S. Military Members Sentenced for Bribery

On January 27, 2016, in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, retired U.S. Army National Guard Staff Sergeant Timothy H. Albright was sentenced to 12 months and a day's incarceration, followed by 12 months' supervised release, fined a \$100 special assessment, and ordered to forfeit \$16,200. The sentencing was a result of Albright's guilty plea to conspiracy to receive and accept bribes.

On March 29, 2016, in the Northern District of Florida, retired U.S. Navy Senior Chief Petty Officer Donald P. Bunch was sentenced to 24 months' incarceration, followed by 24 months' supervised release, ordered to forfeit \$25,000, and fined \$5,000 and a special assessment of \$100. On September 18, 2015, Bunch entered a guilty plea to receiving and accepting illegal bribes by a public official.

The bribery investigation focused on Afghan contractors paying U.S. military personnel in return for government contracts associated with the Humanitarian Aid Yard (HA Yard) at Bagram Airfield (BAF). The HA Yard functions as a storage facility for large quantities of clothing, food, school supplies, and other items available to military units in support of humanitarian aid for the Afghan people. The HA Yard, through the Commander's Emergency Response Program, enables U.S. military commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian relief needs.

From January 2008 until October 2008, Albright, in his position as a commercial-vendor services specialist at BAF, conspired to accept approximately \$25,000 in illegal bribes from an Afghan interpreter to expedite and ensure the successful processing of a particular Afghan vendor's invoices submitted for work performed at the HA Yard. Albright sent the money he received from the vendor to his wife in Lebanon, Pennsylvania, through the U.S. Postal Service. He would typically ship the money in boxes containing DVDs by placing the money in greeting card envelopes and inserting the envelopes between the DVDs. The cards usually contained approximately \$1,000.

Bunch, in his position as the yard boss at the HA Yard, accepted approximately \$25,000 in illegal bribes from Afghan vendors seeking to obtain larger contracts and obtain contracts sooner than they otherwise might have received them. Bunch sent most or all of the money he received from the vendors to his wife in greeting cards at their residence in northern Florida. Bunch and his wife used this money primarily for construction of a home.

Fuel Theft Investigation Results in Guilty Plea

On Monday, March 14, 2016, in the U.S. District Court of Honolulu, Hawaii, Sergeant First Class Marvin Ware entered a plea of guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit bribery and one count of bribery. Additionally, on October 15, 2015, Ware appeared before an U.S. Army Administration Separation Board, convened on U.S. Army installation Schofield Barracks, HI. The board recommended that Ware receive an Other than Honorable Discharge from the U.S. Army. Subsequent to this action, on February 26, 2016, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs directed that Ware be separated from the U.S. Army with an Other than Honorable Conditions characterization of service. Additionally, it was directed he be reduced in rank to Private (E-1).

During late 2011 and early 2012, Forward Operating Base (FOB) Fenty served as a regional fuel depot that supplied outlying U.S. military bases with JP8 jet fuel. Fuel deliveries were made by a local Afghan contractor, which transported the fuel in 3,000-gallon tanker trucks, termed “jingle trucks.” Ware and two other servicemen, Sergeant Ronald Dixon and Specialist Larry Emmons, conspired to accept and accepted bribes in return for participating with the contractor in the theft of jet fuel from FOB Fenty. Ware and the others agreed to fill and divert jingle trucks, in return for which they received \$6,000 for each truckload of stolen fuel.

Ware, Dixon, and Emmons filled the jingle trucks with jet fuel, using U.S. military equipment, at clandestine locations and at times not likely to arouse suspicion. They facilitated their scheme by creating fraudulent official military documents purporting to authorize the movement of fuel from FOB Fenty to other locations. Dixon and Emmons were charged and pled guilty to bribery charges in June 2012 for their participation in the scheme.

During Ware’s involvement in the scheme from about January 1, 2012, until on or about February 18, 2012, he participated in the theft of approximately 180,000 gallons of fuel from FOB Fenty.

The case was investigated by SIGAR, DCIS, CID, and the Defense Contract Audit Agency, with substantial assistance from the FBI.

\$1.4 Million Recovery for U.S. Government

A theft investigation resulted in an approximate \$1.4 million recovery for the U.S. government after 12 missing U.S. government-owned containers and their contents were recovered.

On December 10, 2015, a TRANSCOM contracting officer contacted SIGAR to report that 12 containers had been missing for several months. The containers were to be transported from KAF to BAF with one container destined for the U.S. Embassy Kabul. The prime contractor under the National Afghan Trucking contract for this movement was Vanquish Worldwide LLC, which had subcontracted the movement to Emporium International Transportation Services. At some point thereafter, an Afghan

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national contacted the contracting officer claiming to be in possession of the missing containers. He provided pictures of the containers showing their container numbers and stated he could arrange for their delivery to the contracting officer, in return for \$500,000 payment. The contracting officer worked with SIGAR and DCIS in an elaborate undercover operation to recover the containers.


Subsequent to investigative efforts by SIGAR and DCIS, the Afghan national was arrested on March 1, 2016, by the Parwan Province Prosecutor of Criminal Investigation when he was at BAF for a meeting with the contracting officer and after being interviewed by special agents. While two of the containers had been recovered prior to the subject's arrest, subsequent to that, he made arrangements from jail for the delivery of the 10 remaining containers to KAF, which occurred on March 7, 2016. All cargo was inventoried and accounted for.

Suspensions and Debarments

This quarter, SIGAR's suspension and debarment program referred 25 individuals and 21 companies for suspension or debarment based on evidence developed as part of investigations conducted by SIGAR in Afghanistan and the United States. Three of these individuals were referred for suspension based upon criminal charges being filed against them alleging misconduct related to or affecting reconstruction contracting in Afghanistan. These referrals bring the total number of individuals and companies referred by SIGAR since 2008 to 743, encompassing 393 individuals and 350 companies to date, see Figure 2.2.

FIGURE 2.2

SIGAR INVESTIGATIONS: CUMULATIVE REFERRALS FOR SUSPENSION AND DEBARMENT, Q2 FY 2011-Q2 FY 2016



Source: SIGAR Investigations Directorate, 3/31/2016.

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As of the end of March 2016, the efforts of SIGAR to utilize suspension and debarment to address fraud, corruption, and poor performance in Afghanistan have resulted in a total of 132 suspensions, 418 finalized debarments, and 28 special-entity designations of individuals and companies engaged in U.S.-funded reconstruction projects. An additional 14 individuals and companies have entered into administrative compliance agreements with the government in lieu of exclusion from contracting since the initiation of the program. During the first quarter of 2016, SIGAR's referrals resulted in three suspensions and 44 finalized debarments of individuals and entities by agency suspension and debarment officials.

Suspensions and debarments—actions taken by U.S. agencies to exclude companies or individuals from receiving federal contracts or assistance because of misconduct—are an important tool for ensuring that agencies award contracts only to responsible entities. SIGAR's program addresses three challenges posed by U.S. policy and the contingency contracting environment in Afghanistan: the need to act quickly, the limited U.S. jurisdiction over Afghan nationals and Afghan companies, and the vetting challenges inherent in the use of multiple tiers of subcontractors. SIGAR continues to look for ways to enhance the government's responses to these challenges through the innovative use of information resources and investigative assets both in Afghanistan and the United States.

SIGAR makes referrals for suspensions and debarments based on completed investigations that SIGAR participates in. In most cases, SIGAR's referrals occur in the absence of acceptance of an allegation for criminal prosecution or remedial action by a contracting office and are therefore the primary remedy to address contractor misconduct. In making referrals to agencies, SIGAR provides the basis for a suspension or debarment decision by the agency as well as all of the supporting documentation needed for an agency to support that decision should it be challenged by the contractor at issue. Based on the evolving nature of the contracting environment in Afghanistan and the available evidence of contractor misconduct and/or poor performance, on occasion SIGAR has found it necessary to refer individuals or companies on multiple occasions for consideration by agency suspension and debarment officials.

SIGAR's emphasis on suspension and debarment is exemplified by the fact that of the 743 referrals for suspension and debarment that have been made by the agency to date, 716 have been made since the second quarter of 2011. During the 12-month period prior to January 1, 2016, referrals by SIGAR's suspension and debarment program resulted in the exclusion of 107 individuals and companies from contracting with the government. SIGAR's referrals over this period represent allegations of theft, fraud, poor performance, financial support to insurgents, and mismanagement as part of reconstruction contracts valued at \$527,311,541.73.

Debarment of Two Individuals and 15 Companies for Bribery in the Award of \$28.8 Million in Department of Defense Contracts

On February 16, 2016, as a result of an investigation conducted by SIGAR, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, and other agencies participating in the International Contract Corruption Task Force, the Department of the Army debarred James Addas, Omar Jamil, and 15 companies owned by Jamil based upon allegations of conspiracy to commit bribery and the filing of fraudulent income tax returns.

Specifically, Addas, a retired Army officer and civilian contractor at Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A), used his position to facilitate the award of at least 15 prime contracts valued at \$28,805,831 to Jamil's companies between April 2004 and March 2006. As the result of a lengthy, multi-agency investigation, it was determined that soon after Addas awarded the first contract to Jamil, Jamil provided him with a cash payment of \$50,000. Subsequently, Addas continued to solicit payments from Jamil after the end of his employment at JCC-I/A, receiving approximately \$455,828 in wire transfers and \$72,000 in goods and services from Jamil and his associates between April 2010 and July 2013.

Among the multiple payments and gifts, Jamil paid Addas over \$40,000 in adoption fees for his children, money for the purchase of expensive collectible knives, and money for an addition to his home and for purchase of trees and landscaping. In return, Addas provided multiple recommendations to prime contractors in an effort to persuade them to hire Jamil and his companies as a subcontractor.

On February 20, 2015, pursuant to a plea agreement, a criminal information was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia charging Addas with one count of bribery and one count of making and signing a false tax return. Subsequently, on January 12, 2016, a criminal judgment was entered against Addas based on these charges, sentencing him to 30 months' confinement, restitution of \$115,435, and three years' supervised release. Based upon this judgment and SIGAR's referral, the Army debarred Addas, Jamil, and Jamil's companies until July 8, 2023, a period of eight years, including the time that the parties were in suspended status during their criminal case.

Debarment of Former Air Force Officer Based on Unlawful Representation of a Contractor

On November 13, 2015, based on an investigation conducted by SIGAR, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, and the FBI, the Air Force debarred former Captain Adam Jeff Julias Pudenz, U.S. Air Force Reserve, and his company, Peace Thru Business LLC. On August 21, 2013, Pudenz was arrested on charges of knowingly and willfully performing unlawful representational activities. Specifically, Pudenz knowingly accepted employment

and payments totaling \$247,993 from an Afghan footwear contractor, despite being informed by Air Force officials that he had been disqualified for life due to his participation in the award of reconstruction contracts to that company between December 2011 and December 2012.

Furthermore, Pudenz used his Air Force Reserve identification to escort representatives from this company onto Camp Eggers and other locations as part of this representation, an action that resulted in the issue of a letter from U.S. Forces-Afghanistan barring him from all installations in Afghanistan. On March 11, 2015, Pudenz agreed to enter a plea of guilty to one count each in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2), making a materially false statement and representation, and 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1), violating post-employment restrictions on communications and appearances, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, Central Division.

Based on this plea, a criminal judgement was entered against Pudenz on August 21, 2015, sentencing him to three years' probation and a \$200 special assessment. As a result of SIGAR's referral to the Department of the Air Force, Pudenz and his company were debarred for a period of three years, ending on September 17, 2016. This period of debarment includes and takes into account the time that Pudenz was suspended from contracting while awaiting the disposition of the criminal charges pending against him.

Debarment of an Afghan Company for the Sale of Fraudulent Insurance Policies to Contractors

On February 11, 2016, based on an investigation conducted by SIGAR, the Department of the Army debarred the Insurance Group of Afghanistan (IGA) and Ahmad Ratib based on the sale of fraudulent Defense Base Act (DBA) insurance to an Afghan contractor in November 2014. DBA insurance is workers' compensation insurance for contractor employees injured while performing public-works contracts overseas and is a cost-reimbursable contract line item that must be purchased prior to the start of contract performance and remain valid during the term of the contract's performance.

Proof of DBA insurance, as evidenced by payment to the insurance carrier, is verified by the contracting officer at the time that the cost of insurance is invoiced to the government. SIGAR's investigation into IGA and Ratib's sale of DBA insurance determined that the policies that they sold to Afghan construction contractors were fraudulent in nature and that the payment for this insurance policy was accepted by IGA despite the fact that no such policy had actually been issued by the insurer. When confronted with these facts, Ratib admitted that no policies were issued by IGA despite his accepting payment for them from the contractors and that the "proof of insurance" that he had provided had been fraudulent in nature.

As a result of the actions of Ratib and IGA, the Afghan contractor believed that its employees had worker's compensation insurance when, in fact, no such coverage existed and any employee who suffered an injury

would have been without the insurance required of all contractors under U.S. law. Based on these findings, the Army suspension and debarment official debarred both Ratib and IGA for a period of three years, ending on January 26, 2018. This period of debarment includes and takes into account the time that Ratib and IGA were excluded from contracting while in proposed debarment status beginning on January 26, 2014.

OTHER SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

Special Inspector General Testifies before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

On February 12, 2016, Special Inspector General John F. Sopko testified before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations about SIGAR's completed and ongoing work examining U.S. efforts to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANDSF. Approximately 61% of the \$113 billion in U.S. reconstruction funding appropriated for use in Afghanistan has gone toward building self-sufficient Afghan security forces. Since 2008, SIGAR has released 74 reports examining how funds appropriated for the ANDSF have been used and directed 167 recommendations to DOD to improve U.S. efforts to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANDSF.

Sopko opened by stating that he concurs with former U.S. Forces-Afghanistan and Resolute Support commander General John F. Campbell's view that Afghanistan is currently at an inflection point, and Coalition efforts to support the ANDSF and stabilize Afghanistan will require deliberate, measured adjustments in 2016 to reverse the deteriorating security situation. The lack of security has made it increasingly difficult for many U.S. and even some Afghan officials to get out to manage and inspect U.S.-funded reconstruction projects. SIGAR has managed to continue its work of overseeing U.S. programs and projects, partly through the creative use of local Afghan staff and civil-society organizations, and with the assistance of the U.S. military when available; however, if recent developments are indicators of what is to come, the United States may not be on course to achieve and sustain for the long term the U.S. national security objectives, which are to "deny al-Qaida a safe haven, deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the government, and strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan's security forces and government so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan's future."

Based on SIGAR's completed and ongoing work, Sopko highlighted five key challenges facing ANDSF development:

1. **Limited oversight visibility:** With fewer forces in theater, the U.S. military has lost much of its ability to collect reliable information and data on ANDSF capability and effectiveness.

TESTIMONIES GIVEN

- Testimony 16-17-TY: Assessing the Capabilities and Effectiveness of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
- Testimony 16-18-TY: Challenges to Effective Oversight of Afghanistan Reconstruction Grow as High-Risk Areas Persist
- Testimony 16-24-TY: Oversight of Department of Defense Reconstruction Projects in Afghanistan
- Testimony 16-29-TY: DOD Task Force For Business and Stability Operations in Afghanistan: Review of Selected Expenditures Highlights Serious Management and Oversight Problems

2. **Questionable force-strength numbers:** SIGAR's work shows that neither the United States nor its Afghan allies truly know how many Afghan soldiers and police are available for duty, or by extension, the true nature of their operational capabilities.
3. **Unreliable capability assessments:** Measures of ANDSF capabilities and effectiveness have never been very reliable, and the amount of detail provided in these assessments has declined over the years.
4. **Limited on-budget assistance capacity:** Since 2010, the United States has been gradually increasing the amount of on-budget assistance to the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior. According to CSTC-A, once funds enter the Afghan government's bank account, oversight becomes considerably more challenging.
5. **Uncertain long-term sustainability:** According to DOD, while the Afghan government has increased its contributions to its security budget, the Afghan government has not even been able to make the contribution of \$500 million per year it agreed to at the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago. Additionally, the Afghan economy is not expected to grow quickly enough in the next five years to cover a significantly larger share of ANDSF costs than it is currently paying.

SIGAR Submits Written Testimony to Senate Appropriations Subcommittee

On February 24, Special Inspector General Sopko submitted written testimony to the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs. Sopko's statement described SIGAR's FY 2017 budget request, recent successes, challenges to accomplishing its mission, and steps taken to overcome or mitigate these challenges. The statement also touched on key management and program challenges facing State, USAID, and DOD by noting areas of risk that SIGAR has identified.

A significant reconstruction mission remains in Afghanistan. For FY 2017, the President has requested \$2.5 billion in Afghanistan-related funding via the State Department budget. The President has also requested more than \$3 billion in the DOD budget to train, equip, and sustain the ANDSF. Another \$11.5 billion from previous years' reconstruction appropriations remains available for disbursement. SIGAR currently has the largest oversight presence in Afghanistan and is the only inspector general with interagency authority to audit, inspect, and investigate the activities of all U.S. government agencies and international organizations that receive U.S. funding for Afghanistan reconstruction.

SIGAR's investigations, audit, and other work continues to have positive impacts on ongoing and planned reconstruction programs and agency operations. Whether acting on their own or in coordination with other law-enforcement agencies, SIGAR investigators have conducted investigations

into cases of bribery, theft, smuggling, money laundering, and other offenses; have made arrests in Afghanistan and stateside; and have referred many Afghans to that country's prosecutors.

Special Inspector General Testifies Before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

On March 16, Special Inspector General Sopko testified before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform about SIGAR's inspections of facilities and infrastructure built and renovated by DOD using reconstruction funds. The testimony focused on the findings of SIGAR's March 11, 2016, report that analyzes and identifies common themes across the 36 inspection reports SIGAR issued from July 2009 through September 2015.

Through December 31, 2015, DOD reported that it disbursed approximately \$5.7 billion from the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund to support infrastructure projects for the ANDSF. These projects included military headquarters, barracks, schools and other training facilities, police checkpoint structures, airfields, and roads.

Since its creation in 2008, SIGAR has issued 37 inspection reports examining 45 DOD reconstruction projects with a combined value of about \$1.1 billion. The projects were located in 15 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces, and included 16 ANP and 13 ANA bases, five schools, three medical facilities, three incinerator locations, two storage facilities, one road, one bridge, and one electrical plant. Of the 45 DOD reconstruction projects SIGAR inspected, 17 met contract requirements and technical specifications. These projects demonstrate that high-quality work can be completed when contractors adhere to requirements and there is adequate oversight. The 28 remaining projects had construction work that did not meet contract requirements or technical specifications. The deficiencies found during these inspections generally fit into three categories:

1. Soil issues, including inadequate site preparation and collapsible soil due to poor grading.
2. Systems problems related, but not limited, to electrical, water, and sewer distribution, including improperly installed heating, cooling, and ventilation systems; inoperable water systems; improper testing and commissioning of mechanical systems; and non-code-compliant electrical wiring.
3. Structural problems, such as the use of sub-standard, inadequate, and irregular building materials; poorly mixed, cured, and reinforced concrete; and improperly installed roofs, which led to leaks.

SIGAR found that poor contractor performance and inadequate government oversight were the primary contributors to non-adherence to contract requirements and technical specifications. Of the 28 projects, 16 had

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deficiencies so severe that they threatened the structural integrity of the buildings and the safety of their occupants. For example, during SIGAR's January 2013 inspection of the Bathkhak School in Kabul Province, inspectors found that the contractor substituted a concrete slab roof for the wood-trussed roof required by the contract, raising safety concerns for the occupants due to the school's location in an area of high seismic activity.

Utilization and timely completion of infrastructure projects is also a problem. Of the 45 DOD reconstruction projects SIGAR inspected, 22 were complete and 23 were incomplete at the time of inspection. Of the 22 projects that were complete, 15 were being used and seven, or about one-third of the completed projects, had never been used. Inspectors found that usage of the 15 projects varied with some projects being fully used and others only partially used. For example, in January 2014, SIGAR reported that although the Salang hospital in Parwan province was being used, it was not providing many of the services that it was intended to provide. In addition, the hospital staff were only using about 35% of the square footage of the constructed facility, and the hospital employed less than 20% of the staff it was expected to employ. According to the doctors and nurses on site during our inspection, the limited use—due primarily to the lack of electricity, water, furniture, and equipment—had prevented them from providing optimal medical care. Hospital staff were washing newborns with untreated river water because there was no clean water.

Sopko testified that DOD can improve its administration and oversight of its reconstruction projects by, among other things, improving its project planning and design processes; ensuring contractors are qualified and capable of adhering to requirements; and conducting the oversight needed to ensure that facilities are built correctly and contractors are held accountable for their work. This would help to avoid the waste and delay that can come from having to fix or simply abandon deficient projects. Further, SIGAR continues to be concerned about the Afghan government's ability to sustain the facilities DOD has built for it. DOD is providing operation and maintenance services at many ANDSF facilities across the country. Currently, it is unclear when the Afghan government will be able to take over this responsibility. Until it is able to do so, U.S. taxpayer funds will continue to be expended to sustain the facilities DOD has built for the Afghans.

Special Inspector General Testifies Before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

On April 15, Special Inspector General Sopko testified before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations at a hearing on "Evaluating DOD Investments: Case Studies in Afghanistan Initiatives and U.S. Weapons Sustain." Sopko discussed SIGAR's work examining the Department of Defense's Task Force for Business and Stability Operations

in Afghanistan. The nearly \$800 million Task Force, now shut down, was DOD's principal vehicle for stimulating private-sector growth and investment in Afghanistan's war-torn economy in order to reduce violence, enhance stability, and stimulate the economy.

TFBSO's goals were to reduce violence, enhance stability, and support economic normalcy in Afghanistan. TFBSO was intended to contribute to U.S. government objectives in Afghanistan by bolstering a very weak Afghan economy. The Task Force produced some modest achievements, primarily related to its work in the extractives industries, about which SIGAR recently reported. Unfortunately, SIGAR's cumulative work to date has shown that TFBSO's nearly \$800 million investment in Afghanistan has generally not delivered on its stated goals. A compressed natural gas (CNG) filling station and a cashmere goats project are glaring examples of TFBSO activities SIGAR has examined that were ill-conceived, poorly planned, or left unfinished. Further, it appears that TFBSO's activities in Afghanistan were stymied by several avoidable problems and repeated mistakes from its Iraq experience that hindered Task Force operations and outcomes.

After 14 years, hundreds of billions of dollars spent to support U.S. military operations, and more than \$113 billion appropriated for the largest reconstruction effort in U.S. history, the United States has shown an enduring commitment to the mission in Afghanistan. Although many U.S. troops have come home and Congress has reduced annual appropriations for Afghanistan reconstruction, there was still approximately \$12 billion left to be spent for reconstruction as of December 31, 2015. Further, the U.S. government has committed to providing tens of billions of dollars more in reconstruction aid over the course of Afghanistan's "Transformation Decade" and recently committed to an extended military presence to support the Afghan government until it is able to sustain itself and independently secure itself from insurgent threats.

Despite those commitments, managing and overseeing this massive, ongoing effort is being left to a decreasing number of U.S. military and civilian personnel in Afghanistan. The reduction in resources means that oversight and learning from the U.S. government's experience in Afghanistan and Iraq are more important than ever. Together with Congress, we must ensure that every dollar is spent as effectively and efficiently as possible and used as intended. In that same vein, we must seek to understand where we, as a nation, did not accomplish our goals, learn from those mistakes, and take meaningful corrective action as we move forward in Afghanistan's reconstruction. Failing to do so reduces the likelihood that Afghanistan will become a secure and stable nation, thus risking all the United States, the Afghan government, and our allies have invested.

An understanding of the successes and failures of TFBSO activities is critical for Congress and future administrations when considering economic development activities in future contingency operations.

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It does not appear that DOD or Task Force leadership applied the lessons identified early in its Afghanistan operations. Specifically, TFBSO operations in Afghanistan lacked: (1) a comprehensive strategy, (2) focused and consistent processes and leadership, and (3) coordination with other U.S. and Afghan government stakeholders, as well as with other donors and local populations. DOD and the Task Force's failure to respond and implement changes based on prior lessons appears to have contributed to the unfulfilled expectations for TFBSO activities in Afghanistan.

To date, SIGAR has not been able to find credible evidence showing that TFBSO's activities in Afghanistan produced the intended economic growth or stabilization outcomes that justified its creation. On the contrary, TFBSO's legacy in Afghanistan is marred by unfinished, poorly planned, and ill-conceived projects. SIGAR's analysis has shown that the Task Force did not achieve most of its goals, both in the short-term and, it would appear, in the long-term. In addition, SIGAR's ongoing review of TFBSO activities in Afghanistan raises several key questions that remain unanswered and should be considered by Congress and any Administration contemplating similar programs in the future.

Due to the unanswered questions about TFBSO activities, and at the request of Senators Ayotte and Grassley, SIGAR has begun a comprehensive performance audit of TFBSO and a full financial audit. SIGAR remains committed to uncovering the successes and stumbles of the Task Force in Afghanistan to inform Congress, the Administration, and the American people.

Special Inspector General Sopko Speaks at the University of Pittsburgh's Graduate School of Public and International Affairs

On March 30, Special Inspector General Sopko spoke about the need to fight corruption to achieve the United States' goals in Afghanistan. Sopko stated that it wasn't until 2009—eight years into the reconstruction effort—that the U.S. government began to understand the extent to which corruption undermined the legitimacy and viability of the Afghan state, fueled grievances that strengthened the growing insurgency, and sapped resources from the reconstruction effort.

According to Transparency International, Afghanistan in 2015 ranked 166th-worst out of 168 countries, ahead of only Somalia and North Korea when it comes to public perceptions of corruption. Afghans regularly report having to pay bribes to a variety of Afghan government service providers, including the police, the courts, health personnel, and educators. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reported that in 2012, "half of Afghan citizens paid a bribe while requesting a public service." Last year, over half of Afghans said they paid a bribe to the police. Sixty-three percent of Afghans who had contact with the courts say they paid a bribe to judicial



Special IG Sopko, second from left, with Dean John Keeler, Prof. Jennifer Murtazashvili, Prof. Ron Brand, and Ariel Armony, Director of the University Center for International Studies at the University of Pittsburgh. (SIGAR photo by Robert Lawrence)

officials. More than half of the Afghans who had contact with the public healthcare system reported paying a bribe.

Combating corruption requires the political will to reform and the creation of some incorruptible entities to pursue the task of fighting corruption. But Sopko said he is hopeful that Afghanistan may have found the political will it needs in current President Ashraf Ghani and his colleague Chief Executive Abdullah. For example, when SIGAR briefed President Ghani that four companies had colluded to fix prices and rig bids on a nearly \$1 billion MOD fuel contract funded by the U.S. government, President Ghani immediately canceled the MOD contract, saving the U.S. government over \$200 million, ordered an investigation into the corruption allegations, and invited SIGAR to start attending the weekly meetings of the National Procurement Commission he chairs with Chief Executive Abdullah.

Sopko believes that donors can also help fight corruption by laying down smart donor conditions for assistance. Smart donor conditions can give Afghan reformers the political “top cover” to implement changes they might not otherwise have been able to implement due to push-back by corrupt political elites.

Special Inspector General Sopko Speaks at Harvard University

On April 7, Special Inspector General Sopko spoke at Harvard University about the perilous state of Afghan reconstruction. Sopko said that the future is likely to include new “contingency operations” involving American military and civilian personnel in violent settings that will entail rebuilding failed or fragile nation-states. Close examination of operations like the one that began in Afghanistan nearly 15 years ago can help us make more informed decisions and, hopefully, produce better outcomes in the future.

Sopko discussed the current security situation in Afghanistan, pointing out that this is where most of the U.S. reconstruction funding has gone, about 60% of the \$113 billion Congress has appropriated since fiscal year 2002, or \$68 billion. Security is the essential ingredient for establishing a credible, viable, legitimate government—and for persuading insurgents that they need to negotiate. And the Afghan security sector is the setting for many of the instances where SIGAR has documented that something has gone wrong in the mostly U.S.-funded Afghanistan reconstruction effort.

Reconstruction has suffered in many other areas. Reconstruction problems in Afghanistan cover a wide range of issues, from execution of particular physical projects to broad strategic guidance. They are, of course, not unique to Afghanistan or even to conflict situations. Iraq reconstruction was also fraught with problems, and the problem-riddled reconstruction after Haiti’s earthquake disaster did not involve an active insurgency.

To be fair, U.S. agencies have had reconstruction successes in Afghanistan. Despite ongoing violence, the Afghan people are healthier,

better schooled, and less impoverished than they were 15 years ago. We can learn from those successes. But it is the disappointments and failures that threaten achievement of objectives and stewardship of taxpayers' dollars, so they deserve our keenest attention.

Deputy Inspector General Speaks at the Naval Postgraduate School

Deputy Inspector General Gene Aloise spoke at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, on April 1 about the reconstruction of the ANDSF. Aloise highlighted the challenges associated with oversight of the ANDSF both for SIGAR and U.S. military advisors, such as the difficulty of ascertaining the true number of ANDSF personnel available for duty and the inability to accurately assess ANDSF capabilities below the headquarters and corps levels.

Afghans are now more dependent on their own security forces than ever before. Afghanistan's future lies with the success, or failure, of the ANDSF, especially now that they are challenged by the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, al-Qaeda, and ISIS. To that end, approximately 60% of the \$113 billion spent on reconstruction has gone to support the ANDSF with salaries, training, infrastructure, equipment, and life-support services.

Extensive SIGAR work has identified multiple areas of weakness in U.S. support to the ANDSF where improvements must be made. Unfortunately, as the number of U.S. boots on the ground has decreased in Afghanistan, so has the U.S. military's ability to oversee the ANDSF and identify challenges they are facing. While high-level assessments of ANDSF capabilities at the headquarters and corps level are still possible, assessments below those levels are beyond the capability of the United States and its Coalition partners. Therefore, they have to rely on assessments conducted by the ANDSF themselves, which SIGAR has long been concerned about because of questions about reliability and accuracy of those assessments.

Another area of concern for SIGAR are the actual personnel levels of the ANDSF, otherwise known as of the issue of "ghost soldiers." SIGAR's work shows that while the ANDSF's actual strength has approached the goal of 352,000 authorized personnel, it has never been fully achieved. Indeed, SIGAR's work shows that neither the United States nor our Afghan partners truly know how many Afghan soldiers and police are available for duty, or, by extension the true nature of their operational capabilities. This is particularly distressing as the amount of funds that flow to the ANDSF from the U.S. government are based, in part, on reimbursing them for salaries for the number of personnel they report to Resolute Support.

While the ANDSF has demonstrated some successes this year, they are clearly not ready to operate without U.S. assistance; whether financial, technical, or otherwise, and will not be operationally independent for some time to come.

SIGAR PASSES PEER REVIEW

Generally, every three years, the audit organization of each office of inspector general (OIG) is required to undergo an external review to provide an additional level of assurance that the OIG conducts its audits in compliance with applicable professional standards. The NASA OIG recently completed SIGAR's peer review for the period October 1, 2014, through September 30, 2015, to determine whether SIGAR's system of internal quality control was operating effectively and provided reasonable assurance that established policies and procedures were being followed. NASA OIG determined that SIGAR's system is suitably designed and received a rating of pass, the highest level that can be attained. The review is conducted with guidance provided by the Council of Inspector General for Integrity and Efficiency and standards are based on the Government Accountability's Office, Government Auditing Standards, December 2011 Revision.

SIGAR BUDGET

SIGAR's annual appropriation (the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2016) provides the agency with \$56.9 million through September 30, 2016. The budget supports SIGAR's oversight activities and products by funding SIGAR's (1) Audits and Inspections, (2) Investigations, (3) Management and Support, and (4) Research and Analysis directorates, as well as the Special Projects Team and the Lesson Learned Program.

SIGAR STAFF

SIGAR's staff count remained steady since the last report to Congress, with 195 employees on board at the end of the quarter. At the end of the quarter, 29 SIGAR employees were at the U.S. Embassy Kabul and two others were at Bagram Airfield. SIGAR employed seven local Afghans in its Kabul office to support the Investigations and Audits directorates. In addition, SIGAR supplements its resident staff with personnel assigned to short-term temporary duty in Afghanistan. This quarter, SIGAR had seven employees on temporary duty in Afghanistan for a total of 82 days.

“I know there are some very, very tough times ahead for the country of Afghanistan, but I do see a resilient people, resilient security forces and they’re going to get through these challenges.”

—*General John F. Campbell,
former commander of U.S. and
NATO troops in Afghanistan*

3 RECONSTRUCTION UPDATE



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An Afghan policeman chats with an apple seller at an outdoor market. The European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan is helping to build a civilian community-policing service in Afghanistan. (EUPOL photo)

RECONSTRUCTION UPDATE

OVERVIEW

A year after the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) assumed lead responsibility for Afghan security, several high-ranking U.S. officials testified this quarter before congressional committees on the dire situation in Afghanistan.

General John F. Campbell, then commander of the Resolute Support (RS) mission and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A), informed the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) in February 2016 that Afghanistan had not achieved an enduring level of security and stability that would allow for a reduction in U.S. support. National Intelligence Director James Clapper told the SASC that the intelligence community believes “fighting in 2016 will be more intense than 2015, continuing a decade-long trend of deteriorating security.”

In March, General Campbell handed over command of RS and USFOR-A in Afghanistan to General John W. Nicholson Jr., who within 90 days of confirmation is to provide his assessment of the conditions in Afghanistan and the necessary U.S. troop strength. According to USFOR-A, the ANDSF suffered 6,637 personnel killed and 12,471 wounded in 2015. In the first two months of 2016, an additional 820 members of the Afghan security forces were killed in action and 1,389 were wounded.

During this reporting period, insurgent activity continued across Afghanistan, and U.S. and British forces returned to Helmand province to support and train the beleaguered Afghan National Army (ANA) 215th Corps operating there. A lull in fighting reported during the poppy harvest was short-lived: the Taliban announced April 12, 2016, as the start date of their spring offensive.

In February, the Afghan Minister of the Interior resigned, frustrated by increased police and civilian casualties that he linked to the government’s lack of attention. He later accepted an appointment as Afghanistan’s ambassador to the Netherlands. A senior Helmand police official predicted that unless corruption were controlled, the security situation would not improve. In April, Taj Mohammad Jahid, a former ANA 207th Corps commander, was confirmed as the new minister.

RECONSTRUCTION UPDATE

The delivery of eight A-29 Super Tucano light-attack aircraft to the Afghan Air Force during this reporting period is expected to improve ANDSF performance during the upcoming fighting season.

Nicholas Haysom, Special Representative of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General and head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, briefed the UN Security Council that 2016 will be a challenging year, saying “survival will be an achievement for the National Unity Government.” Haysom identified a fractious political elite, the erosion of the sense of national unity, and reduced confidence in the future as significant political challenges. He also warned of political consequences if election reforms are not implemented expeditiously.

In February, Democracy International (DI) released its survey of 215 Afghan parliamentarians. DI found that only 7% of parliamentarians believe Afghanistan is moving in the right direction. Respondents named poor governance (26%), neighboring countries’ behavior or policies (25%), and insecurity (21%) as the main reasons for pessimism. Parliamentarians are generally dissatisfied with President Ashraf Ghani’s performance, with nearly 45% very dissatisfied and 19% somewhat dissatisfied. Parliamentarians were also dissatisfied with Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, with more than half very dissatisfied and 20% somewhat dissatisfied.

In March, the federal Broadcasting Board of Governors and the Gallup opinion-research organization released the results of a survey of 2,500 Afghans that found deep public dissatisfaction with the Afghan government. Nearly 81% of respondents said they were somewhat or very dissatisfied with the performance of the national-unity government, while 17% said they were somewhat or very satisfied. Additionally, nearly 69% said their lives had gotten somewhat worse or much worse over the past year and almost 46% predicted their life would get even worse in the next year.

The continued decline in Afghanistan’s economic growth rate remains a concern, according to the UN Secretary-General. The World Bank expects a slow recovery over the next three years with Afghan economic-growth prospects dependent on stronger government progress on reforms, political stabilization, and improving security.

This quarter, the Afghan government approved the fiscal year (FY) 1395 national budget (December 22, 2015–December 21, 2016). Donors are expected to finance approximately 68% of the \$6.5 billion budget, mostly through grants. Domestic revenues paid for less than 40% of last year’s (FY 1394) budget expenditures; donor contributions made up most of the difference. The Afghan government projects domestic revenues to increase by about 8.2% in FY 1395, chiefly from new and increased taxes, customs duties, and fees.

The State Department again listed Afghanistan as a major money-laundering country. Narcotics, corruption, and contract fraud are major

sources of the country's illegal revenues and laundered funds. In February, the Financial Action Task Force kept Afghanistan on its "gray list," meaning that while Afghanistan has deficiencies in the areas of strategic anti-money laundering and combating financing of terrorism, its government made a high-level political commitment to address those deficiencies, developed an action plan, and is making progress.

The United States has not yet finalized a revised counternarcotics (CN) strategy for Afghanistan, although it announced last year that it would revise its strategy to support the goals and objectives of the Afghan government's updated strategy. The Afghan government unveiled its new CN strategy, outlined in the National Drug Action Plan (NDAP), in October 2015.

The Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) unveiled its second 100-day plan in early April; the first one was released in June 2015. CN efforts remain a challenge for the MCN given its limited capacity and the deteriorating security conditions in certain provinces. The U.S.-funded Good Performers' Initiative to incentivize provincial CN performance is being phased out by the State Department due to the MCN's lack of technical capacity.

Drug interdiction results this quarter continued to decline, as they have done since the withdrawal of Coalition forces. U.S. Special Forces recently began partnering with Afghan CN forces. Their impact on results will be assessed next quarter.

As of March 31, 2016, cumulative appropriations for relief and reconstruction in Afghanistan totaled approximately \$113.17 billion; however, FY 2016 allocations for State Department (State) and U.S. Agency for International Development foreign assistance accounts were still undergoing the 653(a) congressional-consultation process at the end of the fiscal quarter. State reported that draft allocations were expected to be provided to Congress in late April. Of the total cumulative amount appropriated for Afghanistan reconstruction, \$95.7 billion went to the seven major reconstruction funds featured in the Status of Funds subsection of this report. As of March 31, 2016, approximately \$10 billion of this amount remained available for potential disbursement.

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STATUS OF FUNDS


To fulfill SIGAR’s legislative mandate, this section details the status of U.S. funds appropriated, obligated, and disbursed for reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. As of March 31, 2016, the United States had appropriated approximately \$113.17 billion for relief and reconstruction in Afghanistan since fiscal year (FY) 2002. This total has been allocated as follows:

- \$68.44 billion for security (\$4.31 billion for counternarcotics initiatives)
- \$31.79 billion for governance and development (\$4.16 billion for counternarcotics initiatives)
- \$2.96 billion for humanitarian aid
- \$9.98 billion for civilian operations

Figure 3.1 shows the major U.S. funds that contribute to these efforts.

FIGURE 3.1

U.S. FUNDS SUPPORTING AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS (\$ BILLIONS)




- ASFF:** Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
- CERP:** Commander’s Emergency Response Program
- AIF:** Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund
- TFBSO:** Task Force for Business and Stability Operations
- DOD CN:** DOD Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities
- ESF:** Economic Support Fund
- INCLE:** International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
- Other:** Other Funding

Note: Numbers have been rounded. Final FY 2016 appropriation amounts for State and USAID were still being determined when this report went to press.

^a Multiple agencies include DOJ, State, DOD, USAID, Treasury, USDA, DEA, Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), and SIGAR.

Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data calls, 4/19/2016, 4/18/2016, 4/12/2016, 10/22/2012, 10/14/2009, and 10/1/2009; State, response to SIGAR data calls, 4/8/2016, 4/7/2016, 10/20/2015, 4/15/2015, 4/15/2014, 6/27/2013, 10/5/2012, and 6/27/2012; Treasury, response to SIGAR data call, 7/9/2015; OMB, response to SIGAR data calls, 4/16/2015, 7/14/2014, 7/19/2013, and 1/4/2013; USAID, response to SIGAR data calls, 4/9/2016, 10/15/2010, 1/15/2010, and 10/9/2009; DOJ, response to SIGAR data calls, 4/1/2016 and 7/7/2009; USDA, response to SIGAR data call, 4/2009; DFAS, "AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts March 2016," 4/15/2016; Pub. L. Nos. 114-113, 113-235, 113-76, 113-6, 112-74, 112-10, 111-212, 111-118.

STATUS OF FUNDS




The amount provided to the seven major U.S. funds represents nearly 84.6% (nearly \$95.71 billion) of total reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan since FY 2002. Of this amount, nearly 90.0% (more than \$86.11 billion) has been obligated, and nearly 84.8% (more than \$81.14 billion) has been disbursed. An estimated \$4.56 billion of the amount appropriated these funds has expired.

U.S. RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING FOR AFGHANISTAN

As of March 31, 2016, cumulative appropriations for relief and reconstruction in Afghanistan totaled approximately \$113.17 billion, as shown in Figure 3.2. This total can be divided into four major categories of reconstruction funding: security, governance and development, humanitarian, and oversight and operations. Approximately \$8.47 billion of these funds support counternarcotics initiatives which crosscut both the security (\$4.31 billion) and governance and development (\$4.16 billion) categories. For complete information regarding U.S. appropriations, see Appendix B. FY 2016 allocations for the State Department (State) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) foreign assistance accounts were still undergoing the 653(a) congressional consultation process at the end of the fiscal quarter. State reported that draft allocations were expected to be provided to Congress in late April.⁶⁶ The amount reported as appropriated for

FIGURE 3.2

CUMULATIVE APPROPRIATIONS BY FUNDING CATEGORY, AS OF MARCH 31, 2016 (\$ BILLIONS)



Note: Numbers have been rounded. DOD reprogrammed \$1 billion from FY 2011 ASFF, \$1 billion from FY 2012 ASFF, and \$178 million from FY 2013 ASFF to fund other DOD OCO requirements. ASFF data reflects the following rescissions: \$1 billion from FY 2012 in Pub. L. No. 113-6, \$764.38 million from FY 2014 in Pub. L. No. 113-235, and \$400 million from FY 2015 in Pub. L. No. 114-113. DOD transferred \$101 million from FY 2011 AIF, \$179.5 million from FY 2013 AIF, and \$55 million from FY 2014 AIF to the ESF to fund infrastructure projects implemented by USAID.

^a Final FY 2016 appropriation amounts for State and USAID accounts were still being determined when this report went to press.

Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data calls, 4/19/2016, 4/18/2016, 4/12/2016, 10/22/2012, 10/14/2009, and 10/1/2009; State, response to SIGAR data calls, 4/8/2016, 4/7/2016, 10/20/2015, 4/15/2015, 4/15/2014, 6/27/2013, 10/5/2012, and 6/27/2012; Treasury, response to SIGAR data call, 7/9/2015; OMB, response to SIGAR data calls, 4/16/2015, 7/14/2014, 7/19/2013, and 1/4/2013; USAID, response to SIGAR data calls, 4/9/2016, 10/15/2010, 1/15/2010, and 10/9/2009; DOJ, response to SIGAR data calls, 4/1/2016 and 7/7/2009; USDA, response to SIGAR data call, 4/2009; DFAS, "AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts March 2016," 4/15/2016; Pub. L. Nos. 114-113, 113-235, 113-76, 113-6, 112-74, 112-10, 111-212, 111-118.

STATUS OF FUNDS

FY 2016 will increase from the \$3.92 billion shown in Figure 3.3 when funding levels for these accounts are determined.

The United States aims to channel at least 50% of its development assistance on-budget to the government of Afghanistan.⁶⁷ This assistance is provided either directly to Afghan government entities or via contributions to multilateral trust funds that also support the Afghan government's budget.⁶⁸ Since 2002, the United States has provided nearly \$10.10 billion in on-budget assistance. This includes about \$5.59 billion to Afghan government ministries and institutions, and over \$4.51 billion to three multinational trust funds—the World Bank's Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), the United Nations Development Programme's Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), and the Asian Development Bank's Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF). Table 3.1 shows U.S. on-budget assistance disbursed to the Afghan government and multilateral trust funds.

TABLE 3.1


U.S. ON-BUDGET ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN, SINCE 2002 (\$ MILLIONS)	
Government-to-Government	
DOD	\$4,946
State	92
USAID	549
Multilateral Trust Funds	
LOTFA	\$1,556
ARTF	2,842
AITF	113

Note: Numbers have been rounded. Figures reflect amounts the United States has disbursed in on-budget assistance to Afghan government entities and multilateral trust funds. As of March 31, 2016, USAID has obligated approximately \$1.2 billion for government-to-government assistance.

Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 6/25/2015; USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/7/2016; World Bank, "ARTF: Administrator's Report on Financial Status as of February 19, 2016 (end of 2nd month of FY 1395)", p. 5; UNDP, response to SIGAR data call, 4/13/2016.

FIGURE 3.3

APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR, AMOUNT, AND CATEGORY (\$ BILLIONS)



Note: Numbers have been rounded. DOD reprogrammed \$1 billion from FY 2011 ASFF, \$1 billion from FY 2012 ASFF, and \$178 million from FY 2013 ASFF to fund other DOD OCO requirements. ASFF data reflects the following rescissions: \$1 billion from FY 2012 in Pub. L. No. 113-6, \$764.38 million from FY 2014 in Pub. L. No. 113-235, and \$400 million from FY 2015 in Pub. L. No. 114-113. DOD transferred \$101 million from FY 2011 AIF, \$179.5 million from FY 2013 AIF, and \$55 million from FY 2014 AIF to the ESF to fund infrastructure projects implemented by USAID.

^a Final FY 2016 appropriation amounts for State and USAID accounts were still being determined when this report went to press.

Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data calls, 4/19/2016, 4/18/2016, 4/12/2016, 10/22/2012, 10/14/2009, and 10/1/2009; State, response to SIGAR data calls, 4/8/2016, 4/7/2016, 10/20/2015, 4/15/2015, 4/15/2014, 6/27/2013, 10/5/2012, and 6/27/2012; Treasury, response to SIGAR data call, 7/9/2015; OMB, response to SIGAR data calls, 4/16/2015, 7/14/2014, 7/19/2013, and 1/4/2013; USAID, response to SIGAR data calls, 4/9/2016, 10/15/2010, 1/15/2010, and 10/9/2009; DOJ, response to SIGAR data calls, 4/1/2016 and 7/7/2009; USDA, response to SIGAR data call, 4/2009; DFAS, "AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts March 2016," 4/15/2016; Pub. L. Nos. 114-113, 113-235, 113-76, 113-6, 112-74, 112-10, 111-212, 111-118.

STATUS OF FUNDS

AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING PIPELINE

Since 2002, Congress has appropriated nearly \$113.17 billion for Afghanistan relief and reconstruction. Of this amount, \$95.71 billion (84.6%) was appropriated to the seven major reconstruction funds, as shown in Table 3.2.

FIGURE 3.4

CUMULATIVE AMOUNT REMAINING TO BE DISBURSED (\$ BILLIONS)




TABLE 3.2

CUMULATIVE AMOUNTS APPROPRIATED, OBLIGATED, AND DISBURSED FY 2002–2016 (\$ BILLIONS)

	Appropriated	Obligated	Disbursed	Remaining
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)	\$63.92	\$58.15	\$57.05	\$4.95
Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)	3.68	2.28	2.27	0.02
Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF)	0.99	0.64	0.49	0.15
Task Force for Business & Stability Operations (TFBSO)	0.82	0.75	0.64	0.11
DOD Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities (DOD CN)	3.00	2.88	2.88	0.12
Economic Support Fund (ESF)	18.60	17.08	14.16	3.75
International Narcotics Control & Law Enforcement (INCLE)	4.69	4.31	3.65	0.90
Total 7 Major Funds	\$95.71	\$86.11	\$81.14	\$10.01
Other Reconstruction Funds	7.48			
Civilian Operations	9.98			
Total	\$113.17			

Note: Numbers have been rounded. Amount remaining reflects the total disbursement potential of the seven major reconstruction funds after deducting approximately \$4.6 billion that expired before being obligated. Obligated and disbursed DOD CN funds reflect amounts transferred to the military services and defense agencies to be spent for Afghanistan. Figures reflect transfers, rescissions, and reprogramming activity to date.

Source: SIGAR, analysis of appropriating legislation and quarterly obligation and disbursement data provided by DOD, State, and USAID, 4/19/2016.

As of March 31, 2016, approximately \$10.01 billion of the amount appropriated to the seven major reconstruction funds remained for possible disbursement, as shown in Figure 3.4. These funds will be used to train, equip, and sustain the ANDSF; complete on-going, large-scale infrastructure projects, such as those funded by the AIF and ESF; combat narcotics production and trafficking; and advance the rule of law, strengthen the justice sector, and promote human rights.

On February 9, 2016, President Obama released his FY 2017 budget request. The request, if approved, would provide an additional \$4.8 billion for the major reconstruction funds, as shown in Table 3.3. Although FY 2016 allocations for State and USAID accounts were still being determined when this report went to press, the FY 2017 request for DOD reconstruction accounts is about 5% lower than the amount appropriated these accounts for FY 2016.

TABLE 3.3

FY 2017 AMOUNTS REQUESTED (\$ MILLIONS)	
Fund	Requested
ASFF	\$ 3,448.72
CERP	5.00
DOD CN	140.81
ESF	1,027.00
INCLE	185.00
Total Major Funds	\$4,806.53

STATUS OF FUNDS

Congress appropriated nearly \$5.63 billion to the seven major reconstruction funds for FY 2014. Of that amount, nearly \$1.10 billion remained for possible disbursement, as of March 31, 2016, as shown in Table 3.4 and Figure 3.5.

TABLE 3.4

FY 2014 AMOUNTS APPROPRIATED, OBLIGATED, AND DISBURSED (\$ MILLIONS)				
	Appropriated	Obligated	Disbursed	Remaining
ASFF	\$3,962.34	\$3,956.29	\$3,739.76	\$216.53
CERP	30.00	6.62	6.44	0.19
AIF	144.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
TFBSO	122.24	106.82	85.84	20.98
DOD CN	238.96	238.96	238.96	0.00
ESF	907.00	835.95	167.18	668.77
INCLE	225.00	224.74	34.64	190.10
Total Major Funds	\$5,629.54	\$5,369.38	\$4,272.81	\$1,096.56

Note: Numbers have been rounded. Amount remaining reflects the total disbursement potential of the seven major reconstruction funds after deducting approximately \$260 million that expired before being obligated. Obligated and disbursed DOD CN funds reflect amounts transferred to the military services and defense agencies to be spent for Afghanistan. Figures reflect transfers, rescissions, and reprogramming activity to date.

Source: SIGAR, analysis of appropriating legislation and quarterly obligation and disbursement data provided by DOD, State, and USAID, 4/19/2016.

Congress appropriated more than \$4.80 billion to four of the seven major reconstruction funds for FY 2015. Of that amount, almost \$1.94 billion remained for possible disbursement, as of March 31, 2016, as shown in Table 3.5 and Figure 3.6.

TABLE 3.5

FY 2015 AMOUNTS APPROPRIATED, OBLIGATED, AND DISBURSED (\$ MILLIONS)				
	Appropriated	Obligated	Disbursed	Remaining
ASFF	\$3,709.33	\$3,223.92	\$2,851.96	\$857.38
CERP	10.00	3.37	1.55	1.82
ESF	831.90	2.00	0.00	831.90
INCLE	250.00	8.06	6.03	243.97
Total Major Funds	\$4,801.23	\$3,237.35	\$2,859.54	\$1,935.07

Note: Numbers have been rounded. Amount remaining reflects the total disbursement potential of the seven major reconstruction funds after deducting approximately \$7 million that expired before being obligated. Obligated and disbursed DOD CN funds reflect amounts transferred to the military services and defense agencies to be spent for Afghanistan. Figures reflect transfers, rescissions, and reprogramming activity to date.

Source: SIGAR, analysis of appropriating legislation and quarterly obligation and disbursement data provided by DOD, State, and USAID, 4/19/2016.

FIGURE 3.5

FY 2014 AMOUNT REMAINING TO BE DISBURSED (\$ BILLIONS)






FIGURE 3.6

FY 2015 AMOUNT REMAINING TO BE DISBURSED (\$ BILLIONS)



STATUS OF FUNDS



ASFF FUNDS TERMINOLOGY

DOD reported ASFF funds as appropriated, obligated, or disbursed

Appropriations: Total monies available for commitments

Obligations: Commitments to pay monies

Disbursements: Monies that have been expended

Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 4/13/2010.

AFGHANISTAN SECURITY FORCES FUND

The Congress created the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to provide the ANDSF with equipment, supplies, services, training, and funding, as well as facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, and construction.⁶⁹ The primary organization responsible for building the ANDSF is the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan.⁷⁰ A financial and activity plan must be approved by the Afghanistan Resources Oversight Council (AROC) before ASFF funds may be obligated.⁷¹

The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, appropriated more than \$3.65 billion for the ASFF for FY 2016, increasing total cumulative funding to more than \$63.92 billion.⁷² As of March 31, 2016, nearly \$58.15 billion of total ASFF funding had been obligated, of which nearly \$57.05 billion had been disbursed.⁷³ Figure 3.7 displays the amounts made available for the ASFF by fiscal year.

DOD reported that cumulative obligations increased by nearly \$437.82 million over the quarter, and cumulative disbursements increased by nearly \$848.99 million.⁷⁴ Figure 3.8 provides a cumulative comparison of amounts made available, obligated, and disbursed for the ASFF.

FIGURE 3.7

ASFF APPROPRIATED FUNDS BY FISCAL YEAR
(\$ BILLIONS)





FIGURE 3.8

ASFF FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON
(\$ BILLIONS)



Note: Numbers have been rounded. Data reflects reprogramming actions and rescissions. DOD reprogrammed \$1 billion of FY 2011, \$1 billion of FY 2012, and \$178 million of FY 2013 out of the ASFF to fund other DOD requirements. Pub. L. No. 113-6 rescinded \$1 billion from FY 2012. Pub. L. No. 113-235 rescinded \$764.38 million from FY 2014. Pub. L. No. 114-113 rescinded \$400 million from FY 2015.

Source: DFAS, "AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts March 2016," 4/15/2016; DFAS, "AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts December 2015," 1/16/2016; Pub. L. Nos. 114-113, 113-235, 113-76, and 113-6.

STATUS OF FUNDS

ASFF Budget Activities

DOD allocates funds to three budget activity groups within the ASFF:

- Defense Forces (primarily Afghan National Army (ANA))
- Interior Forces (primarily Afghan National Police (ANP))
- Related Activities (primarily detainee operations)

Funds for each **budget activity group** are further allocated to four **subactivity groups**: infrastructure, equipment and transportation, training and operations, and sustainment.⁷⁵ The AROC must approve the requirement and acquisition plan for any service requirements in excess of \$50 million annually and any non-standard equipment requirement in excess of \$100 million.⁷⁶

As of March 31, 2016, DOD had disbursed nearly \$57.05 billion for ANDSF initiatives. Of this amount, more than \$38.19 billion was disbursed for the ANA, and nearly \$18.47 billion was disbursed for the ANP; the remaining \$388.37 million was directed to related activities.⁷⁷

As shown in Figure 3.9, the largest portion of the funds disbursed for the ANA—more than \$16.01 billion—supported ANA troop sustainment. Of the funds disbursed for the ANP, the largest portion—nearly \$7.68 billion—also supported sustainment of ANP forces, as shown in Figure 3.10.⁷⁸

Budget Activity Groups: categories within each appropriation or fund account that identify the purposes, projects, or types of activities financed by the appropriation or fund

Subactivity Groups: accounting groups that break down the command's disbursements into functional areas

Source: DOD, *Manual 7110.1-M Department of Defense Budget Guidance Manual*, accessed 9/28/2009; Department of the Navy, *Medical Facility Manager Handbook*, p. 5, accessed 10/2/2009.

FIGURE 3.9

ASFF DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE ANA BY SUBACTIVITY GROUP, FY 2005–MAR 31, 2016 (\$ BILLIONS)





FIGURE 3.10


ASFF DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE ANP BY SUBACTIVITY GROUP, FY 2005–MAR 31, 2016 (\$ BILLIONS)



Note: Numbers have been rounded.

Source: DFAS, "AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts March 2016," 4/15/2016.

STATUS OF FUNDS



CERP FUNDS TERMINOLOGY

DOD reported CERP funds as appropriated, obligated, or disbursed

Appropriations: Total monies available for commitments

Obligations: Commitments to pay monies

Disbursements: Monies that have been expended

Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 4/14/2010.

COMMANDER'S EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM

The Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) enables U.S. commanders in Afghanistan to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements in their areas of responsibility by supporting programs that will immediately assist the local population. Funding under this program is intended for small projects that are estimated to cost less than \$500,000 each.⁷⁹ CERP-funded projects may not exceed \$2 million each.⁸⁰

The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, appropriated \$5 million for CERP, increasing total cumulative funding to more than \$3.68 billion.⁸¹ Of this amount, DOD reported that more than \$2.28 billion had been obligated, of which nearly \$2.27 billion had been disbursed as of March 31, 2016.⁸² Figure 3.11 shows CERP appropriations by fiscal year, and Figure 3.12 provides a cumulative comparison of amounts appropriated, obligated, and disbursed for CERP projects.

FIGURE 3.11

CERP APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR
(\$ MILLIONS)





FIGURE 3.12

CERP FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON
(\$ BILLIONS)



Note: Numbers have been rounded. Data may include inter-agency transfers.


Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data calls, 4/19/2016 and 1/19/2016; OMB, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2013; Pub. L. Nos. 114-113, 113-235, 113-76, 113-6, 112-74, 112-10.

AFGHANISTAN INFRASTRUCTURE FUND

The AIF was established in FY 2011 to pay for high-priority, large-scale infrastructure projects that support the U.S. civilian-military effort. Congress intended for projects funded by the AIF to be jointly selected and managed by DOD and State. Each AIF-funded project is required to have a plan for its sustainment and a description of how it supports the counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan.⁸³ The AIF received appropriations from FY 2011 through FY 2014. Although the AIF no longer receives appropriations, many projects remain in progress. DOD may obligate up to \$50 million from FY 2016 ASFF to complete existing AIF projects.⁸⁴

The AIF received cumulative appropriations of over \$1.32 billion; however, \$335.50 million of these funds were transferred to the Economic Support Fund for USAID's power transmission lines projects, bringing the cumulative amount remaining in the AIF to \$988.50 million.⁸⁵ Figure 3.13 shows AIF appropriations by fiscal year.

As of March 31, 2016, more than \$772.60 million of total AIF funding had been obligated, and more than \$500.37 million had been disbursed, as shown in Figure 3.14.⁸⁶



AIF FUNDS TERMINOLOGY

DOD reported AIF funds as appropriated, obligated, or disbursed

Appropriations: Total monies available for commitments

Obligations: Commitments to pay monies

Disbursements: Monies that have been expended

Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 4/13/2012.


FIGURE 3.13

AIF APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR
(\$ MILLIONS)



FIGURE 3.14


AIF FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON
(\$ MILLIONS)



Note: Numbers have been rounded. Updated data resulted in a lower obligated figure than reported last quarter. Data reflects the following transfers from AIF to USAID's Economic Support Fund: \$101 million for FY 2011, \$179.5 million for FY 2013, and \$55 million for FY 2014.

Source: DFAS, "AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts March 2016," 4/15/2016; DFAS, "AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts December 2015," 1/16/2016; Pub. L. Nos. 113-76, 113-6, 112-74, and 112-10.

STATUS OF FUNDS



TFBSO FUNDS TERMINOLOGY

DOD reported TFBSO funds as appropriated, obligated, or disbursed

Appropriations: Total monies available for commitments

Obligations: Commitments to pay monies

Disbursements: Monies that have been expended

Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 4/13/2010.

TASK FORCE FOR BUSINESS AND STABILITY OPERATIONS

In 2010, the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) began operations in Afghanistan aimed at stabilizing the country and countering economically motivated violence by decreasing unemployment and creating economic opportunities for Afghans. TFBSO authorities expired on December 31, 2014, and the TFBSO concluded its operations on March 31, 2015. TFBSO projects included activities intended to facilitate private investment, industrial development, banking and financial system development, agricultural diversification and revitalization, and energy development.⁸⁷

Through March 31, 2016, the TFBSO had been appropriated more than \$822.85 million since FY 2009. Of this amount, nearly \$754.49 million had been obligated and nearly \$640.61 million had been disbursed.⁸⁸ Figure 3.15 displays the amounts appropriated for TFBSO by fiscal year, and Figure 3.16 provides a cumulative comparison of amounts appropriated, obligated, and disbursed for the TFBSO and its projects.

FIGURE 3.15

TFBSO APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR
(\$ MILLIONS)





FIGURE 3.16

TFBSO FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON
(\$ MILLIONS)



Note: Numbers have been rounded. Updated data resulted in a lower obligated figure than reported last quarter. Of the \$822.85 million appropriated for the TFBSO, \$366.05 million was from the Operations and Maintenance, Army, account to pay for the sustainment of U.S. assets, civilian employees, travel, security, and other operational costs; all FY 2015 funding was from this account.


Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data calls, 4/18/2016, 1/13/2016, and 10/4/2011; Pub. L. Nos. 113-76, 113-6, 112-74, 112-10.

DOD DRUG INTERDICTION AND COUNTER-DRUG ACTIVITIES

DOD Drug Interdiction and Counter-drug Activities (DOD CN) supports efforts to stabilize Afghanistan by combating the drug trade and related activities. DOD uses the DOD CN to provide assistance to the counternarcotics effort by supporting military operations against drug traffickers; expanding Afghan interdiction operations; and building the capacity of Afghan law enforcement bodies—including the Afghan Border Police—with specialized training, equipment, and facilities.⁸⁹

DOD CN funds are appropriated by Congress to a single budget line for all military services. DOD reprograms the funds from the Counter-narcotics Central Transfer Account (CTA) to the military services and defense agencies, which track obligations of the transferred funds. DOD reported DOD CN accounts for Afghanistan as a single figure for each fiscal year.⁹⁰

DOD reported that DOD CN received nearly \$142.39 million for Afghanistan for FY 2016, bringing cumulative funding for DOD CN to more than \$3 billion since FY 2004. Of this amount, more than \$2.88 billion had been transferred to the military services and defense agencies for DOD CN projects, as of March 31, 2016.⁹¹ Figure 3.17 shows DOD CN appropriations by fiscal year, and Figure 3.18 provides a cumulative comparison of amounts appropriated and transferred from the DOD CN CTA.



DOD CN FUNDS TERMINOLOGY

DOD reported DOD CN funds as appropriated, obligated, or disbursed

Appropriations: Total monies available for commitments

Obligations: Commitments to pay monies

Disbursements: Monies that have been expended

Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 4/13/2010.


FIGURE 3.17

DOD CN APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR
(\$ MILLIONS)



FIGURE 3.18

DOD CN FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON
(\$ BILLIONS)




Note: Numbers have been rounded. Prior-year adjustments are done periodically to reflect deobligation and/or realignment of multi-year procurement funding. DOD reprogrammed \$125.13 million out of FY 2015 DOD CN due to several requirements for the Afghanistan Special Mission Wing being funded from the ASFF instead of DOD CN.

^a DOD reprograms all funds to the military services and defense agencies for obligation and disbursement.

Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data calls, 4/12/2016 and 12/29/2015; OSD Comptroller, 15-23 PA: Omnibus 2015 Prior Approval Request, 6/30/2015, p. 42.

STATUS OF FUNDS



ESF FUNDS TERMINOLOGY

USAID reported ESF funds as appropriated, obligated, or disbursed

Appropriations: Total monies available for commitments

Obligations: Commitments to pay monies

Disbursements: Monies that have been expended

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/15/2010.

ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND

Economic Support Fund (ESF) programs advance U.S. interests by helping countries meet short- and long-term political, economic, and security needs. ESF programs support counter-terrorism; bolster national economies; and assist in the development of effective, accessible, independent legal systems for a more transparent and accountable government.⁹²

When this report went to press, final FY 2016 funding levels for the ESF had not been determined. USAID reported that cumulative funding for the ESF amounted to nearly \$18.60 billion, including amounts transferred from AIF to the ESF for USAID’s power transmission lines projects. Of this amount, more than \$17.08 billion had been obligated, of which nearly \$14.16 billion had been disbursed.⁹³ Figure 3.19 shows ESF appropriations by fiscal year.

USAID reported that cumulative obligations as of March 31, 2016, increased by more than \$20.19 million and cumulative disbursements increased by more than \$438.23 million from the amounts reported last quarter.⁹⁴ Figure 3.20 provides a cumulative comparison of the amounts appropriated, obligated, and disbursed for ESF programs.

FIGURE 3.19

ESF APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR
(\$ BILLIONS)





FIGURE 3.20

ESF FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON
(\$ BILLIONS)



Note: Numbers have been rounded. Data reflect the following transfers from AIF to the ESF: \$101 million for FY 2011, \$179.5 million for FY 2013, and \$55 million for FY 2014. FY 2016 ESF appropriation amount will be determined after State completes the 653(a) congressional consultation process.


Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data calls, 4/9/2016 and 1/11/2016; State, response to SIGAR data calls, 1/13/2016, 10/20/2015, 4/15/2015, and 4/15/2014.

INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

The U.S. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) manages the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account which funds projects and programs for advancing rule of law and combating narcotics production and trafficking. INCLE supports several INL program groups, including police, counter-narcotics, and rule of law and justice.⁹⁵

When this report went to press, final FY 2016 funding levels for INCLE had not been determined. State reported that cumulative funding for INCLE amounted to more than \$4.69 billion. Of this amount, more than \$4.31 billion had been obligated, of which nearly \$3.65 billion had been disbursed.⁹⁶ Figure 3.21 shows INCLE appropriations by fiscal year.

State reported no change in cumulative obligations during the quarter, but cumulative disbursements as of March 31, 2016, increased by more than \$49.13 million over cumulative disbursements as of December 31, 2015.⁹⁷ Figure 3.22 provides a cumulative comparison of amounts appropriated, obligated, and disbursed for INCLE.



INL FUNDS TERMINOLOGY

INL reported INCLE and other INL funds as appropriated, obligated, or disbursed

Appropriations: Total monies available for commitments

Obligations: Commitments to pay monies

Disbursements: Monies that have been expended

Source: State, response to SIGAR data call, 4/9/2010.

FIGURE 3.21

INCLE APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR
(\$ MILLIONS)





FIGURE 3.22

INCLE FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON
(\$ BILLIONS)



Note: Numbers have been rounded. Data may include inter-agency transfers. FY 2016 INCLE appropriation amount will be determined after State completes the 653(a) Congressional consultation process.

Source: State, response to SIGAR data calls, 4/7/2016 and 1/13/2016.

INTERNATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING FOR AFGHANISTAN

In addition to assistance provided by the United States, the international community provides a significant amount of funding to support Afghanistan relief and reconstruction efforts. Most of the international funding provided is administered through trust funds. Contributions provided through trust funds are pooled and then distributed for reconstruction activities. The two main trust funds are the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA).⁹⁸


Contributions to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund

The largest share of international contributions to the Afghan operational and development budgets comes through the ARTF. From 2002 to February 19, 2016, the World Bank reported that 34 donors had pledged nearly \$9.53 billion, of which nearly \$8.95 billion had been paid in.⁹⁹ According to the World Bank, donors had pledged nearly \$943.92 million to the ARTF for Afghan fiscal year 1395, which runs from December 22, 2015, to December 21, 2016.¹⁰⁰ Figure 3.23 shows the eight largest donors to the ARTF for FY 1395.

As of February 19, 2016, the United States had pledged nearly \$3.12 billion and paid in more than \$2.84 billion since 2002.¹⁰¹ The United States and

FIGURE 3.23

ARTF CONTRIBUTIONS FOR FY 1395 BY DONOR, AS OF FEBRUARY 19, 2016 (\$ MILLIONS)



Note: Numbers have been rounded. FY 1395 = 12/22/2015–12/21/2016.

Source: World Bank, "ARTF: Administrator's Report on Financial Status as of February 19, 2016 (end of 2nd month of FY1395)," p. 1.

STATUS OF FUNDS

the United Kingdom are the two biggest donors to the ARTF, together contributing over 49% of its total funding, as shown in Figure 3.24.

Contributions to the ARTF are divided into two funding channels—the Recurrent Cost (RC) Window and the Investment Window.¹⁰² As of February 19, 2016, according to the World Bank, more than \$3.73 billion of ARTF funds had been disbursed to the Afghan government through the RC Window to assist with recurrent costs such as salaries of civil servants.¹⁰³ The RC Window supports the operating costs of the Afghan government because the government’s domestic revenues continue to be insufficient to support its recurring costs. To ensure that the RC Window receives adequate funding, donors to the ARTF may not “preference” (earmark) more than half of their annual contributions for desired projects.¹⁰⁴

The Investment Window supports the costs of development programs. As of February 19, 2016, according to the World Bank, more than \$4.15 billion had been committed for projects funded through the Investment Window, of which nearly \$3.29 billion had been disbursed. The World Bank reported 21 active projects with a combined commitment value of nearly \$2.82 billion, of which nearly \$1.96 billion had been disbursed.¹⁰⁵

Contributions to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan


The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) administers the LOTFA to pay ANP salaries and build the capacity of the Ministry of Interior (MOI).¹⁰⁶ Since 2002, donors have pledged nearly \$4.66 billion to the LOTFA, of which nearly \$4.49 billion had been paid in, as of April 11, 2016. UNDP reported that the United States had committed more than \$1.64 billion since the fund’s inception and had paid in nearly \$1.56 billion of the commitment.¹⁰⁷ Figure 3.25 shows the four largest donors to the LOTFA since 2002.

The LOTFA’s eighth phase began on July 1, 2015. The phase has an initial estimated budget of \$883.56 million and is planned to run through December 31, 2016. The Phase VIII budget is divided between two individual projects. Over \$850.56 million is for the Support to Payroll Management (SPM) project that aims to develop the capacity of the Afghan government to independently manage all non-fiduciary aspects of its pay budget for the ANP and Central Prisons Directorate (CPD) staff by December 31, 2016.¹⁰⁸ While capacity building is an important aspect of the project, most SPM project funding—nearly \$842.44 million—will be transferred from the UNDP Country Office to the Ministry of Finance (MOF) for ANP and CPD staff remunerations.¹⁰⁹ The MOI and Police Development (MPD) project is budgeted the remaining \$33 million. The MPD project focuses on institutional development of the MOI and police professionalization of the ANP.¹¹⁰

From July 1, 2015, through December 31, 2015, UNDP had expended more than \$237.05 million on the SPM project—a delivery rate of approximately 84%. Of this amount, \$235.71 million was transferred to the MOF to pay for ANP and CPD staff. In addition, nearly \$6.27 million was expended on the MPD project.¹¹¹

FIGURE 3.24

ARTF CONTRIBUTIONS PAID IN BY DONORS, 2002–FEBRUARY 19, 2016




Note: Numbers have been rounded. EU = European Union. “Others” includes 28 donors.

Source: World Bank, “ARTF: Administrator’s Report on Financial Status as of February 19, 2016 (end of 2nd month of FY1395),” p. 5.

FIGURE 3.25

DONOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE LOTFA SINCE 2002, AS OF APRIL 11, 2016



Note: Numbers have been rounded. EU = European Union. “Others” includes 26 donors.

Source: UNDP, response to SIGAR data call, 4/13/2016.

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SECURITY

As of March 31, 2016, the U.S. Congress had appropriated more than \$68.4 billion to support the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). This accounts for 60% of all U.S. reconstruction funding for Afghanistan since fiscal year (FY) 2002. Congress established the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANDSF, which comprises all security forces under the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Ministry of Interior (MOI). Most U.S.-provided funds were channeled through the ASFF and obligated by either the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) or the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Of the \$63.9 billion appropriated for the ASFF, \$58.1 billion had been obligated and \$57 billion disbursed.¹¹²

This section discusses assessments of the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), and the Ministries of Defense and Interior; gives an overview of how U.S. funds are used to build, equip, train, and sustain the Afghan security forces; and provides an update on efforts to combat the cultivation of and commerce in illicit narcotics in Afghanistan.

KEY ISSUES AND EVENTS THIS QUARTER

Top U.S. Officials Testify on Challenges for the ANDSF

During this reporting period, several high-ranking U.S. officials testified before congressional committees on the situation in Afghanistan a year after the ANDSF assumed lead responsibility for Afghan security on January 1, 2015.

Then Resolute Support (RS) and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) commander General John F. Campbell informed the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) in February 2016 that Afghanistan had not achieved an enduring level of security and stability that would allow for a reduction in U.S. support.¹¹³ Campbell also said that while the ANDSF has other capability gaps, he assessed at least 70% of the problems facing the Afghan security forces are a result of poor leadership.¹¹⁴ Also that month, National Intelligence Director James R. Clapper told the SASC that the intelligence

As this SIGAR Quarterly Report went to press, the Afghan Interior Ministry announced the death toll from an April 19 Taliban attack in central Kabul had risen to 64. Another 347 people, mostly civilians, were wounded. The incident began with a suicide car-bomb explosion, followed by an attack with firearms. The attack came a week after the Taliban announced the start of its annual spring offensive.

Source: Radio Free Europe, "Death Toll From Kabul Attack Rises To 64," 4/20/2016.

“Without international funding, the ANSF will probably not remain a cohesive or viable force.”

—James R. Clapper,
Director of National Intelligence

Source: Senate Armed Services Committee, Statement for the Record of James R. Clapper, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” 2/9/2016.

Enablers: support units that provide services needed to keep the combat units operational; such as logistics, maintenance, medical, transportation, intelligence, and close-air support.

Source: MilitaryFactory.com, “U.S. DoD Terminology: enabling force,” accessed 4/15/2016.



Then U.S. Central Command Commander General Lloyd J. Austin, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Marine General Joseph F. Dunford Jr., and outgoing Resolute Support Commander General John F. Campbell at Headquarters Resolute Support Mission in Kabul, Afghanistan, March 2, 2016. (DOD photo by D. Myles Cullen)

community believes “fighting in 2016 will be more intense than 2015, continuing a decade-long trend of deteriorating security.”¹¹⁵

During testimony before the Operations and Investigation Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), a senior official with the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported insurgents control eight (2%) of the 407 districts in Afghanistan with an additional 18 (4%) under the influence of the Taliban.¹¹⁶

In a statement prepared for the SASC in March in advance of his confirmation as head of U.S. Central Command, General Joseph L. Votel, then commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, called on Pakistan to take decisive action against the Haqqani Network, which he described as the greatest threat to U.S. forces and the long-term stability of Afghanistan.¹¹⁷

Defense Intelligence Agency director Lieutenant General Vincent R. Stewart also told the HASC in testimony that the ANDSF struggled with high operational tempo and a lack of Coalition enablers in their first full year conducting independent operations. The director said these conditions led to uneven operations execution and, as a result, insurgents were able to expand their influence in rural areas. He contended that deploying specialized Afghan units and their enablers is necessary to secure key population centers.¹¹⁸ However, in a media report, the commander of the ANA Special Operations Command expressed frustration with the misuse of the Afghan Special Forces, calling for them to be used for specific short-term missions instead of for defending territory.¹¹⁹

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and the Air Force Civil Engineering Center have managed U.S.-reconstruction funded civilian and military infrastructure projects throughout Afghanistan. In testimony before the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee on rebuilding Afghanistan, a senior USACE official discussed efforts to build a construction industry in Afghanistan, working with small businesses, and teaching responsible construction management. That official told lawmakers that challenges such as violent insurgent activity and land-rights disputes have hampered construction efforts; however, the official warned that the cost of not continuing financial support to Afghan businesses includes their failure or increased site insecurity.¹²⁰

Fiscal Year 2017 ASFF Budget Justification

In February 2016, the Department of Defense (DOD) submitted to the U.S. Congress the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) budget justification for FY 2017. The total ASFF request for FY 2017 is \$3.45 billion, which is less than the previous fiscal year’s appropriation of \$3.65 billion.¹²¹

ASFF, along with international and Afghan government funding, supports a force structure, operations, and sustainment for 195,000 ANA personnel, 157,000 ANP personnel, and 30,000 Afghan Local Police (ALP) personnel

for a total authorized force strength of 382,000. The total amount required to support the ANDSF during FY 2017 is \$4.9 billion, of which international donors will fund \$915 million, and the Afghan government will fund \$544 million.¹²²

Resolute Support Change of Command

During a ceremony at Resolute Support headquarters on March 2, 2016, General John W. Nicholson Jr. took over command from General John F. Campbell.¹²³ The new commander of RS and USFOR-A is on his fourth tour in Afghanistan. His predecessor departs after 18 months that included the transition from a combat mission to a train-advise-and-assist mission.¹²⁴

Within 20 days of assuming command, General Nicholson, accompanied by his wife and the acting Afghan ministers of Defense and Interior, visited Kunduz to meet with local leaders and to apologize to the family members of those who died in a mistaken U.S. attack on a Medecins Sans Frontieres hospital last October.¹²⁵ A senior DOD official reported to Congress that a project is under way to rebuild the hospital.¹²⁶

General Nicholson is to provide an assessment, within 90 days of his confirmation, of the conditions in Afghanistan and the recommended U.S. troop strength required for the counterterrorism and the train, advise, and assist missions.¹²⁷ In March, U.S. Central Command commander General Lloyd J. Austin advised Congress that a review of the plan to reduce U.S. troop strength by the end of 2016 is appropriate, as the facts change and the



Then U.S. Central Command Commander General Lloyd Austin, outgoing RS and USFOR-A Commander General John Campbell, NATO Senior Civilian Representative Ambassador Aramaz, and incoming RS and USFOR-A Commander John Nicholson at Headquarters Resolute Support Mission in Kabul, Afghanistan, March 2, 2016. (DOD photo)

“We’re not trying to create a Western-style society here. We’re looking at an adequate level of security to prevent the re-emergence of transnational terrorist threats.”

—Lieutenant General John W. Nicholson Jr., commander of U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan

Source: Senate Armed Services Committee, “Hearing on Nicholson Nomination,” 1/28/2016.

The Taliban fighting season, named Operation Omari after the late Taliban leader, began April 12, 2016. The Taliban vowed to control more territory and launch large-scale attacks against the Kabul government and its foreign allies. The MOD announced the Afghan counteroffensive Operation Shafaq.

Source: *WSJ.com*, “Taliban Announce Spring Offensive in Afghanistan,” 4/12/2016.

assumptions made are no longer valid.¹²⁸ Also in March, General Nicholson acknowledged the high number of ANDSF casualties and the fighting period extending into the usual winter lull has put the NATO training of the ANDSF troops behind schedule.¹²⁹

The Deteriorating Security Situation in Afghanistan

Since the international Operation Enduring Freedom mission ended in 2014, the Taliban have spread their fight across most of the country, forcing Afghan forces to spread their own assets thin.¹³⁰ Afghan security officials report that ANDSF casualties have increased sharply since assuming full control of the security responsibilities from the Coalition forces at the start of last year. According to USFOR-A, the ANDSF suffered 6,637 personnel killed and 12,471 wounded in 2015.¹³¹ In the first two months of 2016, an additional 820 members of the Afghan security forces were killed in action and 1,389 were wounded.¹³² According to Afghan security officials, the Afghan army is enduring an average of four fatalities daily, mainly due to improvised explosive device (IED) attacks.¹³³

As the security situation deteriorated in Kabul, several U.S. agencies reported that restrictions on their movements were having an impact on their missions, including the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Technical Assistance, the Department of Justice, and USAID’s Afghanistan Trade and Revenue project office.¹³⁴

Helmand province, where much of Afghanistan’s opium is produced, has been under grave threat from the Taliban for months.¹³⁵ At the end of December, a provincial council member reported “severe challenges” in 13 districts with only two districts being calm.¹³⁶ The senior Afghan general in Helmand reported more than half the ANDSF deaths during the past 11 months occurred in Helmand.¹³⁷ In testimony to the upper house of parliament, senior Afghan security officials said the ANDSF had pulled out from some areas in Helmand and removed half of the province’s checkpoints in a “tactical retreat,” which along with the reorganization of the 215th Corps was to lessen the loss of troops and to prevent the Taliban from overrunning the province.¹³⁸ According to the 215th Corps commander, the ANA torched the three bases they evacuated.¹³⁹ A more permanent Coalition presence is returning to Helmand, with approximately 40 British and 20 U.S. forces at Camp Shorabak to advise and train the beleaguered 215th Corps.¹⁴⁰ The latest U.S. deployment included almost 500 troops in a support and force-protection role for the 20 advisors.¹⁴¹ Afghan media reported that villagers in Sangin saw less-intense battles during the poppy harvest, but they expect fighting to intensify after the harvest.¹⁴² The most senior Afghan police officer in Helmand said the security situation will not improve without controlling corruption.¹⁴³ A provincial councilman explained that police officials buy their positions, then recoup their money by selling lower-level appointments and ammunition. He said police officers

lost their lives when the check-post commander lacked money to pay for ammunition.¹⁴⁴

In March, the Afghanistan Analysts Network reported that the Taliban is supplementing its existing military structure of a *mahaz* (front) system with a *qet'a* (unit) system.¹⁴⁵ The *qet'a* are larger groups with subgroups of 20 permanent fighters, who are moved when and where needed, and who receive rotational training to include instruction on ANDSF weaponry.¹⁴⁶ In some areas the *qet'a*s were reported to have locals dismantle captured ANA and ANP bases and checkpoints so the ANDSF cannot quickly reestablish their presence.¹⁴⁷ In contrast, the *mahaz* are a multi-level hierarchy of provincial and district commanders with groups of 10–30 fighters under a local commander. Each *mahaz* contributes men to an offensive operation, who return to their home area afterward.¹⁴⁸ At present, provinces with contested districts are reported to have *qet'a*s in place.¹⁴⁹

The United Nations (UN) Secretary-General assessed that the conflict grew in intensity and scope in 2015, resulting in high casualties and displacement among Afghan civilians, while the ANDSF faced significant challenges in effectively countering threats from insurgent groups across the country.¹⁵⁰ The UN recorded 22,634 security incidents in 2015—a 3% increase compared to 2014—and the second-highest count since 2001.¹⁵¹

The majority (70%) of security incidents in 2015 continued to be in the south, southeast, and east, with Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, Kunar, and Nangarhar as the most volatile provinces.¹⁵² The UN reported the Taliban temporarily captured 24 district centers throughout the country, in addition to temporarily seizing the provincial capital of Kunduz, during 2015 as compared to three in 2014.¹⁵³

USFOR-A reports that approximately 70.5% of the country's districts were under Afghan government control or influence as of January 29, 2016. Of the 407 districts within the 34 provinces, 287 districts were under government control or influence, 26 districts (6.4%) within 11 provinces were under insurgent control or influence, and 94 districts (23.1%) were “at risk.”¹⁵⁴

According to USFOR-A, the RS mission determines district status by assessing five indicators of stability: governance, security, infrastructure, economy, and communications, as reflected in Table 3.6 on the following page.¹⁵⁵

During 2015, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) documented 11,002 civilian casualties (3,545 persons killed and 7,457 injured), the highest number of civilian casualties recorded by the Mission since 2009.¹⁵⁶ The UN reported a series of high-profile attacks, targeting mainly civilians, occurred during December 2015–January 2016 at locations including Kandahar airport, the Indian and Pakistani consulates, the Spanish embassy, and a restaurant.¹⁵⁷ UNAMA reported that children accounted for one of every four civilian casualties, and women for one of every ten.¹⁵⁸ The UN recorded 255 incidents involving attacks against humanitarian

“What we have found historically is, if you take your eye off al-Qaeda, and if you don’t apply constant and direct pressure on al-Qaeda, they [have] the ability to regenerate very, very quickly.”

—Brigadier General Charles T. Cleveland, USFOR-A Chief of Communications

Source: *Washingtonpost.com*, “U.S. troops are back in restive Afghan province, a year after withdrawal,” 4/8/2016.

SECURITY

TABLE 3.6

CATEGORIES USED BY RESOLUTE SUPPORT TO DETERMINE LEVEL OF DISTRICT STABILITY					
Stability Factor	INS Control 1	INS Influence 2	Neutral 3	GIROA Influence 4	GIROA Control 5
Governance	No DG or meaningful GIROA presence. INS responsible for governance.	No DG and limited GIROA governance. INS active and well supported.	NO DG present and limited GIROA governance.	DG present and GIROA governance active. INS active but have limited influence.	DG and GIROA control all aspects of governance. Limited INS presence.
Security	INS dominate area. No meaningful ANDSF presence.	ANDSF activities limited. Collapse of district is expected.	ANDSF and INS both present in strength. Neither is able to dominate the area.	ANDSF dominate although INS attacks are common.	ANDSF dominant. INS attacks are rare and ineffective.
Infrastructure	INS control all key infrastructure within the district.	INS control most of the key infrastructure but some GIROA control remains.	Control of key infrastructure routinely passes between GIROA and INS.	GIROA control most of the key infrastructure. INS seek to gain control but are largely ineffective.	GIROA control all key infrastructure. INS unable to compete for control.
Economy	INS control the local economy. No effective GIROA taxation or wages paid. GIROA supply routes are closed.	INS taxation is dominant. Some effective GIROA taxation and wages paid in places.	Effective GIROA taxation and wages are paid but a shadow (and effective) system of INS taxation is also commonplace.	Effective GIROA taxation and wages are paid. A shadow system of INS taxation is present in some areas.	GIROA oversees a function in local economy with taxes collected and wages are paid. Minimal INS interference.
Communications	INS messaging is dominant across the area. GIROA messaging ineffective	INS messaging dominant but GIROA messaging is reaching the people.	Neither GIROA or INS dominate messaging.	GIROA dominate messaging but INS have an active IO campaign.	GIROA dominate. INS messaging is ineffective.
Final Score	< 1	Between 1–2	Between 2–3	Between 3–4	>4
Stability Level (RS Criteria)	Under INS Control	Under INS influence	At Risk	Under GIROA Influence	Under GIROA Control
Stability Level (IDLG Criteria)	Out of GIROA Control	High-Level Threat	Mid-Level Threat	Low-Level Treat	Totally Secure

Note: ANDSF = Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces, DG = District Governor, GIROA = Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, IDLG = Independent Directorate of Local Governance (Afghan), INS = insurgent, IO = Information Operation, RS = Resolute Support.

Source: USFORA, response to SIGAR data call, 2/27/2016.

personnel, assets, and facilities during 2015, resulting in 66 humanitarian workers killed and 91 injured.¹⁵⁹

Tolo News reported more journalists were killed in Afghanistan in the first two months of 2016 than in any two-month period in the last 14 years.¹⁶⁰ The most deadly incident occurred on January 20, 2016, when seven *Tolo News* employees were killed and 26 were wounded in what became known as Black Wednesday. The Taliban claimed responsibility for detonating an explosive-laden vehicle next to the company bus.¹⁶¹ The Taliban had earlier identified *Tolo News* and other Afghan news organizations as “military objectives.”¹⁶²

The UN reported an 8.3% decrease in security incidents across Afghanistan between December 1, 2015, and February 15, 2016, compared

with the same periods in the two preceding years.¹⁶³ The 4,014 security incidents represent an average of 52 incidents occurring each day, as reflected in Figure 3.26. The UN reported armed clashes (57.4%) and incidents involving improvised-explosive devices (19.2%) continued to account for the majority of the security incidents. Among the incidents, 154 involved assassinations and abductions, including the week-long kidnapping of the Afghan Supreme Court Chief Justice’s father—a 27% decrease compared with the same period in 2014 and 2015.¹⁶⁴ The UN forecasts intensification of armed conflict in the coming months if a peace accord is not reached.¹⁶⁵

UNAMA reported on MOI actions to remove the ANP from the Secretary-General’s list of parties that recruit or use children.¹⁶⁶ Recently an ANP unit was established in Nangarhar to use new age-assessment guidelines to reduce child recruitment; it joined six other child-protection units throughout the country.¹⁶⁷ Poverty is the primary reason children join the ANP or ALP.¹⁶⁸ The Taliban also recruited children, who were viewed as less likely to be considered enemy targets by Coalition troops, to report on the location of Afghan and Coalition forces and to plant improvised-explosive devices.¹⁶⁹


“The people of Afghanistan continue to suffer brutal and unprincipled attacks that are forbidden under international law.”

—Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein,
United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights

Source: UNAMA and UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Afghanistan Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: 2015, 2/2016*.

FIGURE 3.26

AVERAGE NUMBER OF REPORTED SECURITY INCIDENTS PER DAY



Note: Security incidents were not reported for the month of November 2015 or February 15–May 15, 2013.

Source: UN, report of the Secretary-General, *The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security reports*, 3/7/2016, p. 6; 12/10/2015, p. 5; 9/1/2015, p. 4; 6/10/2015, p. 4; 2/27/2015, p. 4; 12/9/2014, p. 5; 9/9/2014, p. 6; 6/18/2014, p. 5; 3/7/2014, p. 5; 12/6/2013, p. 6; 9/6/2013, p. 6; and 3/5/2013, p. 5.

Military Use of Schools: a complete takeover of school facilities and grounds or the occupation of a few classrooms or playgrounds by armed forces.

Source: Human Rights Watch, "Dispatches: Don't Turn Afghan Schools into Battlefields," 3/22/2016.

The UN called on both the Afghan security forces and the insurgents not to use schools for military purposes.¹⁷⁰ Human Rights Watch has received reports of the ANDSF deploying weaponry in or around schools and setting up fixed-firing positions on school grounds. Such actions interrupt schooling; increase teacher and student absenteeism, transfers, or drop-outs; and increase the risk of an insurgent attack, which places students in danger.¹⁷¹ During 2015, the UN recorded 111 conflict-related incidents affecting education and resulting in 25 civilian casualties.¹⁷² UNAMA recorded reports of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) members demanding one-month's salary from teachers or threatening teachers in Nangarhar Province with severe punishment or death if they did not close schools or if they reported such threats to the authorities.¹⁷³

"I do believe we're going to have to have a continued modest forward presence...for years to come."

—General John F. Campbell,
former commander of U.S. and
NATO troops in Afghanistan

Source: *Washington Post*, "Outgoing Afghanistan general: U.S. military needs to do more to beat back Taliban," 2/5/2016.

U.S. FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN

According to DOD, 13,195 Coalition forces are serving in Afghanistan as of February 29, 2016. Of that number, approximately 8,850 are U.S. forces, of which 6,800 are supporting the RS train, advise, and assist mission.¹⁷⁴ The remainder either conduct the U.S. counterterrorism mission or provide aviation, medical, logistical, and other support for U.S. forces.¹⁷⁵

Since the RS mission began on January 1, 2015, through February 29, 2016, 11 U.S. military personnel were killed in action, in addition to 10 non-hostile deaths, for a total of 21 U.S. military deaths. During this period, 76 U.S. military personnel were wounded in action.¹⁷⁶ These numbers include the loss of one U.S. service member and wounding of two others in an operation in Helmand Province on January 5, 2016.¹⁷⁷

Seven U.S. civilians or contractors were killed, in addition to nine non-hostile deaths, for a total of 16 DOD, U.S. civilian, or contractor deaths. Nine DOD, U.S. civilian, or contractor personnel were wounded during this period.¹⁷⁸

Three of the 11 killed in action and 14 of the 76 wounded in action were the result of seven insider attacks. Insider attacks were also responsible for the death of three of the seven U.S. civilians killed and one of the nine wounded during this period.¹⁷⁹ There were 69 insider attacks against the Afghan security forces during this period, resulting in the killing of 175 and the wounding of 70 Afghan security forces.¹⁸⁰

SIGAR SPECIAL PROJECT

SIGAR examined the disposal and transfer of U.S. equipment and property in Afghanistan valued at \$907 million. For more information, see Section 2, p. 46.

Significant Challenges Remain in Developing Essential Functions of the ANDSF, MOD, and MOI

Key areas of the RS mission are organized under eight Essential Functions (EF). This quarter, USFOR-A reported several highlights within each EF area. However, after more than a decade of Coalition support from ISAF, CSTC-A, and now the RS mission, many of these highlights raise concerns about the current status of the MOD, MOI, and ANDSF. Rather than

indicating strong institutionalized systems that are being adjusted for better efficiency, the latest highlights show challenges remain. Highlights reported to SIGAR this quarter included the following:

- EF-1 (Multi-Year Budgeting and Execution):** Significant challenges remain in procurement and output remains slow—MOD has a 73% approval rate for requirements submitted and the MOI has 27%. While the MOD submitted its FY 1395 procurement plan two months late in December, the MOI was four months late with its plan, accruing nearly \$1.5 million in penalties that will need to be paid out of its 1395 budget.¹⁸¹ The RS mission provides the ministries with contracted support programs that aim to hire Afghan civilians to fill business-type positions (finance, procurement, logistics, information technology, and human resources). The MOD has filled 35 of the 64 positions allotted for the first phase. The MOI has hired 256 individuals to fill the 361 positions that augment the existing civilians.¹⁸² The RS mission advised the MOD and MOI on meeting the conditions outlined in their FY 1395 financial commitment letters.¹⁸³
- EF-2 (Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight):** Progress in the Ministerial Internal Control Program to assess internal processes and identify weaknesses or noncompliance is reported to be not as steady as anticipated. The MOI Inspector General conducted transparency, accountability, and law enforcement training for MOI leaders and executives and at two of the ANP's zones (in Kabul and Nangarhar) with training scheduled to be completed in the remaining five zones this spring.¹⁸⁴
- EF-3 (Civilian Governance of Afghan Security Institutions):** With a goal of developing processes to prevent, track, investigate, and prosecute gross violations of human rights and significant acts of corruption, the RS mission plans for the U.S. Defense Institute of International Legal Studies to provide a five-day training workshop in May. Both Afghan instructors of the ANA mobile-training team have been trained and certified by the International Committee of the Red Cross and will provide law and order and human rights training to all of the ANA corps personnel.¹⁸⁵ CSTC-A contracted for Afghan legal trainers to provide train-the-trainer courses to MOI and police personnel as well as direct basic legal training, to include human rights training, to individual police personnel. The training is scheduled through July 2016. To date, 49% of MOI legal personnel and approximately 15% of the police have received training.¹⁸⁶
- EF-4 (Force Generation):** The RS Army Institutional Advisory Team (AIAT) provided a 40-member detachment to provide training, advising, and assistance in rebuilding the 215th Corps in Helmand province, including mentoring ANA training teams and teaching the troops. The AIAT assessed this effort to have been the best collective

Members of Congress Ask SIGAR to Investigate Allegations of Sexual Abuse

A bipartisan, bicameral group led by Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) and Representative Thomas J. Rooney (R-FL) and 91 additional members of Congress in December asked SIGAR to conduct an inquiry into the U.S. government's experience with allegations of sexual abuse of children committed by members of the Afghan security forces.

The inquiry will also look into the manner in which the Leahy amendment prohibiting DOD and the State Department from providing assistance to units of foreign security forces that have committed gross violations of human rights is implemented in Afghanistan. See *SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, January 2016, p. 40 for more information. The Department of Defense Inspector General is conducting a similar investigation.

“I assess it will take multiple years to fully develop the capabilities to a point the ANDSF will be able to stand and operate on its own.”

—General Joseph L. Votel,
U.S. Army, then U.S. Special
Operations Command Commander

Source: Prepared Statement for the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Nomination for U.S. Central Command Commander, 3/9/2016, p. 14.

training conducted by conventional ANA units in the past two years.¹⁸⁷ To address the leadership weaknesses within the ANA, the AIAT designed leadership courses for commanders from the strategic down to the tactical level.¹⁸⁸ For details, see page 114 of this section. The RS Police Institutional Advisory Team advised the MOI Training General Command in developing the ANP winter training program, from which approximately 25,000 patrol officers have graduated since October 2015.¹⁸⁹ For additional information, see page 124 of this section.

- **EF-5 (Sustainment):** The MOD and the RS mission partnered on a two-day conference for ANA logistics specialists and decision makers to address and resolve the challenges hampering the Afghan sustainment system. The MOD deputy first minister and the CSTC-A commander opened this first of several planned quarterly sessions, with the Minister of Defense providing closing remarks.¹⁹⁰ The RS mission managed the supply requisitioning for the spring and summer campaigns. Over the last three months 3,000 pallets of equipment, 1,100 vehicles, and 950 weapons have been distributed to the ANDSF using both contracted support and the Afghan National Transportation Brigade.¹⁹¹ In addition, mobile radios were installed in 300 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) and 141 Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAPs).¹⁹² The RS mission has trained 120 of the authorized 130 Afghans hired under a DOD contract to provide logistics support at the national-level logistic centers and the regional depots.¹⁹³ These specialists update the computerized supply system (CoreIMS), manage warehouse information, and identify and correct problems with the facilities, computer servers, training, and parts. A contract was awarded in February 2016 to inventory over 4,400 shipping containers located at the Central Supply Depot, record the material into CoreIMS, and train ANA personnel on warehouse and container management.¹⁹⁴ For additional information on CoreIMS, see page 112 of this section. In Helmand, RS advisors and contracted radio field-service engineers conducted a review of radio equipment, network operations, and maintenance. The team reported a well-maintained radio maintenance shop and personnel with a pride of ownership.¹⁹⁵
- **EF-6 (Strategy and Policy, Planning, Resourcing, and Execution):** The RS mission provided support to the development of the Whole of Government Sustainable Security Strategy, which focuses on the next five years and on locations where the Afghans will likely need to hold, fight, and conduct operations, and the spring/summer campaign plan for the ANDSF. A new readiness-reporting system was implemented for the MOD, with one in development for the MOI. A standard operating procedure was implemented for the Operational Coordination Centers at the regional and provincial levels to provide a unified method of operations and coordination between ANA corps and MOI zone headquarters.¹⁹⁶

- **EF-7 (Intelligence):** The RS mission provides train, advise, and assist support to the ANDSF to enable successful integration of intelligence into its operations. Training this quarter included use of commercial imagery and the National Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency's Protected Internet Exchange imagery database functions. RS and U.S. Central Command conducted a series of intelligence-focused seminars for MOD, MOI, and the National Directorate of Security. Members of the ANA aerostat (surveillance balloon) team were recognized for damage-assessment and post-attack reconnaissance following a rocket attack on the Italian Embassy. According to USFOR-A, use of the MOD National Information Management System in the second quarter of fiscal year 2016 increased 127% compared to the same period in 2015 and reporting from the ANA 215th Corps increased 25% in the month following training.¹⁹⁷
- **EF-8 (Strategic Communications):** The RS mission provided train, advise, and assist support to the ANDSF in developing communication plans for the upcoming spring campaign and to the ANA 215th Corps on updating the media and the public on the situational status in Helmand. According to RS, the ministries need more professional staff to accomplish strategic communications activities.¹⁹⁸
- **Gender Office:** The ANP is sending 90 women to Turkey for advanced training. In addition, 22 women are currently in a U.S.-funded counter-improvised explosive device training class, 20 ANP women have volunteered for a U.S.-funded radio maintenance course, and 270 women are expected to take a newly developed self-defense course. The RS mission supported the ANP in developing and publishing the MOI's magazine for women police personnel.¹⁹⁹ Besides other recruitment, incentive, and training programs, the RS mission supported the ANA in developing and staffing a new scholarship policy.²⁰⁰

ANA LEADS ANDSF STRENGTH GROWTH

This quarter, ANDSF assigned force strength was 325,815 (including civilians), according to USFOR-A.²⁰¹ As reflected in Table 3.7 on the following page, this is 90.5% of the ANDSF authorized force strength of 360,004, counting MOD civilian employees. (The commonly cited end-strength goal of 352,000 does not count MOD civilians.) Last quarter, SIGAR reported the ANA strength as of October 2015 as 176,612. However, after the SIGAR January 2016 *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress* went to press, USFOR-A changed the ANA strength number to 178,125.²⁰² That update changes the ANDSF October 2015 total strength that SIGAR reported last quarter to 324,151.²⁰³ The January 2016 assigned-strength number reflects an increase of 1,664 since October 2015, but a decrease of 6,129 since May 2015.²⁰⁴

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TABLE 3.7

ANDSF ASSIGNED FORCE STRENGTH, JANUARY 2016						
ANDSF Component	Approved End-Strength Goal	Target Date	Current Assigned as of January 2016	% of Target Authorization	Difference Between Current Assigned and Approved End-Strength Goals	Difference (%)
ANA including AAF	195,000	December 2014	172,206	88.3%	(22,794)	(11.7%)
ANA Civilians including AAF Civilians	8,004	-	7,305	91.3%	(699)	(8.7%)
ANA + AAF Total	203,004		179,511	88.4%	(23,493)	(11.6%)
Afghan National Police	157,000	February 2013	146,304	93.2%	(10,696)	(6.8%)
ANDSF Total with Civilians	360,004		325,815	90.5%	(34,189)	(9.5%)

Note: ANDSF = Afghan National Defense and Security Forces; ANA = Afghan National Army; AAF = Afghan Air Force.

Source: DOD, *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, 12/2012, p. 56; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 3/4/2016.

TABLE 3.8

ANDSF ASSIGNED FORCE STRENGTH, FEBRUARY 2014–JANUARY 2016									
	2/2014	5/2014	8/2014	11/2014	2/2015	5/2015	7/2015	10/2015	1/2016
ANA including AAF ^a	184,839	177,489	171,601	169,203	174,120	176,762	176,420	178,125	179,511
ANP ^b	153,269	152,123	153,317	156,439	154,685	155,182	148,296	146,026	146,304
Total ANDSF	338,108	329,612	324,918	325,642	328,805	331,944	324,716	324,151	325,815

Note: ANDSF = Afghan National Defense and Security Forces; ANA = Afghan National Army; AAF = Afghan Air Force; ANP = Afghan National Police. ANA and AAF numbers include civilians; available data for ANP do not indicate whether civilians are included.

^a The total "ANA including AAF" numbers for July 2015 and October 2015 are not fully supported by the detailed numbers in the USFOR-A response to SIGAR data call; Trainee, Transient, Holdee, and Students (TTHS) may represent all or part of the unreconciled portion.

^b Reported November 2014 ANP number appears to double-count some Afghan Uniformed Police; actual number may be 151,272.

Source: CSTC-A response to SIGAR data calls, 3/31/2014, 7/1/2014, and 10/6/2014; RSM, response to SIGAR request for clarification, 3/14/2015; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vettings, 4/10/2015, 7/12/2015, 1/29/2016, and 4/12/2016; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data calls, 12/28/2014, 3/24/2015, 6/29/2015, 9/11/2015, 12/14/2015, and 3/4/2016.

The ANA had the largest increase of 1,386 personnel; the ANP added 278 personnel, as shown in Table 3.8.²⁰⁵

This quarter, details of ANDSF force strength at corps level and below remained classified. SIGAR will report on them in a classified annex to this report.

ANA and ANP attrition rates are moving in opposite directions, according to reports provided to RS by the MOD and MOI. The ANA had a monthly attrition rate of 3.4% in January 2016, up from the 3% rate in October 2015 and the 2.4% rate in July 2015. The January rate remains, however, below the average monthly attrition rates of 3.52% in February 2013 and 3.62% in February 2014.²⁰⁶

The ANP's monthly average attrition rate was reported to have decreased each month from the 2.5% rate in October, although not attaining the 1.9% monthly rate of May–July 2015.²⁰⁷

DOD reports the total cost to sustain the ANDSF at an end-strength of 352,000 in FY 2017 is approximately \$4.9 billion. DOD is requesting Congress appropriate \$3.45 billion for the U.S. share of that expense.²⁰⁸

ANDSF ASSESSMENTS REFLECT ONGOING CHALLENGES

USFOR-A assesses ANDSF performance as inconsistent, with slower than expected progress during the winter campaign. ANDSF capability gaps in aviation, intelligence, and sustainment continue to hamper the ANDSF's ability to conduct the frequent and sustained operations necessary to combat the insurgency.²⁰⁹

Throughout the ANDSF, training is required to maintain unit readiness. With the force's high attrition rates, significant unit-collective training is required due to the personnel turnover.²¹⁰ USFOR-A reports that soldiers seldom receive follow-on training, and that many combat-support and service-support soldiers are assigned to positions outside their career field.²¹¹

Although the levels of threat and insurgent activity vary across the country and ANDSF units have different levels of overall capability, leadership is often the biggest factor in determining both ANA and ANP unit performance. While RS has noticed improvements from replacing ineffective leaders, the number of leadership candidates to choose from is limited.²¹² Western military officials reported more than 100 Afghan general staff officers were recently replaced at the national level, as well as the ANA corps commander and all brigade commanders in Helmand Province.²¹³

The RS Train, Advise, and Assist (TAA) priority areas during the winter campaign were to increase the maneuverability of forces, implement an operational readiness cycle, strengthen the processes for reporting on ANDSF readiness, establish police zone headquarters, and strengthen supply and equipment readiness and manpower (including increasing retention and recruitment and decreasing attrition).²¹⁴

USFOR-A reports two recommendations to improve ANA offensive combined arms maneuvers: (1) increase TAA at the corps regional training centers to improve unit training, and (2) add TAA to the two Mobile Strike Force Brigades.²¹⁵

USFOR-A reports the ANA recruiting program has strained to keep pace with high attrition rates. The RS mission has determined attrition issues can be addressed with proper leadership at the *kandak* (battalion) and *tolay* (company) level. Another factor in reducing attrition is determining where soldiers are stationed. Current Afghan policy does not allow soldiers to serve in their home area because of the possibility they will be influenced by their local communities.²¹⁶ Asked why soldiers were leaving before their commitment time ended, members of the troubled 215th Corps cited the need for improved leadership, money, and fear of the enemy, in that order.²¹⁷

The RS mission and the MOD are activating a reserve kandak as a pilot program to test if additional forces could be mobilized to augment ANA units engaged in critical fights. While former soldiers volunteered within two weeks, issues like determining mobilization procedures and ranks of the reserve soldiers need to be resolved before the reserve kandak becomes institutionalized.²¹⁸

“The Taliban are not 10 feet tall and bulletproof. They face significant challenges and can be defeated.”

—General John F. Campbell,
former commander of U.S. and
NATO troops in Afghanistan

Source: Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, “The Situation in Afghanistan,” 2/4/2016.



Two A-29 Super Tucanos taxi at Camp Fenty, Afghanistan, February 27, 2016. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sergeant Corey Hook)

Although USFOR-A reports the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) are effective and can achieve operational success where other ANDSF units have failed, overall the ASSF still face substantial challenges with logistics, aviation, intelligence, and mission command. Ongoing Coalition TAA and enabler support is critical.²¹⁹

While showing incremental progress, USFOR-A reports substantial systemic deficiencies continue to inhibit ANDSF readiness, sustainment maturity, and combat effectiveness. ANDSF sustainment still lacks timeliness, mission focus, and a sense of Afghan ownership to provide effective and responsive customer support. Failure to enforce the accuracy of inventory balances and consumption tracking and reporting, incorrect prioritization of repair and maintenance operations by ANDSF leadership, and poor coordination throughout the supply chain is prevalent.²²⁰ Additionally, the ANDSF continues to struggle with equipment readiness, while corruption continues to impact unit-level readiness.²²¹

USFOR-A reported the priorities for the Afghan Air Force (AAF) during the winter campaign were to establish and train pilots and tactical air coordinators for the “attack group” (an above-squadron-level component that commands the A-29 and MD-530 squadrons), to provide the air-to-ground capability from start to finish; and to increase the Mi-17 aircrew training to reduce mishap rates.²²² While the AAF leadership and personnel showed resolve in efforts to provide the ANDSF with air support while also fielding new aircraft during 2015, the AAF fleet was too small to meet total demand.²²³

Although the current focus of the ANP is to combine its capabilities with the ANA to fight the insurgency, DOD reports the long-term goal for the ANP remains to transition to a traditional community police force. The ANP forces are often on the front lines during the “hold” phase of counterinsurgency operations. However, they are not sufficiently trained or equipped for traditional counterinsurgency tactics: they have limited crew-served weapons (heavier weapons that require more than one person to operate), anti-armor weapons, armored vehicles, or intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.²²⁴

USFOR-A reports ANP zones were established that roughly correlate with the ANA Corps areas of operation. They should be operational this year, with the RS mission forecasting that all ANP zone headquarters will be “capable” or “partially capable” by October 2016, if they continue to receive consistent TAA support.²²⁵

USFOR-A reports the MOI winter-campaign training surge has reduced the number of untrained Afghan Uniform Police and ALP from 21,000 in October 2015 to less than 6,000 by February 2016, with all untrained police to have completed training before the start of the summer campaign.²²⁶

While not advocating a large-scale deployment of advisors, former RS Commander General John F. Campbell recommended placing some U.S. advisors and air controllers with select ANA units below the corps level.²²⁷

“Building an aircraft while in flight, that’s kind of what it is. The Afghan security forces continue to grow, but at the same time they have to fight, and that is very, very tough.”

—General John F. Campbell, former commander of U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan

Source: *NYTimes.com*, “New U.S. General Takes Command of Coalition Forces in Afghanistan,” 3/2/2016.

This quarter, SIGAR will report on the classified aspects of the ANDSF assessment in the classified annex to this report.

MINISTRIES OF DEFENSE AND INTERIOR MAKE MODEST PROGRESS, STILL FAR FROM ACHIEVING HIGHEST RATINGS

Each RS Essential Function (EF) directorate and the Gender Advisor office uses the Essential Function Plan of Action and Milestones (POAM) to assess the essential-function capabilities of the offices in the ministries of Defense and Interior.²²⁸ MOD offices are assessed on 45 milestones. MOI offices are assessed on 32 milestones—eight less than last quarter.²²⁹ The milestones are assessed using a five-stage rating system displayed in Table 3.9 on the following page.²³⁰ Milestone assessments are combined to determine the overall assessment of a department. Department assessments are then combined to determine the assessment of the overall ministry.²³¹

The five ratings reflect the degree to which Afghan systems are in place, functioning, and being used effectively. The highest rating, “sustaining capability,” indicates an Afghan ministry can perform a specific function without Coalition advising or involvement.²³²

This quarter, the RS assessment indicates both the MOD and MOI continue to show improvement in the percentage of its combined “sustaining capability,” “fully capable,” and “partially capable” development milestones. The MOD has increased from 55.6% to 57.8% then to 66.7% over the last two quarters. The MOI has increased its combined ratings with 71.9% of its development milestones at “sustaining capability,” “fully capable,” and “partially capable” compared to 59.5% and then 65%.²³³

The first “sustaining capability” assessment rating (the highest rating) achieved by the MOI for an EF-5 (Sustainment) milestone last quarter, was maintained for a second quarter.²³⁴ Yet this quarter, the RS assessment reflects the MOD and MOI Gender Relations offices experienced a loss of capability: both had one of three overall milestones slip from “in development” to “scoped.”²³⁵ However, the majority of the ministry-development milestone ratings are “partially capable.” When looking at those milestones that are rated as “sustaining capability” or “fully capable” (the highest- and second-highest ratings), the percentages drop to 6.7% for the MOD and to 9.4% for the MOI.²³⁶

After significantly slower-than-expected progress, RS adjusted the expected capacity levels the MOD will achieve by the end of 2016 for the fourth consecutive quarter. RS now forecasts that 49% of MOD functions are predicted to be “sustaining” or “fully capable,” a drop from the 62%, 69%, 74%, and 90% forecasts in the last four quarters.²³⁷ Notwithstanding the reduction in the number of MOI milestones, RS forecasts 66% of the MOI functions to be “sustaining” or “fully capable,” an improvement from the previous four quarters’ downward-trending forecasts.²³⁸

SIGAR is not able to verify the accuracy of the ministry assessment data provided by the RS mission.

SIGAR INSPECTION

This quarter a SIGAR inspection assessed U.S. efforts to construct the Ministry of Defense headquarters and found, while contract requirements were generally met and the building appears well built, several construction issues need to be assessed. For more information, see Section 2, pp. 37–40.

SECURITY

TABLE 3.9

PROGRESS TOWARD ACHIEVING A “SUSTAINING” RATING FOR ESSENTIAL FUNCTION MILESTONES

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE ASSESSMENT						
Essential Functions	Scoped/Agreed	In Development	Partially Capable	Fully Capable	Sustaining	Total Number of Milestones
1. Multi-Year Budgeting & Execution	-	3	2	1	-	6
2. Transparency, Accountability, & Oversight	-	3	1	-	-	4
3. Civilian Governance of the Afghan Security Institutions	-	-	4	-	-	4
4. Force Generation	-	1	3	-	-	4
5. Sustainment	-	1	8	3	-	12
6. Strategy & Policy, Planning, Resourcing, & Execution	-	1	1	1	-	3
7. Intelligence	-	1	2	-	-	3
8. Strategic Communications	-	2	4	-	-	6
* Gender Advisor	2	1	-	-	-	3
Essential Function Totals	2	13	25	5	-	45
This quarter, percent of total milestones	4%	29%	56%	11%	0%	
Last quarter, percent of total milestones	4%	38%	51%	7%	0%	

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR ASSESSMENT						
Essential Functions	Scoped/Agreed	In Development	Partially Capable	Fully Capable	Sustaining	Total Number of Milestones
1. Multi-Year Budgeting & Execution	-	2	4	-	-	6
2. Transparency, Accountability, & Oversight	-	1	2	-	-	3
3. Civilian Governance of the Afghan Security Institutions	-	-	3	-	-	3
4. Force Generation	-	1	-	1	-	2
5. Sustainment	-	1	9	1	1	12
6. Strategy & Policy, Planning, Resourcing, & Execution	-	-	2	-	-	2
7. Intelligence	-	1	-	-	-	1
8. Strategic Communications	-	-	-	-	-	0
* Gender Advisor	2	1	-	-	-	3
Essential Function Totals	2	7	20	2	1	32
This quarter, percent of total milestones	6%	22%	63%	6%	3%	
Last quarter, percent of total milestones	3%	58%	33%	5%	3%	

Note: EF = Essential Function; last quarter = data as of November 24, 2015; this quarter = data as of February 4, 2016.
 *Rated, but not EF-numbered.

Source: USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data calls, 12/4/2015 and 3/10/2016; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/13/2016.

The UN reported the MOI established 12 new **community-policing** units in several provinces in an effort to introduce community-oriented policing among the ANP. There are now 20 community-policing units throughout the country.²³⁹

Afghan Local Police

Afghan Local Police members, known as “guardians,” are usually local citizens selected by village elders or local power brokers to protect their communities against insurgent attack, guard facilities, and conduct local counterinsurgency missions.²⁴⁰ Since June 15, 2015, the ALP has fallen under the command of the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP). However, the ALP was not absorbed into the AUP *tashkil* (personnel authorizations) and, even though the AUP is one of the ANP’s pillars, the ALP *tashkil* will remain independent of the ANP’s total authorized strength because other donors fund the AUP but not the ALP, which is mainly funded by DOD.²⁴¹

As of January 28, 2016, according to the NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A), the ALP has 28,219 guardians, 22,954 of whom were trained as of February 13, 2016.²⁴² Due to the reluctance of provincial and district police chiefs to release personnel from staffing checkpoints, NSOCC-A reports that only approximately 56% of the planned 6,000 ALP guardians have completed the winter campaign training program through February.²⁴³

According to Afghan reporting, 0.4% of ALP guardians were killed in action during January and February 2016. An additional 1.7% have been dropped from the rolls, while none were reported becoming disabled or injured. These numbers yield an aggregate attrition rate of 2.1%. The Afghan government is no longer reporting the number of ALP guardians who have renewed their contracts.²⁴⁴

NSOCC-A reports the FY 2016 cost to support the ALP at its authorized end strength of 30,000 is \$117 million. The United States expects to fund approximately \$112.5 million, with the Afghan government contributing the remaining \$4.5 million.²⁴⁵ CSTC-A reports the total cumulative amount of ASFF funding obligated in support of the ALP through September 28, 2015, was \$308.7 million, of which \$219.9 million had been expended.²⁴⁶ Since the beginning of the Afghan fiscal year in December 2015, an additional \$6.1 million was obligated through February 29, 2016.²⁴⁷ NSOCC-A reports, however, that there are no Coalition advisors outside the Kabul-capital region that are in consistent contact with the ALP.²⁴⁸

Last quarter SIGAR reported on the MOI reforms enacted after the internal assessment of 164 of the 170 districts in which the ALP operates.²⁴⁹ This quarter NSOCC-A reported that in addition to enrolling the ALP personnel into the Afghan Human Resources Information Management System and continuing to transition ALP salary payments through an electronic funds-transfer process, a materiel inventory is being conducted.²⁵⁰ CSTC-A

The Afghan president’s Interior minister-designate, Taj Mohammad Jahid, was confirmed by the lower house of parliament on April 9, 2016. He previously served in the ANA as the commander of the 207th Zafar Military Corps in western Herat province.

Source: *Pajhwok.com*, “Ghani’s choice for interior minister, AG win trust votes,” 4/9/2016.

Community policing: a law-enforcement philosophy that focuses on crime control through the delivery of traditional police services along with community engagement. Community policing works to increase trust between law enforcement and the community, reduce the fear of crime, and improve the quality of life. Community policing requires a law enforcement and community partnership to identify and solve community problems.

Source: DOJ, “Community Policing Dispatch,” 2/2008; European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan, “Six questions about community policing,” 2/21/2016.

reported the ALP fleet consists of 1,296 Ford Ranger light tactical vehicles and 2,321 motorcycles. But approximately 25% of the fleet has not received scheduled maintenance in over 12 months, so its operational readiness is uncertain.²⁵¹

AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

As of March 31, 2016, the United States had obligated \$38.8 billion and disbursed \$38.2 billion of ASFF funds to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANA.²⁵²

ANA Military Personnel Increase in Second Consecutive Quarter

Last quarter, SIGAR reported the ANA strength as of October 2015 as 176,612. However, after the SIGAR January 2016 *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress* went to press, USFOR-A changed the ANA strength number to 178,125.²⁵³ As of January 20, 2016, the overall assigned strength of the ANA, including the AAF and civilians, was 179,511 personnel, according to USFOR-A.²⁵⁴ This is an overall increase of 1,386 from the October 2015 assigned end strength report of 178,125.²⁵⁵ The number of ANA civilians increased this quarter by 411; the number of ANA military personnel increased by 975.²⁵⁶ ANA assigned military personnel are at 88.3% of the approved end strength.²⁵⁷

During the month of January 2016, the ANA attrition rate was 3.4%; the AAF's was 1.2%. ANA and AAF attrition during October 2015 was 3% and 1.5%, respectively.²⁵⁸

General John F. Campbell said after his farewell ceremony that Afghan forces need to address recruiting and attrition problems, in addition to making leadership reforms. He said allowing the security forces to take leave to be with their families and time to train could reduce attrition.²⁵⁹

In January 2016, the Afghan army raised the new-recruit age limit from 35 to 40 years old in an effort to replenish the force and meet recruitment goals.²⁶⁰

Details of ANA troop strength and attrition at corps level and below remain classified. SIGAR will report on them in a classified annex to this report.

ANA Sustainment

As of March 31, 2016, the United States had obligated \$16.3 billion and disbursed \$16 billion of ASFF for ANA sustainment.²⁶¹ The most prominent use of ASFF sustainment funding is for salaries and incentive payments; other uses include items such as ammunition, organizational clothing and individual equipment (OCIE), aviation sustainment, and vehicle maintenance.²⁶² CSTC-A reported the total amount expended for all payroll and nonpayroll sustainment requirements in Afghan FY 1394 (2015) was \$876.1 million.²⁶³

Sustainment items for the combat forces (27%) and the Afghan Air Force (23%) account for half of the funding, followed by funding for vehicles and transportation (9%) and communications (7%).²⁶⁴

CSTC-A is working with the Afghan government to have ANDSF uniforms produced in Afghan factories. Although current U.S. regulations require that all materials to make uniforms purchased with U.S. funding—including cloth, zippers, and buttons—come from the United States, the tailoring can be done in Afghanistan by local workers. The deputy commander of CSTC-A said “Getting people jobs here is a critical part of what we’re driving for.” The initial order for 195,000 uniforms would be awarded to two or three Afghan companies—60,000 uniforms the first year and 135,000 in the second—and is expected to create hundreds of local jobs.²⁶⁵

ANA Salaries and Incentives

CSTC-A reported the funding required for ANA base salaries, bonuses, and incentives will average \$682 million annually over the next five years, with \$676.2 million required in FY 2016.²⁶⁶ During Afghan FY 1394, the United States provided \$271 million directly to the Afghan government to fund ANA salaries and contractor pay, with the significant majority of the funding, \$179.5 million, applied toward officer base pay. An additional \$91 million was used for noncommissioned officers’ and soldiers’ pay, and \$500,000 for ANA contractors’ base pay.²⁶⁷

To encourage the MOD to use electronic-payment systems, CSTC-A plans to provide 100% funding only for personnel in authorized tashkil positions being paid electronically, once the automated pay system is ready for use in 2016.²⁶⁸ In addition, CSTC-A will not fund salaries for personnel not slotted in the Afghan Human Resource Information Management System (AHRIMS) or for those personnel without a unique ID number, a valid biometric record in the MOD Biometric Database, a valid record in AHRIMS, and a valid, current ID.²⁶⁹ USFOR-A reports as of March 1, 2016, that the MOD has input 95% of the ANA forces into AHRIMS with 65% of the force slotted into an approved FY 1394 tashkil position.²⁷⁰

AHRIMS contains a personnel module that includes name, rank, education level, identification card number, current tashkil position, and other data. A tashkil module within AHRIMS contains all the approved positions within the MOD and the MOI along with pertinent information such as unit, location, and duty title. Personnel records in AHRIMS are linked to the appropriate position within the tashkil module. These two modules form the core of the personnel system for the MOD and MOI. The Afghan Personnel Pay System (APPS) is to ensure pay accountability by integrating the data in the AHRIMS modules with compensation and payroll modules to process authorizations, personnel accountability, payroll, and funds disbursement. CSTC-A is overseeing the integration

of a biometrically linked ID card into the APPS. This effort is to ensure the employee exists and payments are sent directly into the employee's bank account.²⁷¹

ANA Equipment and Transportation

As of March 31, 2016, the United States had obligated \$12.9 billion and disbursed \$12.8 billion of ASFF for ANA equipment and transportation.²⁷² Most of these funds were used to purchase vehicles, aircraft, communication equipment, weapons, and related equipment. Approximately 48.4% of U.S. funding in this category was for vehicles and related parts, as shown in Table 3.10.

TABLE 3.10

COST OF U.S.-FUNDED ANA EQUIPMENT, AS OF FEBRUARY 29, 2016			
Type of Equipment	Procured	Remaining to be Procured	Procured and Fielded to the ANA
Weapons	\$642,032,285	\$21,893,716	\$522,533,955
Vehicles	7,295,113,342	390,091,747	6,519,731,649
Communications	856,203,711	25,086,658	711,195,493
Aircraft	2,442,053,461	54,404,529	1,343,074,599
Ammunition	2,469,192,080	268,857,178	2,180,830,996
Transportation Services	49,380,000	18,760,000	13,459,569
C-IEDs	421,509,208	64,940,319	341,550,056
Other	884,304,375	0	801,295,177
Total	\$15,059,788,462	\$844,034,147	\$12,433,671,494

Note: C-IED = Counter-improvised explosive devices. Equipment category amounts include the cost of related spare parts.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 3/8/2016.

Since last quarter, the total cost of equipment procured for the ANA increased by over \$332.5 million.²⁷³ CSTC-A reported that the amount for vehicles, including related maintenance and spare parts, “remaining to be procured” decreased since last quarter from \$604.4 million to \$390.1 million, although there was not a corresponding increase reported to the “procured” amount.²⁷⁴

A stipulation in the MOD 1395 Bilateral Financial Commitment Letter required the MOD to provide an inventory of all small-arms weapons (less than .50 caliber) to CSTC-A by March 1, 2016.²⁷⁵ The MOD submitted a weapons-inventory loss report for 835 weapons, but did not meet the inventory reporting suspense date. Until the inventory is received, the CSTC-A end-use monitoring team has recommended withholding future small-arms deliveries.²⁷⁶

Due to inconsistent and unreliable reporting by the MOD, the accuracy of the ANA equipment operational-readiness rate is questionable. CSTC-A said data quality is expected to improve once the National Maintenance Strategy

is implemented and training results are realized, but pointed to several factors within MOD that contribute to poor readiness rates:²⁷⁷

- high number of battle- or accident-damaged vehicles
- a shortage of about 600 trained mechanics for vehicle maintenance
- assignment of mechanics to other duties such as staffing checkpoints
- a maintenance contractor's relatively immature supply system that is not projected to reach full capability until June 2016—even though the contract has existed for six years—indicating the importance of building Afghan capacity to order parts from the DOD supply system²⁷⁸

According to DOD, the logistics and sustainment gaps significantly limit the ability of the ANDSF on the battlefield as well as negatively affect recruiting, training, and force retention. The MOD and MOI's ability to provide CSTC-A with accurate ammunition, fuel, parts, clothing, and other supply requirements results in Coalition advisors developing requirements without actual-usage insight and contractors independently ordering parts.²⁷⁹ Furthermore, DOD said use of an expedited procurement and fielding approach bypassed the standard DOD "Total Package Approach" in which equipment is provided with sustainment plans, technical manuals, parts catalogues, and manufactures' recommended training programs.²⁸⁰

Equipment purchased for the ANA that was later determined to no longer be required by the ANDSF or that was damaged before transfer to the Afghan government can be converted into DOD stock for disposition, after USFOR-A considers alternative dispositions and the U.S. Congress is notified. DOD said no notification was processed during this reporting period, so the cumulative value remains at \$215 million.²⁸¹

The National Maintenance Strategy

This quarter CSTC-A provided an update on plans for a National Maintenance Strategy (NMS). As the ANDSF does not possess the capacity to maintain acceptable levels of readiness to support combat operations, the NMS is planned to provide contract maintenance and training to supplement the ANA and ANP organic maintenance. The NMS will be one component of a plan to address the shortfalls in the ANDSF organic maintenance and supply support capabilities.²⁸²

The NMS is to be configured to the unique needs of each ministry. The MOI has almost no mechanics, maintenance training, or maintenance production-management capability. The MOD has limited maintenance training, some mechanics, and limited understanding of maintenance management and production control. The NMS goal is to grow the ministry capabilities while gradually reducing contractor support, more specifically to:²⁸³

- increase fleet readiness while building ANDSF maintenance capability
- train mechanics to improve skill and knowledge

SIGAR AUDIT

An ongoing SIGAR audit will review DOD's support to the ANA's portion of the Technical Equipment Maintenance Program (A-TEMP). Specifically, SIGAR plans to determine (1) the extent to which the ANA A-TEMP is meeting its stated goals and (2) whether key ANA A-TEMP contract requirements are being met.

- train supply personnel to correctly request requirements and document receipts (failure to order correct repair parts is a major challenge)
- build repair-parts management capability within MOI
- expand the existing Afghan Component Overhaul Program to four sites (performing major-assembly repair saves spare part funds, with savings to date of about \$52 million)²⁸⁴

There are 31 MOD/MOI maintenance sites throughout Afghanistan. A heavy-repair capability is embedded in each ANA corps. NMS is expected to have 17 advisor-mentor teams to provide training on maintenance management and supply operations, and 68 contract teams to provide off-site repair capability and meet surges in maintenance requirements.²⁸⁵

The NMS contract is expected to be awarded in April 2017 with a base-year cost estimated at \$230 million.²⁸⁶

Core Information Management System

CSTC-A also provided an update on the Core Information Management System (CoreIMS) this quarter. Since 2012, efforts have been under way to develop and implement an automated asset-visibility system within both ministries to replace a paper-based process using CoreIMS as the platform. CoreIMS is a proprietary inventory-management system that is being enhanced to eventually provide asset visibility of basic items like vehicles, weapons, night vision devices, and repair parts, both in-stock and on-order to allow for informed allocation of material, predictive analysis of the requirements, and proactive budgeting, while reducing the opportunity for fraudulent activity.²⁸⁷ The goal is to improve Afghan sustainment processes from the national level to the corps and regional levels by linking asset visibility to managers and decision makers.²⁸⁸

Civilian Afghan managers and 23 of 24 logistics specialists at the Central Supply Depot (CSD) and the Material Management Center-Army were trained this quarter in using CoreIMS.²⁸⁹ Deployment of CoreIMS is under way to allow each ANA corps to receive, issue, and manage supply stocks. The logistical specialists at ANA corps, MOI regions, the CSD, and the Center assist in warehouse operations and provide training.²⁹⁰ The last recorded inventory at the CSD was in 2013. Contractors have been hired to inventory and capture in CoreIMS the contents of 4,300 containers at the CSD and to provide inventory and warehouse training to the Afghan logistics specialists.²⁹¹

While continuing to develop warehousing, shipping, and receiving skills within the Afghan ministries, CSTC-A recommends:²⁹²

- enforce conditionality on recording receipt and use of supplies in CoreIMS
- transition the paper-based property-book system to an automated system to improve accountability for equipment such as weapons,

vehicles, communication systems, night-vision devices, and serial-numbered items

- create a maintenance-management system that links serial-number accountability to maintenance of items
- integrate the Defense Security Cooperation Agency's Security Cooperation Information Portal data to link items-shipped reports with their receipts

ANA Infrastructure

As of March 31, 2016, the United States had obligated \$5.9 billion and disbursed \$5.7 billion of ASFF for ANA infrastructure such as military head-quarter facilities, schoolhouses, barracks, air fields, and roads.²⁹³

As of February 29, 2016, the United States had completed 382 infrastructure projects valued at \$5.2 billion, with another 18 projects valued at \$157.6 million ongoing, according to CSTC-A.²⁹⁴ The largest ongoing ANA infrastructure projects this quarter are the same as last quarter: the second phase of the Marshal Fahim National Defense University (MFNDU) in Kabul (although the estimated costs decreased from \$76.3 million to \$73.3 million), to be completed in December 2017, and the Logistics Officers Branch School in Kabul (\$33.6 million) and the fourth phase of the Kabul Military Training Center in Kabul (\$19.7 million), both were to have been completed in December 2015.²⁹⁵

In addition, one project—the ANA Camp Eagle wastewater-treatment plant and repair facility—was completed at a cost of \$240,600.²⁹⁶

Two contracts were awarded this quarter at a cost of \$1.6 million to construct protection walls at AAF and ANA Special Operations Command facilities in Kabul.²⁹⁷ Among the 23 projects (\$183.3 million) in the planning phase, three projects are to construct facilities for females (\$30.1 million), five projects are to construct facilities for the AAF, and three projects are to support the national electrical grid strategy.²⁹⁸

The ASFF-funded national operations and maintenance contract provides maintenance for 24 MOD facilities including military-related facilities at the presidential palace, training and higher-learning facilities, a justice center, a detention center, and a hospital.²⁹⁹

CSTC-A reported the MOD Construction and Properties Management Department met the FY 1395 MOD financial-commitment letter requirements to provide CSTC-A a transition and sustainment plan for the facilities constructed with U.S. funding and transferred to the Afghan government, as well as the MOD prioritized project list for Afghan FY 1396 and 1397.³⁰⁰

ANA and MOD Training and Operations

As of March 31, 2016, the United States had obligated and disbursed \$3.7 billion of ASFF for ANA and MOD training and operations.³⁰¹



Interior view of a magazine under construction in Kabul Province. (USACE-TAA photo)

SIGAR AUDIT

Last quarter a SIGAR audit to assess U.S. efforts to increase the ANA's effectiveness through the creation of a National Engineering Brigade (NEB) determined the brigade incapable of operating independently. In vetting, CSTC-A reported the new Afghan NEB commander has greatly improved morale, readiness, and effectiveness. For more information, see the January 2016 *SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, p. 22.

CSTC-A reported 15 ongoing U.S.-funded training programs, including 10 focusing on technical training.³⁰² The majority of the funding is applied toward pilot training, aviation and equipment maintenance, and essential-function development training.³⁰³

During this quarter, the EF-4 (Force Generation) Army Institutional Advisory Team (AIAT) reported on the status of the three new officer-training courses. To address the problem that less than 5% of graduates of long-term developmental programs were assigned relevant positions, the AIAT designed three short-duration courses for those about to enter or just starting a command role:³⁰⁴

- **Kandak Pre-Command Course:** a two-week course for newly appointed kandak commanders that includes combined-arms operations, cross-pillar coordination, air-to-ground integration, operational readiness, and training management. The first course, held in December 2015, was determined by the AIAT and advisors from the U.S. Maneuver Center of Excellence to have been well taught by knowledgeable, confident ANA instructors, resulting in a course that will be valuable for ANA leadership and one they can self-sustain. The course will be held four times a year for approximately 20 students.³⁰⁵
- **Brigade Pre-Command Course:** a two-week course for newly appointed brigade commanders is to cover the kandak pre-command course topics from a more senior commander's perspective. The course is scheduled to be held twice a year for approximately 10 students. The first course, in February 2016, had 40 students attending. Daily external speakers, such as ANA general officers and the Resolute Support Mission commander, addressed the group. The AIAT and advisors from the U.S. Maneuver Center of Excellence mentored the ANA instructors.³⁰⁶
- **The CAPSTONE Course:** a two-week leadership course primarily for corps and zone commanders. The course, developed by members of the U.S. Army War College and the UK Defense Academy, was modeled after a UK program. The first course is scheduled for April 2016. Staff of the Defense Academy will teach the course in Kabul, followed by one week in the United States visiting the XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters and the National Defense University.³⁰⁷

SIGAR SPECIAL PROJECT

In February 2015, SIGAR conducted a fact-finding visit on the A-29 Super Tucanos at Moody Air Force Base in the state of Georgia. SIGAR will conduct ongoing monitoring of the program's roll-out and the training of the Afghan pilots.

Afghan Air Force and the Special Mission Wing

Between FY 2010 and FY 2015, the United States has obligated more than \$2.5 billion to develop the AAF, including over \$953 million for equipment and aircraft.³⁰⁸ In addition, the \$518.1 million in ASFF was appropriated for FY 2016 and DOD requested \$508.6 million for FY 2017, with the significant majority of the funds for training and sustainment.³⁰⁹

According to USFOR-A, this quarter the AAF aircraft available for operations includes:³¹⁰

- 2 Mi-35 helicopters

- 39 Mi-17 helicopters
- 13 MD-530 helicopters
- 24 C-208 airplanes
- 4 C-130 airplanes
- 8 A-29 aircraft (the first quarter reported)

Of these aircraft, 33 of the Mi-17s and all of the MD-530s, C-208s, and the C-130s were procured using ASFF.³¹¹ USFOR-A reported the loss of a Mi-35 helicopter in a training accident and the AAF loss of another on March 16, 2016; the remainder were retired after reaching end-of-life status.³¹² USFOR-A stated that the AAF lost one MD-530; two are in the U.S. for use in testing upgrades and add-on equipment.³¹³ However, an additional 12 MD-530s are being purchased and are scheduled for delivery in 2016.³¹⁴ Twenty A-29 Super Tucanos, a light-attack aircraft for counterinsurgency, close-air support, and aerial reconnaissance, have been purchased, but only eight have been delivered—four in January and an additional four at the end of March.³¹⁵ According to Afghan media, two of the A-29s are located at Mazar-e Sharif, the provincial capital of northern Balkh Province.³¹⁶ With the last A-29s not scheduled for delivery until 2018, General John F. Campbell, former RS and USFOR-A commander, forecasted the AAF would not reach their full strength until 2020.³¹⁷

USFOR-A reported the A-29 aircraft were scheduled to begin combat operations in April 2016. Pilots returned in January from A-29 training in the United States and continued training in Afghanistan to prepare for combat operations.³¹⁸ Joint ANA and AAF training exercises in late March allowed Afghan tactical air coordinators to call-in A-29 and MD-530 air strikes. The tactical air coordinators facilitate requests for close air support, air casualty evacuation, aerial resupply, and airlift.³¹⁹ In March, Afghan military students, to include three A-29 pilots, eight A-29 mechanics, and nine C-130 mechanics, began training in the United States.³²⁰

The RS TAA cell devoted to training the AAF continued to press for a **flying-hour program**. AAF leadership, however, is focused on combat operations and preparations for the summer campaign. USFOR-A stated the Coalition expansion of contract logistics support to meet the AAF operations tempo has masked the importance of establishing a flying-hour program.³²¹

The Special Mission Wing (SMW) conducts multifunctional aviation operations in direct support of the ASSF units for counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and special-operations missions.³²² CSTC-A reported that between FY 2012 and FY 2015, the United States has invested approximately \$2.0 billion to develop the SMW, obligating roughly \$952.7 million of that amount for equipment and aircraft.³²³ An additional \$15.5 million was appropriated in FY 2016; DOD requested \$148.3 million for FY 2017 for aircraft sustainment, equipment, and training.³²⁴

“Close air support is just a capability gap that we knew was going to take years and years to build.”

—General John F. Campbell,
former commander of U.S. and
NATO troops in Afghanistan

Source: *Washingtonpost.com*, “Outgoing Afghanistan general: U.S. military needs to do more to beat back Taliban,” 2/5/2016.

Flying-hour program: a set of fleet management processes that integrates budget, logistics, maintenance, and aircraft scheduling activities.

Source: USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/12/2016.

AFGHAN AIR FORCE

On April 27, 2002, the same day Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was in Kabul to meet with interim Afghan leader Hamid Karzai, an Afghan Air Force (AAF) MiG-21—a supersonic, Soviet-designed jet fighter—crashed while practicing for an airshow, killing its pilot. Secretary Rumsfeld and Karzai had been meeting to discuss concerns that the Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters were still loose in Afghanistan and planning a new offensive.³²⁵ Fast forward 14 years: the Taliban and al-Qaeda are still on the loose, but a supersonic-jet-operating Afghan Air Force is now just a memory.

During the period of Soviet assistance, Afghanistan’s air force had up to 500 aircraft, including 200 helicopters, 100 fighter jets and as many as 7,000 personnel. It fell into disrepair when the Taliban came to power. Most of the equipment that had not fallen into the hands of warlords was destroyed when U.S.-backed Afghan forces removed the Taliban from power in late 2001.³²⁶ Then, in 2002, according to a former State Department official, the Bush Administration decided not to rebuild Afghanistan’s air force.³²⁷

By 2005, it had become clear that Afghanistan would need an air force to support its soldiers and police on the ground if the Afghans were to keep their country secure and build on the gains of over a decade of U.S. and Coalition success against the Taliban and al-Qaeda.³²⁸

In 2008, General Dan McNeill told the *New York Times* that “It will take [the Afghans] a few more years to get their air transport and air support platforms online, but they should be covering a lot of battle space by some time in 2011, in my view.” In 2016, eight years after that interview and more than a year after Coalition support had been greatly reduced, the AAF is still not covering much battle space. With U.S. funding and support, the Afghans are still trying to create a viable air force.



Two MD-530s fly from Camp Fenty after being showcased at an Afghan aircraft event. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sergeant Corey Hook)


For many years, the ANDSF relied heavily on the U.S. military to provide air support for its fighting forces. This support included aerial reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, medical evacuation of Afghan soldiers and police, and air-to-ground fire support. To provide the Afghans with the ability to conduct their own aerial operations, the United States has obligated over \$2.5 billion to build and support the AAF, including over \$953 million for equipment and aircraft, as shown in Figure 3.27.³²⁹ In addition \$518.1 million was appropriated to support the AAF for FY 2016 and DOD requested \$508.6 million for FY 2017, with the large majority of funds marked for training and sustainment.³³⁰

However, in 2016, the Afghans still lack the air assets they need to protect and support their own troops. The impact of the lack of a well-equipped and capable Afghan Air Force became all too clear during operations to retake Kunduz City after it fell to the Taliban

QUARTERLY HIGHLIGHT

FIGURE 3.27

AFGHAN AIR FORCE TIMELINE WITH CUMULATIVE OBLIGATED DOLLARS (\$ BILLIONS)



Note: * Reflects ASFF funds obligated for the AAF, FY 2010–2016; data on funds obligated before that time were not available.

Source: NATO, "Facts and Figures: Afghan National Army," 10/2009; NAVAIR, "News Release: NAVAIR delivers new Mi-17 helicopters to Afghan National Army Air Corps," 11/19/2009; USAF CENTCOM, "Afghan National Army Air Corps now Afghan National Army Air Force," 6/14/2010; DOD, *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, 11/2010, p.32; USAF, "AAF receives first fixed-wing trainers," 9/19/2011; *DVIDSHUB.net*, "News: AAF receives first of six new Cessna 208Bs," 10/24/2011; State, "Interview of Rose Gottemoeller by Elena Chernenko of Kommersant Daily", 3/28/2012; *Beechcraft Defense Company LLC v. United States and Sierra Nevada Corporation*, ruling and order in Bid Protest No. 13-202C, U.S. Court of Federal Claims, reissued for publication 5/10/2013, p. 2.; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/2/2013; SIGAR, *Concerns Regarding the Requirement for and Utilization of C-130 Aircraft for the Afghan Air Force*, SIGAR 14-80-AL, 7/14/2014; SIGAR, *Scrapping of G222 Fleet*, SIGAR 15-02-SP, 10/3/2014; *The Air Force Times*, "Moody Set to Begin Training Afghan Pilots," 1/16/2015; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/16/2015; *Khaama Press*, "Afghan Air Force's first six armed MD-530s arrived last night," 3/18/2015; Federal Register, "Modification of Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act Measures Against a Russian Entity," 11/25/2015; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/4/2015; *The Air Force Times*, "First Afghan A-29 pilots, maintainers finish training," 12/22/2015; *United Press International*, "Afghanistan receives A-29 Super Tucano aircraft," 1/19/2016; *Khaama Press*, "Afghan Air Force receive 4 more light attack aircraft from United States," 3/29/2016.

QUARTERLY HIGHLIGHT

TABLE 3.11

AAF INVENTORY OF USABLE AIRCRAFT, 2008–PRESENT								
Aircraft	6/2008	8/2009	10/2010	12/2011	12/2012	12/2013	12/2014	3/2016
Mi-17 Transport Helicopters	13	12	27	33	48	58	56	40
Mi-35 Attack Helicopters	4	-	9	11	11	5	5	2
G222/C-27A Cargo Planes	-	-	6	14	16	-	-	-
MD-530F Light Helicopters	-	-	-	6	6	5	5	14
Cessna 182T Four-Person Trainer Plane	-	-	-	6	6	6	-	-
Cessna 208 Light Transport Plane	-	-	-	6	22	26	25	24
C-130H Transport Plane	-	-	-	-	-	2	3	4
A-29 Super Tucano	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
Antonov AN-26 Plane	2	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
Antonov AN-32 Plane	5	4	5	-	-	-	-	-
Aero L-39 Albatros Jets	-	2 ^a	2	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	24	19	50	76	109	103	94	92

Note: ^a DOD listed two "L-29s" in its October 2009 *Section 1231 Report*; There is no such aircraft; the Russian advanced MiG-29 may have been intended, but no other sources indicate the AAF has ever owned MiG-29 aircraft. This may be an error; the two aircraft reported were likely L-39s.

Source: DOD, *Section 1231 Reports*, 6/2008, p. 17; 10/2009, p. 27; 11/2010, p. 32, *SIGAR Quarterly Reports to Congress*, 1/30/2012, p. 79; 1/30/2012, p. 75; 1/30/2013, p. 81; 1/30/2014, pp. 97–98; *Supplement to SIGAR Quarterly Report to Congress*, 2/2015, p. 17; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 3/8/2016.

on September 28, 2015. Despite the end of U.S. combat operations and a transition to a mission focused on training, advising, and assisting, U.S. forces were once again called upon to provide air support to Afghan forces as they retook Kunduz.³³¹

Both the United States and Afghanistan have long recognized the importance of developing air power. As Afghanistan's small, aging fleet of Soviet-era aircraft retired from service, the United States and other donor nations provided more and newer aircraft to rebuild its air capability. However, some of the decisions made to procure new AAF aircraft often faced setbacks or were ultimately unsuccessful due to poor planning, legal challenges, contracting disputes, lack of coordination with the Afghans to determine their needs, and even possible fraud. Coupled with losses of aircraft due to crashes and expired service lives, this has also led to various aircraft becoming briefly part of the AAF's inventory, only later to be removed from service, as shown in Table 3.11. Moreover, SIGAR has found significant instances of waste and squandered opportunities in building up the AAF, resulting in the waste of millions of dollars of U.S. taxpayer money.

One of the most egregious missteps was DOD's \$486 million purchase of 20 G222 medium-lift cargo planes for the AAF. Due to poor planning, poor oversight, poor contract management (including possible fraud), and a lack of critical spare parts, those aircraft could not be kept flightworthy. The program ended in March 2013 after experiencing continuous and severe operational difficulties. Sixteen of those 20 aircraft were sold for scrap metal for six cents a pound, or \$32,000, in 2013.³³² SIGAR is investigating this procurement.

In an example of poor coordination between DOD and the Afghan government, DOD purchased six C-182 fixed-wing training aircraft for the AAF in 2014. But the AAF refused to accept ownership. Instead, the Afghans opted not to use their own training aircraft but to train their pilots in the United Arab Emirates instead.³³³

The workhorse of the AAF has long been the Russian-made Mi-17 helicopter which, due to its success in Afghanistan, DOD has been procuring for the ANDSF since 2005. The Mi-17 is a multi-use transport helicopter developed by the former Soviet Union to operate in the thin air of Afghanistan's high elevations.³³⁴ New Mi-17s are sold by Russia's state-owned

arms export firm, Rosoboronexport, the country's sole authorized exporter of military end-use products. However, the program for procuring Mi-17s ran into trouble when, as a result of multiple violations of U.S. law, Rosoboronexport was subjected to U.S. sanctions in 2006. The sanctions were lifted in 2010 and procurement subsequently resumed.³³⁵

One of DOD's plans to close AAF capability gaps was to provide it with 20 A-29 Super Tucanos. Far different from the Soviet-era jet fighters, the Tucano is a subsonic, single-propeller, aerial reconnaissance aircraft that can be armed to provide fire support for ground troops. A contract was signed to build these A-29s in November 2011, but a legal challenge from another company prevented the winning contractor from meeting their initial delivery date of April 2013.³³⁶ Because of this, the

first four A-29s were not delivered to Afghanistan until January 19, 2016—a year after the drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan.³³⁷ USFOR-A reported the A-29 aircraft were scheduled to begin combat operations in April 2016. Pilots returned in January from training on the A-29s in the United States and continued training in Afghanistan to prepare for combat operations.³³⁸ Another four were delivered on March 29—the last ones for this year.³³⁹

General Campbell said in February 2016, it will take three years before the Air Force is equipped and fully capable of providing close-air support. He also said that it takes about three years to train a pilot.³⁴⁰ If so, then U.S. and Coalition forces may again be called to provide air support to Afghan ground forces, as they were in the battle to retake Kunduz.

SIGAR INSPECTION

This quarter a SIGAR inspection assessing U.S. efforts to convert the National Military Academy of Afghanistan into the Afghan Air Force University found contract requirements were generally met, but said instances of noncompliance, poor workmanship, and inadequate maintenance need to be addressed. For more information, see Section 2, pp. 42–44.

According to CSTC-A, the SMW fleet of 59 fielded aircraft comprises Mi-17 helicopters and PC-12 turboprop planes that have intelligence-gathering, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.³⁴¹ Of these aircraft, 30 Mi-17s and all of the PC-12s were procured using ASFF.³⁴² According to NSOCC-A, the SMW is 72% staffed at 596 members, of which 67 are pilots, all part of the MOD. The decrease of 41 pilots since last quarter was not explained.³⁴³

Details of the AAF capabilities are classified. SIGAR will report on them in a classified annex to this report.

AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

As of March 31, 2016, the United States had obligated \$18.9 billion and disbursed \$18.5 billion of ASFF funds to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANP.³⁴⁴

ANP Strength

As of January 22, 2016, the overall assigned end strength of the ANP, including the Afghan Uniform Police, Afghan Border Police, Afghan National Civil Order Police, and MOI Headquarters and Institutional Support (MOI HQ & IS), was 146,304, according to USFOR-A.³⁴⁵ This is an increase of 278 ANP personnel since last quarter, as reflected in Table 3.12, but 8,878 below the May 2015 assigned end strength that was reported at 155,182.³⁴⁶ Patrol personnel represent the largest component of the ANP with 71,641 members; noncommissioned officers numbered 49,355, while officer ranks stood at 25,308.³⁴⁷

The ANP attrition for the past months is reflected in Figure 3.28. During January, the ANP experienced a 2.05% attrition rate, as compared to 1.04% in February 2015.³⁴⁸ The Afghan National Civil Order Police continues to

TABLE 3.12


ANP Component	Authorized			Assigned		
	Q4 2015	Q1 2016	Quarterly Change	Q4 2015	Q1 2016	Quarterly Change
	AUP	91,000	91,000	-	85,976	86,827
ABP	23,313	23,313	-	21,520	20,990	(530)
ANCOP	16,200	16,200	-	14,511	14,450	(61)
MOI HQs & IS	26,487	26,487	-	24,019	24,037	18
ANP Total (as reported)	157,000	157,000	-	146,026	146,304	278

Note: Quarters are calendar-year; Q4 2015 data as of 10/2015; Q1 2016 data as of 1/2016. AUP = Afghan Uniformed Police; ABP = Afghan Border Police; ANCOP = Afghan National Civil Order Police; IS = Institutional Support personnel.

Source: USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data calls, 12/14/2015 and 3/4/2016.

FIGURE 3.28

REPORTED ANP MONTHLY ATTRITION RATES



Source: USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 3/4/2016.

endure the highest attrition rates, with rates of 7.77% (a marked spike since February 2015), 5.53%, and 4.22% over November, December, and January.³⁴⁹ During those same three months, an average of 68.1% of ANP members eligible to reenlist chose to remain with the ANP.³⁵⁰

In vetting comments, USFOR-A reported nonexistent, “ghost” personnel could have an impact on ANP strength and attrition. They contend ANP personnel numbers will drop as “ghosts” are removed from the rosters, causing a corresponding increase in reported attrition rates and offsetting any progress made in recruiting and retention.³⁵¹

Noor-ul-Haq Olomi resigned as Minister of Interior in February, telling the Afghan media he was frustrated by the National Unity Government’s lack of attention to proposals for reforms and its failure to approve MOI appointments in a timely manner. He attributed increased police and civilian casualties to the government’s lack of attention.³⁵²

ANP Sustainment

As of March 31, 2016, the United States had obligated \$8 billion and disbursed \$7.7 billion of ASFF for ANP sustainment.³⁵³ This includes contributions to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), which pays for ANP salaries, the most prominent ASFF sustainment funding. Other uses of ANP sustainment funding include ammunition, information technology, and organizational clothing and individual equipment.³⁵⁴

The U.S. contribution to LOTFA for Afghan fiscal year 1395, as of March 7, 2016, is \$28.6 million to fund salaries, incentives, and the UN Development Programme management fee.³⁵⁵ CSTC-A reports the U.S. funding required for

SIGAR AUDIT

An ongoing SIGAR audit will review DOD’s procurement, maintenance, and oversight of organizational clothing and individual equipment purchases for the ANDSF.

LOTFA over the next five years will depend on the contributions of Coalition partners. However, due to the Afghan government starting to fund the ANP salaries, CSTC-A now estimates fiscal year 2016 expenses to be \$223.5 million and fiscal year 2017 to be \$77.2 million, down significantly from the earlier reported fiscal year 2016–2020 average of \$613.2 million.³⁵⁶ In addition to LOTFA, CSTC-A has provided \$66.6 million for ALP salaries and incentives and \$33.7 million toward non-payroll items.³⁵⁷

To encourage the MOI to use electronic-payment systems, CSTC-A plans to provide funding only for those authorized tashkil positions being paid electronically, once the automated pay system is ready for use in 2016. In addition, CSTC-A will not fund salaries for personnel not validated in the Afghan Human Resource Information Management System (AHRIMS) or the current electronic pay system, or for those personnel without a valid, current ID.³⁵⁸

USFOR-A stated the EF-4 advisors met with key MOI human resource leaders to build awareness of the need to use electronic pay systems. USFOR-A reports that, as of March 1, 2016, the MOI has input 90% of the ANP forces into the AHRIMS personnel module and input 87% in the tashkil module filling an approved tashkil position. Additionally, 1,491 ALP patrolmen have been added to the AHRIMS personnel module and 8,626 added to the tashkil module.³⁵⁹ USFOR-A reported that although it is not projected that all requirements will be met within the required timeframes, completion is forecasted within six months.³⁶⁰

ANP Equipment and Transportation

As of March 31, 2016, the United States had obligated and disbursed \$4.1 billion of ASFF for ANP equipment and transportation.³⁶¹ Most of these funds were used to purchase vehicles, ammunition, weapons, and communication equipment as shown in Table 3.13. More than 68% of funding in this category was used to purchase vehicles and vehicle-related equipment.

Since last quarter, the total cost of equipment procured for the ANP increased by over \$54.7 million, all within the vehicle and transportation-services categories.³⁶² The vehicles “remaining to be procured” amount increased since last quarter from zero to \$234.9 million. In addition, the ammunition “remaining to be procured” amount increased to \$34 million, while no communications equipment remained to be procured.³⁶³ DOD reported there is a continued requirement to replace equipment from battle losses and equipment that are not economical to repair.³⁶⁴

A stipulation in the MOI 1395 Bilateral Financial Commitment Letter required the MOI to provide an inventory of all small-arms weapons (less than .50 caliber) to CSTC-A by March 1, 2016.³⁶⁵ The MOI did not meet the deadline. Until the inventory or a loss report is received, the CSTC-A end-use monitoring team has recommended withholding future small-arms deliveries.³⁶⁶

TABLE 3.13

COST OF U.S.-FUNDED ANP EQUIPMENT, AS OF FEBRUARY 2016			
Type of Equipment	Procured	Remaining to be Procured	Procured and Fielded to the ANP
Weapons	\$291,495,548	\$22,124,531	\$205,851,400
Vehicles ^a	3,518,042,669	234,852,557	3,159,856,026
Communications	230,376,282	0	224,995,225
Ammunition	738,345,011	34,017,600	419,352,362
Transportation Services	24,646,263	9,240,000	7,770,471
C-IEDs	115,757,817	5,711,645	115,581,810
Other	243,097,382	0	91,438,300
Total	\$5,161,760,972	\$305,946,333	\$4,224,845,594

Note: C-IEDs = Counter-improvised explosive devices. Aircraft costs are no longer shown for the ANP; the Special Mission Wing for which they were procured has been transferred to the ANA, hence from MOI to MOD control.

^a Vehicle costs includes vehicles and parts.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 3/8/2016.

CSTC-A reports the only information about ANP equipment operational readiness comes from the contractor that performs vehicle maintenance. Of the ANP fleet that has been in for scheduled maintenance, the contractor reports equipment operational-readiness rates ranging from 93% to 97%. However, since approximately 24% of the fleet has not received scheduled or unscheduled maintenance in over 12 months, the actual operational-readiness rate is not known.³⁶⁷ Of the ANP fleet of 45,286 vehicles (including 187 pieces of mechanized handling equipment such as hoisting systems, winching equipment, or lifting devices) serviced by the contractor, an overall operational-readiness rate of 96.5% at the end of February 2016 was reported due to:³⁶⁸

- Not mission-capable: in for maintenance 674 vehicles
- Not mission-capable: awaiting supply parts 41 vehicles
- Written off: not repairable 1,597 vehicles

Equipment purchased for the ANP that was later determined to be no longer required by the ANDSF or that was damaged before transfer to the Afghan government can be converted to DOD stock for disposition, after USFOR-A considers alternative dispositions and the U.S. Congress is notified. DOD said no notification was processed during the quarter, so the cumulative value of ANP equipment transferred to DOD remains at \$18.4 million.³⁶⁹

ANP Infrastructure

As of March 31, 2016, the United States had obligated \$3.1 billion and disbursed \$3 billion of ASFF for ANP infrastructure.³⁷⁰

As of February 29, 2016, the United States had completed 739 infrastructure projects valued at \$3.6 billion, with another five projects valued

SIGAR INSPECTION

SIGAR has an inspection under way of the new MOI headquarters in Kabul to assess whether the work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards, and if the complex is being maintained and used as intended.



New MOI Headquarters administration buildings in Kabul. (CSTC-A CJ-Engineer photo)

Women's Participation Program:

An initiative which seeks to advance and promote women's participation in Afghan security institutions. The Women's Participation Program promotes adequate facilities, proper equipment, training, and opportunities for women in order to increase female membership within the ANDSF.

Source: OSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/15/2016.

at \$67.8 million ongoing, according to CSTC-A.³⁷¹ The largest ongoing ANP infrastructure project this quarter is the training center for females in Nangarhar (with an estimated cost of \$6.4 million).³⁷² CSTC-A clarified that although there are almost twice as many ANP infrastructure projects as there are ANA projects (739 versus 382), the total cost is much less (\$3.6 billion versus \$5.2 billion) primarily due to the smaller size of the ANP facilities, which typically host 100 personnel.³⁷³

Five projects, totaling \$9.5 million, were completed this quarter, including the MOI headquarters complex in Kabul (\$63.5 million) that began in March 2012.³⁷⁴ One contract was awarded at a cost of \$810,000 for the MOI headquarter complex's front barrier wall.³⁷⁵ In addition, CSTC-A reports the majority of the 25 projects in the planning phase (\$133 million) are in support of the **Women's Participation Program**.³⁷⁶

The ASFF-funded national operations and maintenance contract provides maintenance for six MOI facilities including the MOI headquarters; Camp Gibson, which houses a police training center; and four national and regional logistics centers. The annual cost of the contract is \$6.2 million.³⁷⁷ CSTC-A reports maintenance for the MOI headquarters and Camp Gibson is scheduled to transition to the MOI by the end of February 2017. Maintenance for the other four facilities was scheduled to transition to the MOI by the end of March 2016. In accordance with the 1395 bilateral commitment letter, CSTC-A is withholding the cost for these four centers from the MOI facilities budget until the transition is completed.³⁷⁸

ANP Training and Operations

As of March 31, 2016, the United States had obligated \$3.7 billion and disbursed \$3.6 billion of ASFF for ANP and MOI training and operations.³⁷⁹

CSTC-A reported five ongoing U.S.-funded training programs: four focused on technical training and one focused on basic training.³⁸⁰ The largest U.S.-funded training includes essential function development training and operational-specialty training, such as vehicle maintenance, and radio operation and maintenance.³⁸¹

USFOR-A reported a marked increase in the number of police recruits assigned for training in January 2016—over 10,000 more recruits than in any of the past 12 months.³⁸² The EF-4 Police Institutional Advisory Team (PIAT) mentored the MOI Training General Command for the winter training surge as approximately 15,000 ANP and 4,500–8,000 ALP were working without any formal police training. The PIAT reports that the lack of formal training contributes to higher casualties, desertions, and decreased public trust and international donor confidence. With half of personnel requiring training, ALP participation in the winter training surge lags in comparison with the other police pillars. According to RS, ID cards in the future will only be issued upon completion of initial-entry training to limit the number of untrained police on the force.³⁸³

STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE ANDSF

This quarter RS reported 3,905 women serving in the ANDSF, an increase from the 3,728 reported last quarter.³⁸⁴ Even with the overall increase in the ANDSF end strength, the percentage of women serving in the ANDSF only increased from 1.16% to 1.2%.³⁸⁵ Of the total, 2,878 were serving with the ANP, 969 with the ANA, and 58 with the AAF. Overall there were 1,237 officers, 1,296 noncommissioned officers, 1,238 soldiers, and 134 cadets.³⁸⁶ The number of women in officer positions increased by 29 since last quarter.³⁸⁷

The MOI Female Policy Council serves to provide communication and professional activities with national and international women's groups and to address women's issues such as work environment problems and practical solutions, improvement of police women's living conditions to attract recruits into the ANP, actions to improve the social and economic stability, promotions, and policies and other legal benefits for women. The council consists of police and civilian women, although any citizen may qualify to be a member.³⁸⁸

ANDSF MEDICAL/HEALTH CARE

CSTC-A reported the frequent changes in the number of authorized medical positions are due to shifting personnel policies and procedures. While the authorizations are expected to stabilize when the tashkil is approved, MOI commanders are allowed to convert an unfilled medical position into a non-medical position.³⁸⁹ As of January 20, 2016, CSTC-A reports there are 899 physicians and 2,758 other medical staff within the ANDSF health-care system, with vacancies of 347 (27.9%) and 571 (17.2%) respectively.³⁹⁰

To address the problem of medical personnel being assigned to non-medical positions, the ANP Surgeon General developed policy guidance directing medical personnel be assigned into medical positions. Additionally, a proposal to hire civilian personnel to work in the ANP hospital and provincial medical treatment facilities is under consideration.³⁹¹ The MOI approved eight 20-bed regional hospitals; the Helmand and Kunduz facilities are planned to begin operations by the end of 2016. These regional facilities will also serve as satellite medical supply points, thereby reducing the dependence on the Kabul warehouse.³⁹²

This quarter CSTC-A reported several accomplishments within the ANDSF health-care system. An \$87.5 million donation from the NATO ANA Trust Fund will be used to purchase medical consumables, subsidize ANA vaccination-program costs, outfit the National Martyr and Rehabilitation Care Center, expand the 215th Corps hospital, and upgrade the ANA Medical Emergency Operations Center.³⁹³

SECURITY

TABLE 3.14

CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION PROGRAM METRICS, FISCAL YEARS 2009–2016						
Date Range	AT/AP Destroyed	UXO Destroyed	SAA Destroyed	Fragments Cleared	Minefields Cleared (m ²)	Estimated Contaminated Area Remaining (m ²)*
2010	13,879	663,162	1,602,267	4,339,235	39,337,557	650,662,000
2011	10,504	345,029	2,393,725	21,966,347	31,644,360	602,000,000
2012	11,830	344,363	1,058,760	22,912,702	46,783,527	550,000,000
2013	6,431	203,024	275,697	10,148,683	25,059,918	521,000,000
2014	12,397	287,331	346,484	9,415,712	22,071,212	511,600,000
2015/2016**	2,023	32,220	99,438	3,962,329	12,580,354	589,000,000
Total	57,064	1,875,129	5,776,371	72,745,008	177,476,928	589,000,000

Note: AT/AP = antitank/antipersonnel ordnance. UXO = unexploded ordnance. SAA = small-arms ammunition.

Fragments are reported because their clearance requires the same care as for other objects until their nature is determined. There are about 4,047 square meters (m²) to an acre.

*Total area of contaminated land fluctuates as clearance activities reduce hazardous areas while ongoing survey identifies and adds new contaminated land in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.

**includes first quarter results for FY 2016.

Source: PM/WRA, response to SIGAR data calls, 6/26/2015, 12/29/2015, and 3/31/2016.

REMOVING UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE

The Department of State's (State) Bureau of Political-Military Affairs' Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) manages the conventional-weapons destruction program in Afghanistan. Since FY 2002, State has provided \$331.6 million in weapons destruction and humanitarian mine-action assistance to Afghanistan. PM/WRA has two-year funding, and all FY 2015 money has been obligated. Approximately \$3.3 million of FY 2016 has been obligated; PM/WRA plans to obligate the remaining \$17 million in the upcoming months.³⁹⁴

State directly funds five Afghan nongovernmental organizations (NGO), four international NGOs, and one U.S. government contractor. These funds enable the clearance of areas contaminated by explosive remnants of war (ERW) and support the clearance of conventional weapons used by insurgents to construct roadside bombs and other improvised explosive devices. As of December 31, 2015, State-funded implementing partners have cleared more than 177.5 million square meters of land (approximately 68.5 square miles) and removed or destroyed approximately 7.7 million landmines and other ERW such as unexploded ordnance, abandoned ordnance, stockpiled munitions, and home-made explosives since 2002 (see Table 3.14).³⁹⁵

The estimated total area of contaminated land continues to fluctuate as clearance activities reduce hazardous areas, while ongoing survey activities find new contaminated land. At the beginning of this quarter, there were 209.4 square miles of contaminated minefields and battlefields. During the quarter, 6.7 square miles were cleared. However, ongoing surveys identified 24.6 square miles of additional contaminated areas, bringing the known contaminated area to 227.4 square miles by the end of the quarter. PM/WRA

SIGAR AUDIT

This quarter SIGAR published a financial audit of the Department of State's demining activities. SIGAR examined grants awarded between 2011 and 2013 from the Mine Detection Dog Center (MDC) totaling \$10.5 million. SIGAR identified three deficiencies in MDC's internal controls and six instances of noncompliance with grant terms and regulations resulting in \$98,780 in unsupported costs. For more information, see Section 2, pp. 31–32.

defines a minefield as the area contaminated by landmines, whereas a contaminated area can include both landmines and other ERW.³⁹⁶

USAID in partnership with the UN Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan (UNMACA) provides services for victims and survivors of mines and ERW, as well as for civilians affected by conflict and persons with disabilities, through the Afghan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP). The goal of this project is to mitigate the short-term and long-term impact of conflict on civilians, including victims of mines and ERW.

UNMACA draws on its wider network under the Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan, which consists of 50 international and national organizations, to access beneficiaries and communities. One of those organizations, the Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA), collects casualty data on mine/ERW victims to help prioritize its clearance activities. According to USAID, ACAP funding will allow MACCA to expand its victim assistance activities beyond service provision and data collection to include immediate assistance for individual survivors and their families. The \$30.2 million ACAP program has expended \$9.6 million to date and will conclude in February 2018.³⁹⁷

COUNTERNARCOTICS

As of March 31, 2016, the United States has provided \$8.5 billion for counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan since 2002. Nonetheless, Afghanistan remains the world's leading producer of opium, providing 80% of the world's output over the past decade, according to the United Nations.³⁹⁸

Congress appropriated most of these counternarcotics funds through the DOD Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities Fund (\$3 billion), the Afghan Security Forces Fund (\$1.3 billion), the Economic Support Fund (\$1.5 billion), and a portion of the State Department's International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account (\$2.2 billion). USAID's alternative-development programs support U.S. counternarcotics objectives by helping countries develop economic alternatives to narcotics production. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) also receives funding to operate in Afghanistan. See Appendix B for additional funding information.³⁹⁹

The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) is currently operating under the 2012 U.S. government counternarcotics strategy, which has not always been successful in curbing the illicit drug trade. INL reports that the United States is in the final stages of updating its counternarcotics strategy for Afghanistan in order to uphold the shared CN and National Unity Government priorities. The revised strategy will continue to focus on building Afghanistan's capacity to counter narcotics, and will support Afghanistan's counternarcotics goals and objectives, as outlined in the country's National Drug Action Plan released in October 2015.⁴⁰⁰

Until we can create a stable enough environment for some of these economic development initiatives to take hold, I think we are going to have this problem [Afghanistan's opium trade] for some time to come.

—General John W. Nicholson Jr.,
Resolute Support Commander

Source: Nomination Hearing Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 1/28/2016.

In early April 2016, the Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) announced its second 100-day plan since the first one was released in June 2015. The Minister of Counter Narcotics stated her ministry is determined to create more inclusive programs to combat cultivation, production, and drug trafficking. The minister said current available resources are inadequate to effectively maintain counternarcotic efforts and asked for assistance from other relevant ministries in order to achieve its objectives.⁴⁰¹

This quarter, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) presented a socio-economic analysis of its December 2015 *Afghanistan Opium Survey*, which showed that opium poppy farmers earned considerably less in 2015 compared to the previous year: gross income from opium decreased to \$3,100 per hectare in 2015 from \$3,800 in 2014—an 18% decrease and the lowest level since 2002 after the end of the Taliban opium ban. According to UNODC, the combination of four consecutive moderate to poor harvests in the main opium-poppy growing areas and moderate prices likely made investing in new land and keeping high-maintenance fields with expensive irrigation systems less profitable. Moreover, opium yields have decreased, possibly due to lower land productivity and disease.

Survey results show that 38% of farmers who discontinued cultivation in 2015 cited agronomic and ecological conditions—such as poppy pests, diseases and bad yields—as reasons for their decision. Interviews with the farmers also show one reason they do not grow alternative crops is that the main poppy-growing areas have only limited access to markets. Other factors that limit farmers from finding alternative livelihoods include the need for non-farm job opportunities, better physical and social infrastructure, and enhanced strategies to address political crises and conflicts.⁴⁰²

The UNODC December survey estimated that the area under cultivation was 183,000 hectares, a 19% decrease from the previous year. Afghan opium production (3,300 tons) also decreased 48% from its 2014 level. However, UNODC cautioned that it changed its methodology between 2014 and 2015, which could make changes appear larger than they actually were. The decreases do not result from a single factor or policy measure. According to UNODC, the declines are mainly a consequence of repeated crop failures in the southern and southwestern regions of Afghanistan and do not represent a downward trend. Production and cultivation results had been rising for the past decade, as illustrated in Figure 3.29.⁴⁰³


In December 2015, INL took part in two UNODC international meetings, the High-Level Meeting of Partners for Afghanistan and Neighboring Countries at which the National Drug Action Plan (NDAP) was presented, and the **Paris Pact** Consultative Group Meeting. The meetings reaffirmed U.S. support for counternarcotics in Afghanistan and encouraged international commitments to the NDAP.⁴⁰⁴

The Paris Pact: The partnership of several countries and international organizations to combat illicit opium traffic from Afghanistan. It originated from a meeting of various ministers held in Paris in 2003 on central Asian drug routes. It aims to reduce opium-poppy cultivation, production and global consumption of heroin and other opiates, and establish a broad international coalition to combat illicit traffic in opiates.

Source: Paris Pact website, "What is it?" www.paris-pact.net.

FIGURE 3.29

AFGHAN OPIUM CULTIVATION AND PRODUCTION SINCE 2008



Source: UNODC, *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008*, 11/2008, p. 5; *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009*, 12/2009, p. 5; *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2010*, 12/2010, p. 7; *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2011: Summary Findings*, 10/2011, p. 1; *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013*, 12/2013, p. 12; *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2014: Cultivation and Production*, 11/2014, p. 7; *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015: Cultivation and Production*, 12/2015, p. 3.

Drug Demand Reduction

Although INL reports that Afghanistan has one of the highest substance-abuse rates in the world, INL is reducing funding to all Afghan treatment centers in collaboration with the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) in order to redirect funding to other critical drug-demand reduction programs. For example, funding will be redirected to rural treatment programs to address the rural drug use problem, which studies show is significantly higher than in urban areas. INL told SIGAR it lacked resources to maintain current levels.⁴⁰⁵ INL will also work with MOPH to encourage other international donors to provide funding for treatment facilities.⁴⁰⁶

In January 2015, INL transitioned the first group of 13 treatment programs to MOPH responsibility. Another 15 treatment centers began transitioning in January 2016; another 21 treatment centers will begin transitioning in January 2017; the remaining treatment centers will be transitioned by the end of 2019. INL reduced funding to all facilities (including the MOPH portfolio of 23 centers) by approximately 20% in 2015, another 15% in 2016, and another 25% in 2017. INL provided \$1.55 million for operational costs for all 89 facilities this quarter and \$1.49 million last quarter.

During 2015, the MOPH and the **Colombo Plan** collaborated to transfer all clinical staff onto the Afghan government payroll. According to INL, this

Colombo Plan: Instituted as a regional intergovernmental organization to further economic and social development, it was conceived at a conference held in Colombo, Sri Lanka (then Ceylon), in 1950 with seven founding member countries, and has expanded to 26 member countries. INL continues to support the Colombo Plan's Asian Centre for Certification and Education of Addiction Professionals (ACCE), a training unit of treatment experts to assist governments in developing a professional certification process for addiction professionals in Asia and Africa.

Source: The Colombo Plan Secretariat, "History," www.colombo-plan.org, accessed 4/7/2014; State, INL, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume I, Drug and Chemical Control*, 3/2013, p. 20.

will be complete by January 2016. Due to Afghan legal constraints, the transition will occur as MOPH assumes responsibility of the transitional treatment centers. A total of 103 clinical staff members were trained between January and February 28, 2016, under the Colombo Plan; training for an additional 50 clinical staff will take place between March 27 and April 15, 2016.

According to the UN, 26 treatment centers were handed over to the Afghan government in 2015. These centers have an annual treatment capacity of about 33,000. However, this allows only 8% of the opium and heroin users in the country to access any form of drug-treatment services.

During the quarter, INL began working with the Ministry of Higher Education on the possibility of establishing an addiction-studies department at Kabul University and continued its efforts with the Ministry of Education on preventive drug-education teacher training.⁴⁰⁷

INL contributed over \$4.6 million to the Colombo Plan in April 2015 and \$12.9 million during 2015 for drug treatment and education programs.⁴⁰⁸

Counter-Narcotics Community Engagement

INL funds the nationwide Counter-Narcotics Community Engagement (CNCE) program, which focuses on discouraging poppy cultivation, preventing drug use by raising public awareness, and encouraging licit crop production. Since 2013, INL has expended \$9.18 million on the program, reflecting all funding available on the current grant. The program was extended for one year on April 4, 2015, with an additional cost of \$1.55 million. INL is negotiating an extension of the CNCE grant, and anticipates awarding it next quarter.

The program pays an Afghan company, Sayara Media Communications, to place 42 observers in Afghan provinces, which are ranked from tier 1 to tier 4 based on cultivation levels, to gather information and gauge perceptions of counternarcotics policies and messaging. Sayara assesses the effectiveness of campaigns and seeks to identify the provincial drivers of drug trafficking, opium cultivation, and public sentiment.

Sayara monitors counternarcotics-related items in the media and evaluates any changes in coverage on a monthly basis. The effectiveness of this media campaign is unclear. INL said some areas exposed to counternarcotics media experienced a decrease in opium cultivation, while in other areas where security and governance remain a challenge, cultivation numbers increased or remained the same. An independent evaluation of the INL-funded messaging program has not taken place since early in the program's implementation, but a 2008 evaluation of a similar campaign concluded that "public CN [counternarcotics] awareness campaigns cannot be effective in isolation and, to increase the chances of success, need to be (i) coordinated with the development of the licit rural economy to provide alternatives to opium poppy cultivation, and (ii) accompanied by credible threats of punishment (including eradication)."⁴⁰⁹

Ministry of Counter-Narcotics Capacity Building

INL has focused resources in the following areas in order to promote capacity-building efforts at the MCN: finance and fiscal transparency, administration support, public outreach and strategic communications, policy-development support, and ministerial-level advising by U.S. contractors. Additionally, INL funds Asian University for Women (AUW) fellows, who work in various offices across the MCN; plans are being made for another group of seven fellows to start in September 2016. The AUW fellows focus on English translation, grant writing, research, public outreach, and gender integration across the MCN's directorates.⁴¹⁰

INL will measure MCN's development through the indicators listed in the MCN capacity building performance measurement plan. Because the focus of the capacity-building program is shifting to provide skills-based training, INL will collect data on the number of training courses provided and individuals trained, the knowledge and skills acquired through training by means of pre- and post-training tests, and the Ministry's effectiveness at preparing and establishing administrative and financial standard operating procedures.⁴¹¹

To support some of the MCN's training requests, INL issued a notice of funding opportunity focused on the following training elements: English, computer software, grant writing, and human-resources management. The solicitation closed in early April and INL anticipates awarding the grant by June 2016. This quarter, INL also solicited a financial-remediation plan contract to improve financial management controls at the MCN. INL anticipates awarding the latter in April 2016. INL's initial assessment of the MCN Capacity Building Program was completed in November 2015. The next review is scheduled for May 2016.⁴¹²


Governor-Led Eradication Program

INL funds the Governor-Led Eradication Program (GLE) program. The program reimburses provincial governors for expenses associated with poppy eradication. Since 2007, INL has contributed \$10 million to the MCN for the GLE program, which accounts for less than 2% of INL's annual counternarcotics budget for Afghanistan. The MCN tracks cumulative results that are verified by UNODC. According to UNODC, a total of 3,720 hectares were eradicated in 2015, a 40% increase from 2014. This quarter, INL disbursed \$540,750 to the MCN for the final 2015 GLE payment.

The MCN and INL agreed in February 2016 to reconcile unearned advances by province from previous years. Following this reconciliation, INL approved and disbursed the remaining 2015 GLE funds to the MCN in March 2016. An updated memorandum of understanding to the GLE implementing instructions was signed in March 2016 and awaits approval by the Afghan government.

FIGURE 3.30

GOVERNOR LED OPIUM-POPPY ERADICATION, 2008–2015 (HECTARES)



Note: Program results are based on UNODC-verified eradication figures.

Source: UNODC, *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008*, 11/2008, p. 5; *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009*, 12/2009, p. 5; *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2010*, 12/2010, p. 7; *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2011: Summary Findings*, 10/2011, p. 1; *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013*, 12/2013, p. 12; *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2014: Cultivation and Production*, 11/2014, p. 7; *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015: Cultivation and Production*, 12/2015, p. 3.

Eradication results have been declining over the past few years, as shown in Figure 3.30. Few security incidents occurred during last year's eradication campaign, which UNODC attributes to improved coordination between the MCN, MOD, MOI, and the Independent Directorate of Local Governance. Eradication took place near active military operations in Helmand and Kandahar, which reportedly improved security but also underscored the lack of government control in those areas.⁴¹³

Good Performer's Initiative Will Be Phased Out Due to the Lack of MCN Capacity

INL's Good Performer's Initiative (GPI) is a program implemented by the MCN that seeks to incentivize provincial counternarcotics performance. As of February 2016, a total of 256 GPI projects with a value of \$119,867,042 were approved. Some 199 projects were completed, 54 projects are ongoing, and three projects are nearing completion.

Under the terms of the original GPI, which ran through August 30, 2014, a province was eligible for financial support of GPI development projects for each year that it achieved UNODC-verified poppy-free status or reduced cultivation by more than 10% compared to the previous year's levels. In September 2014, the MCN began implementing a redesigned GPI to encourage more integrated counternarcotics action and provide more focused

support for rural alternative livelihoods. Under the new GPI (GPI II), the award categories for “good performers” were expanded to include progress in public outreach and law enforcement, in addition to cultivation. The new program will continue to link action with rewards: provinces must demonstrate verifiable counternarcotics achievements against defined standards to receive awards.⁴¹⁴

INL said it has decided to phase out the GPI program because the MCN lacked the technical capacity to implement GPI II. INL will continue to approve new project proposals until April 30, 2016, after which the balance of previously awarded GPI funds not associated with projects in procurement will be rescinded. INL will continue to provide operational support for the MCN until all ongoing projects are completed. No new GPI awards will be issued, and the GPI II memorandum of understanding will not be signed. INL is currently in the initial stages of developing new alternative development programs with other implementing partners.⁴¹⁵

ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT/ALTERNATIVE LIVELIHOOD

USAID’s alternative-development programs support U.S. counternarcotics objectives by helping countries develop economic alternatives to narcotics production. INL funding supports supply-reduction and alternative-development programs. INL told SIGAR it coordinates regularly with USAID to ensure that INL-supported alternative-development efforts complement past and ongoing investments by USAID in licit livelihoods and rural development in Afghanistan.⁴¹⁶

Strengthening Afghan Governance and Alternative Livelihoods

The nongovernmental Aga Khan Foundation and its partners implement activities under INL’s \$11.9 million Strengthening Afghan Governance and Alternative Livelihoods (SAGAL) grant across 16 provinces: Badakhshan, Baghlan, Takhar, Bamyan, Kunduz, Parwan, Faryab, Kabul, Balkh, Jowzjan, Kandahar, Nangarhar, Helmand, Laghman, Uruzgan, and Kunar. The implementers favor activities, rather than stand-alone projects, with the following five objectives:

- improve agricultural yields of high-potential licit crops
- increase economic return for licit crops
- improve farmers’ access to financing
- reduce vulnerability of at-risk populations to engage in the illicit economy
- improve subnational governance

The SAGAL grant ended January 20, 2016; \$7.3 million has been expended to date for actual expenses incurred through September 30, 2015. The Aga Khan Foundation is now closing out its financial reports

SECURITY

TABLE 3.15

ALTERNATIVE LIVELIHOOD PROGRAMS					
Agency	Project Title	Start Date	End Date	Total Estimated Cost (\$)	Cumulative Disbursements, as of 3/31/2016 (\$)
State (INL)	Strengthening Afghan Governance and Alternative Livelihoods (SAGAL)	7/21/2014	1/20/2016	\$11,884,816	\$7,321,345*
USAID	Commercial Horticulture and Agriculture Marketing Program (CHAMP)	2/1/2010	12/30/2016	45,296,184	45,296,184
USAID	Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ)	7/31/2013	8/30/2016	27,695,788	22,535,000
USAID	Regional Agricultural Development Program (RADP)-South	10/7/2013	10/6/2018	125,075,172	56,924,493
USAID	Regional Agricultural Development Program (RADP)-North	5/21/2014	5/20/2019	78,429,714	16,872,197
USAID	Regional Agricultural Development Program (RADP)-West	8/10/2014	8/9/2019	69,973,376	18,858,081

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data calls, 3/28/2016 and 4/7/2016; INL, response to SIGAR data call, 4/1/2016.
 * Disbursements for expenses incurred through 9/30/2015 only.

Note: USAID programs listed are not necessarily funded from the agency's Alternative Development Fund.

and will submit additional reimbursement requests during the project close-out period.⁴¹⁷

Table 3.15 provides summary financial information on SAGAL and other alternative livelihood programs.

Kandahar Food Zone

The Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ) is a three-year, \$27.7 million USAID project, implemented by International Relief and Development Inc. under a joint strategy and in close coordination with INL. KFZ is designed to identify and address the drivers of poppy cultivation in targeted districts of Kandahar province through grants for activities that improve community infrastructure, strengthen alternative livelihoods, and support small businesses. The Afghan government's MCN KFZ program has four pillars: public outreach, eradication, demand reduction, and alternative livelihoods. USAID's activities only support the alternative livelihoods component.⁴¹⁸

KFZ expended \$1.95 million between October and December 2015. During that period, KFZ trained 46 master trainers in technical areas, continued irrigation canal maintenance and rehabilitated or constructed 12 canals in the target districts, and continued rehabilitation of four additional irrigation canals. KFZ continued to partner with government entities to reinforce their capacity to provide efficient services to communities. The program received approval for 15 alternative development projects and four infrastructure canal-rehabilitation projects.

This quarter, construction and rehabilitation work on the four canals is approximately 59% complete. The program is waiting on government approval for two women's skills and market training projects. Coordination meetings took place in early February 2016 in preparation for the March 23–24, 2016, Agricultural Fair in Panjwayee, Kandahar. As of March 31, 2016, USAID has disbursed \$22.5 million. For funding information, please refer to Table 3.15.⁴¹⁹

Regional Agricultural Development Program

The Regional Agricultural Development Program (RADP) is intended to help Afghan farmers achieve more inclusive and sustainable economic growth. RADP projects are under way in the southern, western, and northern regions of Afghanistan. The projects focus on strengthening the capacity of farmers to improve the productivity of high-value crops and livestock. Using a **value-chain** approach, these projects work with farmers and agribusinesses to overcome obstacles hindering production, processing, sales, and overall development of agricultural value chains. As of March 31, 2016, USAID has made cumulative disbursements of \$16.9 million to RADP-North, \$56.9 million to RADP-South and \$18.9 million to RADP-West.⁴²⁰

RADP-North is a five-year, \$78.4 million program covering Badakshan, Baghlan, Balkh, Jowzjan, Kunduz and Samangan Provinces. Last quarter, the program implemented seven activities and issued seven grants valued at \$115,062 to local partners. Between October and December 2015, 800 women were trained in hygiene and nutrition, and 14 contracts to use Afghan wheat varieties between seed enterprises and processors were signed. RADP-North also conducted a short-message service (SMS or “text message”) marketing campaign to more than 4,800 farmers and suppliers. The program also sponsored 12 agribusinesses to participate at the “WorldFood Kazakhstan” Trade Show that resulted in the signing of four contracts for over 62.5 tons of raisins and dried fruit.⁴²¹

The purpose of RADP-South is to improve food and economic security for rural Afghans in Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, and Uruzgan. It began in October 2013 and is scheduled to end in October 2018 with an estimated cost of \$125 million. Between October and December 2015, RADP-South increased the capacity of over 17,800 farmers in greater wheat and high-value crop production, livestock care, and improved basic business skills, vegetable cultivation, and greenhouse technology for women farmers. During last quarter, RADP-South’s interventions impacted over 7,100 households; over 7,000 farmers grew high-value crops under the program. As a result, over 6,300 hectares are under increased high-value crop production. More than 1,000 surveyed farmers reported over 1,200 hectares being used with the improved technologies or management practices.⁴²²

The implementing partner noted that the security situation in Helmand and Uruzgan deteriorated during that period. Clashes between ANDSF and insurgent forces forced the cancellation or postponement of some activities. The program’s monitoring and evaluation unit was unable to conduct site visits in Helmand in October 2015 and RADP-South will engage a third party monitor during the next quarter to address this issue. RADP-South anticipates continuing planned program activities as the next quarter unfolds.⁴²³

The five-year RADP-West program focuses on helping rural Afghans in the western provinces of Herat, Farah, and Badghis to improve food and economic security. During January 2016, RADP-West monitored 785

Value chain: the range of goods and services necessary for an agricultural product to move from the farm to the final customer or consumer. It encompasses the provision of inputs, actual on-farm production, post-harvest storage and processing, marketing and transportation, wholesale and retail sales.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/12/2015.

cultivated wheat-plot germination rates and prepared and developed cultivation training that will be conducted during the winter. The program received commitments from flour mills to purchase wheat during the June/July harvest. In addition, the program will develop the capability of a Badghis flour producer to purchase wheat from program beneficiaries.

RADP-East is still in procurement; USAID anticipates awarding a contract next quarter.⁴²⁴

For summary information on this alternative-livelihood program, see Table 3.15 on page 134 of this report.⁴²⁵

Commercial Horticulture And Agricultural Marketing Program

The Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing (CHAMP) program is a \$45.3 million USAID program designed to boost agricultural productivity and food security, provide market opportunities, and decrease poppy production. CHAMP works to reduce poverty among rural Afghan farmers by helping them shift from relatively low-value subsistence crops, such as wheat and corn, to high-value crops such as fruits and vegetables.⁴²⁶ As of March 31, 2016, USAID has disbursed all funds for the CHAMP program. Though the program will end December 2016, USAID told SIGAR no funding increase is necessary given the current scope of the program; the implementing partner has also confirmed that the available funds will carry the project until its end date.

CHAMP worked with 289 **producer groups** last year. At CHAMP farmer field schools, participants learn new agricultural practices such as orchard or trellis management and receive modern agricultural tools. In 2015, the program arranged farmer field school programs for over 4,000 orchard farmers, including 488 women, in six provinces. The program also provided food safety training and harvest and post-harvest management training.

The program also provides direct assistance in fruit processing, sorting, grading and packing, and introducing improved packaging that meets international market standards. The program's marketing team worked with 19 companies to export 10,485 metric tons of apples, pomegranates, raisins, fresh and dried apricots, almonds, grapes, and melons to international markets. CHAMP organized business-to-business meetings between Afghan farmers and traders as well as meetings between Afghan traders and international buyers. CHAMP's trade offices in Dubai and New Delhi created stronger linkages between Afghan exporters and local buyers, facilitating nearly 600 metric tons of fruits and nuts. CHAMP also participated in international trade fairs in Dubai, Kabul, and New Delhi, enabling Afghan traders to bring their products to an international audience, most notably the Dubai Gulfood exhibition, at which CHAMP traders signed nearly \$4 million in contracts with international buyers.⁴²⁷

For summary financial information on this program, see Table 3.15 on page 134 of this report.

producer group: consists of a lead farmer and 10 to 15 member farmers (sub-farmers). The lead farmer is responsible for disseminating information on CHAMP trainings throughout the group.

Source: USAID, *Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing Program (CHAMP) 2015 Annual Report*, p. 7, 1/2016.

INTERDICTION OPERATIONS AND RESULTS

The Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) consists of regular narcotics police and specialized units across the country. The specialized units include the Sensitive Investigation Unit (SIU), National Interdiction Unit (NIU), and the Intelligence Investigation Unit (IIU). Nearly half of the CNPA's 2,528 personnel are assigned to Kabul. In addition to the CNPA, Afghan organizations contributing to interdiction activities include elements of the Afghan National Police: the Afghan Border Police, Afghan Uniform Police, and the General Command of Police Special Unit (GCPSU).⁴²⁸

The INL interdiction program supports the maintenance and operations of NIU/SIU and DEA facilities as well as a judicial wire-intercept unit (JWIP). SIU processes an average of 45,000 pertinent calls quarterly through the JWIP, which generates evidence admissible in courts of law in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Until December 2015, INL provided limited mission and operations support for the CNPA Kabul headquarters compound, averaging less than \$1 million per year. INL provides extensive support to the CNPA's NIU and SIU including salary supplements for NIU members (and DEA for SIU members). As of late 2015, INL began support for SIU training and professional development. The NIU/SIU program is also supported by various DOD-funded activities, which include specialized training, and the Special Mission Wing, a rotary- and fixed-wing force that supports NIU missions, among others.⁴²⁹

Last quarter, INL reduced its operations at the Counter Narcotics Strip Mall in Kabul. The INL-funded mentoring program ended its mission in December 2015 with the withdrawal of U.S. and foreign personnel from the strip-mall facility. INL continues to provide operations and mission support services at the strip mall including core services such as meals and electric power generation. This quarter, INL will complete refurbishment of properties in two DEA compounds near the U.S. Embassy, where DEA and SIU officers will operate the JWIP system.

Since 2004, DOD's CN requirements for Afghanistan have been funded mostly through supplemental and Overseas Contingency Operations appropriations. These train-and-equip programs aim to support U.S. regional goals and reduce CN-related terrorism and financing. The majority of funding is for special-purpose vetted units such as the Special Mission Wing and the CNPA.⁴³⁰

DOD reported that from January 1 to March 24, 2016, Afghan security forces and law-enforcement agencies conducted 41 drug-interdiction operations resulting in the detention of 59 individuals. These operations included routine patrols, cordon-and-search operations, vehicle interdictions, and detention operations. DOD is currently working with INL and DEA to relocate personnel to the international zone in Kabul, which will enable DEA to continue mentoring and training the CNPA's specialized investigative units. U.S. interdiction activities in Afghanistan throughout

“Counternarcotics is primarily a law enforcement and justice function versus a military one. As such, the Department of Defense’s role in broader U.S. government counternarcotics efforts is primarily to enable or support law enforcement agencies as appropriate, while limiting unilateral action to targets which are at the nexus of the drug trade and terrorism and are threats to U.S. vital national interests.

—General John W. Nicholson, Jr.,
Resolute Support Commander

Source: Advance Policy Questions for Nomination Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 1/28/2016.

2015 were minimal, and only one counternarcotic operation was conducted during the reporting period.⁴³¹

The security situation has negatively impacted counternarcotics activities in Afghanistan. In the south and southwest, operations are extremely difficult to conduct due to the increased requirements on security forces to protect threatened district centers and security force positions. The UN reported that 70% of security incidents that occurred in 2015 took place in the south, east and southeast. According to DOD, counternarcotics operations in the north and east also may decrease as security forces prioritize countering militant forces during spring and summer.

DOD also informed SIGAR of a reduction in available transportation, particularly helicopters. DOD also said counternarcotics forces are needed to play general security roles where drug trade and anti-government forces are concentrated in southern, southwest, and northern Afghanistan. Recent partnering of CN forces with U.S. Special Forces has not yet yielded immediate results, but may present opportunities for future operations.⁴³²

In 2014, DOD created a regional narcotics interagency fusion cell (RNIFC) to combat the regional drug trade given the U.S. military's reduced capabilities in Afghanistan. The RNIFC, located in Bahrain, tracks and interdicts the illicit movement of Afghan heroin and other illicit commodities on dhows (boats) destined for the Middle East and East Africa. The RNIFC collaborates with the Combined Maritime Force (CMF) passing on information to CMF patrols in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean on suspect dhows and other vessels.⁴³³

Afghan operations during this period also resulted in the reported seizures of the following narcotics contraband:⁴³⁴

- 1,430 kg of opium
- 109 kg of heroin
- 2,763 kg of hashish/marijuana

There were no seizures of precursor chemicals this quarter.

Precursor chemical: a substance that may be used in the production, manufacture and/or preparation of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

Source: UNODC, "Multilingual Dictionary of Precursors and Chemicals," 2009, viii.

TABLE 3.16

INTERDICTION RESULTS, FISCAL YEARS 2008–2016										
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016*	TOTAL
Number of Operations	136	282	263	624	669	518	333	268	77	3,170
Detainees	49	190	484	862	535	386	441	394	113	3,454
Hashish seized (kg)	241,353	58,677	25,044	182,213	183,776	37,826	19,088	24,785	120,280	893,042
Heroin seized (kg)	277	576	8,392	10,982	3,441	2,489	3,052	2,855	785	32,849
Morphine seized (kg)	409	5,195	2,279	18,040	10,042	11,067	5,925	505	-	53,462
Opium seized (kg)	15,361	79,110	49,750	98,327	70,814	41,350	38,307	27,498	5,236	425,753
Precursor chemicals seized (kg)	4,709	93,031	20,397	122,150	130,846	36,250	53,184	234,981	-	695,548

Note: The large increase in total precursor-chemical seizures from 2014 to 2015 reflects a 12/2015 seizure of 135,000 liters.

* Results for period 10/1/2015–3/24/2016 only.

Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data calls, 7/29/2015, 12/29/2015, and 3/31/2016.

As noted in previous SIGAR reports, interdiction results have been declining since 2012, as shown in Table 3.16.

According to UNODC, Africa is no longer just a transit point for Afghan-sourced opium; there is a growing domestic market for Afghan opium on the continent. Interdiction results have been declining since the withdrawal of Coalition forces.⁴³⁵

AVIATION SUPPORT

The Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) issued a report this quarter on joint DEA/DOD aviation support. In 2008, the DEA purchased an aircraft at the cost of \$8.6 million to support its CN efforts in Afghanistan. Over the years, DEA and DOD expended \$86 million for aircraft modifications and construction of a hangar to house the aircraft at Kabul International Airport. The hangar remains unused.

DOJ OIG found that the aircraft purchased for what became known as DEA's Global Discovery program missed its initial delivery date and nearly quadrupled the initial program cost of \$22 million. It also found that DEA did not fully comply with federal regulations in the purchase and solicitation of the aircraft. In addition, it found that bids were not properly evaluated, resulting in a higher purchase price for the aircraft. The OIG audit uncovered over \$2.5 million in unsupported and unallowable costs. DOJ identified other deficiencies in the Global Discovery program. The aircraft remains inoperable.⁴³⁶

Between January and March 26, 2016, State's Air Wing provided the following air support to DEA (air shuttle and National Interdiction Unit movements): 43 flight hours, 34 sorties, 652 personnel transported, and 43,719 pounds of cargo moved. Air Wing also transported 305 INL and DEA personnel on its air shuttle for all movements within Kabul.⁴³⁷

INL's ability to support tactical operations in the south and southwest regions of the country has been constrained since the June 2015 closure of INL's base at Kandahar Air Field. NIU personnel continue to staff the regional law enforcement centers (RLECs) in Kandahar, Herat, and Kunduz. Additionally, NIU personnel occasionally support other MOI operations outside of Kabul. INL continues to assist the NIU and SIU with enablers, including operations and maintenance, while NIU typically uses Resolute Support assets, including the Special Mission Wing (SMW). See pages 114–115 of this report for more information on the SMW.⁴³⁸

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As of March 31, 2016, the United States had provided nearly \$31.8 billion to support governance and economic development in Afghanistan. Most of this funding, nearly \$18.6 billion, was appropriated to the Economic Support Fund (ESF) administered by the State Department (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

KEY EVENTS

This quarter, James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence, questioned Afghanistan's political stability, saying that 2016 will see eroding political cohesion, assertions of authority by local power brokers, recurring financial shortfalls, and countrywide, sustained attacks by the Taliban. Clapper said political cohesion will remain a challenge as the government will confront larger and more divisive issues later in 2016, including the implementation of election reforms, long-delayed parliamentary elections, and a potential alteration of Afghanistan's constitutional order by a *Loya Jirga* grand national assembly.⁴³⁹

Nicholas Haysom, Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, similarly argued that 2016 will be a challenging year, saying "survival will be an achievement for the National Unity Government." Haysom identified a fractious political elite, the erosion of the sense of national unity, and reduced confidence in the future as significant political challenges. He also warned of political consequences if election reforms are not implemented expeditiously.⁴⁴⁰

In February, Democracy International (DI) released their survey of 215 Afghan parliamentarians. DI found that only 7% of parliamentarians believe Afghanistan is moving in the right direction. Respondents named poor governance (26%), neighboring countries' behavior or policies (25%), and insecurity (21%) as the main reasons for pessimism. Parliamentarians are generally dissatisfied with President Ashraf Ghani's performance, with nearly 45% very dissatisfied and 19% somewhat dissatisfied. Parliamentarians were also dissatisfied with Chief Executive

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Abdullah Abdullah, with more than half very dissatisfied and 20% somewhat dissatisfied.⁴⁴¹

In March, the federal Broadcasting Board of Governors and the Gallup opinion-research organization released the results of a survey of 2,500 Afghans that found deep public dissatisfaction with the Afghan government. Nearly 81% of respondents said they were somewhat or very dissatisfied with the performance of the National Unity Government, while 17% said they were somewhat or very satisfied. Additionally, nearly 69% said their lives had gotten somewhat worse or much worse over the past year and almost 46% predicted their life would get even worse in the next year.⁴⁴²

Pakistan's Advisor to the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs, Sartaj Aziz, conceded this quarter that Pakistan has some influence over the Taliban because "their leadership is in Pakistan, and they get some medical facilities, their families are here." He said one of the reasons the Taliban participated in the July 7, 2015, peace talks was because the Pakistan government restricted Taliban freedom of movement and access to hospitals, and threatened to expel the Taliban leadership from Pakistan if they did not participate. Despite this leverage, Aziz insisted, Pakistan cannot negotiate on behalf of the Afghan government because "we can't offer [the Taliban] what Afghan government can offer them."⁴⁴³

High-profile supporters of President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah feuded this quarter, revealing enduring tensions within the national-unity government. In March, supporters of vice president Abdul Rashid Dostum protested the removal of billboards featuring Dostum's photo in Mazar-e Sharif, Balkh Province. The protesters accused the long-time governor



Secretary of State John Kerry visited Kabul and met with President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, in April. (State photo)

of Balkh Province, Atta Mohammad Noor, of removing the billboards. Noor was one of Abdullah's main supporters during the 2014 presidential election, whereas Dostum supported Ghani. Ghani technically dismissed Noor—along with the other provincial governors—when the new government was established; however, Noor has refused to give up his position and the government has not publicly pursued the matter. In an April interview with the *New York Times*, Noor said that he would be willing to discuss vacating the governorship he has held since 2004 only after being formally reappointed to his position, arguing the government “cannot remove me by force.”⁴⁴⁴

On April 9 in Kabul, Secretary of State John Kerry met with President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah to discuss Afghan government reforms and the challenges to national unity. Secretary Kerry's visit came as the Afghan unity government approaches a September 2016 deadline for holding a Loya Jirga to amend the Afghan constitution and consider creating the post of an executive prime minister. This deadline was part of the political deal between Ghani and Abdullah that served as the basis for the National Unity Government. Secretary Kerry said that while there was a goal to hold a Loya Jirga at some point within the first two years of the agreement, he wanted to be “very, very clear” that the broader agreement for a government of national unity was meant to last the entire five-year presidential term.⁴⁴⁵ Kerry's comments prompted protests from former president Hamid Karzai and Senate chairman Fazel Hadi Muslimyar, who labeled the statements “major violation of Afghanistan's national sovereignty” and “clear interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs,” respectively.⁴⁴⁶

NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT COMMITMENTS

Refreshed Mutual Accountability

In September 2015, international donors and the Afghan government met in Kabul for the second Senior Officials Meeting (SOM). The meeting was a continuation of the annual high-level meetings to follow up on mutual commitments from the July 2012 Tokyo Conference. The purpose of the SOM was to review progress on the Afghan reform program, discuss key policy issues, and to jointly decide the way forward.⁴⁴⁷

As a result of the September SOM, the Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework (SMAF) has superseded the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF). The SMAF helps guide the activities of the Afghan government and the international community at least to the end of the term of the present government. The SMAF covers six areas: (1) improving security and political stability (with three associated indicators); (2) anticorruption, governance, rule of law, and human rights (14 indicators); (3) restoring fiscal sustainability and integrity of public

finance and commercial banking (nine indicators); (4) reforming development planning and management, and ensuring citizens' development rights (three indicators); (5) private-sector development and inclusive growth and development (four indicators); and (6) development partnerships and aid effectiveness (eight indicators).⁴⁴⁸ In addition to the SMAF indicators, there are 39 short-term deliverables across the same six areas that are collectively due to be completed by the end of 2016.⁴⁴⁹

Three SMAF short-term deliverables were due to be completed by the first quarter of 2016. According to USAID, as of March 16, donors confirm that the Afghan government successfully approved a new comprehensive human-resources reform policy for the Afghan Customs Department (ACD) and established a new law-enforcement element within the ACD. While the Afghan government reports that it has successfully implemented an International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff-monitored program and negotiated subsequent financial arrangements with the IMF, donors are still awaiting confirmation from the IMF. Finally, the Afghan government was expected to issue a public-private partnership regulation but, as of March 16, USAID is only aware of a first draft of the regulation having been prepared and circulated to government ministries for comment.⁴⁵⁰

Overall, SOM donors reaffirmed their Tokyo commitment of sustaining support through 2017 at or near the levels of the past decade.⁴⁵¹ USAID said that although it cannot identify funds that may be awarded or withheld directly related to compliance or noncompliance with SMAF targets and indicators, noncompliance with SMAF indicators could erode donor confidence and reduce aid contributions.⁴⁵²

Electoral Reform Challenges

According to State, the U.S. government and other potential international donors are waiting for the Afghan government to present an electoral timeline along with a plan to achieve specified electoral reforms before committing to any funding or other support for elections. State is encouraging the Afghan government to announce its election timeline as soon as possible to allow for efficient planning by international donors. While the Independent Election Commission (IEC) issued a press release on January 18 asserting its authority for managing and overseeing elections and announcing October 15, 2016, as the date for parliamentary and district council elections, this date has not been officially confirmed by the Afghan government.⁴⁵³

On December 16, 2015, President Ghani issued a presidential decree announcing seven members of a selection committee to decide on the candidates for the IEC and the Central Complaints Commission (CCC) commissioners.⁴⁵⁴ The selection committee received hundreds of resumes, which it had begun to review. However, after both houses of parliament rejected President Ghani's September 2015 decree authorizing the

formation of the selection committee, the committee suspended its work on January 5. On March 5, President Ghani submitted a new decree reconstituting the members of the selection committee. This new decree reduced the number of civil-society representatives and added the speakers of the upper and lower houses of parliament to the committee.⁴⁵⁵

On March 26, Ahmad Yusuf Nuristani resigned as chief of the IEC. He had been appointed chairman of the IEC in August 2013 and oversaw the controversial 2014 elections.⁴⁵⁶ In February, 16 months after the establishment of the government, Nuristani announced the results of the 2014 presidential election and accused the government of violating the law.⁴⁵⁷ Later in early March, Nuristani accused foreign governments, international institutions, and elements of the Afghan government of interfering in the elections process and called on the Afghan government to approve the IEC budget.⁴⁵⁸ Following his resignation, Nuristani insisted that election reforms are the responsibility of the IEC, not that of commissions created by presidential decree.⁴⁵⁹

Chief Executive Abdullah's office called for new elections commissioners in February, with Abdullah's deputy spokesman insisting that "no election will held" without reforms and new commissioners.⁴⁶⁰ A spokesman for Chief Executive Abdullah said movement on election reforms should intensify now that Nuristani has resigned.⁴⁶¹

Overhauling the electoral process was a central part of the power-sharing deal brokered by the United States between President Ghani and his former election rival, current Chief Executive Abdullah, after the troubled presidential elections. The September 2014 agreement that led to forming the national-unity government called for immediate establishment of a special commission for election reform. The intent was to implement reform before the 2015 parliamentary elections, and to distribute electronic identity cards to all Afghan citizens as quickly as possible.⁴⁶²

U.S. ASSISTANCE TO THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT BUDGET

Summary of On-Budget Agreements

To improve governance and align development efforts with Afghan priorities, international donors at the 2010 Kabul Conference committed to increase to 50% the proportion of civilian development aid delivered **on-budget** through the Afghan government.⁴⁶³ Donors, including the United States, reiterated this pledge at the July 2012 Tokyo Conference and again at both the December 2014 London Conference and the September 2015 SOM.⁴⁶⁴

The Afghan government and donors are currently discussing priority reform areas in preparation for the ministerial-level development conference scheduled to be held in Brussels in October, at which new

On-budget assistance: encompasses donor funds that are aligned with Afghan government plans, included in Afghan government budget documents, and approved by the parliament and managed by the Afghan treasury system. On-budget assistance is primarily delivered either through direct bilateral agreements between the donor and Afghan government entities, or through multidonor trust funds.

Off-budget assistance: encompasses donor funds that are excluded from the Afghan national budget and not managed through Afghan government systems.

Source: SIGAR, *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, 7/30/2014, p. 130; Ministry of Finance, "Aid Management Policy for Transition and Beyond," 12/10/2012, p. 8; State, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/14/2016.

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development assistance pledges for 2017–2020 will be made. These discussions include possible linkages between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit to be held in Warsaw in July and the Brussels conference, with a focus on the fiscal impact of security sector spending and the maximization of its contribution to development outcomes. As part of this preparation, on April 4, international donors and the Afghan government met for a special session of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB). The head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) called on the Afghan government to achieve immediate and tangible results in the anticorruption fight, while the European Union special representative said it is necessary for the Afghan government to implement reforms and improve governance to ensure continued exceptional levels of foreign assistance.⁴⁶⁵

As shown in Table 3.17, USAID expects to spend \$937 million on active direct bilateral-assistance programs. It also expects to contribute \$1.9 billion to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), on top of \$1.37 billion disbursed under the previous grant agreement between USAID and the World Bank. USAID has disbursed \$113 million to the Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF).⁴⁶⁶

TABLE 3.17

USAID ON-BUDGET PROGRAMS							
Project/Trust Fund Title	Afghan Government On-Budget Partner	Special Bank Account?	Start Date	End Date	Total Estimated Cost (\$)	Cumulative Disbursements, as of 3/31/2016 (\$)	
Bilateral Government to Government Projects							
Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity Project (PTEC)	Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS)	Yes	1/1/2013	12/31/2018	\$725,000,000	\$84,260,062	
Sheberghan Gas Development Project (SGDP)	Ministry of Mines and Petroleum	Yes	5/15/2012	8/31/2016	90,000,000	21,895,875	
Kajaki Unit 2 Project (Installation of Turbine Generator Unit 2 at Kajaki Dam Hydropower Plant)	DABS	Yes	4/22/2013	5/31/2016	80,000,000	38,916,173	
Afghanistan Workforce Development Project (AWDP)	MOE	Yes	9/18/2013	4/3/2016	11,500,000	1,321,456	
Basic Education, Learning, and Training (BELT)-Textbook Printing and Distribution	MOE	Yes	11/16/2011	12/31/2016	26,996,813	24,970,742	
E-Government Resource Center (EGRC)	Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MOCIT)	Yes	8/28/2013	6/1/2016	3,900,000	405,000	
Multi-Donor Trust Funds							
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) (current award)*	Multiple	No	3/31/2012	3/31/2017	1,900,000,000	1,209,255,530	
Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF)	Multiple	No	3/7/2013	3/6/2018	113,670,184	113,000,000	

Note: * USAID had a previous award to the ARTF that concluded in March 2012 and totaled \$1,371,991,195 in disbursements. Cumulative disbursements from the two ARTF awards are currently \$2,581,246,725.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/7/2016.

The U.S. government announced in March 2015 that it intends to seek funding to support the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), including the army and police, at the level of 352,000 personnel through at least 2017.⁴⁶⁷ The Department of Defense (DOD) was appropriated \$3.7 billion to support the ANDSF for fiscal year (FY) 2016.⁴⁶⁸

Previously, at the 2012 Chicago Conference, the United States and its allies reaffirmed their commitments to financially support the Afghan security forces, noting that the pace and size of a gradual, managed force reduction from the surge peak (330,000 army and police personnel at the time of the conference, expanded to 352,000 personnel later in 2012) to a sustainable level would be conditions-based and decided by the Afghan government in consultation with the international community. The preliminary model envisioned Afghan security forces of 228,500 personnel with an estimated budget of \$4.1 billion, to be reviewed regularly against the changing security environment. According to DOD, the peak surge force structure of 352,000 personnel has been sustained since 2012 due to the security situation.⁴⁶⁹ At the September 2014 Wales Summit, NATO allies and partners renewed their commitment to contribute significantly to the financial sustainment of the ANDSF through the end of 2017 and to financially sustain the ANDSF over the next 10 years. The international community has pledged an additional amount of almost €1 billion, or approximately \$1.29 billion, annually to sustain the ANDSF for 2015 through the end of 2017.⁴⁷⁰ At a December meeting in Brussels, Belgium, NATO foreign ministers agreed to begin steps to secure international funding for the ANDSF through the end of 2020.⁴⁷¹

For 2016, DOD expects to contribute \$110 million for police salaries to the Ministry of Interior (MOI) through the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA).⁴⁷²

DOD also expects to contribute approximately \$1.13 billion this year in direct contributions to the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and approximately \$412 million in direct contributions to the MOI.⁴⁷³

Civilian On-Budget Assistance

USAID provides on-budget civilian assistance through (1) bilateral agreements with seven Afghan government entities and (2) contributions to two multidonor trust funds, the ARTF and the AITF.⁴⁷⁴ According to USAID, all bilateral-assistance funds are deposited in separate bank accounts established by the Ministry of Finance for each program.⁴⁷⁵

The ARTF, administered by the World Bank, provides funds to both the Afghan government's operating and development budgets in support of Afghan government operations, policy reforms, and national-priority programs.⁴⁷⁶ The AITF, a multidonor trust fund administered by the Asian Development Bank, coordinates donor assistance for infrastructure

SIGAR AUDIT

Last quarter, SIGAR initiated a follow-up audit of the ARTF. In July 2011, SIGAR found that the World Bank and the Afghan government had established mechanisms to monitor and account for ARTF contributions, but that several limitations and challenges should be addressed. This audit will assess the extent to which the World Bank and the Afghan government (1) monitor and account for U.S. contributions to the ARTF; (2) evaluate whether ARTF-funded projects have achieved their stated goals and objectives; and (3) utilize and enforce any conditionality on ARTF funding.

projects in Afghanistan.⁴⁷⁷ According to USAID, the majority of on-budget funding has been and will continue to be directed through the multidonor trust funds, particularly the ARTF.⁴⁷⁸

On-Budget Assistance to the ANDSF

A large portion of on-budget U.S. assistance is for the Afghan security forces. DOD provides on-budget assistance to the Afghan government through (1) direct contributions from the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to the MOD and the MOI, and (2) ASFF contributions to the multi-donor LOTFA.⁴⁷⁹ Administered by the UNDP, LOTFA primarily funds Afghan National Police (ANP) salaries and incentives.⁴⁸⁰ Direct-contribution funding is provided to the Ministry of Finance, which allots it incrementally to the MOD and MOI, as required.⁴⁸¹

In February 2011, the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller authorized the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) to provide direct contributions to the Afghanistan government from ASFF to develop ministerial capacity and capability in the areas of budget development and execution, acquisition planning, and procurement. CSTC-A administers all contributions of ASFF resources to the MOD and MOI. CSTC-A monitors and formally audits the execution of those funds to assess ministerial capability, ensure proper controls and compliance with documented accounting procedures, and compliance with provisions of the annual commitment letters.⁴⁸²

Thus far in the current Afghan fiscal year, CSTC-A has provided \$233.1 million to the MOD and \$109.5 million to the MOI. Of the \$109.5 million for the MOI, \$80.9 million were direct contributions and \$28.7 million was provided via LOTFA.⁴⁸³

Ghani's effort to reduce procurement-related corruption has slowed procurement and created what CSTC-A has labeled the [Afghan fiscal year] "1394 Procurement Crisis." According to CSTC-A, the procurement crisis resulted in many MOD contracts not being fully executed by the end of the previous fiscal year. This delay meant that a large number of contracts need to carry over into the new fiscal year. Additionally, there were over 150 MOD contracts that were approved but not awarded by the end of the previous fiscal year. This means that a large amount of CSTC-A's 1395 funds will be used to cover the 1394 contracts. Despite the slowdown in procurements, however, CSTC-A reports that the impact was minimized to ensure that critical supplies and services (such as fuel and food) were prioritized. In some cases, sole-source contracts that complied with Afghan laws and procedures were used.⁴⁸⁴

The MOI procurement directorate, however, has not yet fully adopted President Ghani's procurement reforms and maintains a "business as usual" mentality. According to CSTC-A, MOI staff lack sufficient knowledge of procurement laws. Additionally, MOI personnel are timid about

signing procurement-related documents for fear of being removed and/or reprimanded.⁴⁸⁵

NATIONAL GOVERNANCE

Capacity-Building Programs

USAID capacity-building programs seek to improve Afghan ministries' ability to prepare, manage, and account for on-budget assistance. These programs also provide general assistance to support broader human and institutional capacity-building of Afghan government entities.⁴⁸⁶ USAID also seeks to increase civil-society capacity through the Afghan Civic Engagement Program (ACEP). As shown in Table 3.18, active programs include the Ministry of Women's Affairs (MOWA) Organizational Restructuring and Empowerment (MORE) project, a \$14 million project that, among other things, assists the ministry to improve its financial management, as required for future on-budget assistance.⁴⁸⁷ MORE has provided 76 scholarships for MOWA staff to attend 25 Afghan universities. As of March, six MOWA staff have graduated from undergraduate programs and 24 are scheduled to graduate by the end of 2016. MORE is also sponsoring English-language and computer training for MOWA staff who did not benefit from scholarships.⁴⁸⁸

TABLE 3.18

USAID CAPACITY-BUILDING PROGRAMS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL					
Project Title	Afghan Government Partner	Start Date	End Date	Total Estimated Cost (\$)	Cumulative Disbursements, as of 3/31/2016 (\$)
Afghan Civic Engagement Program (ACEP)	N/A	12/4/2013	12/3/2018	\$70,000,000	\$29,791,294
Assistance to Legislative Bodies of Afghanistan (ALBA)	Parliament	3/28/2013	3/27/2018	24,990,827	14,344,993
Ministry of Women's Affairs Organizational Restructuring and Empowerment (MORE)	Ministry of Women's Affairs	12/20/2012	12/19/2015	14,182,944	8,759,900

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/7/2016 and 4/10/2016.

USAID has also provided \$5 million for the \$150 million ARTF-managed Capacity Building for Results (CBR) program. CBR aims to improve the capacity and performance of Afghan government ministries through the provision of skilled civil servants to implement ministries' reform programs. CBR provides Afghan government ministries with the opportunity to recruit high capacity staff into critical posts at salaries closer to the market rates. The aim is to increase on-budget service delivery and reduce reliance upon the so-called "second civil service" wherein Afghan consultants, instead of civil servants, performed government functions.⁴⁸⁹

According to the World Bank, CBR has made limited progress over the past three years. Last year, the Afghan government mandated that individual

ministries are now responsible for hiring senior civil servants, a move the World Bank says should help improve CBR implementation. The World Bank reports that 682 out of a planned 1,500 CBR-supported Afghan government positions—reduced from the original target of 2,400—have been advertised and are in different stages of screening and recruitment. USAID does not expect to see Afghan government capacity improvements until CBR civil-servant positions are filled and the new civil servants begin to exercise their responsibilities.⁴⁹⁰ Additionally, the World Bank now questions whether CBR will be able to ultimately improve service delivery as this CBR objective may not be measurable, attributable to the program, or achievable within the remaining implementation period. According to the SMAF, at least 800 civil-service positions are to be filled through CBR by December 2016.⁴⁹¹

National Assembly

The Afghan parliament was on winter recess, January 20 to March 6, for much of the quarter.⁴⁹²

USAID funds the \$25 million Assistance to Legislative Bodies of Afghanistan project (ALBA) to help Afghanistan's parliament operate as an independent and effective legislative, representative, and oversight body.⁴⁹³ In January, ALBA supported an outreach trip to Helmand Province by the upper house's internal-security and defense commission. The parliamentary delegation met with local government and security officials, provincial council members, and community elders. The commission heard of problems including insufficient coordination among Afghan security forces, insufficient equipment and munitions, and insufficient numbers of military personnel. In February, ALBA facilitated a parliamentary



Members of the upper house of parliament visit an industrial park in Herat Province. (USAID photo)

study tour to Bangladesh by the lower house's women's affairs commission and an oversight trip to Herat Province by the upper house's public-welfare committee.⁴⁹⁴

Civil Society

The Afghan Civic Engagement Program's goal is to promote civil-society and media engagement that enables Afghan citizens to influence policy, monitor government accountability, and serve as advocates for political reform. ACEP aims to achieve this goal through five program areas: (1) regular civil-society organization (CSO) engagement with the Afghan government, (2) increased CSO and media-thematic expertise in democracy and governance, (3) expanded civic engagement, (4) improved access to independent news and public affairs information, and (5) increased CSO organizational capacity.⁴⁹⁵

This quarter, ACEP initiated the 2016 Emerging Civil Society Leaders (ECSL) program for 34 participants, including 15 women. The ECSL program will focus on civic activism, public speaking, research, advocacy and leadership, and includes an international study tour to further support the development of young Afghans and their links with civil society. ACEP also launched an ECSL alumni network to connect participants from the 2013 to 2016 ECSL classes.⁴⁹⁶

ACEP hosted its annual Afghan Media Conference in March. This year's theme was women in the media. The conference was designed to promote networking, information sharing, and learning, and featured speeches by media representatives from Kabul and the provinces, panel discussions, thematic presentations, information sessions, and group work.⁴⁹⁷

SUBNATIONAL GOVERNANCE

Rural Stabilization Programs

USAID has conducted several stabilization programs aimed at helping the Afghan government extend its reach into unstable areas and build local governance capacity. Last quarter, the Community Cohesion Initiative (CCI) ended operations.⁴⁹⁸ CCI—which ran from March 2012 to December 2015—implemented 1,321 activities totaling approximately \$41 million. USAID does not plan a follow-up program.⁴⁹⁹

Community Cohesion Initiative

USAID's Community Cohesion Initiative (CCI) program supported creating conditions for stability and development in conflict-prone and other priority areas of Afghanistan by (1) increasing cohesion within and between communities, (2) supporting peaceful and legitimate governance processes and outcomes, and (3) countering violent extremism.⁵⁰⁰

SIGAR AUDIT

SIGAR has an ongoing audit of the MISTI project. This audit plans to (1) assess the extent to which the MISTI contractor provided third-party monitoring services in accordance with the terms of the contract; (2) assess the extent to which USAID considered MISTI program results in planning and implementing stabilization programs; and (3) identify challenges in MISTI, if any, with USAID using third-party monitoring to evaluate stabilization reconstruction programs, and the extent to which USAID has addressed those challenges.

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As of December 2015, CCI closed and all staff were demobilized. CCI implemented 1,321 activities, disbursing \$41 million for these activities. According to USAID, there is no planned follow-up program.⁵⁰¹

In February, USAID released the CCI final evaluation. The evaluation relied on 33 focus-group discussions and 263 interviews of local stakeholders, USAID officials, and CCI staff and grantees.⁵⁰² The evaluation concluded that CCI programming made important contributions to the political and security transitions in Afghanistan. In particular, the evaluation credited CCI's mobilization of 40 international election-audit observers during the 2014 presidential election with “creating time and space for the two sides in the election dispute to reach a power-sharing agreement and avert state collapse by eventually establishing a new unity government.” The evaluation highlighted CCI's strategic communications efforts in support of peaceful elections that led to high enthusiasm and participation in the elections and effectively overwhelmed antidemocratic voices (until the situation descended into crisis due to allegations of fraud).⁵⁰³

According to the evaluation, the power-sharing arrangement that resulted is unconstitutional, and the government that emerged after a long period of negotiation is politically weak and internally divided. The evaluation concluded that the political weakness of the Afghan government means community-driven programming—such as that implemented by CCI—is unlikely to create the situation in which Afghan government legitimacy is consolidated and the insurgency is marginalized. In comments to SIGAR, USAID clarified that the conclusional language represented the views of the third-party evaluator and were outside the scope of the CCI evaluation. USAID subsequently asked the evaluator to remove this conclusion in a revised version of the evaluation.⁵⁰⁴

According to the evaluation, CCI's goal to strengthen community reliance was poorly understood by CCI local staff, whereas the goal to increase cohesion was better understood. “Resilience” has no easy translation into Dari or Pashto, and the English usage of this term had multiple variants that complicated its explanation. CCI documents used the term resilience variously to describe influential individuals, abilities to cope with shocks arising from violence and economic exigencies and/or natural phenomena, links with the Afghan government, and resistance to the insurgency. The evaluation found that local stakeholders understood resilience mainly in terms of their ability to meet basic needs and cope with external shocks that were unrelated to the insurgency.⁵⁰⁵

In contrast to “resilience,” “cohesion” was a better term for communicating the intent of the program because it is easily translated into Afghanistan's local languages and was well understood by local stakeholders and CCI staff. The cohesion terminology was better suited to convey the objectives of the program, and changes to the objectives, to

local staff and stakeholders. Interviewees variously described cohesion in terms of coordination, cooperation, communication, unity, and mutual understanding between different communities and people from different areas, between members of the same community, between communities and the government, between youth and elders, between women, and also between local communities, the government, and former and current sympathizers or members of armed opposition groups, such as the Taliban. Cohesion, rather than resilience, was understood by CCI local staff and community stakeholders as the key factor that empowered communities to resist the insurgency by presenting a united front in the face of Taliban opposition to the project activities in their communities.⁵⁰⁶

Despite greater clarity surrounding the cohesion objective, the evaluation found that the extent to which CCI contributed to cohesion between the Afghan government and local communities was limited by local perceptions of Afghan government official corruption.⁵⁰⁷

In certain insurgent-controlled or -contested areas, elders in CCI-supported communities were reported to have sought permission and/or security guarantees from the Taliban, including the Peshawar Shura leadership, to allow CCI projects to proceed. According to one respondent, Taliban leadership would allow the projects so long as they were not funded by the Afghan government. Despite these findings, the evaluation concludes that CCI programming in such areas was effective at improving security, linking communities to the Afghan government, and preventing the Taliban from controlling a district in Khowst Province.⁵⁰⁸ In another insurgent-influenced district in Helmand Province, the Taliban allowed some projects to proceed but blocked others. Local stakeholders and the CCI independent monitoring unit reported that projects that did not receive Taliban permission were not implemented; however, the evaluation found that the USAID CCI database reported the projects closed and all grants funds disbursed. When the evaluators spoke with the former CCI local project manager, the manager responded that “to do anything there, you had to tell the Taliban.” In comments to SIGAR, USAID noted that community negotiations with the Taliban were not part of the approved CCI process.⁵⁰⁹

Most respondents reported that links between the Afghan government and their community had increased as a result of CCI programming. The evaluation argued that the most lasting effect of CCI was a change in mentality that increased cohesion between people and willingness to work together to achieve common ends. The other major change in mentality surrounded people’s understanding of what to expect from the government and how to communicate their needs and expectations to the government. The evaluation noted, however, that a common frustration from stakeholders and CCI local staff was the short duration of the program and lack of a follow-on activity.⁵¹⁰

GOVERNANCE

Jobs for Peace

In November 2015, President Ashraf Ghani announced the first portion of the Jobs for Peace program, a 24-to-30-month jobs-focused stimulus and stabilization program that the Afghan government initially estimates will cost approximately \$1.18 billion, though some components of the program still require budget estimates. The program is meant to provide short-term, labor-intensive employment in rural and urban areas.⁵¹¹ It aims to create short-term employment, but will also focus on political aspects of unemployment by targeting areas and populations that are especially susceptible to destabilization and insurgent recruitment.⁵¹²

In December, the United States announced plans to contribute \$50 million to support the Afghan government’s job-creation efforts.⁵¹³ U.S. assistance for the Jobs for Peace program consisted of a \$35 million on-budget contribution to the National Solidarity Program and a \$15 million off-budget contribution for an apprenticeship program for educated women in urban areas.⁵¹⁴ USAID reports it does not know how the Afghan government intends to assess the Jobs for Peace program, particularly political aspects related to destabilization and insurgent recruitment.⁵¹⁵

Provincial and Municipal Programs

USAID has two subnational programs focused on provincial centers and municipalities: the Initiative to Strengthen Local Administrations (ISLA) and Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope and Resilience (SHAHAR) programs. Table 3.19 summarizes total program costs and disbursements to date.

TABLE 3.19

USAID SUBNATIONAL (PROVINCIAL AND MUNICIPAL) PROGRAMS				
Project Title	Start Date	End Date	Total Estimated Cost (\$)	Cumulative Disbursements, as of 3/31/2016 (\$)
Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope and Resilience (SHAHAR)	11/30/2014	11/29/2017	\$73,499,999	\$15,062,189
Initiative to Strengthen Local Administrations (ISLA)	2/1/2015	1/31/2020	62,364,687	5,798,105

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/7/2016.

Initiative to Strengthen Local Administrations

The ISLA program is meant to enable the Afghan government to improve provincial governance in the areas of fiscal and development planning, representation of citizens, and enhanced delivery of public services. ISLA aims to strengthen subnational systems of planning, operations, communication, representation, and citizen engagement. This should lead to services that more closely respond to all citizens’ needs in health, education, security, justice, and urban services.⁵¹⁶

During the quarter, ISLA deployed 46 personnel to provincial governors’ offices to begin work. ISLA is also preparing strategic communications training for 34 provincial spokespersons.⁵¹⁷

Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope and Resilience

The objective of the SHAHAR program is to create well-governed, fiscally sustainable Afghan municipalities capable of meeting the needs of a growing urban population. Targeted support to municipal governments, as well as to the General Directorate of Municipal Affairs and municipal advisory boards, aims to improve municipal financial management, urban service delivery, and citizen consultation.⁵¹⁸

In February, the 20 SHAHAR-supported municipalities registered a total of 165 new businesses and issued 2,243 new business licenses. These efforts resulted in approximately \$68,427 in new municipal revenue for the month and a total of \$117,092 in new revenue for the year. SHAHAR-supported municipalities also registered 263 properties in February and collected \$299,866 in property taxes, bringing the year-to-date total to \$564,279.⁵¹⁹

SHAHAR should soon begin construction of the initial batch of Competitive Urban Service Delivery Mechanism projects for 16 eligible municipalities. SHAHAR-supported municipalities submitted 194 project ideas that were later reduced to 66 proposals that met SHAHAR eligibility criteria. During the first year, SHAHAR and the municipalities will follow a cost-sharing scheme in which SHAHAR funds 75% of the project cost (up to \$120,000) and the municipality funds the remainder. Examples of the first batch of projects include a bus and taxi station, renovation of a stadium, construction of a cattle market, and construction of a women's park. SHAHAR plans to contribute \$1.4 million to 17 of the initial projects while the municipalities plan to contribute \$483,425.⁵²⁰

RECONCILIATION AND REINTEGRATION

According to the United Nations Secretary-General, the peace process gained regional momentum though the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) consisting of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the United States, and China, but the commitment of the Taliban to a possible peace process remained uncertain.⁵²¹ In March, Nicholas Haysom—Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan—reported he had met with the Taliban Political Commission and been told that the Taliban was not yet ready to engage in direct peace talks with the Afghan government.⁵²²

In early December 2015, Pakistan hosted a Heart of Asia summit attended by President Ghani, senior Chinese officials, and a U.S. delegation led by the Deputy Secretary of State. The summit was a forum for regional players to discuss their commitments to an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process.⁵²³

Following the Heart of Asia summit, the QCG met four times between January 11 and February 23. According to State, the meetings were important steps in forging a regional consensus in support of Afghan-led peace

talks. QCG members pledged to advance the peace process and seek direct talks with the Taliban. The Ghani administration has demonstrated a willingness to work with the Pakistani government on coordinated reconciliation objectives, which marks a departure from previous attempts at reconciliation. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan have made repeated, public calls for the Taliban to participate in direct talks with the Afghan government.⁵²⁴

In spite of the QCG process, the acting head of the National Directorate of Security accused the Pakistan government of supporting the Taliban. During a briefing to Afghan parliamentarians, he said the Pakistani military intelligence service is “completely supporting” the Taliban.⁵²⁵

Concurrent with the QCG meetings, the nongovernmental organization Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs organized a “track II” dialogue in Doha, Qatar, on January 23 and 24. This unofficial meeting included Afghan politicians attending in their personal capacities and representatives of the Taliban. Participants declared peace an urgent need and rejected Daesh (a transliteration of the Arabic phrase often rendered as “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria” or ISIS) as a foreign phenomenon. Additionally, participants felt that the Taliban should have an office and address and be able to travel freely to facilitate peace talks. There was disagreement over the current Afghan constitution; some participants preferred amending it, while others argued it should be substantially rewritten. President Ghani has voiced his opposition to track II efforts that facilitate dialogue outside of the official process.⁵²⁶

In March, the Hezb-e-Islami insurgent group met with the High Peace Council after publicly announcing they were ready to join political reconciliation talks with the Afghan government. Meanwhile, the mainstream Taliban, under leader Mullah Akhtar Mohammed Mansour, issued a public statement in early March rejecting the QCG’s call for talks in Pakistan. QCG members, however, are continuing efforts to persuade the Taliban to the negotiating table.⁵²⁷

According to James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, and General Joseph Votel, the new Commander of U.S. Central Command, the Taliban remains relatively united despite the announcement of Mullah Omar’s death and some dissatisfaction over the rise of Mullah Mansour as the new Taliban leader. Votel further stated that the degree of fracturing which has led to the emergence of intra-Taliban opposition groups is unlikely to impact near-term reconciliation efforts.⁵²⁸

In March, the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies released the results of a survey on perceptions toward the peace talks from 1,540 respondents in 15 provinces. The majority of respondents (76.8%) believe that the Taliban’s behaviors are not acceptable. Additionally, 28.4% of respondents believe that the main reason the Taliban fights the Afghan government is to further the interests of Pakistan and almost 13% believe the reason is

to further the interests of unspecified foreign countries. Another 25.9% believed the Taliban was fighting for power. Despite these views of the Taliban, respondents were mixed on whether the Taliban are a part of Afghan society and whether it is important to share power with them; 55% disagreed and 40.7% agreed.⁵²⁹

Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program

The Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) is an Afghan-led program to reintegrate low-level insurgent fighters and their commanders into Afghan civil society.⁵³⁰ The APRP is the only institutional mechanism within the Afghan government with capacity to pursue both high-level reconciliation negotiations and provincial-level reintegration of insurgent fighters.⁵³¹

As of March 15, the APRP has facilitated a total of 11,074 reintegrees, 1,050 of whom were reportedly “commanders.” A total of 154 reintegrees were documented recidivists.⁵³² This quarter, the APRP processed 100 reintegrees in January, February, and March.⁵³³ The insurgency has an estimated strength of between 20,000 to 40,000 fighters.⁵³⁴

According to State, the APRP has faced several challenges including: (1) inadequate security assurances for reintegrees—184 of whom have been killed by insurgents—and inadequate protection for APRP staff and members, 40 of whom have been killed, including former HPC Chairman Burhanuddin Rabbani; (2) the lack of a cease-fire and/or peace agreement that has severely limited the numbers of insurgents willing to demobilize and reintegrate; (3) the long-term vacancies of APRP senior leadership positions that were only recently filled; (4) the low priority the Afghan government used to assign the APRP; (5) and the lack of regular long-term donor funding that has created operational challenges for the program.⁵³⁵

On February 23, President Ghani announced major changes to the High Peace Council including a new chairman, six new deputy chairmen, five new executive advisors, and a new secretariat.⁵³⁶ According to State, the appointment of Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani as the new chairman of the HPC, along with other HPC leadership positions, is an important step for organizing peace talks with the Taliban.⁵³⁷ Following Gailani’s appointment as chairman of the HPC, a number of donors provided additional funding for reintegration. The APRP has approximately \$6.4 million for operations, including \$1.9 million remaining from the U.S. government’s most recent \$5 million contribution.⁵³⁸

RULE OF LAW AND ANTICORRUPTION

Project Summary

The United States has assisted the formal and informal justice sectors through several mechanisms. These include the State Department’s Justice

GOVERNANCE

TABLE 3.20

RULE OF LAW AND ANTICORRUPTION PROGRAMS				
Project Title	Start Date	End Date	Total Estimated Cost (\$)	Cumulative Disbursements, as of 3/31/2016 (\$)
Justice System Support Program II (JSSP II)	6/16/2010	2/28/2017	\$247,142,053	\$230,294,160
Advancing Effective Reforms for Civic Accountability (AERCA)*	7/13/2009	6/30/2017	51,302,682	38,465,138
Corrections System Support Program (CSSP III)	1/1/2015	2/29/2016	21,107,063	18,673,225
CSSP IV	3/1/2016	2/28/2017	10,000,000	-
Justice Training Transition Program (JTTP)	1/2/2013	3/31/2016	47,759,796	47,759,796
Delegated Cooperation Agreement (DCAR) with the Department for International Development (DFID) for Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC)	5/19/2015	8/31/2020	3,000,000	500,000

Note: *On November 1, 2015, USAID extended the AERCA award beyond the planned December 31, 2015, end date, added \$12.6 million in estimated costs, and incorporated additional anticorruption activities into the program description. The information in the table refers to the entire award, not simply the new anticorruption portion covered by the modification.

Source: State, INL, response to SIGAR data calls, 4/1/2016; USAID, response to SIGAR data calls, 12/28/2015 and 4/7/2016.

Sector Support Program (JSSP), and Justice Training Transition Program (JTTP). These and other rule-of-law and anticorruption programs are shown in Table 3.20.

In the area of anticorruption, USAID has a cooperation arrangement with the United Kingdom's Department for International Development to fund the Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC). USAID support funds the MEC's monitoring, analysis, and reporting activities, including its vulnerability-to-corruption assessments.⁵³⁹ Last year, USAID facilitated an agreement between the MEC and the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) for the MEC to conduct a ministry-wide anticorruption assessment. This assessment will inform the MOPH's own anticorruption strategy and should be completed next quarter. USAID hopes this approach will be a model for other Afghan government ministries.⁵⁴⁰

USAID aims to improve public services by reducing corruption opportunities in Afghan government administrative and business processes. In November 2015, USAID modified the existing Advancing Effective Reforms for Civic Accountability (AERCA) project—previously the Afghanistan Electoral Reform and Civic Advocacy (AERCA) project—to address immediately identifiable corrupt practices. AERCA will lay the groundwork for a new, five-year project known as AMANAT (Afghanistan's Measure for Accountability and Transparency). Through a combination of its support to the MEC and AERCA project, USAID aims to (1) strengthen local Afghan capacity to identify corruption vulnerabilities and develop sensible recommendations in response, (2) provide technical assistance to target government agencies to plan for and operationalize those recommendations, and (3) strengthen civil society's ability to fulfill its watchdog function.⁵⁴¹

AERCA aims to increase the demand from civil-society organizations to spur the Afghan government's efforts to reduce administrative corruption while building a foundation of lawfulness that can over time chip away at what the World Bank has called "grand corruption." AERCA is in the work planning phase and is currently consulting with the Afghan government to plan specific interventions. Additionally, AERCA is working with civil society to prepare grants to track and monitor Afghan government reform promises.⁵⁴²

The State Department's JSSP objectives include continuing to develop a case-management system (CMS) to track cases throughout Afghanistan's justice system and to build the capacity and administrative skills of ministry officials.⁵⁴³

The CMS is used to monitor criminal cases on an individual or aggregated basis from the time of arrest until the end of confinement. All ministries in the formal criminal-justice sector have access to the CMS. The CMS is used to demonstrate inefficiencies in the criminal-justice system by identifying when cases are not being processed in a statutory manner. Ministries routinely utilize the CMS to analyze and understand the function of the formal justice sector. For example, the CMS can help identify an individual prosecutor's case load and conviction rates, information that is useful for determining promotion eligibility. In addition to using the CMS to conduct criminal background checks on internal and external employment applicants, the MOI generates a weekly report of arrests in Kabul by the type of crime.⁵⁴⁴

The State Department's JTTP provided regional training to justice-sector officials on a wide range of criminal-justice topics.⁵⁴⁵ JTTP aimed to increase the confidence of Afghan citizens in their justice sector and to achieve two outcomes: (1) increase the capacity and competencies of Afghan justice-sector professionals in delivering justice according to Afghan law, and (2) ensure that Afghan justice institutions are capable of managing the sustainable implementation of training programs.⁵⁴⁶ According to State, JTTP ended on March 31 with a follow-on project starting April 1.⁵⁴⁷

The Supreme Court and the Formal Justice Sector

In March, President Ghani ordered the newly appointed attorney general to reopen the Farkhunda Malikzada case after the Supreme Court upheld a lower court's decision to reduce the sentences of 13 men convicted in her murder. Farkhunda was beaten to death by a mob in March 2015 after being falsely accused of having burned a Koran. Human Rights Watch said the handling of the case thus far represented a failure by the Afghan criminal-justice system.⁵⁴⁸

According to USAID, the Supreme Court has taken initial steps to address judicial performance and corruption through administrative measures. In early 2016, the court reassigned just under 100 high-ranking judges

and administrative heads—including all 34 provincial chief judges—to advisory and lower ranking positions.⁵⁴⁹

According to the SMAF, short-term deliverables related to the justice sector include the launch of a justice-sector reform plan and a draft of a revised penal code, both to be completed by December 2016. This plan has been drafted but not yet finalized.⁵⁵⁰

Afghan Correctional System

According to State, the inmate population of Afghanistan's prisons managed by the General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Centers (GDPDC) has increased by an average of 6.51% annually over the past five years. As of January 31, the GDPDC incarcerated 26,867 males and 751 females, while the Ministry of Justice's Juvenile Rehabilitation Directorate (JRD) incarcerated 915 male juveniles and 112 female juveniles. These incarceration totals do not include detainees held by any other Afghan governmental organization, as INL does not have access to their data.⁵⁵¹

Overcrowding is a persistent, substantial, and widespread problem within GDPDC facilities for adult males, although state-funded prison construction has added some new prison beds and presidential-amnesty decrees have reduced the prison population significantly. As of January 31, the total male provincial-prison population was at 200% of capacity, as defined by the International Committee of the Red Cross's (ICRC) minimum standard 3.4 square meters per inmate. The total female provincial-prison population was at 55% of the ICRC-recommended capacity. The JRD's juvenile-rehabilitation centers' population was at 75% of ICRC-recommended capacity.⁵⁵²

This quarter, State through the Corrections System Support Program (CSSP) completed four small-scale renovation projects that will increase the safety, security, and humane treatment of those prisons that received limited renovation and reconstruction support. These included: (1) the replacement of an exterior wall that was on the verge of collapse at the Nangarhar provincial prison; the construction of two visitor canopies to provide shelter for prison visitors and additional canopies and fencing in the detainee recreation area to provide shade and protection from inclement weather at the Kabul Detention Center; (3) renovations to enhance security, improve visitation, and expand industries programs at the Kabul Female Prison and Detention Center; and (4) the rebuilding of three rooms for housing, refurbishment of the recreational area, installation of a new septic system, and reconstruction of a security wall at the Juvenile Rehabilitation Center in Samangan.⁵⁵³

Anticorruption

This quarter, at the March ministerial meeting of the G7+ association of countries in Kabul, President Ghani spoke on corruption saying, "Our

grasp of corruption remains weak, trapped in the realm of definitions and denunciations but still lacking the framework that will let us define its contours and domains of action.” Ghani acknowledged that state corruption is the result of elite capture in which government institutions become the means to perpetuate corrupt behavior rather than the tool for development. However, he questioned the value of common responses, saying the “solution to fragmented and captured states is never going to be more consultants, anticorruption plans, or good governance projects.” Instead, he said improvements are driven by reformist leadership that (1) have control over their budgets; (2) use the state to build price-setting, resource-allocating markets; and (3) develop a partnership between the citizenry and the state.⁵⁵⁴

According to the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Afghan government has performed poorly on prosecuting major criminal-corruption cases. The Afghan government appears to have no political will to pursue corruption cases, with DOJ reporting that the predominant attitude of many of their Afghan government counterparts in the justice sector being one of defeat and anxiety.⁵⁵⁵

This quarter, Transparency International and Integrity Watch Afghanistan (TI/IWA) issued an integrity system assessment to establish a picture of Afghanistan’s institutional landscape with regard to integrity, accountability, and transparency. The report focused on the legal system, public sector and service delivery, and the integrity of elected leaders. The report found that the corrupt enjoy impunity thanks to a dysfunctional law-enforcement and judicial system. The authors say that Afghanistan’s anticorruption agency, the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOO), has also proven to be ineffective in the fight against corruption.⁵⁵⁶

The TI/IWA report also says the judiciary is seen as being manipulated by both the government and parliament with judicial decisions frequently biased in their favor. The overall result is a dysfunctional justice system in which corruption largely goes unpunished. This situation leads citizens to seek justice elsewhere, further undermining the legitimacy of the already fragile state. With regard to service delivery, widespread corruption and political interference in the public sector, combined with the highly centralized system of administration, has undermined the ability of the public sector to deliver basic services to citizens. Finally, the authors write that the lack of integrity of Afghan elected leaders erodes public confidence and reinforces the sense of impunity that prevails in Afghanistan.⁵⁵⁷

While the report found many areas of failure, the authors argue that progress is possible when there is strong political commitment for reform. In particular, the Afghan government has made progress in the area of public procurement. The new government established the National Procurement Authority (NPA) in October 2014 to oversee procurement activities in the public sector with a stated policy of zero tolerance for corruption. According to the Afghan government, the NPA has already saved more

than \$70 million of taxpayers' money and over 50 companies have been blacklisted. Nevertheless, the authors say concerns remain over the limited transparency in procurement processes and lack of cooperation with civil-society organizations. Another area of progress includes the introduction of an access-to-information law in December 2014, though a number of important weaknesses in the law still need to be addressed. According to the report, although the law obligates all Afghan government institutions to provide information upon request, civil society organizations report that implementation remains weak. Finally, the report cited the reopening of the Kabul Bank case as a positive sign; however, the fact that the former Kabul Bank chief executive was invited to participate in a large-scale Afghan government investment project was a worrying development.⁵⁵⁸

Afghan Attorney General's Office

On April 9, the lower house of parliament approved the nomination of Mohammad Farid Hamidi for attorney general. Hamidi, a graduate of Kabul University Faculty of Law and Political Science and Harvard University, served as a commissioner of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission for over 10 years before assuming the duties of deputy director in 2013. He served on the Electoral Complaints Commission in 2005 and is the co-founder of the Free and Fair Elections Foundation in Afghanistan. Hamidi has also served on various advisory boards to the government focusing on human rights and civil society.⁵⁵⁹ The appointment of a new attorney general by the end of 2015 was a SMAF short-term deliverable.⁵⁶⁰

Major Crimes Task Force

The Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) recently lost its complement of National Directorate of Security (NDS) personnel—roughly half of the MCTF staff—and is now housed within the MOI's anti-crime police. Along with the reorganization, the MCTF deputy director replaced the previous director whom DOD had assessed as ineffective and potentially compromised. Following the leadership change, the MCTF immediately began to make arrests, some of which had been stifled under previous leadership. In January and February, the MCTF arrested an Attorney General's Office (AGO) prosecutor for extortion, an Afghan police colonel for extortion, two police colonels for weapons trafficking, two Ministry of Transportation & Civil Aviation officials for corruption at the entry points into Kabul, and numerous persons involved in illegal mining of gemstones that resulted in the seizure of almost 100 tons of stones. Politicians, including several members of parliament, have sought to pressure MCTF to release defendants or otherwise sabotage cases of those recently arrested.⁵⁶¹

Despite recent progress, DOD reports that the MCTF's effectiveness against high-level corruption will continue to be limited by external factors, such as AGO corruption and political pressure. Recently, the AGO released

several MCTF-arrested defendants in mid-level corruption cases including a police colonel and a Ministry of Transportation & Civil Aviation official. The latter bragged while in custody that he would soon be released.⁵⁶²

Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee

A presidential decree established the MEC in March 2010. Its mandate is to develop anticorruption recommendations and benchmarks, to monitor efforts to fight corruption, and to report on these efforts. It comprises three Afghan members and three international members and is led by an Afghan executive director. The MEC has approximately 20 staff, but USAID notes that the MEC may increase its staff since President Ghani has increasingly sought analytical products from it.⁵⁶³

The MEC is currently working on a three-year institutional strategic plan.⁵⁶⁴

High Office of Oversight and Anticorruption

The High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOO) was established in July 2008 by presidential decree to oversee and coordinate implementation of the Afghan government's anticorruption strategy. The HOO collects corruption complaints through a hotline and complaint boxes installed in several ministries and other public-service delivery institutions, and conducts the initial investigation of corruption allegations that it receives before referring allegations to the Attorney General's Office (AGO) for further investigation and possible prosecution. According to USAID, these investigations seldom lead to prosecution. Mutual recrimination between AGO and HOO is common.⁵⁶⁵

In February, the HOO signed a memorandum of understanding with the Ministry of Hajj & Islamic Affairs to spread anticorruption messages through mosques. The head of the HOO said that raising public awareness against corruption is an important part of its strategy.⁵⁶⁶

Also in February, the HOO director accused the Afghan government of not making sufficient efforts to overcome corruption, making political compromises that hinder corruption cases, and lacking a single anticorruption policy.⁵⁶⁷ In March, the HOO director claimed that the delays in prosecuting the six senior officials from the Ministry of Urban Development fired for corruption last year by President Ghani was the result of ethnic and political meddling in the work of judicial institutions.⁵⁶⁸

Security Services

According to DOD, the Afghan government's anticorruption efforts lack tangible action beyond the much-publicized establishment of the National Procurement Commission and the reopening of the Kabul Bank case. MOD and MOI are still developing their respective anticorruption plans.⁵⁶⁹

Ministry of Defense

Three active forums are currently addressing corruption issues within the MOD: the Counter Corruption Working Group, the Senior High Level Committee on Anti-Corruption, and the Senior Leader Counter Corruption Panel.

According to DOD, despite anticorruption rhetoric at all levels, the MOD has pursued few corruption cases without Coalition prompting. The Afghan government rarely prosecutes senior MOD officials involved in corruption and often allows those accused to retire instead. DOD has observed administrative and technical capacity improvements across MOD anticorruption bodies; however, insufficient Afghan government political will and support has reduced the effectiveness of these anticorruption bodies.⁵⁷⁰

Ministry of Interior

The executive-level anticorruption Transparency, Accountability, and Law Enforcement (TALE) Committee, chaired by the MOI Inspector General (MOI IG), has met three times since its establishment. According to DOD, this committee enjoyed the full support of the MOI IG and is an effective forum for cross-coordination and development of anticorruption policy recommendations. In addition to the executive-level TALE committee, MOI has recently established province- and multi-province zonal-level TALE committees.⁵⁷¹

HUMAN RIGHTS

This quarter, State released its annual country report on human-rights practices in Afghanistan. According to State, the most significant human-rights problems in 2015 were widespread violence, including indiscriminate attacks on civilians by armed insurgent groups; armed insurgent groups' killings of persons affiliated with the government; torture and abuse of detainees by government forces; widespread disregard for the rule of law and little accountability for those who committed human-rights abuses; and targeted violence of and endemic societal discrimination against women and girls. Other human-rights problems included extrajudicial killings by security forces; ineffective government investigations of abuse and torture by local security forces; poor prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention, including of women accused of so-called moral crimes; prolonged pretrial detention; judicial corruption and ineffectiveness; violations of privacy rights; restrictions on freedom of speech, press, religion, and movement; pervasive governmental corruption; underage and forced marriages; abuse of children, including sexual abuse; trafficking in persons; discrimination against persons with disabilities; discrimination and abuses against ethnic minorities; societal discrimination based on race, religion, gender,

sexual orientation, and HIV/AIDS status; and abuse of worker rights, including forced labor and child labor.⁵⁷²

State also found widespread disregard for the rule of law and official impunity for those who committed human-rights abuses. The Afghan government did not consistently or effectively prosecute abuses by officials, including security forces.⁵⁷³

Refugees and Internal Displacement

According to the Afghan Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation, in 2015 approximately 180,000 Afghans left the country to seek asylum in Europe. In January, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) interviewed 191 Afghans arriving in Greece: 71% cited conflict and violence as their reason for leaving Afghanistan; 55% said they had been internally displaced before leaving; 19% said they were born in Iran and had not lived in Afghanistan.⁵⁷⁴

In an interview with BBC News, President Ghani said that he has “no sympathy” for Afghan refugees who have chosen to leave Afghanistan “under the slightest pressure.” President Ghani said that those leaving include members of Afghanistan’s educated elite who, by leaving, have broken the social contract with the state.⁵⁷⁵

The Minister of Refugees and Repatriation, Sayed Hussain Alemi Balkhi, speaking before the upper house of parliament, reported that more than 250,000 Afghans sought asylum in Europe in 2015 but that approximately 40% would likely not be accepted. Balkhi took credit for preventing the expulsion of at least 100,000 Afghan refugees and said he had reached an agreement with European countries to prevent the forced deportation of asylum seekers.⁵⁷⁶

The Afghan Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation said 300,000 Afghans were forcibly returned from Iran and Pakistan in 2015. In January, UNHCR recorded only 325 Afghans voluntarily repatriated to Afghanistan. According to State, harsh winter weather, combined with the news of insecurity and lack of livelihood opportunities in Afghanistan, have slowed refugee repatriation.⁵⁷⁷

State has previously reported that many returned refugees felt pressured to return to Afghanistan due to reported arrests, detention, extortion, and harassment by local Pakistani authorities following the December 2014 Peshawar school attacks and the Pakistani security response.⁵⁷⁸ Despite State and UNHCR concerns of increased harassment and uncertainty for the 1.5 million Afghan refugees holding temporarily extended proof of registration cards in Pakistan, there has been no statistical increase in detentions or recorded deportations of Afghans holding these temporary cards.⁵⁷⁹

As of November 2015, UNHCR recorded a total of 1,116,546 conflict-affected internally displaced persons. Most of the displaced left insecure rural areas and small towns seeking relative safety and government services

GOVERNANCE

in larger towns and cities of the same province.⁵⁸⁰ Between January 1 and March 31, the United Nations recorded 81,445 individuals fled their homes due to conflict. The provinces that have produced the highest number of displaced people are Baghlan (with over 25,000 displaced), followed by Uruzgan (over 12,000), Helmand (over 9,000), Kunduz (over 6,000), and Kandahar (nearly 5,000).⁵⁸¹

Gender

The largest gender-focused initiative in USAID's history is the Promote partnership that aims to assist over 75,000 Afghan women in achieving leadership roles over five years in all parts of society, including business, academia, politics, and public policy.⁵⁸² As shown in Table 3.21, USAID has committed \$216 million to Promote and hopes to raise an additional \$200 million from other international donors.⁵⁸³ However, no other donors have committed to contribute funds to Promote.⁵⁸⁴

TABLE 3.21

USAID GENDER PROGRAMS				
Project Title	Start Date	End Date	Total Estimated Cost (\$)	Cumulative Disbursements, as of 3/31/2016 (\$)
Afghan Women's Leadership in the Economy	7/1/2015	6/30/2020	\$71,571,543	\$4,123,909
Women's Leadership Development	9/23/2014	9/22/2019	41,959,377	9,268,803
Promote: Women in Government	4/21/2015	4/20/2020	37,997,644	3,435,533
Promote: Women's Rights Groups and Coalitions	9/2/2015	9/1/2020	29,534,401	1,258,515
Promote: Economic Empowerment of Women in Afghanistan	5/8/2015	5/7/2018	1,500,000	300,000
Promote: Scholarships	3/4/2015	3/3/2020	1,247,522	1,247,522

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/10/2016.

This quarter, Promote's Women in Government (WIG) program began a pilot program for 25 interns at the Afghanistan Civil Service Institute. WIG has also selected 200 interns for the next tranche of trainings.⁵⁸⁵ According to a memorandum of understanding negotiated between the WIG and the Afghanistan Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC), the Afghan government will recognize WIG internship experience as equivalent to one year full-time job experience in the Afghan civil service. Additionally, IARCSC will instruct other Afghan government ministries and agencies to consider WIG internship graduates as priority recruits for vacant civil service positions.⁵⁸⁶

In February, USAID modified the Promote Women in the Economy (WIE) program by adding an extra activity to the WIE program, the placement of 7,500 interns or apprentices under President Ghani's Afghan Jobs Now initiative. Afghan Jobs Now's goal is to create paid apprenticeships for and enhance job skills of women, boost the Afghanistan economy by providing Afghan firms with temporary subsidized labor, and engender a sense of

social responsibility across public- and private-sectors around the issues of youth and women's unemployment. This modification will increase WIE's current target of 2,000 internships to include an additional 7,500 apprenticeships before January 2018, bringing the total number of planned WIE internships and apprenticeships to 9,500.⁵⁸⁷ USAID reports that WIE has placed 20 women in full-time jobs and 97 interns with employers in health-care, information and communications technology, media, education and other private sector industries.⁵⁸⁸

The SMAF includes several short-term deliverables related to women's rights, including the requirement for a national action plan for women peace-and-security implementation and financing plan approved by the end of 2015, with implementation starting by mid-2016; an anti-harassment regulation for improving working environments for public-sector women, to be issued by mid-2016; and dedicated violence-against-women prosecution units established in 26 provinces by December 2016.⁵⁸⁹



First Lady of Afghanistan Rula Ghani speaks during a USAID-sponsored graduation ceremony in Kabul. (USAID photo)

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ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

As of March 31, 2016, the U.S. government has provided nearly \$31.8 billion to support governance and economic and social development in Afghanistan. Most of these funds—nearly \$18.6 billion—were appropriated to the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Economic Support Fund. Of this amount, \$17.1 billion has been obligated and \$14.2 billion has been disbursed.⁵⁹⁰ The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2016, provided additional funding for the Economic Support Fund, but the total amount designated for Afghanistan will not be known until the State Department (State) completes the fiscal year (FY) 2016 congressional notification process.

KEY EVENTS

Several events this quarter are likely to affect Afghanistan’s prospects for economic and social development:

- The *Wolesi Jirga*, Afghanistan’s lower house of parliament, approved the FY 1395 national budget (December 22, 2015–December 21, 2016) on January 18, 2016.⁵⁹¹ The 444.6 billion afghani (AFN) budget (\$6.5 billion)—a 1.9% increase over FY 1394—includes AFN 276.1 billion (\$4.0 billion) for the operating budget and AFN 168.6 billion (\$2.5 billion) for the development budget.⁵⁹²
- Domestic revenues collected in FY 1394 rose 22.9% above FY 1393, covering 38.8% of total expenditures. Expenditures increased 5.9% compared to FY 1393.⁵⁹³
- International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff met Afghan officials to discuss the second and final Staff-Monitored Program (SMP) review, which ran April–December 2015. The Afghan government hopes its reform efforts lead to a more formal IMF financial program like an Extended Credit Facility arrangement.⁵⁹⁴

ECONOMIC PROFILE

The World Bank estimated Afghanistan’s real (net of inflation) gross domestic product (GDP), excluding opium, to have grown 1.5% in 2015, with weak

“The impact of simultaneous political, economic and security transitions has been slow to diminish. Persistently low rates of economic growth, high unemployment and rising levels of conflict-related displacement and civilian casualties have exacted a heavy cost on the population and fueled an increasingly vocal political opposition.”

Source: UN, Report of the Secretary-General, *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, 3/7/2016, p. 15.

domestic demand due to high political uncertainty and worsened security environment. It expects a slow recovery over the next three years with Afghan economic-growth prospects dependent on stronger government progress on reforms, political stabilization, and improved security. Private investment remained flat in 2015, according to the World Bank, reflecting Afghanistan's risky market conditions and uncertain political situation.⁵⁹⁵

Agriculture, the second largest driver of Afghanistan's economy behind services, declined by an estimated 2% in 2015, according to the World Bank.⁵⁹⁶ Agricultural output and income, though, fluctuate with the weather, so economic growth based on this sector is necessarily volatile.⁵⁹⁷ Meanwhile, industry and services, all of which benefitted from the Coalition's large presence, security spending, and aid flows, have grown at the slowest pace since 2013.⁵⁹⁸

Lower foreign-military spending has reduced demand for goods and services, leading to tens of thousands of jobs lost. Although the Afghan government is working with the IMF and other donors on long-term economic reforms, it reported that the country is suffering from a major economic downturn. Meanwhile, the strength of the insurgency has caused the government to spend more on the military and less on job-creating investments.⁵⁹⁹

Consumer prices dropped by a World Bank-estimated average of 1.5% in 2015, compared to a 1.4% rise in 2014. This was attributed to weak economic activity, declining global food and fuel prices, and waning domestic demand.⁶⁰⁰ The World Bank said this deflationary pressure on Afghanistan's economy was being offset by the inflationary pressure of their currency, the afghani, depreciating against the U.S. dollar. Exchange-rate depreciation would normally cause higher consumer prices for an import-dependent nation like Afghanistan, but this was offset by declining global prices.⁶⁰¹

“The continued decline in the economic growth rate is a cause for serious concern. While it is encouraging that government measures to increase revenue mobilization have shown results, fiscal pressures are expected to continue.”

Afghanistan's Fiscal Outlook

Afghanistan's fiscal vulnerability remains high, according to the World Bank, and will require a large increase in revenues and sustained levels of aid. Its medium-term economic outlook is “unfavorable.”⁶⁰² While domestic revenues have increased, the World Bank said security costs have grown beyond donors' initial projections.⁶⁰³ Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) costs were estimated at \$5.4 billion in FY 2015, of which the United States paid \$4.1 billion. FY 2016 costs are projected to be \$5 billion.⁶⁰⁴ Other donors and Afghan funds cover the gap between U.S. payments and total costs. United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon reported that when donors meet later this year, “it will be important that discussions reflect the fiscal impact of security sector spending on the Afghan government's contribution to development outcomes.”⁶⁰⁵

The 2012 NATO summit in Chicago predicted Afghanistan's contribution to ANDSF costs would be at least \$500 million in 2015.⁶⁰⁶ Afghanistan did not achieve this in 2015 if its cost share is denominated in dollars; it did if

Source: UN, Report of the Secretary-General, *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, 3/7/2016, p. 16.

denominated in afghanis (AFN).⁶⁰⁷ At the time of the summit, Afghanistan's \$500 million commitment was equivalent to about AFN 23 billion, which is what the government budgeted for in 2015. However, the AFN's significant depreciation would have required the government to spend 24% more to reach its 2015 ANDSF commitment in dollar terms. Afghanistan's target ANDSF contribution for 2016 is AFN 25 billion—approximately 18.7% of expected revenues.⁶⁰⁸

FY 1394 Revenues and Expenditures—Final

Total collected domestic revenues—a figure that excludes donor grants—stood at 123.4 billion AFN (\$1.8 billion) in FY 1394, about 22.9% above FY 1393. The Afghan government exceeded its revenue target.⁶⁰⁹ Still, domestic revenues paid for less than half (38.8%) of Afghanistan's total budget expenditures of AFN 318.3 billion (\$4.6 billion); donor contributions made up the difference. Afghan government expenditures in FY 1394 increased by AFN 17.7 billion (by 5.9% or \$258.8 million in current dollars) compared to FY 1393.⁶¹⁰

A fiscal gap can widen or shrink, depending on variables including budget-execution rates, donor grants received, qualification for donor incentive funds, revenue collection, and changing expenditures.⁶¹¹ Afghanistan's fiscal gap is large, with donor assistance narrowing or closing it, as depicted in Figure 3.31 on the following page. Based on Afghan treasury documentation, in FY 1394, Afghanistan had an AFN 194.9 billion (\$2.8 billion) total budget deficit against domestic revenues; donor contributions reduced that deficit to AFN 14.7 billion (\$214.4 million). The operating budget, which includes recurring costs such as public-sector payroll, would have had an AFN 113.0 billion (\$1.6 billion) deficit if not for donor assistance, which produced an AFN 9.8 billion (\$143.3 million) surplus. Without donor assistance, the development budget would have had an AFN 81.9 billion (\$1.2 billion) deficit. After donor funds, the deficit was reduced to AFN 24.5 billion (\$357.8 million).⁶¹²

In April 2016, the World Bank reported that the FY 1394 budget deficit was reduced to approximately \$150 million, largely due to nondiscretionary donor grant disbursements being recorded after the fiscal year closed, and not representing an actual financing gap.⁶¹³

FY 1395 Budget Approved

The Wolesi Jirga, Afghanistan's lower house of parliament, approved the FY 1395 national budget (December 22, 2015–December 21, 2016) on January 18, 2016.⁶¹⁴ The AFN 444.6 billion (\$6.5 billion) budget—a 1.9% increase over FY 1394—includes AFN 276.1 billion (\$4.0 billion) for the operating budget and AFN 168.6 billion (\$2.5 billion) for the development budget. Expenditures will focus on security (40% of the total budget), infrastructure (20%), education (13%), agriculture (7%), and health (5%).⁶¹⁵

Donor funding commitments made at the 2012 Chicago summit were for ANDSF only, which comprises the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. Afghanistan's other security-related expenditures—the National Directorate of Security and the Presidential Protective Service, for example—are funded through other means.


Source: DOD, *Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, 12/2015, p. 79.

Donors are expected to finance approximately 68% of Afghanistan's FY 1395 national budget, mostly through grants. This covers approximately 55% of the operating budget and 89% of the development budget.

Source: MOF, *National Budget Document, 1395 Fiscal Year*, 1/18/2016.

FIGURE 3.31

AFGHANISTAN'S DOMESTIC REVENUES AND DONOR GRANTS COMPARED TO OPERATING AND DEVELOPMENT BUDGET EXPENDITURES (AFN MILLIONS)



Note: Until recently, Afghan fiscal years ran approximately March 20 to March 20 of Gregorian consecutive calendar years. Nine-month data for fiscal year 1391 reflect a change in the timing of the Afghan fiscal year. Afghan fiscal years now generally run December 22 through December 21 of the following year. Grants represent funds received from donors. Donor grants are often for specific projects or activities, but can sometimes be spent at GIROA's discretion.

Source: MOF, *Qaws Financial Statements FY 1394*, 2/27/2016; MOF, *Dalwa Financial Statements FY 1395*, 3/5/2016; MOF, "Annual Fiscal Report 1393," 3/12/2015; MOF, "1394 National Budget," 1/28/2015; MOF, "1393 National Budget," 2/1/2014.

From 2012 through 2014, Afghanistan had the lowest total government revenue as a percentage of GDP—an average of 8.3%—of all South Asian economies. Afghan revenues improved to 10.6% of GDP in 2015, according to the World Bank.

Source: ADB, *Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2015*, 10/2015, p. 348; World Bank, *South Asia Economic Focus, Spring 2016*, 4/10/2016, p. 22.

The Afghan government projected domestic revenues to reach approximately AFN 133.5 billion (\$1.9 billion) in FY 1395, about 8.2% more than collected in FY 1394.⁶¹⁶ It is relying on new taxes, increased tax rates, customs duties, and other fees to accomplish this.⁶¹⁷ Additionally, the budget assumed a 4.4% GDP growth rate in FY 1395 even though the growth estimate in FY 1394 was revised down to 1.9%.⁶¹⁸

FY 1395 Revenues and Expenditures: First Two Months

Total collected domestic revenues, excluding donor grants, stood at AFN 20.9 billion (\$304.2 million) in the first two months of FY 1395, representing a net surplus of AFN 1.7 billion (\$24.9 million). With donor contributions, the budget surplus was AFN 22.9 billion (\$333.6 million).⁶¹⁹

International Monetary Fund Staff-Monitored Program

IMF staff and Afghan officials met February 24–March 4 to discuss the second and final IMF Staff-Monitored Program review. The results were similar to the first review: IMF staff deemed Afghanistan’s performance “satisfactory,” with downwardly revised quantitative targets achieved and progress made on structural benchmarks.⁶²⁰ Political and security uncertainties hurt economic activity, and the deteriorating security environment complicated implementation efforts. The Afghan government hopes its reform efforts lead to a more formal IMF financial program like an Extended Credit Facility arrangement.⁶²¹

The SMP ran April–December 2015.⁶²² Successful completion of an SMP can encourage donor assistance and give the IMF staff confidence that the national authorities will meet their obligations under a more formal program like an Extended Credit Facility arrangement. Afghanistan’s poor record with its previous Extended Credit Facility, which expired in November 2014, caused previous program reviews to be suspended.⁶²³

Trade

Afghanistan’s trade balance—negative \$8.1 billion (equivalent to 39.6% of GDP) in 2014 and an estimated negative \$8.4 billion (equivalent to 39.2% of GDP) in 2015—is unsustainable, and shows an urgent need for an environment that promotes domestic and foreign investment.⁶²⁴ The Afghan government pledged to simplify the visa process and work to identify ways to “expedite, rather than impede exports.” The government aims to increase the number of border crossings, develop dry ports to advance trade and transit agreements, and increase customs cooperation.⁶²⁵

Export and Import Data

Although Afghanistan routinely sustains a large trade deficit, donor aid helped the country maintain an IMF-projected current-account balance surplus equivalent to 4.5% of GDP—about \$872 million—in 2015. Without it, the IMF estimates Afghanistan would have a current-account deficit equivalent to 38.9% of its GDP—about \$7.9 billion. This estimate is \$416 million (or 32.3%) lower than Afghanistan’s 2014 current account.⁶²⁶

During 2013–2014, Afghanistan exported \$3.2 billion to \$4 billion worth of goods and services annually, but was estimated to export only \$2.6 billion in 2015, not including illicit narcotics, according to the IMF.⁶²⁷ Unsurprisingly, IMF staff said that Afghanistan needs to increase and diversify its exports, which will stimulate innovation and good management.⁶²⁸ During 2013–2014, Afghanistan imported between \$10.8 billion and \$11.3 billion worth of goods and services annually. The IMF estimated Afghanistan’s 2015 imports at more than \$10.6 billion of goods and services, with about \$8.8 billion paid for by official donor grants.⁶²⁹

“The principal connection between the Afghan economy and the rest of the world are donor inflows. These inflows finance most imports and dwarf (licit) exports.”

Source: IMF, *Staff Report for the 2015 Article IV Consultation and the First Review Under the Staff-Monitored Program*, 11/3/2015, p. 13.

Afghanistan Trade and Revenue Project

USAID's four-year, \$77.8 million Afghanistan Trade and Revenue (ATAR) project is a trade-facilitation program designed to (1) improve trade-liberalization policies, including support for Afghanistan's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO); (2) improve and streamline the government's ability to generate revenue by modernizing Afghanistan's customs institutions and practices; and (3) facilitate bilateral and multilateral regional trade agreements.⁶³⁰ To achieve sustainable economic growth, job creation, enhanced delivery of government services, and fiscal sustainability, ATAR assumes that the Afghan government will carry out its commitments to reform, and that a stable security environment will allow the private sector to take advantage of an improved business climate.⁶³¹

On December 17, 2015, WTO trade ministers approved terms for Afghanistan's accession to the organization. Afghanistan has until June 30, 2016, to ratify the deal.⁶³² The Cabinet of Ministers approved the accession package, but it has not yet been submitted to parliament. Once parliament ratifies it, President Ghani will be required to sign it. Meanwhile, ATAR reported that the cabinet approved WTO reform laws on food safety and copyrights, and amendments to the regulation on drafting procedure and processing of legal acts. Additionally, the Council of Ministers' legislative committee approved a law on protecting trade and industry secrets, and the Minister of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock agreed to proceed with the law on plant-variety protection.⁶³³

Also this quarter, ATAR helped Afghanistan strengthen regional trade ties. Afghan produce traders signed contracts worth \$2.38 million at the Gulfood Exhibition in Dubai, and ATAR assisted the Afghan delegation in the sixth Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Coordination Authority meeting where both sides agreed to better facilitate trade.⁶³⁴

BANKING AND FINANCE

The World Bank said access to finance remains low and is a major constraint to Afghan economic growth. Only 5.7% of Afghan firms are reported to have a bank loan, and only 2% use banks to finance investments.⁶³⁵

Less than 10% of the Afghan population uses banks, according to a State Department report, with approximately 90% of financial transactions going through the informal money services businesses (MSB)/*hawala* system. There is no clear division between MSBs/*hawala* and formal banking systems—*hawaladars* keep bank accounts and use wire-transfer services, while banks occasionally use *hawalas* to transmit funds to remote areas in Afghanistan. MSBs and *hawaladars*, which account for a substantial portion of illegal proceeds moving through Afghanistan's financial system, are generally not as closely scrutinized by the Afghan government as formal financial institutions.⁶³⁶

The IMF reported that lax governance and regulatory enforcement in early 2014 caused the financial positions of some Afghan banks to deteriorate; two were characterized as being in “hazardous condition.” Afghan authorities, with donor and IMF assistance, began to address banking vulnerabilities in 2015, but reforms are not progressing as quickly as anticipated. The IMF said all weak Afghan banks were subject to enforcement actions in 2015, notably two vulnerable publicly unidentified banks.⁶³⁷

U.S. Treasury Assistance

The U.S. Treasury’s Office of Technical Assistance (OTA) continued implementing its March 2015 agreement to develop technical assistance and capacity-building programs for Afghanistan’s Ministry of Finance (MOF). On March 17, 2016, USAID agreed to fund OTA programs to help Afghanistan with budgets, banking, and revenues. Funding negotiations continued with the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement for OTA assistance to help Afghanistan combat economic crimes.⁶³⁸

OTA has conducted six assessment missions to Afghanistan, the most recent of which was March 12–19, focused on revenue generation. OTA expects to support the creation of an Afghanistan Revenue Department custom and tax academy, including help with curriculum design, course delivery, and course materials.⁶³⁹

Money Laundering

This quarter, the State Department again listed Afghanistan as a major money-laundering country whose financial institutions either engage in, or are vulnerable to, transactions involving significant criminal proceeds, all of which “continue to pose serious threats to the security and development of Afghanistan.” Narcotics, corruption, and contract fraud are major sources of the country’s illegal revenues and laundered funds. Afghanistan has weak or nonexistent supervisory and enforcement regimes, and weak political will to combat corruption.⁶⁴⁰

Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism Deficiencies

A March 2016 State Department report said Afghanistan’s laws were largely in line with international standards, but are still deficient, with implementing regulations lacking clarity and effectiveness. For example, although asset-seizure authority exists, there is no asset-recovery mechanism in place and no specific Afghan entity is responsible for recoveries. Customs regulations do not specify what should be done in cases of suspected money laundering/terrorist financing. Cargo is often exempted from any screening or inspection due to corruption at the official border crossings and customs depots, and most border areas are underpoliced or not policed. Moreover, Kabul International Airport lacks stringent currency inspection controls for

all passengers: it has a VIP lane that allows certain passengers to avoid any inspections or controls.⁶⁴¹

Financial Action Task Force

At its most recent plenary session in Paris, February 17–19, 2016, the **Financial Action Task Force** (FATF) chose to keep Afghanistan on its “Improving Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) Global Compliance” document, also known as the “gray list.” This means that while Afghanistan has strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, its government has developed an action plan, made a high-level political commitment to address those deficiencies, and is making progress.⁶⁴²

FATF said Afghanistan has improved its AML/CFT administration since it last met in October 2015 by amending its regulations to detect cross-border transportation of cash and bearer-negotiable instruments. FATF urged Afghanistan to further implement its legal framework for identifying, tracing, and freezing terrorist assets; implement an adequate AML/CFT oversight program for all financial sectors; and further establish and implement effective controls for cross-border cash transactions.⁶⁴³

Treasury previously explained that Afghanistan’s efforts to resolve deficiencies in its cross-border declaration system at airports are greatly hampered by general capacity limitations and resource challenges that are exacerbated at porous land borders in often fractious areas. Treasury was concerned about these deficiencies and Afghanistan’s implementation of the legal framework for freezing terrorist assets.⁶⁴⁴ This is the sixth consecutive FATF review in which Afghanistan has maintained this status since being downgraded to the “dark gray” list in February 2014.⁶⁴⁵

Kabul Bank Theft Accountability

Under the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework, the basis for donor support to Afghanistan until September 2015, the Afghan government was required to take all possible steps to recover more assets stolen from Kabul Bank. However, the current basis for support, the Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework, has no such provision.⁶⁴⁶ U.S. Embassy Kabul officials do, however, routinely urge Afghan officials to make progress in the Kabul Bank case.⁶⁴⁷

The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) said Afghan authorities have not adequately or effectively adhered to the rule of law regarding the Kabul Bank judgment.⁶⁴⁸ This quarter, the Kabul Bank Receivership (KBR) faced continuing difficulty convincing debtors to pay interest on amounts owed, found an increasing number of debtors defaulting on their required payments, and saw cases it had referred to the Attorney General’s Office languishing. No court actions were reported to State this quarter.⁶⁴⁹ The KBR also suffered a setback in its efforts to impose forfeiture and liquidation on debtor properties in Dubai when a Dubai appellate court negated

Financial Action Task Force: an intergovernmental policy-making body that sets standards and promotes effective implementation of legal, regulatory, and operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing, and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system. Its 36 members include the United States, United Kingdom, Switzerland, and the European Union; observers include the United Nations and the Asian Development Bank.

Source: Financial Action Task Force website, “Who We Are,” and “Members and Observers,” accessed 1/3/2016.

President Ghani this quarter requested SIGAR’s assistance with his government’s efforts to repatriate funds stolen from Kabul Bank. SIGAR was asked to participate in a new task force President Ghani plans to create that will include the Ministry of Finance, the Attorney General’s Office, and the Kabul Bank Asset Recovery Commission. Special Inspector General Sopko was told that SIGAR would have full access to relevant banking and financial records.

lower-court decisions to freeze several properties.⁶⁵⁰ For more accountability challenges, see pp. 143–146 in the SIGAR January 2016 *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*.

Cash and Asset Recoveries

The Kabul Bank Receivership informed the State Department that total recoveries stand at \$443.5 million as of February 29, 2016. This figure comprises cash recoveries, forgiven Kabul Bank debts, and assets recovered or seized, as well as the amount still owed by 12 major debtors who signed loan-repayment agreements in 2015. Total recoveries are \$126 million lower than reported last quarter after the receivership recategorized convicted ex-Kabul Bank chief executive Khalilullah Ferozi's debt as still outstanding. KBR officials do not expect Ferozi to adhere to his repayment agreement since he was rejailed following public opposition to the release that allowed him to participate in the government-backed "Smart City" Kabul land-development project. KBR calculated the outstanding loan portfolio at \$543.5 million.⁶⁵¹

Farnood and Ferozi Repayments

The Afghan government has been unable to compel full repayment from convicted ex-Kabul Bank chairman Sherkhan Farnood and Ferozi, both of whom remain in jail full-time, as of March 31, 2016.⁶⁵² Last quarter, SIGAR noted a discrepancy between the higher amounts that the court ordered Farnood and Ferozi to pay and the lower amounts the KBR reported it is collecting against.⁶⁵³ This quarter, the KBR explained that the courts did not have the final audit reports when calculating the amounts owed by each convicted debtor.⁶⁵⁴

Farnood is said to have paid back approximately \$62 million in cash—not quite 15% of his \$417 million obligation—as well as \$18.2 million in other assets. According to the KBR, Farnood still owes \$336.8 million (no change from last quarter).⁶⁵⁵


KBR has reportedly collected approximately \$10.1 million from Ferozi—about 7.4% of his \$137.2 million obligation. Ferozi previously had pledged \$127 million in collateral assets, which the KBR considered a recovery, but, as already noted, officials do not expect Ferozi to adhere to his repayment agreement now that he is back in jail.⁶⁵⁶

U.S. ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT

Most assistance from the Economic Support Fund goes toward USAID's development programs. In September 2015, USAID published an updated Performance Management Plan to guide and measure its development objectives, and to articulate its development strategy through 2018. The plan will be reviewed at least annually and updated as necessary.⁶⁵⁷ Figure 3.32 on the following page shows USAID assistance by sector.

FIGURE 3.32

USAID DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, CUMULATIVE DISBURSEMENTS, AS OF MARCH 31, 2016
(\$ MILLIONS)



Note: Numbers rounded. Agriculture programs include Alternative Development. Infrastructure programs include power, roads, extractives, and other programs that built health and education facilities.

*Unpreferenced funds are U.S. contributions to the ARTF that can be used for any ARTF-supported initiatives.

Source: SIGAR analysis of USAID response to SIGAR data call, 4/11/2016; SIGAR analysis of World Bank, ARTF, Administrator's Report on Financial Status, as of February 19, 2016, accessed 4/12/2016.

None of the three lapis lazuli mines in Afghanistan, all in Badakhshan Province, had a valid license from the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum, as of August 2015.

Source: UN, *Sixth Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team*, 8/26/2015.

Development of Natural Resources

Minister of Mines and Petroleum Daud Shah Saba resigned on March 28, 2016.⁶⁵⁸ As this report went to press, it was unconfirmed whether President Ghani had accepted his resignation.

Ghani has listed mining as one of the Afghanistan's most important economic assets. So far, however, mining has contributed only slightly to the country's GDP.⁶⁵⁹ Actual receipts in FY 1394 were only about 38% of the budget projection.⁶⁶⁰ In the first two months of FY 1395, actual receipts were AFN 49.5 million compared to AFN 171.5 million in the same period last year (71% lower).⁶⁶¹

This quarter, Afghanistan's Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) seized almost 100 tons of illegally mined lapis lazuli gemstones—the sales of which can now flow through the legal economy—and made numerous arrests.⁶⁶² Afghanistan is the largest source of the world's lapis lazuli, but the Afghan government made mining it illegal in 2015.⁶⁶³ The State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement reported that generally, there appears to be no political will in Afghanistan's attorney general's office to prosecute MCTF cases.⁶⁶⁴

Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability

USAID's Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS) program aims to strengthen the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (MOMP) and relevant private-sector entity capacities to exploit

Afghanistan's natural resources in accordance with international standards.⁶⁶⁵ This quarter, MIDAS was extended to March 2017 and has been rescoped to provide technical assistance and transaction advisory services to the MOMP in its effort to either cancel or renegotiate some or all of the 339 existing contracts.⁶⁶⁶

Also this quarter, MIDAS legal advisors helped the MOMP create a request for proposal for a Herat cement project, the first MIDAS-supported mineral solicitation; helped the MOMP prepare a response to the Hajigak iron-ore tender winner, which is seeking to transfer its negotiating rights to another firm; reviewed chromite contracts for compliance with Afghan law; and helped advise the MOMP in Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline negotiations. Other MIDAS advisors continued training Afghan Geological Survey staff on geological mapping, data management and analysis, and geophysics.⁶⁶⁷ MIDAS and USAID's other extractives-assistance programs are listed in Table 3.22.

TABLE 3.22

USAID EXTRACTIVES-ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS				
Project Title	Start Date	End Date	Total Estimated Cost (\$)	Cumulative Disbursements, as of 3/31/2016 (\$)
Sheberghan Gas Generation Activity (SGGA)	12/21/2011	7/31/2016	\$30,440,958	\$25,293,239
Sheberghan Gas Development Project (SGDP)	5/15/2012	8/31/2016	90,000,000	21,895,875
Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS)	3/31/2013	3/30/2017	50,096,175	27,215,727

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/11/2016.

Hydrocarbons

Afghanistan's efforts to develop its oil and gas reserves focus on the Amu Darya Basin and Afghan-Tajik Basin, both in northern Afghanistan.⁶⁶⁸

Afghanistan has only small-scale topping plants—early-stage refineries that can process only limited petroleum components of crude oil—and remains heavily dependent on fuel imports.⁶⁶⁹ The country imports 10,000 tons of oil products a day from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Russia, Pakistan, and Iran, representing roughly one-fourth of all annual Afghan imports, or approximately \$1.5 billion.⁶⁷⁰

Sheberghan Programs

The Sheberghan gas fields hold the potential for cheap natural-gas-generated power that could be competitive with imported power from Uzbekistan, according to the World Bank.⁶⁷¹ USAID is supporting the Sheberghan project to help Afghanistan identify and manage gas resources to be used for power generation through two mechanisms: (1) the \$90 million, on-budget Sheberghan Gas Development Project to rehabilitate and drill wells in the Amu Darya Basin and fund a gas-gathering system and gas-processing plant; and (2) the \$30.4 million, off-budget Sheberghan Gas

Generation Activity (SGGA) for capacity building and technical assistance to the MOMP.⁶⁷²

Drilling activities in the Juma and Bashikurd gas wells were completed, and core sample testing showed better-than-predicted commercial prospects. Construction for a gas processing plant has not yet started.⁶⁷³ A contract for evaluating data and reserve estimates for up to seven Sheberghan gas fields was signed this quarter, and SGGA began uploading gas field data to the awardee. Additionally, SGGA is evaluating six request-for-proposal responses it received for its public-private partnership solicitation.⁶⁷⁴

AGRICULTURE

Agriculture continues to be the main source of employment and subsistence for the Afghan population, accounting for about 25% of GDP, employing more than 50% of the labor force, and affecting 75% of Afghans who depend on agricultural activities for their livelihoods.⁶⁷⁵ USAID believes agriculture can stimulate and sustain Afghan-led economic growth. USAID's agricultural projects focus on wheat, high-value horticultural crops, and livestock, and aim to help farmers improve their output and sales through new technology, management practices, and the cultivation of key high-value crops, while also focusing on improving natural-resource management, and creating or rehabilitating irrigation and drainage systems.⁶⁷⁶

This quarter, USAID solicited a \$95 million Strengthening Watershed and Irrigation Management (SWIM) project, which aims to improve agricultural water use, resource management, and regulatory framework.⁶⁷⁷ Also, USAID provided \$24.5 million for the second phase of the World Bank-administered On-Farm Water Management Project, which aims to rehabilitate irrigation structures, develop standards and procedures for establishing irrigation associations, provide technical assistance, establish demonstration sites, and develop a draft irrigation-and-drainage law and an implementation plan.⁶⁷⁸

Since 2002, USAID has disbursed approximately \$2 billion to improve agricultural production, increase access to markets, and develop income alternatives to growing poppy.⁶⁷⁹ Pages 133–136 of this quarterly report discuss USAID's alternative-development programs. A list of all active USAID agriculture programs is found in Table 3.23.

Agricultural Credit Enhancement II

The Agricultural Credit Enhancement (ACE) II project is the technical-assistance/advisory support component of the conditions-based Agricultural Development Fund (ADF) that is administered by the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock. ADF extends agriculture-related credit access to small- and medium-sized farms and agribusinesses in all

TABLE 3.23

USAID ACTIVE AGRICULTURE PROGRAMS				
Project Title	Start Date	End Date	Total Estimated Cost (\$)	Cumulative Disbursements, as of 3/31/2016 (\$)
Afghanistan Agriculture Extension Project II (AAEP-II)	10/1/2014	9/30/2017	\$19,814,702	\$9,334,341
Agriculture Credit Enhancement II (ACE II)	6/24/2015	6/23/2018	18,234,849	2,686,533
Capacity Building and Change Management Program II (CBCMP II)	7/10/2014	7/9/2017	19,999,989	11,998,874
Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWSNET) Phase III	12/29/2011	12/28/2016	11,340,000	4,420,553
Strengthening Afghan Agricultural Faculties (SAAF)	3/25/2011	12/31/2016	7,824,209	6,634,603
Mothers and Under-Five Nutrition and Child Health (MUNCH)	12/16/2014	12/31/2016	5,000,000	5,000,000
SERVIR	9/14/2015	9/30/2020	3,100,000	-

Note: Some of the USAID programs listed receive both Alternative Development and Agriculture Development funds. For more information on Alternative Development programs, see Table 3.15 on p. 134 of this report.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/11/2016.

regional economic zones, particularly to those that add value to agricultural products, such as distributors, producers, processors, and exporters.⁶⁸⁰

On April 5, USAID announced ACE II will further support ADF by providing \$3 million in loans to each of two financial institutions to expand their lending to farmers and small- and medium-size agribusinesses in Jalalabad, Kunduz, and Bamiyan Provinces. USAID reported that with ACE II help, ADF has cumulatively provided more than \$67 million in credit to over 32,000 beneficiaries.⁶⁸¹

This quarter, the ACE II helped ADF develop its five-year financial projections, which formed part of ADF's business plan that was discussed at the ADF High Council meeting in January. ACE II also prepared papers on key ADF risks, ADF's current legal status, and its leadership succession plans, and provided input on ways to expand credit to small agricultural producers. ACE II also began designing a research plan to measure the impact of agricultural credit at household and community levels, and to evaluate all overdue loans to identify causes for delinquency.⁶⁸²

ESSENTIAL SERVICES AND DEVELOPMENT

Since 2002, the United States has provided reconstruction funds to increase the electricity supply, build roads and bridges, and improve health and education in Afghanistan. This section addresses key developments in U.S. efforts to improve the government's ability to deliver these essential services.

Power Supply

Afghanistan has one of the lowest rates of electrification in the world, with an estimated 25–33% of Afghans connected to the power grid.⁶⁸³ Most parts

of urban areas like Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, and Mazar-e Sharif have 24-hour power, although power outages are not uncommon, but only 10% of the rural population have access to grid-connected power.⁶⁸⁴

Afghanistan imports approximately 81% of its total electricity.⁶⁸⁵ Electricity imports are expected to rise in the near term, according to the World Bank, which also noted that limited access to electricity is one of Afghanistan's biggest constraints to private-sector development.⁶⁸⁶ Afghanistan will need regional cooperation to meet its energy demands.⁶⁸⁷

U.S. Power Sector Assistance

Since 2002, USAID obligated more than \$2.7 billion to build generators, substations, and transmission lines, and provide technical assistance in the sector.⁶⁸⁸ USAID believes that economic expansion and increased employment depend on maintaining and improving Afghanistan's electrical infrastructure. It is helping Afghanistan's national electric utility, Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS), to increase electricity supply and revenue generation by improving sustainability, management, and commercial viability.⁶⁸⁹ For its part, the Department of Defense (DOD) has disbursed approximately \$183 million for power projects through the Commander's Emergency Response Program, as of July 2015, and roughly \$403.5 million through the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF), which is jointly managed by DOD and State.⁶⁹⁰

Afghanistan's two primary power systems are the **Northeast Power System (NEPS)** and the **Southeast Power System (SEPS)**. USAID projects to connect and increase the electricity supply in both systems include: (1) the Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity (PTEC) project to construct a transmission line connecting Kabul with Kandahar and build the capacity of DABS to sustain energy-infrastructure investments, (2) the Sheberghan Gas Development Project to attract private investment to develop gas resources in Sheberghan and build power plants, and (3) the now-concluded Kandahar-Helmand Power Project. The Kandahar-Helmand Power Project was intended to include installation of a third turbine at Kajaki Dam and improving the transmission system connecting Kajaki with Kandahar, but responsibility for those tasks was transitioned to DABS, along with a \$75 million USAID commitment, in April 2013.⁶⁹¹ USAID's active power-infrastructure projects are listed in Table 3.24.

NEPS: imports electricity from the Central Asian Republics to provide power to Kabul and the communities north of Kabul.

SEPS: draws most of its power from the Kajaki Dam and from diesel generators in Kandahar City to provide power in the Helmand and Kandahar areas.

Source: DOD, *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, 11/2013, p. 107.

Kajaki Dam–Unit 2

DABS continued its efforts to increase long-term, sustainable hydropower from Kajaki Dam to Kandahar and Helmand Provinces by installing a third turbine, known as Unit 2, in the powerhouse.⁶⁹² USAID is funding technical support, site security, life-support services, and helicopter support to DABS.⁶⁹³ USAID committed an additional \$5 million this quarter and extended the program five months to May 31, 2016.⁶⁹⁴

TABLE 3.24

USAID ACTIVE POWER-INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS				
Project Title	Start Date	End Date	Total Estimated Cost (\$)	Cumulative Disbursement, as of 3/31/2016 (\$)
Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity	1/1/2013	12/31/2018	\$725,000,000	\$84,260,062
Contributions to the Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund	3/7/2013	3/6/2018	113,670,184	113,000,000
Kajaki Dam Unit 2	4/22/2013	5/31/2016	80,000,000	38,916,173
Utility Executive Exchange	9/30/2007	9/30/2017	698,555	698,555
Afghan Engineering Support Program	11/9/2009	11/8/2016	97,000,000	74,812,071
PEER Grants	7/25/2011	7/24/2016	5,440,647	5,440,647
TBD (Unknown)	8/24/2015	8/24/2017	3,994,902	283,565

Note: The Sheberghan Gas Generation Activity (SGGA), Sheberghan Gas Development Project (SGDP), and Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS) programs, which are categorized under the power sector in USAID's funding pipeline report, are listed in the extractives-sector programs subsection on p. 178 of this report.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/11/2016.

DOD said ongoing fighting in Kandahar and Helmand Provinces continued to delay contractors at Kajaki Dam and some SEPS construction sites. Insurgent activity this quarter caused road closures along Route 611—the road between Sangin and Kajaki—delaying delivery of construction materials and possibly further affecting project completion schedules.⁶⁹⁵ USAID said all staff have returned to the dam, as of April 13. The turbine-installation completion date was revised to fall 2016, but is subject to change.⁶⁹⁶

Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity Program

The U.S.-funded PTEC program was designed to strengthen and expand Afghanistan's power-generation, transmission, and distribution systems, including funding the 320-mile transmission line between Kabul and Kandahar to connect NEPS with SEPS.⁶⁹⁷ PTEC's DABS commercialization and capacity-building components aim to help the utility become financially sustainable by increasing revenues using utility management software in Kabul, Mazar-e Sharif, Herat, and Jalalabad, while reducing technical and commercial losses through training and support.⁶⁹⁸

Construction has started on the transmission line and substations between Arghandi and Ghazni, the first segment of the NEPS-SEPS connector, which USAID sees as essential for power-sector development. Land acquisition and resettlement issues along the transmission line path continued to impact timelines, but construction is scheduled to be completed in December 2016. The Arghandi connector substation that will feed this line will not be ready until after December 2017. Alternatives to power the Arghandi-Ghazni project are under consideration.⁶⁹⁹ To date, \$46.2 million has been disbursed to PTEC contractors for this segment.⁷⁰⁰

USAID is providing \$350 million in direct assistance to DABS in support of the second segment of the NEPS-SEPS connector, Ghazni

SIGAR AUDIT

This quarter, SIGAR initiated an audit to examine U.S. government efforts to increase the supply, quantity, and distribution of electric power from the Kajaki Dam. For more information, see Section 2, pp. 25–26 in this report.



Transmission towers along the Arghandi-Ghazni line, part of more than 500 km of USAID-supported construction to connect power systems from Kabul to Kandahar and Helmand. (USAID photo)

to Kandahar—\$179.5 million was transferred to USAID through the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund. DABS issued two requests for proposals to construct one transmission line and five substations; bids are being evaluated; and signed contracts are scheduled for May 2016. USAID said security will be a major challenge to implementing this project.⁷⁰¹

U.S. fuel subsidies totaling \$141 million for power generation at two industrial parks in Kandahar City ceased at the end of September 2015. USAID reported that since then, the Shorandam Industrial Park's diesel generators, which had been producing an average of 120,000 kilowatt-hours (KWh) daily on a 24-hour basis, were reduced to producing 48,000 KWh daily while running only eight hours a day, six days a week. The generators at Bagh-e-Pol, which had also been running 24 hours a day, have stopped. Both of the generation facilities served residential and industrial electrical load.⁷⁰²

To help bridge the gap between Kandahar's electric-generation capacity and demand until the NEPS-SEPS transmission line is completed, PTEC is funding a reverse auction whereby independent power producers will compete to construct and sell power to DABS from a solar power plant. This plant may be able to operate at an installed capacity of 10 MW of power; the diesel generators in Kandahar City have a combined average operational capacity of about 18 MW.⁷⁰³ USAID reported this quarter that the power-purchase agreement was significantly revised to incorporate comments from potential bidders, resolve issues such as DABS financial security mechanisms (bonds, insurance, guarantees, etc.), government-backed guarantees, and taxes, and to update provisions to reflect current market trends. The auction is scheduled for mid-June 2016 with construction to begin later that month.⁷⁰⁴

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

TABLE 3.25

AFGHANISTAN INFRASTRUCTURE FUND POWER PROJECTS, AS OF MARCH 23, 2016 (\$ MILLIONS)						
AIF Project	Description	Notified			Status	
		Amount	Obligated	Disbursed		
AIF FY 2011	Kandahar Power Bridging Solution	Provides fuel and O&M for diesel generators in Kandahar City	40.5	39.1	39.1	Complete
	SEPS - Kajaki Dam to Lashkar Gah	Repair, install transmission lines and rebuild, construct power substations	130.0	66.4	51.0	Terminated due to security cost increase
	NEPS - SEPS Connector, Arghandi to Ghazni	Design, construct transmission lines and substations (first segment of NEPS-SEPS connection) USAID: PTEC	107.0	104.9	46.2	* Under construction (completion: December 2016)
	NEPS - Arghandi to Pul-e Alam	Design, construct transmission line and power substation	93.7	50.3	14.2	Transmission line and substation under construction; community issues affecting some tower locations (completion: December 2016)
AIF FY 2012	Kandahar Power Bridging Solution	Provides fuel and O&M for diesel generators in Kandahar City	67.0	64.7	64.7	Complete
	SEPS - Maiwand to Durai Junction - Phase 2	Design, construct transmission line; rebuild and construct substations	40.0	28.7	8.8	Under construction; tower excavation, civil work ongoing (completion: August 2016)
	NEPS - Pul-e Alam to Gardez - Phase 2	Design, construct transmission line and power substation	77.5	69.9	49.3	Transmission line under construction; substation in design; pending modification for one transformer (completion: December 2016)
	NEPS - Charikar to Gul Bahar and Nejrab - Phase 3	Design, construct transmission lines and power substation	42.5	38.8	19.6	Transmission line under construction; substation design under review; community issues affecting some tower locations (completion: December 2016)
AIF FY 2013	Kandahar Power Bridging Solution	Provides fuel and O&M for diesel generators in Kandahar City	37.0	34.0	34.0	Complete
	NEPS - Charikar to Gul Bahar and Nejrab - Phase 3	Design, construct transmission lines and power substation	33.0	24.1	21.2	Transmission line under construction; substation design under review; community issues affecting some tower locations (completion: December 2016)
	SEPS Completion - Phase 1	Design, construct, and rehabilitate substations in Tangi, Sangin North and South	15.0	62.9	46.7	Under construction (ongoing delays); security challenges (completion: ** November 2016)
		Design, construct, transmission lines from Sangin North to Lashkar Gah	60.0			Design approved; under construction (ongoing delays); security challenges (completion: *** December 2016)
	NEPS - SEPS Connector, Ghazni to Kandahar	Design, Construct transmission line and substations. Final phase of NEPS-SEPS connector. USAID: PTEC	179.5	350.0	0.0	Bids under evaluation by DABS; expected award: May 2016
AIF FY 2014	Kandahar Power Bridging Solution	Provides fuel and O&M for diesel generators in Kandahar City	4.0	3.9	3.9	Complete
	SEPS Completion - Phase 2	Design, construct transmission line, and install equipment and commission substations	55.0	55.0	0.0	Transferred to USAID; expected award: May 2016.
	NEPS - Gardez to Khowst - Phase 4	Design, construct transmission line and substation. DOD's final contribution to NEPS.	130.0	119.0	4.8	Descoping survey/design; transmission line and substation design, right of way, under review (completion: December 2017)

Note: All AIF power projects are to be sustained by Afghanistan's Ministry of Energy and Water, and Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS), Afghanistan's national electric utility. Notified amount reflects estimated project ceiling cost. Obligations and disbursements are as of 3/1/2016. All other information is as of 3/23/2016.

* The Arghandi connector substation that will feed this line will not be ready until 2018. Alternatives to power the Arghandi-Ghazni project are under consideration.

** Completion date pending approval. At high risk for further delay. No work in Sangin north and south due to security issues.

*** Some work resumed on 2/16/2016. No work from Sangin to Durai Junction due to ongoing military operations. At medium risk for further delay.

Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call 3/30/2016; USAID, OEG, response to SIGAR data call, 3/28/2016.

Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund Power Programs

AIF projects were initiated to support critical counterinsurgency and economic-development objectives in Afghanistan. Although DOD's mission has since evolved to advising and assisting Afghan security forces and ministries, as well as counterterrorism operations, it is also focused on completing AIF projects.⁷⁰⁵

U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) has completed four AIF power projects so far. All were phases of the now-concluded Kandahar Power Bridging Solution, which provided fuel and technical support for diesel power-generation plants in Kandahar City while turbine-installation work at Kajaki Dam was under way. USFOR-A has six other ongoing power projects; USAID has three.⁷⁰⁶

This quarter, fighting in Kandahar and Helmand Provinces, as well as bureaucratic delays in getting right-of-way approvals for NEPS transmission lines, continued to challenge AIF contractors and some project-completion schedules. However, DOD remained focused on implementing power projects to complete its portion of the NEPS and SEPS using FY 2011–FY 2014 AIF money as shown in Table 3.25 on the previous page.⁷⁰⁷ No FY 2015 or FY 2016 AIF funds were requested or appropriated, but up to \$50 million from the FY 2016 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund may be used under limited circumstances to help finish existing AIF projects.⁷⁰⁸

Afghanistan's Capacity to Sustain Power Projects

DABS and other government entities will be responsible for sustaining NEPS-SEPS power projects, including operations and maintenance (O&M) costs once they are completed and turned over to the government. SIGAR has raised questions about DABS's capacity and said Afghanistan lacks the resources necessary—financial and otherwise—to pay for O&M.⁷⁰⁹

DOD has notified Congress that increased revenue from an expanded customer base and improved collection capabilities will help DABS provide long-term sustainment of infrastructure.⁷¹⁰ USAID, which is working to help strengthen DABS's financial management and establish a corporate governance framework, said the utility's revenues have increased over the last three years, allowing it to pay for more of its operating expenses, although nonrecurring major capital-infrastructure expenses are still mainly funded by donors.⁷¹¹

A World Bank report cautioned that even though DABS, with donor assistance, has been able to reduce some commercial losses and improve revenue collections, its commercial (meter-reading and billing errors, theft, etc.) and technical (heating, magnetic, and other transmission and distribution) losses “remain significant.” The report added that DABS cannot raise or expect donors to provide the capital necessary to meet Afghanistan's energy infrastructure requirements.⁷¹²

SIGAR AUDIT

An ongoing SIGAR audit focuses on DOD and State Department progress in completing FY 2011 Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund projects, the impact on other infrastructure priorities and counterinsurgency objectives, and sustainment challenges.

TRANSPORTATION

Afghanistan’s lack of transportation infrastructure hinders internal commerce, foreign trade, and economic growth. The World Bank said Afghanistan’s transportation-infrastructure shortcomings constrain the service and agriculture sectors, which have typically been the leading drivers of the economy. It also holds back the mining industry, whose future revenues the Afghan government and international donor community are counting on to offset declining international aid.⁷¹³

This quarter, the Afghan government signed a feasibility-study contract on expanding its northern rail network.⁷¹⁴ Only one completed freight rail line currently exists—a 47-mile (75 km) line from Hairatan, on the border with Uzbekistan, to Mazar-e Sharif.⁷¹⁵ Meanwhile, the United States continued its efforts to develop the capacity of the Ministry of Public Works in the areas of road construction, operations, and maintenance.⁷¹⁶

Roads

Since 2002, the United States has provided approximately \$2.2 billion cumulatively for road construction and O&M.⁷¹⁷ Afghanistan has more than 76,400 miles of road, 28,000 of which has been rehabilitated or improved. However, the World Bank has reported 85% are in poor shape and a majority cannot be used year-round.⁷¹⁸ Afghanistan does not currently have sufficient funding and technical capacity to maintain its roads and highways, according to USAID. Afghanistan is estimated to spend \$17 million annually for O&M, leaving a projected \$100 million annual shortfall.⁷¹⁹

Emergency O&M on the Kabul-Kandahar road outside of Ghazni Province was completed on December 31, 2015, as part of USAID’s Road Sector Sustainability Project (RSSP). Another emergency O&M work order on the Kabul-Ghazni road in Wardak Province is ongoing. Additionally, the Road Sector Sustainability Project helped complete three studies on establishing a roads authority, road fund, and transportation institute, while structure design is in process.⁷²⁰

USAID’s active road-construction and O&M programs are listed in Table 3.26.

SIGAR AUDIT

An ongoing SIGAR audit is reviewing U.S. efforts to sustain roads and strengthen the Afghan government’s ability to perform road maintenance.

TABLE 3.26

USAID ACTIVE ROAD-CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATIONS-AND-MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS				
Project Title	Start Date	End Date	Total Estimated Cost (\$)	Cumulative Disbursements, as of 3/31/2016 (\$)
Technical Assistance to Ministry of Public Works	8/3/2014	8/2/2017	\$25,486,058	\$12,963,209
Salang Tunnel Maintenance	3/24/2013	3/30/2016	3,533,350	3,487,237
Engineering, Quality Assurance, and Logistical Support (EQUALS)	4/18/2011	4/17/2016	126,307,645	119,141,568
Support for USAID’s Construction of Health and Education Facilities Program	1/19/2008	6/30/2016	57,541,288	56,465,885
Emergency Road O&M	12/1/2015	11/30/2016	5,000,000	-
Emergency Road O&M at Maidan Wardak Savedabad Kabul	1/10/2016	3/14/2016	87,440	-

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/11/2016.

TABLE 3.27

AFGHANISTAN INFRASTRUCTURE FUND ROAD PROJECTS, AS OF MARCH 23, 2016 (\$ MILLIONS)							
AIF Project	Description	Notified Amount	Obligated	Disbursed	Status		
AIF FY 2011	Lashkar Gah to Nawar Road	Design, construct 22.5 km road	22.0	20.5	20.5	Complete	
	RC-East Border Transportation Corridor	Saracha Bridge	Design, construct 0.16 km bridge over Chaparhar River, along Hwy 7 in Nangarhar Province	8.0	6.8	6.2	Complete
Ghulam Khan Corridor		Design, construct 24.1 km road, 4 bridges, culverts, switchback repairs in Khowst Province	27.6	12.7	12.3	Construction complete; Warranty issues scheduled to be completed 5/1/2016	
AIF FY 2012	Panwan to Bamiyan Road - Section 6	Section 6.1	Design, construct 7 km road of Salang bypass in Bamiyan Province	3.0	3.0	3.0	Complete
		Section 6.2	Design, construct 11 km road of Salang bypass in Bamiyan Province	7.0	7.0	7.0	Complete
	Dahla Dam Phase 2 - Site Preparation (Route Bear Road)	Realign 4.7 km road along NW shore of Dahla Dam	11.2	7.2	7.2	Complete	
AIF FY 2013	Ghulam Khan Corridor - Phase 2	Design, construct remaining 7 km road to Khowst city and 1 bridge to complete Ghulam Khan Transportation Corridor	10.0	5.1	0.1	35% of design approved; MOU signed for MOPW quality assurance capacity building	

Note: Notified amount reflects estimated project ceiling cost. Obligations and disbursements are as of 3/1/2016. All other information is as of 3/23/2016.

Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 3/30/2016.

Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund Road Projects

DOD has obligated \$62.3 million and disbursed \$56.3 million for five road projects under the AIF, as of March 1, 2016. Some of these projects had multiple phases, three of which—Saracha Bridge, Parwan to Bamiyan Road, and the Ghulam Khan Transportation Corridor—were completed this quarter, as shown in Table 3.27.⁷²¹

ECONOMIC GROWTH

The World Bank ranked Afghanistan 177th of 189 countries in its *Doing Business 2016* report on regulatory quality and efficiency—a six-place rise from 2015.⁷²² President Ghani has stressed the need for accountability in carrying out the difficult economic reforms needed for Afghanistan to build a competitive, export-oriented economy, with access to neighboring markets.⁷²³ USAID, which is assisting in this effort, has disbursed approximately \$1.1 billion cumulatively for economic growth programs in Afghanistan.⁷²⁴ Active programs can be found in Table 3.28.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

TABLE 3.28

USAID ACTIVE ECONOMIC-GROWTH PROGRAMS				
Project Title	Start Date	End Date	Total Estimated Cost (\$)	Cumulative Disbursements, as of 3/31/2016 (\$)
Financial Access for Investing in the Development of Afghanistan (FAIDA)	2/7/2011	8/5/2016	\$108,258,374	\$101,751,431
Afghanistan Trade and Revenue Project (ATAR)	11/7/2013	11/6/2017	77,754,267	43,032,260
Afghanistan Public Financial Management (APFM)	7/27/2015	7/26/2018	22,130,033	2,317,848
Afghan Women's Leadership in the Economy (AWLE)	7/1/2015	6/30/2020	71,571,543	4,123,909
Turquoise Mountain Smithsonian Exhibition	3/9/2015	12/31/2016	535,055	323,074
IFC PIO Grant - Support of Business Environment Reform	10/15/2010	10/30/2017	4,030,000	4,030,000
Afghanistan International Bank Guarantee Agreement	9/27/2012	9/27/2020	2,000,000	520,800
Development Credit Authority (DCA) with FINCA, OXUS, and First Microfinance Banks	9/25/2014	9/24/2020	1,953,875	0
Commercial Law Development Program	3/1/2014	9/30/2019	10,000,000	3,647,406
Afghanistan Workforce Development Program (AWDP) On-Budget	9/18/2013	4/3/2016	11,500,000	1,321,456
Afghanistan Workforce Development Program (AWDP) Off-Budget	4/5/2012	6/30/2016	32,647,898	30,113,298
E-Government Resource Center II	8/28/2013	6/1/2016	3,900,000	405,000
Mobile-izing Saving Study	N/A	N/A	50,022	50,022
Assistance in Building Afghanistan by Developing Enterprise (ABADE)	10/16/2012	10/16/2016	104,997,656	71,810,058
Strengthening the Revenue Collection Capacity of GIROA	11/30/2014	12/30/2018	4,000,000	4,000,000
Regional Water Management	N/A	N/A	3,750,000	0
Rebranding Afghanistan: Creating Jobs, Changing Perceptions, Empowering Women	11/2/2015	11/1/2018	4,800,000	300,000
Afghanistan Investment Climate Program	3/27/2015	3/26/2020	13,300,000	420,200
Multi-Input Area Development-Global Development Alliance	3/23/2013	3/22/2018	30,481,436	10,369,778

Note: The Mobile-izing Saving Study explores financial inclusion products to encourage Afghans to build savings. USAID's Development Credit Authority (DCA) provides partial credit guarantees to mobilize local financing. FINCA, OXUS, and First Microfinance Banks are to use these guarantees to secure loans from larger lenders, and in turn lend to micro and small businesses in Afghanistan. Afghanistan International Bank is to use the DCA guarantee to mitigate its lending risk and facilitate lending to small and medium-size enterprises.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/11/2016; Innovations for Poverty Action, "Mobile-izing Savings with Defaults in Afghanistan," 12/8/2015; USAID, Development Credit Authority, "Overview," 2/2/2015.

Afghanistan Workforce Development Program

USAID's four-year, \$62.6 million, Afghanistan Workforce Development Program (AWDP) aims to increase economic opportunities for 25,000 Afghans through vocational education and training, business-management training programs, and job-placement services. AWDP also seeks to mitigate high unemployment and address the scarcity of technically skilled Afghan labor. The goal of the program, through on- and off-budget assistance, is to facilitate job creation, develop a skilled and semiskilled workforce, increase self-employment, and promote economic development in Afghanistan.⁷²⁵

AWDP is also supporting efforts to build the capacity of technical/vocational educators and trainers. AWDP seeks to improve the quality of these

training programs through public-private partnerships, and make them more accessible.⁷²⁶ As of December 31, 2015, (the most recent data available) more than 26,700 Afghans had been trained and more than 17,500 either placed in jobs or promoted to mid-career/semi-professional jobs. Training areas ranged from project and financial management to construction, information technology, and marketing. So far, USAID said 36% of those trained, placed, or promoted were women, exceeding the program's target of 25%. The AWDP disbursed approximately \$29.5 million.⁷²⁷

Financial Access for Investing in the Development of Afghanistan

USAID's \$108.3 million, 66-month Financial Access for Investing in the Development of Afghanistan (FAIDA) program aims to promote an inclusive, diverse, and sustainable financial sector that generates jobs and provides a range of services for micro, small, and medium enterprises. FAIDA helps Afghan partners build capacity to deliver financial services, develop a legal framework and market infrastructure, provide technical assistance to mobile network operators for mobile-money services, and assist Afghan women entrepreneurs with business-development training so they can gain access to financing and opportunities for economic and professional growth.⁷²⁸

From October 2015 through January 2016, FAIDA facilitated the approval of 47 loans worth \$544,500 for Afghan enterprises, which is expected to be used to create 68 jobs, 18 of them for women. FAIDA also helped businesses submit 124 loan applications valued at \$7.06 million to create 711 jobs, 135 of which are for women. Additionally, FAIDA provided first-of-its-kind training in Afghanistan to 24 bankers and accountants on international valuation standards.⁷²⁹

EDUCATION

Following a June 2015 SIGAR letter to USAID requesting information about the reliability of Afghan-provided data that USAID uses to oversee and fund education programs in Afghanistan, President Ghani ordered an investigation into allegations of corruption within the Ministry of Education (MOE).⁷³⁰ On January 2, 2016, *Tolo News* reported alleged results of the investigation, which SIGAR described in its January 2016 *Quarterly Report*.⁷³¹ The findings and recommendations were presented to MOE leadership and donors, but USAID was told that, contrary to earlier reports, they will not be published.⁷³²

Subsequently, the MOE and donors prioritized their efforts to finalize a national education strategic plan, and reform and reorganize the MOE. In February, USAID hosted a seven-day workshop to develop a framework to focus existing resources on improving the quality and relevance of education; increasing equitable access to education; and increasing the

A United Nations report on the effects of armed conflict on children's access to education and healthcare in Afghanistan documented 125 conflict-related incidents against health facilities in 2015, with 19 clinics closed, 90,000 children not immunized, and 129 health personnel killed, injured or kidnapped.

Source: United Nations, *Education and Healthcare at Risk, Key Trends and Incidents Affecting Children's Access to Healthcare and Education in Afghanistan*, 4/2016, p. 2.

effectiveness, transparency, and accountability of education management. USAID said the resulting framework was endorsed by four deputy ministers, the Office of the President's Policy and Coordination Unit, and the Minister of Education. Drafting will begin upon President Ghani's approval, which is expected no earlier than July 2016.⁷³³

Ministry of Education Data

According to the Education Management Information System (EMIS) for FY 1394, Afghanistan reportedly has 15,249 general-education (government) schools, including 680 inactive/closed schools, with almost 8.7 million students enrolled.⁷³⁴ The number of enrolled students is the sum of present and absent students.⁷³⁵ The MOE counts students who have been absent for up to three years as enrolled because it says they might return to school.⁷³⁶

Education Data Assessment and Verification

Barriers to data collection in Afghanistan have resulted in imprecise and inaccurate EMIS data.⁷³⁷ Minister of Education Balkhi pledged to improve EMIS quality and the MOE conducted a third-party assessment that verified FY 1392 data of 1,600 schools in 24 provinces. The results, made available this quarter, found that while there were variances across EMIS indicators, data accuracy and reliability was high for general education, low for Islamic education, and inconclusive for vocational education and literacy due to limited or no data.⁷³⁸

Researchers compared national EMIS information against individual school records when available, and provincial MOE records when not.⁷³⁹ Assessing MOE/EMIS susceptibility to corruption, arguably a more potent concern and one that the Joint Anticorruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC) reported on in June 2015, was outside the scope of this study. The MEC found teacher-recruitment assessment reports to be of poor quality and based on fraudulent data. It reported that nonexistent or "ghost" teachers have been a long-standing problem and, in most cases, attendance sheets are not filled out or are frequently forged. The MEC also frequently found fully-staffed schools that had very few students.⁷⁴⁰

USAID Programs

USAID aims to improve equitable access to quality education in Afghanistan through community-based classes in remote regions, as well as to develop relevant, in-demand technical skills to better prepare Afghans for employment. Its programs focus on early-grade reading, textbooks and other learning materials, raising literacy rates through teacher and educator training.⁷⁴¹ USAID had disbursed more than \$844 million for education programs in Afghanistan, as of March 31, 2016.⁷⁴² USAID's active education programs can be found in Table 3.29 on the following page.

SIGAR AUDIT

A SIGAR audit published this quarter reviewed DOD, State, and USAID efforts to develop primary and secondary education in Afghanistan. It found that unlike USAID, DOD and State lacked a defined education strategy. Additionally, there was no articulated interagency coordination of roles, responsibilities, strategies, and objectives, and no adequate assessment of overall sector support. Additionally, USAID may be portraying an inaccurate picture of what its programs have contributed to the education sector in Afghanistan. For more information, see Section 2, pp. 22–25 in this report.

TABLE 3.29

USAID ACTIVE EDUCATION PROGRAMS				
Project Title	Start Date	End Date	Total Estimated Cost (\$)	Cumulative Disbursements, as of 3/31/2015 (\$)
Afghanistan's Global Partnership for Education	10/11/2012	6/30/2017	\$4,270,954	\$2,076,948
Support to American University of Afghanistan	8/1/2013	11/29/2019	45,902,538	20,778,075
Strengthening Education in Afghanistan (SEA II)	5/19/2014	9/30/2020	44,835,920	7,340,324
PROMOTE Scholarships	3/4/2015	3/3/2020	1,247,522	1,247,522
Assessment of Learning Outcomes and Social Effects in Community-Based Education	1/1/2014	12/31/2017	7,262,016	2,165,965
Afghanistan University Support and Workforce Development Program	1/1/2014	12/31/2018	91,927,769	24,447,380
Increasing Access to Basic Education and Gender Equality	9/17/2014	12/31/2019	77,402,457	77,402,457
Basic Education, Literacy, and Technical-Vocational Education (BELT), Textbooks	11/16/2011	12/31/2016	26,996,813	24,970,742
Early Grade Reading Survey	7/27/2015	3/27/2017	12,487,469	2,252,674
BELT/All Children Reading and Improved Access	7/27/2015	3/27/2017	427,585	272,875

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/11/2016; USAID, Modification of Assistance, Award Number AID-306-IO-12-00002, 12/28/2015.

This quarter, USAID extended its Global Partnership for Education (GPE)–Supervising Entity program through June 2017 to continue programmatic and fiduciary oversight of the MOE. The MOE, with core GPE support for main programmatic activities not funded by USAID, has developed key sector documents—budgets, guidelines, operational plans, field monitoring visits and oversight reports, year-end reviews, and lessons learned.⁷⁴³

Basic Education, Learning, and Training (BELT)/ Education Quality Improvement Project (EQUIP) II

Basic Education, Learning, and Training (BELT) aims to expand and improve basic education access and quality. BELT encompasses a number of activities, including a national early-grade reading program, and textbook printing and distribution. Over a 1.2 million textbooks and other reading material have been distributed nationwide so far, covering Afghanistan's entire primary-school population. This quarter, USAID extended its textbook program through December 2016.⁷⁴⁴

BELT also does capacity building at the MOE, and pre- and in-service teacher training through the World Bank-administered Education Quality Improvement Project (EQUIP) II program, which has trained more than 154,000 teachers/educators and awarded more than 11,000 female students scholarships to attend teacher-training colleges.⁷⁴⁵

An Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee assessment found that despite some successes, EQUIP has failed to meet its overall goals since it began in 2004. The program suffers from poor planning, weak monitoring, and ineffective coordination among implementers that caused 30–40% of funds to be misused, poor school construction, and inadequately educated students.

Source: Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, *Vulnerability to Corruption Assessment of the Education Quality Improvement Program in the Ministry of Education*, 11/2015, p. 3.

Increasing Access to Basic Education and Gender Equality Through Community-Based Education

Despite real progress made in Afghanistan's education system, 3.5 million primary-school-age children—75% of them girls—remain out of school. Causes vary from societal norms about the value of education for females, to economic hardships, violence, and a lack of schools and learning materials in remote areas. Community Based Education provides access to basic, primary education (grades 1–6) in 13 provinces where there are no formal schools or only schools for boys, or where other constraints prevent children from attending formal classrooms. As of December 2015 (the most recent data available), 912 community-based schools and 71 accelerated learning centers (ALC) have been established providing access to more than 40,828 boys and girls; 3.5 million textbooks were printed.⁷⁴⁶

Community-based school enrollment figures (37,650) exceeded the 20,000 target for 2015, but implementers noted that the numbers declined during course of the year. The 51% enrollment among girls fell short of the 70% target. Meanwhile, the distance children have to travel to school was reduced to less than two miles from their communities, but insecurity delayed program implementation and resulted in school closures.⁷⁴⁷

HEALTH

Afghanistan has registered improvements in its health indicators since 2002, though it remains below average among low-income countries. Afghanistan's public health is beset by many challenges—tuberculosis, polio, poor maternal health, and one of the world's highest levels of child malnutrition, according to the World Bank.⁷⁴⁸

Insecurity for aid and development workers is also a strain on effective health delivery services to the population, according to the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief & Development, an advocacy organization working in Afghanistan comprising 135 national and international nongovernmental organizations. The agency said Afghanistan has the one of highest number of major attacks on aid workers in the world, surpassing all other countries except Somalia and Syria.⁷⁴⁹

USAID Funding and Health Programs

U.S. health-sector programs aim to preserve and enhance gains made since 2002. USAID assistance to the Ministry of Public Health includes capacity-building, training, and quality-assurance activities to strengthen the ministry's management and control over health-care delivery across Afghanistan.⁷⁵⁰

U.S. on- and off-budget assistance to Afghanistan's health sector totaled approximately \$1 billion, as of March 31, 2016.⁷⁵¹ On-budget assistance to

A United Nations report on the effects of armed conflict on children's access to education and healthcare in Afghanistan documented 132 conflict-related incidents against schools in 2015, with 369 schools closed, 139,000 children out of school, and 75 school personnel killed, injured or kidnapped.

Source: United Nations, *Education and Healthcare at Risk, Key Trends and Incidents Affecting Children's Access to Healthcare and Education in Afghanistan*, 4/2016, p. 2.

TABLE 3.30

USAID ACTIVE HEALTH PROGRAMS				
Project Title	Start Date	End Date	Total Estimated Cost (\$)	Cumulative Disbursements, as of 3/31/2016 (\$)
Strengthening Pharmaceutical System	8/28/2011	7/10/2017	\$34,399,936	\$24,771,958
Challenge Tuberculosis	1/1/2015	9/29/2019	15,000,000	2,546,790
Weekly Iron Folic Acid Supplementation	11/7/2014	12/31/2017	5,610,012	5,408,826
Disease Early Warning System (DEWS)	9/1/2008	6/30/2017	8,500,000	8,500,000
Disease Early Warning System (DEWS Plus)	1/1/2015	12/30/2020	32,728,000	18,108,000
Family Planning and Assessment	5/16/2015	5/15/2016	634,833	634,833
Health Sector Resiliency (HRS)	9/28/2015	9/27/2020	37,936,471	386,740
Demographic and Health Surveys	9/9/2013	9/8/2018	6,699,863	4,245,266
Sustaining Health Outcomes through the Private Sector (SHOPS Plus)	6/1/2016	6/1/2018	6,000,000	501,583
Regional Fortification in the Central Asian Republics and Afghanistan	9/29/2014	9/29/2016	9,722,000	9,722,000
Enhance Community Access, Use of Zinc, Oral Rehydration Salts for Management of Childhood Diarrhea	7/21/2015	7/7/2020	15,002,610	4,400,000
Helping Mother and Children Thrive (HEMAYAT)	1/7/2015	1/6/2020	60,000,000	8,678,913

Note: The Regional Fortification in the Central Asian Republics and Afghanistan project aims to increase iron, zinc, folic acid, and vitamin A nutrient intake by 20% through distribution of fortified wheat and edible oil.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/11/2016; Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition, "Regional Fortification in the Central Asian Republics," accessed 1/15/2016.

BPHS: provides primary health-care services—such as immunizations and prenatal care—at small and rural health clinics and forms the core of health-service delivery for all primary care facilities in Afghanistan.

EPHS: outlines the medical services each type of hospital in the Afghan health-care system should provide in terms of general services, staff, equipment, diagnostic services, and medications while promoting a health referral system that integrates the BPHS with hospitals.

the MOPH provides basic health care and essential hospital services. Off-budget assistance includes activities to strengthen health systems, engage the private sector, reduce child and maternal deaths, reduce tuberculosis-related deaths, reduce child undernutrition, improve the use of modern family-planning methods, and eliminate polio.⁷⁵²

USAID believes that the MOPH's ability to deliver quality health-care through the **Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS)** and **Essential Package of Hospital Services (EPHS)**—the cornerstone of health-service delivery in Afghanistan—is critical to improve health outcomes.⁷⁵³ USAID's active health programs have a total estimated cost of \$232 million, and are listed in Table 3.30.

Polio

From FY 2003 through FY 2014, USAID provided \$25 million for polio eradication in Afghanistan.⁷⁵⁴ Afghanistan and Pakistan are the only two countries where polio is endemic.⁷⁵⁵

Afghanistan reported 20 cases in 2015, a decrease from 28 in 2014. Two cases were confirmed so far in 2016, as of April 4. Pakistan reported 54 cases in 2015, down from 306 in 2014, and seven cases so far in 2016.⁷⁵⁶ Both

Source: SIGAR, *Health Services in Afghanistan: Two New USAID-Funded Hospitals May Not be Sustainable and Existing Hospitals are Facing Shortages in Some Key Medical Positions*, Audit Report 13-9, 4/2013, p. 1.

countries, which share a 1,500-mile border, suffer from the Taliban's opposition to vaccination campaigns.⁷⁵⁷

Security and access challenges remained a particular concern, according to the United Nations, which reported that in December 2015, 89,873 children could not be vaccinated—13,493 children were not vaccinated in Helmand Province due to active fighting, and 72,288 in Kunar and Nangarhar provinces, where anti-government forces prevented access.⁷⁵⁸ A report from the Independent Monitoring Board of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative stated that Afghanistan's "security situation cannot be used as an excuse for poor performance—where access is available, it is too often being let down by poor supplementary immunization activity quality."⁷⁵⁹ The World Health Organization agreed, reporting "operational deficits in accessible areas."⁷⁶⁰

Helping Mothers and Children Thrive

USAID's Helping Mothers and Children Thrive (HEMAYAT) program aims to increase access to and utilization of family planning and maternal health services through BPHS and also strengthen referral systems to hospitals through EPHS.⁷⁶¹ Deteriorating security conditions interrupted program implementation this quarter, but efforts to build capacity at the MOPH and affect policy changes continued.⁷⁶²

HEMAYAT helped establish a chlorhexidine (antiseptic) working group to develop a national distribution plan for newborn umbilical-cord care, conducted a community-health nurse workshop to inform future strategies, assisted government efforts to include long-term reversible contraceptives into their essential-drug list, and helped implement a national postpartum-hemorrhage prevention plan.⁷⁶³

SIGAR AUDIT

An ongoing SIGAR audit is focusing on USAID's efforts to support and improve Afghanistan's health-care services and focuses on the extent to which USAID assessed the overall impact of its efforts and the extent to which USAID collects, verifies, and reconciles healthcare data to determine its accuracy.

4 OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT



OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT CONTENTS

Completed Oversight Activities	200
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Photo on previous page

Women members of the Afghan National Police participate the Ministry of Interior's International Women's Day celebration in Kabul on March 13, 2016. They are among 389 graduates of basic training in Turkey. (U.S. Navy photo by Lt. Charity Edgar)

OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT

SIGAR's enabling legislation requires it to keep the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense fully informed about problems relating to the administration of reconstruction programs, and to submit a report to Congress on SIGAR's oversight work and on the status of the U.S. reconstruction effort no later than 30 days after the end of each fiscal quarter. Each quarter, SIGAR requests updates from other agencies on completed and ongoing oversight activities. This section compiles these updates. Publicly available copies of completed reports are posted on the agencies' respective websites.

The descriptions appear as submitted, with minor changes to maintain consistency with other sections of this report: acronyms and abbreviations in place of full names; standardized capitalization, punctuation, and preferred spellings; and third-person instead of first-person construction.

These agencies perform oversight activities in Afghanistan and provide results to SIGAR:

- Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DOD IG)
- Department of State Office of Inspector General (State OIG)
- Government Accountability Office (GAO)
- U.S. Army Audit Agency (USAAA)
- U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Inspector General (USAID OIG)

OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT

COMPLETED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

Table 4.1 lists the four oversight projects related to reconstruction that participating agencies reported as completed this quarter.

TABLE 4.1

RECENTLY COMPLETED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES OF OTHER U.S. AGENCIES, AS OF MARCH 31, 2016			
Agency	Report Number	Date Issued	Project Title
DOD IG	DODIG-2016-040	1/20/2016	Controls Over Ministry of Interior Fuel Contracts Could be Improved
GAO	GAO-16-154	12/18/2015	Defense Health Care: Research on Hyperbaric Oxygen Therapy to Treat Traumatic Brain Injury and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
GAO	GAO-16-100	12/3/2015	Afghanistan: State and USAID Should Evaluate Actions Taken to Mitigate Effects of Attrition among Local Staff
USAID OIG	F-306-16-002-P	3/14/2016	Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's Assistance in Building Afghanistan by Developing Enterprises Program

Source: DOD IG, response to SIGAR data call, 3/28/2016; State OIG, response to SIGAR data call, 3/15/2016; GAO, response to SIGAR data call, 3/23/2016; USAAA, response to SIGAR data call 2/25/2016; USAID OIG, response to SIGAR data call, 3/23/2016.

U.S. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General

During this quarter, DOD IG issued one report related to Afghanistan reconstruction.

Controls Over Ministry of Interior Fuel Contracts Could be Improved

(Report No. DODIG-2016-040, Issued January 20, 2016)

The Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and Ministry of Interior (MOI) oversight of the MOI fuel contracts were not effective. Some CSTC-A organizations performed limited oversight of MOI fuel activities but did not coordinate their efforts; the MOI did not consistently provide Afghan National Police (ANP) fuel consumption data; and CSTC-A did not determine which ANP units were not reporting consumption data as required by the fiscal year (FY) 1394 Commitment Letter. Consequently, CSTC-A did not have reasonable assurance that the fuel ordered and delivered on the three MOI contracts, valued at \$437.6 million, supported actual ANP requirements and was used for its intended purpose.

U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General-Middle East Regional Operations

During this quarter, State OIG released no reports related to Afghanistan reconstruction.

Government Accountability Office

During this quarter, GAO issued two reports related to Afghanistan reconstruction.

Defense Health Care: Research on Hyperbaric Oxygen Therapy to Treat Traumatic Brain Injury and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder

(Report No. GAO-16-154, Issued December 18, 2015)

GAO identified 32 peer-reviewed, published articles on research about the use of hyperbaric oxygen (HBO2) therapy to treat traumatic brain injury (TBI) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), most of which were focused solely on TBI (29 articles). The 32 articles consisted of seven case reports (reports on the treatment of individuals), 10 literature reviews (reviews of studies), and 15 articles on interventional studies or clinical trials, which provide the strongest clinical evidence about a treatment. Three of the 15 articles on interventional studies or clinical trials focused on the safety of HBO2 therapy for treating TBI and concluded that it is safe. The other 12 articles described the effectiveness of HBO2 therapy in treating TBI. Four of these articles (two on severe TBI and two that did not specify severity) reported that HBO2 therapy was effective. The remaining eight articles focused on mild TBI—six concluded that it was not effective and two concluded that it was.

Afghanistan: State and USAID Should Evaluate Actions Taken to Mitigate Effects of Attrition among Local Staff

(Report No. GAO-16-100, Issued December 3, 2015)

Resignations of Afghan local staff at the Department of State (State) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) after receiving a special immigrant visa (SIV) reached their highest level in 2014, and have had varied effects on the agencies' institutional knowledge. Resignations increased as more Afghan staff began the SIV application process than in the initial years of the program, and as State addressed delays that had previously slowed visa issuances. Afghan staff resignations are likely to be lower in 2015 than in previous years based on the number of current staff that have initiated the SIV process. Based on GAO's assessment of changes to average tenure and grade level of Afghan staff from 2010 until June 2015, and insights from agency officials, the effects of SIV-related resignations on State's and USAID's institutional knowledge is varied. Agencies have taken a number of actions to mitigate the effects of Afghan staff attrition, including SIV-related resignations. State and USAID officials said that these agencies have not evaluated actions taken to mitigate the effects of Afghan staff attrition.

GAO recommends that State and USAID evaluate actions intended to mitigate the effects of Afghan local staff resignations. State and USAID agreed with the recommendations.

U.S. Army Audit Agency

The USAAA completed no audits related to Afghanistan reconstruction this quarter.

U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Inspector General

This quarter, USAID OIG issued one audit related to Afghanistan reconstruction activities.

Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's Assistance in Building Afghanistan by Developing Enterprises Program (Report No. F-306-16-002-P, Issued March 14, 2016)

The objective of the audit was to determine whether USAID/Afghanistan's Assistance in Building Afghanistan by Developing Enterprises Program was creating jobs, increasing private investment, and improving the business environment as planned.

The audit found that the Assistance in Building Afghanistan by Developing Enterprises Program was not achieving the level of results originally envisioned. Findings include: 1) the program was behind schedule and created few jobs because of a slow start and customs delays; 2) the program had little impact on the business regulatory environment; 3) reported data results were invalid and unreliable; 4) the program did not show status of equipment shipments in quarterly reports; 5) initial jobs target was unrealistic; and 6) approximately \$18,000 in questioned costs.

The audit made 12 recommendations to address these issues.

OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT

ONGOING OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

As of March 31, 2016, the participating agencies reported 11 ongoing oversight activities related to reconstruction in Afghanistan. The activities reported are listed in Table 4.2 and described in the following sections by agency.

TABLE 4.2

ONGOING OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES OF OTHER U.S. AGENCIES, AS OF MARCH 31, 2016			
Agency	Project Number	Date Initiated	Project Title
DOD IG	D2015-D000JB-0089.000	3/9/2016	Audit of the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's Controls Over U.S. Direct Assistance Funded Contracts
DOD IG	D2016-D00SPO-0054.000	11/25/2015	Assessment of U.S./Coalition Efforts to Transition Security Cooperation and Assistance Activities Supporting the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan from Department of Defense Authority to Department of State Authority
DOD IG	D2016-D000PT-0030.000	10/16/2015	Summary Report on Inspections of DOD Facilities and Military Housing
DOD IG	D2015-D000JB-0239.000	8/14/2015	Audit of Contract Oversight in Afghanistan
State OIG	16AUD051	12/22/2015	Audit of Department of State Compliance with Critical Environment Contracting Requirements
State OIG	15AUD063	4/29/2015	Audit of the Embassy Kabul Operations and Maintenance Contract
GAO	100431	1/21/2016	DOD Use of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Funds
GAO	100148	10/7/2015	Disposal of Waste in Burn Pits
GAO	351991	11/21/2014	Military Construction in a Contingency Environment
USAID OIG	FF1C0116	1/20/2016	Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's Use of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
USAID OIG	FF1C0316	12/7/2015	Follow-Up Review of Selected Recommendations from the Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's Internal Controls in the Administration of the Involuntary Separate Maintenance Allowance

Source: DOD IG, response to SIGAR data call, 3/28/2016; State OIG, response to SIGAR data call, 3/15/2016; GAO, response to SIGAR data call, 3/23/2016; USAAA, response to SIGAR data call 2/25/2016; USAID OIG, response to SIGAR data call, 3/23/2016.

U.S. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General

DOD continues to face many challenges in executing its Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). DOD IG has identified priorities based on those challenges and high risks. For fiscal year (FY) 2016, DOD IG will continue to focus on the areas of monitoring and oversight of acquisition and contracting processes that support training, equipping, and sustaining Afghanistan's security forces. DOD IG will also continue to review and assess the Department's efforts to train and equip Afghan National Defense and Security Forces.

The DOD IG-led Southwest Asia Joint Planning Group assists in coordinating and deconflicting federal and DOD OCO-related oversight activities. DOD IG, working with SIGAR as well as fellow inspectors general and defense oversight-community members, have issued the *FY 2016 Comprehensive Oversight Plan for Overseas Contingency Operations (COP-OCO)*, formerly known as the *Comprehensive Oversight Plan for Southwest Asia*. The COP-OCO includes the Joint Strategic Oversight Plans (JSOP) for Operation Inherent Resolve and Afghanistan. The

OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT

Afghanistan JSOP includes Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS), as well as reconstruction and humanitarian assistance programs and activities that are separate from OFS.

DOD IG has four ongoing projects this quarter that relate to reconstruction or security operations in Afghanistan.

Audit of the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's Controls Over U.S. Direct Assistance Funded Contracts (Project No. D2016-D000JB-0089.000, Initiated March 9, 2016)

DOD IG is determining whether CSTC-A and the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's Ministries of Defense and Interior have established and implemented effective controls over the contract management process.

Assessment of U.S./Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip the Afghan National Army Special Operations Forces (Project No. D2016-D00SPO-0054.000, Initiated November 25, 2015)

DOD IG is determining whether U.S. government and Coalition goals, objectives, plans, and resources to train the Afghan National Army Special Operations Forces are sufficient, operative, and relevant.

Summary Report on Inspections of DOD Facilities and Military Housing (Project No. D2016-D000PT-0030.000, Initiated October 16, 2015)

This project will collectively evaluate the results of the previous DOD IG inspections of buildings and housing facilities in Afghanistan, Japan, Korea, and regions of the continental United States, as well as the ongoing facility inspection in Jordan. DOD IG is performing additional analysis based on these reports to identify any potential broader findings and recommendations related to electrical system safety, fire protection systems, environmental health and safety, etc. Specifically, DOD IG will evaluate common deficiencies and systemic issues found throughout DOD facilities during the previous inspections. DOD IG will also evaluate DOD policy regarding health and safety standards and requirements for DOD-occupied facilities world-wide.

Audit of Contract Oversight in Afghanistan (Project No. D2015-D000JB-0239.000, Initiated August 14, 2015)

DOD IG is determining whether contracting officer's representatives were properly appointed and trained, and were able to effectively perform their oversight responsibilities for contracts in Afghanistan.

U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General-Middle East Regional Operations

State OIG has two ongoing projects this quarter related to Afghanistan reconstruction.

Audit of Department of State Compliance with Critical Environment Contracting Requirements

(Project No. 16AUD051, Initiated December 22, 2015)

The primary objective of this audit is to determine whether the Critical Environment Contracting Analytics Staff has conducted risk assessments and developed risk mitigation plans for operational and political risks associated with contractor performance in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Audit of the Embassy Kabul Operations and Maintenance Contract

(Project No. 15AUD063, Initiated April 29, 2015)

Pacific Architects and Engineers Government Services Inc. (PAE) operates and maintains the utility systems for the U.S. embassy compound and Camp Sullivan in Kabul, Afghanistan. (Camp Sullivan is located by Kabul International Airport and provides the living quarters for the embassy's security force.) PAE provides support services 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, for electrical generation and distribution; heating and ventilation; water-supply purification and distribution; fire protection; sewage and wastewater treatment; elevator maintenance; and fuel storage and distribution for generators and vehicles. PAE also provides unscheduled services to embassy offices and living quarters and escort services for subcontractors and other individuals without security clearances who work at secure sites on the embassy compound.

This audit will be the first in a series of audits on the PAE operations and maintenance contract. An audit of the PAE operations and maintenance contract will address risk areas related to department management and oversight of contractor performance, an area identified by OIG as a management and performance challenge. (See: *Fiscal Year 2014 Agency Financial Report*, U.S. Department of State; pp. 118–120; 11/2014.) The first audit will focus on risk areas in the fuel-storage and distribution system and possibly offer the opportunity for monetary benefits. Future audits will focus on other services provided by PAE.

Government Accountability Office

GAO has three ongoing projects this quarter related to Afghanistan reconstruction.

OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT

DOD Use of Overseas Contingency Operations Funds

(Project No. 351991, Initiated January 21, 2016)

Since September 2001, DOD has received more than \$1.5 trillion designated as Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), Global War on Terror (GWOT), or as emergency funding for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as other activities like disaster relief and evacuation efforts. In FY 2015, Congress appropriated \$64 billion in OCO-designated funds as DOD continues to draw down troops in Afghanistan. Despite a significant reduction in the number of troops deployed to Afghanistan, OCO-designated funding remains proportionally high. In fact, the cost per deployed troop supported by OCO-designated funding has grown from roughly \$1 million per troop in FY 2013 to \$4 million per troop in FY 2015. GAO has reported on the need for DOD to improve the reliability of its OCO cost reporting and to become more disciplined in its approach to developing OCO budgets, including moving long-term enduring costs funded by OCO-designated appropriations into the base defense budget to better account for the true costs of its operations and plan for future budget needs. Spending these funds for activities unrelated to war operations hides the true cost of government and inhibits the Congress' ability to knowingly set funding levels for government programs.

Disposal of Waste in Burn Pits

(Project No. 100148, Initiated October 7, 2015)

A provision in the Carl Levin and Howard "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-291, § 313 (2014) requires GAO to assess the methodology used by the Secretary of Defense in conducting DOD's review of disposal of waste in open air burn pits, the adequacy of DOD's report, and compliance with DOD instruction and applicable law regarding the disposal of covered waste in burn pits by the military departments and combatant commands.

Military Construction in a Contingency Environment

(Project No. 351991, Initiated November 21, 2014)

The audit will examine: (1) the processes DOD officials used to make decisions about military construction in Iraq and Afghanistan, to include procedures for determining whether a structure should be permanent or temporary; (2) the costs associated with decisions made about military construction in Iraq and Afghanistan, to include the sources of funding; (3) any lessons the Department has learned about military construction during contingency operations based on the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan; and (4) any other issues related to military construction in a contingency environment that may come to light during the course of the audit.

U.S. Army Audit Agency

This quarter the USAAA has no ongoing audits related to Afghanistan reconstruction.

U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Inspector General

This quarter USAID OIG has two ongoing audits related to reconstruction initiatives.

Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's Use of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund

(Project No. FF1C0116, Initiated January 20, 2016)

Audit Objective: Has USAID/Afghanistan adopted effective and consistent practices to provide reasonable assurance that activities implemented through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund contribute to achieving USAID's objectives in Afghanistan?

Follow-up Review of Selected Recommendations from the Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's Internal Controls in the Administration of the Involuntary Separate Maintenance Allowance (ISMA)

(Project No. FF1C0316, Initiated December 7, 2015)

Audit Objective: Has USAID/Afghanistan's implementation of Recommendations 1, 2, 4, and 9 from the *Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's Internal Controls in the Administration of the Involuntary Separate Maintenance Allowance* prevented improper use of ISMA?

APPENDICES AND ENDNOTES CONTENTS

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The Official Seal of SIGAR

The official seal of SIGAR represents the coordination of efforts between the United States and Afghanistan to provide accountability and oversight of reconstruction activities. The phrases in Dari (top) and Pashto (bottom) on the seal are translations of SIGAR's name.

APPENDICES AND ENDNOTES



APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

CROSS-REFERENCE OF REPORT TO STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS

This appendix cross-references the pages of this report to the quarterly reporting and related requirements under SIGAR’s enabling legislation, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1229 (Table A.1), and to the semiannual reporting requirements prescribed for inspectors general more generally under the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (5 U.S.C. App. 3) (Table A.2).

TABLE A.1

CROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER PUB. L. NO. 110-181, § 1229			
Public Law Section	SIGAR Enabling Language	SIGAR Action	Report Section
Purpose			
Section 1229(a)(3)	To provide for an independent and objective means of keeping the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operations and the necessity for and progress on corrective action.	Ongoing; quarterly report	Full report
Supervision			
Section 1229(e)(1)	The Inspector General shall report directly to, and be under the general supervision of, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.	Report to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense	Full report
Duties			
Section 1229(f)(1)	OVERSIGHT OF AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION – It shall be the duty of the Inspector General to conduct, supervise, and coordinate audits and investigations of the treatment, handling, and expenditure of amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and of the programs, operations, and contracts carried out utilizing such funds, including subsections (A) through (G) below.	Review appropriated/available funds Review programs, operations, contracts using appropriated/available funds	Full report
Section 1229(f)(1)(A)	The oversight and accounting of the obligation and expenditure of such funds	Review obligations and expenditures of appropriated/available funds	SIGAR Oversight Funding
Section 1229(f)(1)(B)	The monitoring and review of reconstruction activities funded by such funds	Review reconstruction activities funded by appropriations and donations	SIGAR Oversight
Section 1229(f)(1)(C)	The monitoring and review of contracts funded by such funds	Review contracts using appropriated and available funds	Note 1
Section 1229(f)(1)(D)	The monitoring and review of the transfer of such funds and associated information between and among departments, agencies, and entities of the United States, and private and nongovernmental entities.	Review internal and external transfers of appropriated/available funds	Appendix B
Section 1229(f)(1)(E)	The maintenance of records on the use of such funds to facilitate future audits and investigations of the use of such fund[s]	Maintain audit records	SIGAR Oversight Appendix C Appendix D

Continued on the next page

APPENDICES

TABLE A.1 (CONTINUED)

CROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER PUB. L. NO. 110-181, § 1229			
Public Law Section	SIGAR Enabling Language	SIGAR Action	Report Section
Section 1229(f)(1)(F)	The monitoring and review of the effectiveness of United States coordination with the Governments of Afghanistan and other donor countries in the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy	Monitoring and review as described	Audits
Section 1229(f)(1)(G)	The investigation of overpayments such as duplicate payments or duplicate billing and any potential unethical or illegal actions of Federal employees, contractors, or affiliated entities, and the referral of such reports, as necessary, to the Department of Justice to ensure further investigations, prosecutions, recovery of further funds, or other remedies	Conduct and reporting of investigations as described	Investigations
Section 1229(f)(2)	OTHER DUTIES RELATED TO OVERSIGHT – The Inspector General shall establish, maintain, and oversee such systems, procedures, and controls as the Inspector General considers appropriate to discharge the duties under paragraph (1).	Establish, maintain, and oversee systems, procedures, and controls	Full report
Section 1229(f)(3)	DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978 – In addition, ... the Inspector General shall also have the duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act of 1978.	Duties as specified in Inspector General Act	Full report
Section 1229(f)(4)	COORDINATION OF EFFORTS – The Inspector General shall coordinate with, and receive the cooperation of, each of the following: (A) the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, (B) the Inspector General of the Department of State, and (C) the Inspector General of the United States Agency for International Development.	Coordination with the inspectors general of DOD, DOS, and USAID	Other Agency Oversight
Federal Support and Other Resources			
Section 1229(h)(5)(A)	ASSISTANCE FROM FEDERAL AGENCIES – Upon request of the Inspector General for information or assistance from any department, agency, or other entity of the Federal Government, the head of such entity shall, insofar as is practicable and not in contravention of any existing law, furnish such information or assistance to the Inspector General, or an authorized designee.	Expect support as requested	Full report
Section 1229(h)(5)(B)	REPORTING OF REFUSED ASSISTANCE – Whenever information or assistance requested by the Inspector General is, in the judgment of the Inspector General, unreasonably refused or not provided, the Inspector General shall report the circumstances to the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense, as appropriate, and to the appropriate congressional committees without delay.	None reported	N/A

Continued on the next page

APPENDICES

TABLE A.1 (CONTINUED)

CROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER PUB. L. NO. 110-181, § 1229			
Public Law Section	SIGAR Enabling Language	SIGAR Action	Report Section
Reports			
Section 1229(i)(1)	QUARTERLY REPORTS – Not later than 30 days after the end of each fiscal-year quarter, the Inspector General shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report summarizing, for the period of that quarter and, to the extent possible, the period from the end of such quarter to the time of the submission of the report, the activities during such period of the Inspector General and the activities under programs and operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Each report shall include, for the period covered by such report, a detailed statement of all obligations, expenditures, and revenues associated with reconstruction and rehabilitation activities in Afghanistan, including the following –	Report – 30 days after the end of each calendar quarter Summarize activities of the Inspector General Detailed statement of all obligations, expenditures, and revenues	Full report Appendix B
Section 1229(i)(1)(A)	Obligations and expenditures of appropriated/donated funds	Obligations and expenditures of appropriated/donated funds	Appendix B
Section 1229(i)(1)(B)	A project-by-project and program-by-program accounting of the costs incurred to date for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, together with the estimate of the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the United States Agency for International Development, as applicable, of the costs to complete each project and each program	Project-by-project and program-by-program accounting of costs. List unexpended funds for each project or program	Funding Note 1
Section 1229(i)(1)(C)	Revenues attributable to or consisting of funds provided by foreign nations or international organizations to programs and projects funded by any department or agency of the United States Government, and any obligations or expenditures of such revenues	Revenues, obligations, and expenditures of donor funds	Funding
Section 1229(i)(1)(D)	Revenues attributable to or consisting of foreign assets seized or frozen that contribute to programs and projects funded by any U.S. government department or agency, and any obligations or expenditures of such revenues	Revenues, obligations, and expenditures of funds from seized or frozen assets	Funding
Section 1229(i)(1)(E)	Operating expenses of agencies or entities receiving amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan	Operating expenses of agencies or any organization receiving appropriated funds	Funding Appendix B
Section 1229(i)(1)(F)	In the case of any contract, grant, agreement, or other funding mechanism described in paragraph (2)* – (i) The amount of the contract or other funding mechanism; (ii) A brief discussion of the scope of the contract or other funding mechanism; (iii) A discussion of how the department or agency of the United States Government involved in the contract, grant, agreement, or other funding mechanism identified and solicited offers from potential contractors to perform the contract, grant, agreement, or other funding mechanism, together with a list of the potential individuals or entities that were issued solicitations for the offers; and (iv) The justification and approval documents on which was based the determination to use procedures other than procedures that provide for full and open competition	Describe contract details	Note 1

Continued on the next page

APPENDICES

TABLE A.1 (CONTINUED)

CROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER PUB. L. NO. 110-181, § 1229			
Public Law Section	SIGAR Enabling Language	SIGAR Action	Report Section
Section 1229(i)(3)	PUBLIC AVAILABILITY – The Inspector General shall publish on a publicly available Internet website each report under paragraph (1) of this subsection in English and other languages that the Inspector General determines are widely used and understood in Afghanistan.	Publish report as directed at www.sigar.mil Dari and Pashto translation in process	Full report
Section 1229(i)(4)	FORM – Each report required under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex if the Inspector General considers it necessary.	Publish report as directed	Full report
Section 1229(j)(1)	Inspector General shall also submit each report required under subsection (i) to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.	Submit quarterly report	Full report

Note 1: Although this data is normally made available on SIGAR's website (www.sigar.mil), the data SIGAR has received is in relatively raw form and is currently being reviewed, analyzed, and organized for future SIGAR use and publication.

* Covered "contracts, grants, agreements, and funding mechanisms" are defined in paragraph (2) of Section 1229(i) of Pub. L. No. 110-181 as being—

"any major contract, grant, agreement, or other funding mechanism that is entered into by any department or agency of the United States Government that involves the use of amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan with any public or private sector entity for any of the following purposes:

To build or rebuild physical infrastructure of Afghanistan.

To establish or reestablish a political or societal institution of Afghanistan.

To provide products or services to the people of Afghanistan."

APPENDICES

TABLE A.2

CROSS-REFERENCE TO SEMIANNUAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE IG ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED (5 U.S.C. APP. 3) (“IG ACT”)			
IG Act Section	IG Act Language	SIGAR Action	Section
Section 5(a)(1)	Description of significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies	Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG member reports List problems, abuses, and deficiencies from SIGAR audit reports, investigations, and inspections	Other Agency Oversight See Letters of Inquiry at www.sigar.mil
Section 5(a)(2)	Description of recommendations for corrective action...with respect to significant problems, abuses, or deficiencies	Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG member I reports List recommendations from SIGAR audit reports	Other Agency Oversight See Letters of Inquiry at www.sigar.mil
Section 5(a)(3)	Identification of each significant recommendation described in previous semiannual reports on which corrective action has not been completed	List all instances of incomplete corrective action from previous semiannual reports	In process
Section 5(a)(4)	A summary of matters referred to prosecutive authorities and the prosecutions and convictions which have resulted	Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG member reports List SIGAR Investigations that have been referred	Other Agency Oversight
Section 5(a)(5)	A summary of each report made to the [Secretary of Defense] under section 6(b)(2) (instances where information requested was refused or not provided)	Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG member reports List instances in which information was refused SIGAR auditors, investigators, or inspectors	Other Agency Oversight
Section 5(a)(6)	A listing, subdivided according to subject matter, of each audit report, inspection report and evaluation report issued...showing dollar value of questioned costs and recommendations that funds be put to better use	Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG member reports List SIGAR reports	Other Agency Oversight
Section 5(a)(7)	A summary of each particularly significant report	Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG member reports Provide a synopsis of the significant SIGAR reports	Other Agency Oversight A full list of significant reports can be found at www.sigar.mil
Section 5(a)(8)	Statistical tables showing the total number of audit reports and the total dollar value of questioned costs	Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG member reports Develop statistical tables showing dollar value of questioned cost from SIGAR reports	See reports of SWA/JPG members In process
Section 5(a)(9)	Statistical tables showing the total number of audit reports, inspection reports, and evaluation reports and the dollar value of recommendations that funds be put to better use by management	Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG member reports Develop statistical tables showing dollar value of funds put to better use by management from SIGAR reports	See reports of SWA/JPG members In process
Section 5(a)(10)	A summary of each audit report, inspection report, and evaluation report issued before the commencement of the reporting period for which no management decision has been made by the end of reporting period, an explanation of the reasons such management decision has not been made, and a statement concerning the desired timetable for achieving a management decision	Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG member reports Provide a synopsis of SIGAR audit reports in which recommendations by SIGAR are still open	See reports of SWA/JPG members None

APPENDICES

TABLE A.2 (CONTINUED)

CROSS-REFERENCE TO SEMIANNUAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE IG ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED (5 U.S.C. APP. 3) (“IG ACT”)			
IG Act Section	IG Act Language	SIGAR Action	Section
Section 5(a)(11)	A description and explanation of the reasons for any significant revised management decision	Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG member reports	See reports of SWA/JPG members
		Explain SIGAR audit reports in which significant revisions have been made to management decisions	None
Section 5(a)(12)	Information concerning any significant management decision with which the Inspector General is in disagreement	Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG member reports	See reports of SWA/JPG members
		Explain SIGAR audit reports in which SIGAR disagreed with management decision	No disputed decisions during the reporting period
Section 5(a)(13)	Information described under [Section 804(b)] of the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 (instances and reasons when an agency has not met target dates established in a remediation plan)	Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG member reports	See reports of SWA/JPG members
		Provide information where management has not met targets from a remediation plan	No disputed decisions during the reporting period
Section 5(a)(14)(A)	An Appendix containing the results of any peer review conducted by another Office of Inspector General during the reporting period; or	SIGAR has posted in full the results of, and reports from, SIGAR’s most recent peer reviews (completed during July 2010, prior to the current reporting period), on its website	Posted in full at www.sigar.mil
Section 5(a)(14)(B)	If no peer review was conducted within that reporting period, a statement identifying the date of the last peer review conducted by another Office of Inspector General	A peer review was conducted in the reporting period.	Posted in full at www.sigar.mil
Section 5(a)(15)	A list of any outstanding recommendations from any peer review conducted by another Office of Inspector General that have not been fully implemented, including a statement describing the status of the implementation and why implementation is not complete	None – all peer review recommendations effectively addressed, and remedial measures implemented, by 9/30/2015	Recommendations and related materials posted in full at www.sigar.mil
Section 5(a)(16)	Any peer reviews conducted by SIGAR of another IG Office during the reporting period, including a list of any outstanding recommendations made from any previous peer review . . . that remain outstanding or have not been fully implemented	Not applicable (SIGAR did not conduct, or participate in the conduct, of a peer review of another Office of Inspector General during the reporting period)	SIGAR Oversight

APPENDICES

APPENDIX B

U.S. FUNDS FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION (\$ MILLIONS)

Table B.1 lists funds appropriated for Afghanistan reconstruction by program, per year, as of March 31, 2016. Table B.2 lists fund appropriated for counter-narcotics initiatives since 2002.

TABLE B.2

COUNTERNARCOTICS, CUMULATIVE AMOUNT APPROPRIATED, SINCE 2002 (\$ MILLIONS)	
ASFF	\$1,311.92
DOD CN	3,000.47
ESF	1,536.45
INCLE	2,184.72
DEA ^a	438.41
Total	\$8,471.97

Table B.2 Note: Numbers have been rounded. Counternarcotics funds cross-cut both the Security and Governance & Development spending categories; these funds are also captured in those categories in Table B.1. Figures represent cumulative amounts appropriated for counternarcotics initiatives in Afghanistan since 2002. Initiatives include eradication, interdiction, support to Afghanistan's Special Mission Wing (SMW), counternarcotics-related capacity building, and alternative agricultural development efforts. ESF and INCLE figures show the cumulative amounts appropriated for counternarcotics initiatives from those funds. SIGAR excluded FY 2014 & 2015 ASFF funding for the SMW from this analysis due to the decreasing number of counternarcotics missions conducted by the SMW.

^a DEA receives funding from State's Diplomatic & Consular Programs account in addition to DEA's direct line appropriation listed in Appendix B.

Table B.2 Source: SIGAR analysis of counternarcotics funding, 4/20/2016; State, response to SIGAR data call, 4/7/2016; DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 4/12/2016; USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/7/2016; DOJ, response to SIGAR data call, 4/1/2016.

Table B.1 Note: Numbers have been rounded. DOD reprogrammed \$1 billion from FY 2011 ASFF, \$1 billion from FY 2012 ASFF, and \$178 million from FY 2013 ASFF to fund other DOD OCO requirements. ASFF data reflects the following rescissions: \$1 billion from FY 2012 in Pub. L. No. 113-6, \$764.38 million from FY 2014 in Pub. L. No. 113-235, and \$400 million from FY 2015 in Pub. L. No. 114-113. DOD transferred \$101 million from FY 2011 AIF, \$179.5 million from FY 2013 AIF, and \$55 million from FY 2014 AIF to the ESF to fund infrastructure projects implemented by USAID. ^a Final FY 2016 appropriation amounts for State and USAID accounts were still being determined when this report went to press.

Table B.1 Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data calls, 4/19/2016, 4/18/2016, 4/12/2016, 10/22/2012, 10/14/2009, and 10/1/2009; State, response to SIGAR data calls, 4/8/2016, 4/7/2016, 10/20/2015, 4/15/2015, 4/15/2014, 6/27/2013, 10/5/2012, and 6/27/2012; Treasury, response to SIGAR data call, 7/9/2015; OMB, response to SIGAR data calls, 4/16/2015, 7/14/2014, 7/19/2013, and 1/4/2013; USAID, response to SIGAR data calls, 4/9/2016, 10/15/2010, 1/15/2010, and 10/9/2009; DOJ, response to SIGAR data calls, 4/1/2016 and 7/7/2009; USDA, response to SIGAR data call, 4/2009; DFAS, "AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts March 2016," 4/15/2016; Pub. L. Nos. 114-113, 113-235, 113-76, 113-6, 112-74, 112-10, 111-212, 111-118.

TABLE B.1

U.S. FUNDING SOURCES	AGENCY	TOTAL	FY 2002-04
Security			
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)	DOD	\$63,922.65	0.00
Train & Equip (DOD)	DOD	440.00	150.00
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)	State	1,059.14	662.34
International Military Education and Training (IMET)	State	16.22	1.24
Drug Interdiction & Counter-Drug Activities (DOD CN)	DOD	3,000.47	71.80
Total - Security		\$68,438.49	885.37
Governance & Development			
Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)	DOD	3,684.00	40.00
Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF)	DOD	988.50	0.00
Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO)	DOD	822.85	0.00
Economic Support Fund (ESF)	USAID	18,599.01	1,248.06
Development Assistance (DA)	USAID	886.50	213.98
Afghanistan Freedom Support Act (AFSA)	DOD	550.00	450.00
Child Survival & Health (CSH + GHAI)	USAID	554.63	90.60
Commodity Credit Corp (CCC)	USAID	31.48	8.80
USAID (Other)	USAID	52.09	5.50
Non-Proliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining & Related (NADR)	State	692.99	145.60
Provincial Reconstruction Team Advisors	USDA	5.70	0.00
Treasury Technical Assistance	Treasury	4.45	1.96
International Narcotics Control & Law Enforcement (INCLE)	State	4,690.86	280.00
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)	DOJ	230.31	7.17
Total - Governance & Development		\$31,793.37	2,491.67
Humanitarian			
Pub. L. No. 480 Title I	USDA	5.00	5.00
Pub. L. No. 480 Title II	USAID	891.28	205.60
Disaster Assistance (IDA)	USAID	575.91	294.00
Transition Initiatives (TI)	USAID	37.69	30.98
Migration & Refugee Assistance (MRA)	State	1077.57	265.90
Voluntary Peacekeeping (PKO)	State	69.33	53.83
Emergency Refugee & Migration Assistance (ERMA)	State	25.20	25.00
Food for Progress	USDA	109.49	14.04
416(b) Food Aid	USDA	95.18	95.18
Food for Education	USDA	50.49	15.39
Emerson Trust	USDA	22.40	0.00
Total - Humanitarian		\$2,959.54	1,004.92
Civilian Operations			
Oversight		422.05	0.00
Other		9,556.15	403.34
Total - Civilian Operations		\$9,978.20	403.34
Total Funding		\$113,169.60	4,785.31

APPENDICES

	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	FY 2011	FY 2012	FY 2013	FY 2014	FY 2015	FY 2016 ^a
	995.00	1,908.13	7,406.40	2,750.00	5,606.94	9,166.77	10,619.28	9,200.00	4,946.20	3,962.34	3,709.33	3,652.26
	290.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	396.80	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	0.95	0.98	1.19	1.66	1.40	1.76	1.56	1.18	1.42	1.50	1.40	0.00
	224.54	108.05	290.97	192.81	230.06	392.27	379.83	472.99	255.81	238.96	0.00	142.39
	1,907.28	2,017.17	7,698.57	2,944.47	5,838.40	9,560.80	11,000.67	9,674.16	5,203.44	4,202.80	3,710.73	3,794.65
	136.00	215.00	209.00	488.33	550.67	1,000.00	400.00	400.00	200.00	30.00	10.00	5.00
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	299.00	400.00	145.50	144.00	0.00	0.00
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	14.44	59.26	239.24	245.76	138.20	122.24	3.72	0.00
	1,283.00	473.39	1,224.75	1,399.51	2,077.49	3,346.00	2,168.51	1,836.76	1,802.65	907.00	831.90	0.00
	169.21	185.08	166.81	149.43	0.40	0.30	0.00	0.00	0.35	0.00	0.95	0.00
	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	38.00	41.45	100.77	63.04	58.23	92.30	69.91	0.00	0.25	0.01	0.06	0.00
	0.00	0.00	0.00	10.77	4.22	4.22	3.09	0.38	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	0.00	0.00	0.00	21.96	2.81	4.90	6.25	7.10	1.84	0.80	0.82	0.12
	40.65	35.72	36.72	29.72	59.92	70.74	69.30	65.32	52.60	43.20	43.50	0.00
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	5.70	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	0.95	0.19	0.13	0.75	0.47	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	709.28	232.65	251.74	307.56	493.90	589.00	400.00	357.92	593.81	225.00	250.00	0.00
	16.77	23.66	20.38	40.59	18.88	19.20	18.70	18.70	17.00	18.70	9.05	1.52
	2,493.85	1,207.14	2,010.30	2,511.66	3,287.14	5,185.92	3,673.99	3,331.93	2,952.19	1,490.96	1,149.99	6.64
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	49.20	56.60	60.00	60.00	177.00	58.13	112.55	0.00	46.20	66.00	0.00	0.00
	4.23	0.04	0.03	16.87	27.13	29.71	66.39	56.00	21.51	28.19	25.71	6.13
	1.60	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.75	0.85	1.08	0.63	0.32	0.83	0.60	0.05
	47.10	41.80	54.00	44.25	76.79	80.93	65.00	99.56	76.07	107.89	118.28	0.00
	15.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	30.10	23.24	9.47	20.55	12.09	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	10.02	25.08	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	0.00	0.00	0.00	22.40	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	157.75	146.76	123.50	164.07	293.96	169.62	245.01	156.18	144.09	202.91	144.59	6.18
	0.00	0.00	2.50	14.30	25.20	34.40	37.20	59.00	58.70	62.65	68.60	59.50
	136.29	131.90	207.80	435.51	1,065.86	1,761.70	905.10	1,425.42	1,272.59	852.62	909.50	48.52
	136.29	131.90	210.30	449.81	1,091.06	1,796.10	942.30	1,484.42	1,331.29	915.27	978.10	108.02
	4,695.16	3,502.96	10,042.67	6,070.00	10,510.56	16,712.43	15,861.97	14,646.69	9,631.01	6,811.94	5,983.42	3,915.48

APPENDIX C

SIGAR WRITTEN PRODUCTS*

SIGAR Audits

Completed Performance Audit

SIGAR completed one performance audit during this reporting period.

COMPLETED SIGAR PERFORMANCE AUDIT AS OF MARCH 31, 2016

Report Identifier	Report Title	Date Issued
SIGAR 16-32-AR	Primary and Secondary Education In Afghanistan: Comprehensive Assessments Needed to Determine the Progress and Effectiveness of Over \$759 Million in DOD, State, and USAID Programs	4/2016

New Performance Audits

SIGAR initiated two performance audits during this reporting period.

NEW SIGAR PERFORMANCE AUDITS AS OF MARCH 31, 2016

Project Identifier	Project Title	Date Initiated
SIGAR 115A	U.S. Government Efforts to Increase the Supply, Quantity, and Distribution of Electric Power from the Kajaki Dam	4/2016
SIGAR 114A	Task Force for Business and Stability Operations' Programs and Activities in Afghanistan from 2010 through 2014	4/2016

Ongoing Performance Audits

SIGAR had 14 performance audits in progress during this reporting period.

ONGOING SIGAR PERFORMANCE AUDITS AS OF MARCH 31, 2016

Project Identifier	Project Title	Date Initiated
SIGAR 112A	Administration, Monitoring, and Reporting of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund	12/2015
SIGAR 111A	Award, Administration, and Performance of Legacy Research Contracts	8/2015
SIGAR 110A	Effectiveness of the Commander's Emergency Response Program in Afghanistan	8/2015
SIGAR 109A	U.S. Salary Supplements for Afghan Government Employees and Technical Advisors	5/2015
SIGAR 108A	USAID's Efforts to Support Land Reform in Afghanistan	5/2015
SIGAR 107A	U.S. Efforts to Sustain Afghanistan's Road Infrastructure	5/2015
SIGAR 106A	Accountability for ANSF Organizational Clothing and Individual Equipment	12/2014
SIGAR 105A	USAID's Efforts to Support and Improve Afghanistan's Health Sector	11/2014
SIGAR 103A	USAID Measuring Impacts of Stabilization Initiatives Program	11/2014
SIGAR 102A	Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund Follow-Up	11/2014
SIGAR 101A	Afghanistan Technical Equipment Maintenance Program (A-TEMP) for ANA Vehicle Maintenance and Capacity Building	10/2014

Continued on the next page

APPENDICES

ONGOING SIGAR PERFORMANCE AUDITS AS OF MARCH 31, 2016 (CONTINUED)

Project Identifier	Project Title	Date Initiated
SIGAR 100A	DOD Oversight of Infrastructure Projects Transferred to the Afghan Government	8/2014
SIGAR 096A (part II)	U.S. Efforts to Assist Afghan Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons	2/2014
SIGAR 088A	U.S. Government Efforts to Assist in Reconstruction and Commercialization of Afghanistan's Information and Communication Technology Sector	11/2013

Completed Financial Audits

SIGAR completed seven financial audits during this reporting period.

COMPLETED SIGAR FINANCIAL AUDITS AS OF MARCH 31, 2016

Report Identifier	Report Title	Date Issued
SIGAR 16-20-FA	USDA's Soybeans for Agricultural Renewal in Afghanistan Initiative.	3/2016
SIGAR 16-21-FA	USAID's Irrigation and Watershed Management Program in Afghanistan	3/2016
SIGAR 16-25-FA	Department of State's Demining Activities in Afghanistan	3/2016
SIGAR 16-27-FA	USAID's Support for the American University of Afghanistan	3/2016
SIGAR 16-28-FA	USAID's Department of State's Demining Activities in Afghanistan	3/2016
SIGAR 16-30-FA	Construction of the Special Forces Kandak in Kandahar	4/2016
SIGAR 16-31-FA	USAID's Health Care Improvement Project	4/2016

New Financial Audits

SIGAR initiated eight financial audits during this reporting period.

NEW SIGAR FINANCIAL AUDITS AS OF MARCH 31, 2016

Project Identifier	Project Title	Date Initiated
F-090	Checchi and Company Consulting Inc. (CCCI) - Services under Program Project Offices for Results Tracking (SUPPORT II)	3/2016
F-091	Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS) - Kajaki Dam Unit 2	3/2016
F-092	Chemonics International, Inc. - Financial Access for Investing in the Development of Afghanistan (FAIDA)	3/2016
F-093	Management Sciences for Health (MSH) - Strengthening Pharmaceutical System (SPS)	3/2016
F-094	Roots of Peace - Commercial Horticulture and Agriculture Marketing Program (CHAMP)	3/2016
F-095	Volunteers for Economic Growth Alliance (VEGA) - Assistance in Building Afghanistan by Developing Enterprise (ABADE)	3/2016
F-096	International Relief and Development (IRD) - Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ)	3/2016
F-097	Task Force for Business and Stability Operations' Programs and Activities in Afghanistan from 2010 through 2014	4/2016

* SIGAR may also report on products and events occurring after March 31, 2016, up to the publication date.

APPENDICES

Ongoing Financial Audits

SIGAR had 16 financial audits in progress during this reporting period.

ONGOING SIGAR FINANCIAL AUDITS AS OF MARCH 31, 2016		
Project Identifier	Project Title	Date Initiated
F-089	Sterling Global Operations (Afghan Wide Mine Clearance-Phase II)	11/2015
F-088	AECOM (Construction of Nimroz Border Patrol)	11/2015
F-087	Sayara Media and Communications (Counternarcotic Program)	11/2015
F-086	Aga Khan Foundation (SAGAL program)	11/2015
F-085	State Public Affairs Grants for Producing TV, Radio, and Media Programs	11/2015
F-084	USAID Contract with Black & Veatch Special Projects Corporation for the Kandahar-Helmand Power Program	10/2015
F-083	USAID Contract with Democracy International for Electoral Reform and Civic Advocacy (AERCA) Program	10/2015
F-082	USAID Contract with Counterpart International for the Promoting Afghan Civic Education (PACE) Program	10/2015
F-079	DOD Contract with PRI DJI, A Construction JV for construction of District HQ Uniform Police Station, Marjah	3/2015
F-078	DOD Contract with PRI DJI, A Construction JV for construction of 4th Special Forces Kandak, Shindand	3/2015
F-077	DOD Contract with AMEC Earth & Environmental Inc. for construction of Afghan Defense University, Qarghah	3/2015
F-076	DOD Contract with PRI/DJI, A Construction JV for repair of Shindand Runway, Shindand	3/2015
F-075	DOD Contract with Gilbane Federal for construction of 1st Commando Brigade HQ & Transient Kandak, Gardez	3/2015
F-074	DOD Contract with Gilbane Federal for construction of Afghan National Civil Order Police Battalion & Brigade HQ, Marjah	3/2015
F-072	DOD Contract with Mission Essential Personnel LLC for translation/ linguist support services	3/2015
F-061	DOD Contract with Dyncorp, International LLC for mentoring and training services in support of the ANSF	4/2014

SIGAR Inspections

Completed Inspections

SIGAR completed three Inspection reports this reporting period.

COMPLETED SIGAR INSPECTIONS AS OF MARCH 31, 2016		
Product Identifier	Product Title	Date Issued
SIGAR 16-16-IP	Afghan Ministry of Defense Headquarters: \$154.7 Million Building Appears Well Built, but Has Several Construction Issues that Should Be Assessed	2/2016
SIGAR 16-22-IP	Department of Defense Reconstruction Projects: Summary of SIGAR Inspection reports Issued from July 2009 through September 2015	3/2016
SIGAR 16-26-IP	Afghan Air Force University: Contract Requirements Were Generally Met, but Instances of Non-compliance, Poor Workmanship, and Inadequate Maintenance Need to Be Addressed	3/2016

New Inspection

SIGAR initiated one Inspection report this reporting period.

NEW SIGAR INSPECTION AS OF MARCH 31, 2016		
Product Identifier	Product Title	Date Initiated
I-039	Follow-up Inspection of the Pol-i-Charkhi Prison	2/2016

SIGAR Special Projects Completed Special Projects

SIGAR completed two Special Project products this reporting period.

COMPLETED SIGAR SPECIAL PROJECTS AS OF MARCH 31, 2016		
Product Identifier	Product Title	Date Issued
SIGAR 16-19-SP	Structural Damage at Health Facility No. 1987	3/2016
SIGAR 16-23-SP	Department of Defense Base Closures and Transfers in Afghanistan: The U.S. Has Disposed of \$907 Million in Foreign Excess Real Property	3/2016

SIGAR Lessons Learned Projects Ongoing Lessons Learned Projects

SIGAR has five ongoing Lessons Learned projects this reporting period.

ONGOING SIGAR LESSONS LEARNED PROJECTS AS OF MARCH 31, 2016		
Project Identifier	Project Title	Date Initiated
SIGAR-LL-05	Private Sector Development and Economic Growth	10/2015
SIGAR-LL-04	Counternarcotics in Afghanistan Reconstruction	4/2015
SIGAR-LL-03	Corruption in Afghanistan: Perceptions and Responses of the U.S. Government	5/2015
SIGAR-LL-02	U.S. Coordination with External Partners in Administering Aid	12/2014
SIGAR-LL-01	Interagency Coordination on Strategy and Planning	12/2014

Other SIGAR Written Products

This reporting period, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, John F. Sopko testified before Congress four times.

NEW SIGAR TESTIMONY AS OF MARCH 31, 2016		
Testimony Identifier	Testimony Title	Testimony Submitted
SIGAR 16-29-TY	DOD Task Force for Business and Stability Operations in Afghanistan: Review of Selected Expenditures Highlights Serious Management and Oversight Problems	4/2016
SIGAR 16-24-TY	Oversight of Department of Defense Reconstruction Projects in Afghanistan	3/2016
SIGAR 16-18-TY	Challenges to Effective Oversight of Afghanistan Reconstruction Grow as High-Risk Areas Persist	2/2016
SIGAR 16-17-TY	Assessing the Capabilities and Effectiveness of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces	2/2016

APPENDIX D


SIGAR INVESTIGATIONS AND HOTLINE

SIGAR Investigations

This quarter, SIGAR opened 17 new investigations and closed 38, bringing the total number of open investigations to 288. Of the new investigations, most were procurement and contract fraud, as shown in Figure D.1. Of the closed investigations, most were closed due to lack of investigative merit, as shown in Figure D.2.

FIGURE D.1


SIGAR NEW INVESTIGATIONS, JANUARY 1–MARCH 31, 2016



Source: SIGAR Investigations Directorate, 4/15/2016.

FIGURE D.2

SIGAR INVESTIGATIONS: CLOSED INVESTIGATIONS, JANUARY 1–MARCH 31, 2016




Source: SIGAR Investigations Directorate, 4/14/2016.

SIGAR Hotline

Of the 108 Hotline complaints received this quarter, most were received electronically, as shown in Figure D.3. In addition to working on new complaints, the Investigations directorate continued its work this quarter on complaints received prior to July 1, 2015. This quarter, the directorate dealt with 164 complaints, most of which are under review or were closed, as shown in Figure D.4.

FIGURE D.4


STATUS OF SIGAR HOTLINE COMPLAINTS: MARCH 31, 2016



Note: 108 complaints received during quarter; total includes status changes to complaints made in earlier periods.
Source: SIGAR Investigations Directorate, 4/14/2016.

FIGURE D.3

SOURCE OF SIGAR HOTLINE COMPLAINTS, JANUARY 1–MARCH 31, 2016



Source: SIGAR Investigations Directorate, 4/14/2016.

SIGAR Suspensions and Debarments

Table D.1 is a comprehensive list of finalized suspensions, debarments, and special entity designations relating to SIGAR's work in Afghanistan as of March 31, 2016. *SIGAR lists its suspensions, debarments and special entity designations for historical purposes only.* For the current status of any individual or entity listed herein as previously suspended, debarred, or listed as a special entity designation, please consult the System for Award Management, www.sam.gov.

Entries appearing in both the suspension and debarment sections are based upon their placement in suspended status following criminal indictment or determination of nonresponsibility by the agency suspension and debarment official. Final debarment was imposed following criminal conviction in U.S. Federal District Court and/or final determination by the agency suspension and debarment official regarding term of debarment.

APPENDICES

TABLE D.1

SPECIAL ENTITY DESIGNATIONS, SUSPENSIONS, AND DEBARMENTS AS OF MARCH 31, 2016		
Special Entity Designations		
Arvin Kam Construction Company	Khan, Haji Mohammad Almas	Saadat, Wakil
Arvin Kam Group LLC, d.b.a. "Arvin Kam Group Security," d.b.a. "Arvin Kam Group Foundation," d.b.a. "Arvin Global Logistics Services Company"	Noh-E Safi Mining Company	Triangle Technologies
Ayub, Mohammad	Noor Rahman Company	Wasim, Abdul Wakil
Fruzi, Haji Khalil	Noor Rahman Construction Company	Zaland, Yousef
Haji Amir Muhammad	Nur Rahman Group, d.b.a. "NUCCL Construction Company," d.b.a. "RUCCL Rahman Umar Construction Company," d.b.a. "Rahman Trading and General Logistics Company LLC	Zurmat Construction Company
Haji Dhost Mohammad Zurmat Construction Company	Rahman, Nur, a.k.a. "Noor Rahman", a.k.a. "Noor Rahman Safa"	Zurmat Foundation
Jan, Nurullah	Rhaman, Mohammad	Zurmat General Trading
		Zurmat Group of Companies, d.b.a. "Zurmat LLC"
		Zurmat Material Testing Laboratory
Suspensions		
Al-Watan Construction Company	Sharpway Logistics	Rivera-Medina, Franklin Delano
Basirat Construction Firm	United States California Logistics Company	Peace Thru Business
Brophy, Kenneth	Yousef, Najeebullah	Pudenz, Adam Jeff Julias
Naqibullah, Nadeem	Rahimi, Mohammad Edris	Elham, Yaser, a.k.a. "Najibullah Saadullah"
Rahman, Obaidur	Wooten, Philip Steven	Everest Faizy Logistics Services
Campbell, Neil Patrick	Domineck, Lavette Kaye	Faizy Elham Brothers Ltd.
Borcata, Raul A.	Markwith, James	Faizy, Rohullah
Close, Jarred Lee	All Points International Distributors Inc.	Hekmat Shadman General Trading LLC
Logistical Operations Worldwide	Cipolla, James	Hekmat Shadman Ltd., d.b.a. "Hikmat Shadman Ltd."
Robinson, Franz Martin	Hercules Global Logistics	Hikmat Shadman Construction and Supply Company
Taylor, Zachery Dustin	Schroeder, Robert	Hikmat Shadman Logistics Services Company, d.b.a. "Hikmat Shadman Commerce Construction and Supply Company," d.b.a. "Hikmat Shadman Commerce Construction Services"
Aaria Group Construction Company	AISC LLC	Saif Hikmat Construction Logistic Services and Supply Co.
Aaria Group	American International Security Corporation	Shadman, Hikmatullah, a.k.a. "Hikmat Shadman," a.k.a. "Haji Hikmatullah Shadman," a.k.a. "Hikmatullah Saadulah"
Aaria Herai General Trading	Brothers, Richard S.	Travis, James Edward
Aaria M.E. General Trading LLC	David A Young Construction & Renovation Inc.	Sherzai, Akbar Ahmed
Aaria Middle East	Force Direct Solutions LLC	Bertolini, Robert L.
Aaria Middle East Company LLC	Harris, Christopher	Kahn, Haroon Shams, a.k.a. "Haroon Shams"
Aaria Middle East Company Ltd. - Herat	Hernando County Holdings LLC	Shams Constructions Limited
Aaria Supplies Company LTD	Hide-A-Wreck LLC	Shams General Services and Logistics Unlimited
Aaria Supply Services and Consultancy	Panthers LLC	Shams Group International, d.b.a. "Shams Group International FZE"
Aftech International	Paper Mill Village Inc.	Shams London Academy
Aftech International Pvt. Ltd.	Shroud Line LLC	Shams Production
Alam, Ahmed Farzad	Spada, Carol	Shams Welfare Foundation
Albahar Logistics	Taylor, Michael	Autry, Cleo Brian
American Aaria Company LLC	Welventure LLC	Chamberlain, William Todd
American Aaria LLC	World Wide Trainers LLC	
Barakzai, Nangjalai	Young, David	
Formid Supply and Services	Espinoza, Mauricio	
Greenlight General Trading	Long, Tonya	
Kabul Hackle Logistics Company	Brophy, Kenneth Michael	

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TABLE D.1 (CONTINUED)

SPECIAL ENTITY DESIGNATIONS, SUSPENSIONS, AND DEBARMENTS AS OF MARCH 31, 2016 (CONTINUED)

Suspensions (continued)		
Cook, Jeffrey Arthur	Mayberry, Teresa	San Francisco for Housing Company
Harper, Deric Tyron	Addas, James	Sura Al Mustakbal
Swim, Alexander	Advanced Ability for U-PVC	Top Techno Concrete Batch
Walls, Barry Lee, Jr.	Al Bait Al Amer	Edmondson, Jeffrey B.
Ciampa, Christopher	Al Iraq Al Waed	Lugo, Emanuel
Casellas, Luis Ramon	Al Quraishi Bureau	Montague, Geoffrey K.
International Contracting and Development	Al Zakoura Company	Pena, Ramiro
Sobh, Adeeb Nagib, a.k.a. "Ali Sobh"	Al-Amir Group LLC	Ware, Marvin
Stallion Construction and Engineering Group	Al-Noor Contracting Company	Green, Robert Warren
Wazne Group Inc., d.b.a. "Wazne Wholesale"	Al-Noor Industrial Technologies Company	Bailly, Louis Matthew
Wazne, Ayman, a.k.a. "Ayman Ibrahim Wazne"	California for Project Company	Albright, Timothy H.
Hampton, Seneca Darnell	Civilian Technologies Limited Company	Bailly, Louis Matthew
Green, George E.	Industrial Techniques Engineering Electromechanically Company	Bunch, Donald P.
Tran, Anthony Don	Jamil, Omar K.	Epps, Willis
Vergez, Norbert	Pulsars Company	Kline, David
Debarments		
Farooqi, Hashmatullah	Radhi, Mohammad Khalid	Kunari, Haji Pir Mohammad
Hamid Lais Construction Company	Safi, Fazal Ahmed	Mushfiq, Muhammad Jaffar
Hamid Lais Group	Shin Gul Shaheen, a.k.a. "Sheen Gul Shaheen"	Mutallib, Abdul
Lodin, Rohullah Farooqi	Espinoza-Loor, Pedro Alfredo	Nasrat, Sami
Bennett & Fouch Associates LLC	Campbell, Neil Patrick	National General Construction Company
Brandon, Gary	Navarro, Wesley	Passerly, Ahmaad Saleem
K5 Global	Hazrati, Arash	Rabi, Fazal
Ahmad, Noor	Midfield International	Rahman, Atta
Noor Ahmad Yousufzai Construction Company	Moore, Robert G.	Rahman, Fazal
Ayeni, Sheryl Adenike	Noori, Noor Alam, a.k.a. "Noor Alam"	Roshandil, Mohammad Ajmal
Cannon, Justin	Northern Reconstruction Organization	Saber, Mohammed
Constantino, April Anne	Shamal Pamir Building and Road Construction Company	Safi, Azizur Rahman
Constantino, Dee	Wade, Desi D.	Safi, Matiullah
Constantino, Ramil Palmes	Blue Planet Logistics Services	Sahak, Sher Khan
Crilly, Braam	Mahmodi, Padres	Shaheed, Murad
Drotleff, Christopher	Mahmodi, Shikab	Shirzad, Daulet Khan
Fil-Tech Engineering and Construction Company	Saber, Mohammed	Uddin, Mehrab
Handa, Sdiharh	Watson, Brian Erik	Watson, Brian Erik
Jabak, Imad	Abbasi, Shahpoor	Wooten, Philip Steven
Jamally, Rohullah	Amiri, Waheedullah	Espinoza, Mauricio
Khalid, Mohammad	Atal, Waheed	Alam, Ahmed Farzad
Khan, Daro	Daud, Abdullilah	Greenlight General Trading
Mariano, April Anne Perez	Dehati, Abdul Majid	Aaria Middle East Company LLC
McCabe, Elton Maurice	Fazli, Qais	Aaria Middle East Company Ltd. - Herat
Mihalcz, John	Hamdard, Mohammad Yousuf	Aaria M.E. General Trading LLC
Qasimi, Mohammed Indress		Aaria Middle East

APPENDICES

TABLE D.1 (CONTINUED)

SPECIAL ENTITY DESIGNATIONS, SUSPENSIONS, AND DEBARMENTS AS OF MARCH 31, 2016 (CONTINUED)		
Debarments (continued)		
Barakzai, Nangialai	Khan, Solomon Sherdad, a.k.a. "Solomon"	Johnson, Angela
Formid Supply and Services	Mursalini, Ikramullah, a.k.a. "Ikramullah"	CNH Development Company LLC
Aria Supply Services and Consultancy	Musafer, Naseem, a.k.a. "Naseem"	Johnson, Keith
Kabul Hackle Logistics Company	Ali, Esrar	Military Logistic Support LLC
Yousef, Najeebullah	Gul, Ghanzi	Eisner, John
Aria Group	Luqman Engineering Construction Company, d.b.a. "Luqman Engineering"	Taurus Holdings LLC
Aria Group Construction Company	Safiullah, a.k.a. "Mr. Safiullah"	Brophy, Kenneth Michael
Aria Supplies Company LTD	Sarfarez, a.k.a. "Mr. Sarfarez"	Abdul Haq Foundation
Rahimi, Mohammad Edris	Wazir, Khan	Adajar, Adonis
All Points International Distributors Inc.	Akbar, Ali	Calhoun, Josh W.
Hercules Global Logistics	Crystal Construction Company, d.b.a. "Samitullah Road Construction Company"	Clark Logistic Services Company, d.b.a. "Clark Construction Company"
Schroeder, Robert	Samitullah (Individual uses only one name)	Farkas, Janos
Helmand Twinkle Construction Company	Ashna, Mohammad Ibrahim, a.k.a. "Ibrahim"	Flordeliz, Alex F.
Waziri, Heward Omar	Gurvinder, Singh	Knight, Michael T., II
Zadran, Mohammad	Jahan, Shah	Lozado, Gary
Afghan Mercury Construction Company, d.b.a. "Afghan Mercury Construction & Logistics Company"	Shahim, Zakirullah a.k.a. "Zakrullah Shahim", a.k.a. "Zikrullah Shahim"	Mijares, Armando N., Jr.
Mirzali Naseeb Construction Company	Alyas, Maiwand Ansunullah a.k.a. "Engineer Maiwand Alyas"	Mullakhiel, Wadir Abdullahmatin
Montes, Diyana	BMCS	Rainbow Construction Company
Naseeb, Mirzali	Maiwand Haqmal Construction and Supply Company	Sardar, Hassan, a.k.a. "Hassan Sardar Inqilab"
Robinson, Franz Martin	New Riders Construction Company, d.b.a. "Riders Construction Company," d.b.a. "New Riders Construction and Services Company"	Shah, Mohammad Nadir, a.k.a. "Nader Shah"
Smith, Nancy	Riders Constructions, Services, Logistics and Transportation Company	Tito, Regor
Sultani, Abdul Anas a.k.a. "Abdul Anas"	Riders Group of Companies	Brown, Charles Phillip
Faqiri, Shir	Domineck, Lavette Kaye	Sheren, Fasela, a.k.a. "Sheren Fasela"
Hosmat, Haji	Markwith, James	Anderson, Jesse Montel
Jim Black Construction Company	Martinez, Rene	Charboneau, Stephanie, a.k.a. "Stephanie Shankel"
Arya Ariana Aryayee Logistics, d.b.a. "AAA Logistics," d.b.a. "Somo Logistics"	Maroof, Abdul	Hightower, Jonathan
Garst, Donald	Qara, Yousef	Khan, Noor Zali, a.k.a. "Wali Kahn Noor"
Mukhtar, Abdul a.k.a. "Abdul Kubar"	Royal Palace Construction Company	Saheed, a.k.a. "Mr. Saheed," a.k.a. "Sahill;" a.k.a. "Ghazi-Rahman"
Noori Mahgir Construction Company	Bradshaw, Christopher Chase	Weaver, Christopher
Noori, Sherin Agha	Zuhra Productions	Al Kaheel Oasis Services
Long, Tonya	Zuhra, Niajai	Al Kaheel Technical Service
Isranuddin, Burhanuddin	Boulware, Candice a.k.a. "Candice Joy Dawkins"	CLC Construction Company
Matun, Navidullah, a.k.a. "Javid Ahmad"	Dawkins, John	CLC Consulting LLC
Matun, Wahidullah	Mesopotamia Group LLC	Complete Manpower Solutions
Navid Basir Construction Company	Nordloh, Geoffrey	Mohammed, Masiuddin, a.k.a. "Masi Mohammed"
Navid Basir JV Gagar Baba Construction Company	Kieffer, Jerry	Rhoden, Bradley L., a.k.a. "Brad L. Rhoden"
NBCC & GBCC JV		Rhoden, Lorraine Serena
Noori, Navid		Royal Super Jet General Trading LLC
Asmatullah, Mahmood, a.k.a. "Mahmood"		Super Jet Construction Company
Khan, Gul		Super Jet Fuel Services

APPENDICES

TABLE D.1 (CONTINUED)

SPECIAL ENTITY DESIGNATIONS, SUSPENSIONS, AND DEBARMENTS AS OF MARCH 31, 2016 (CONTINUED)		
Debarments (continued)		
Super Jet Group	Haidari, Mahboob	LTCCORP O&G LLC
Super Jet Tours LLC, d.b.a. "Super Jet Travel and Holidays LLC"	Latifi, Abdul	LTCCORP Renewables LLC
Super Solutions LLC	McCammon, Christina	LTCCORP Inc.
Abdullah, Bilal	Mohibzada, Ahmadullah, a.k.a. "Ahmadullah Mohebzada"	LTCCORP/Kaya Djibouti LLC
Farmer, Robert Scott	Neghat, Mustafa	LTCCORP/Kaya East Africa LLC
Mudiyanselage, Oliver	Qurashi, Abdul	LTCCORP/Kaya Romania LLC
Kelly, Albert, III	Raouf, Ashmatullah	LTCCORP/Kaya Rwanda LLC
Ethridge, James	Shah, David	LTCORP Technology LLC
Fernridge Strategic Partners	Touba, Kajim	Toltest Inc., d.b.a. "Wolverine Testing and Engineering," d.b.a. "Toledo Testing Laboratory," d.b.a. "LTC," d.b.a. "LTC Corp," d.b.a. "LTC Corp Ohio," d.b.a. "LTC Ohio"
AISC LLC	Zahir, Khalid	Toltest/Desbuild Germany JV LLC
American International Security Corporation	Aryubi, Mohammad Raza Samim	Veterans Construction/Lakeshore JV LLC
David A Young Construction & Renovation Inc.	Atlas Sahil Construction Company	Afghan Royal First Logistics, d.b.a. "Afghan Royal"
Force Direct Solutions LLC	Bab Al Jazeera LLC	American Barriers
Harris, Christopher	Emar-E-Sarey Construction Company	Arakozia Afghan Advertising
Hernando County Holdings LLC	Muhammad, Pianda	Dubai Armored Cars
Hide-A-Wreck LLC	Sambros International, d.b.a. "Sambros International LTD," d.b.a. "Sambros-UK JV"	Enayatullah, son of Hafizullah
Panthers LLC	Sambros JV Emar-E-Sarey Construction Company, d.b.a. "Sambros JV ESCC"	Farhas, Ahmad
Paper Mill Village Inc.	Antes, Bradley A.	Inland Holdings Inc.
Shroud Line LLC	Lakeshore Engineering & Construction Afghanistan, Inc., d.b.a. "Lakeshore General Contractors Inc."	Intermaax FZE
Spada, Carol	Lakeshore Engineering Services, Inc.	Intermaax Inc.
Welventure LLC	Lakeshore Engineering Services/Toltest JV LLC	Karkar, Shah Wali
World Wide Trainers LLC	Lakeshore Toltest - Rentenbach JV LLC	Sandman Security Services
Young, David Andrew	Lakeshore Toltest Corporation, d.b.a. "Lakeshore Group," d.b.a. "LTC Newco d.b.a. "LTC CORP Michigan," d.b.a. "Lakeshore Toltest KK"	Siddiqi, Atta
Woodruff and Company	Lakeshore Toltest Guam LLC	Specialty Bunkering
Travis, James Edward	Lakeshore Toltest JV LLC	Spidle, Chris Calvin
Khairfullah, Gul Agha	Lakeshore Toltest RRCC JV LLC	Vulcan Amps Inc.
Khalil Rahimi Construction Company	Lakeshore/Toltest METAG JV LLC	Worldwide Cargomasters
Momand, Jahanzeb, a.k.a. "Engineer Jahanzeb Momand"	LTC & Metawater JV LLC	Aziz, Haji Abdul, a.k.a. "Abdul Aziz Shah Jan," a.k.a. "Aziz"
Yar-Mohammad, Hazrat Nabi	LTC Holdings Inc.	Castillo, Alfredo, Jr.
Walizada, Abdul Masoud, a.k.a. "Masood Walizada"	LTC Italia SRL	Abbasi, Asim
Alizai, Zarghona	LTC Tower General Contractors LLC	Muturi, Samuel
Aman, Abdul	LTCCORP Commercial LLC	Mwakio, Shannel
Anwari, Laila	LTCCORP E&C Inc.	Ahmad, Jaweed
Anwari, Mezhgan	LTCCORP Government Services - OH Inc.	Ahmad, Masood
Anwari, Rafi	LTCCORP Government Services Inc.	A & J Total Landscapes
Arghandiwal, Zahra, a.k.a. "Sarah Arghandiwal"	LTCCORP Government Services-MI Inc.	Aryana Green Light Support Services
Azizi, Farwad, a.k.a. "Farwad Mohammad Azizi"		Mohammad, Sardar, a.k.a. "Sardar Mohammad Barakzai"
Bashizada, Razia		Pittman, James C., a.k.a. "Carl Pittman"
Coates, Kenneth		
Gibani, Marika		

APPENDICES

TABLE D.1 (CONTINUED)

SPECIAL ENTITY DESIGNATIONS, SUSPENSIONS, AND DEBARMENTS AS OF MARCH 31, 2016 (CONTINUED)		
Debarments (continued)		
Poaipuni, Clayton	Siddiqi, Sayed Attaullah	Al Bait Al Amer
Wiley, Patrick	Umbrella Insurance Limited Company	Al Iraq Al Waed
Crystal Island Construction Company	Taylor, Michael	Al Quraishi Bureau
Afghan Columbia Constructon Company	Gardazi, Syed	Al Zakoura Company
Ahmadi, Mohammad Omid	Smarasinghage, Sagara	Al-Amir Group LLC
Dashti, Jamsheed	Security Assistance Group LLC	Al-Noor Contracting Company
Hamdard, Eraj	Bailly, Louis Matthew	Al-Noor Industrial Technologies Company
Hamidi, Mahrokh	Kumar, Krishan	California for Project Company
Raising Wall Construction Company	Raj, Janak	Civilian Technologies Limited Company
Artemis Global, Inc., d.b.a. "Artemis Global Logistics and Solutions," d.b.a. "Artemis Global Trucking L.L.C."	Singh, Roop	Industrial Techniques Engineering Electromechanically Company
O'Brien, James Michael, a.k.a. "James Michael Wienert"	Masraq Engineering and Construction Company	Pena, Ramiro
Tamerlane Global Services Inc. d.b.a. "Tamerlane Global L.L.C.," d.b.a. "Tamerlane L.L.C.," d.b.a. "Tamerlane Technologies L.L.C."	Miakhil, Azizullah	Pulsars Company
Jean-Noel, Dimitry	Stratton, William G	San Francisco for Housing Company
Hampton, Seneca Darnell	Umeer Star Construction Company	Sura Al Mustakbal
Dennis, Jimmy W.	Zahir, Mohammad Ayub	Top Techno Concrete Batch
Timor, Karim	Marshal Afghan American Construction Company	Albright, Timothy H.
Wardak, Khalid	Marshal, Sayed Abbas Shah	Insurance Group of Afghanistan
Rahmat Siddiqi Transportation Company	Peace Thru Business	Ratib, Ahmad, a.k.a. "Nazari"
Siddiqi, Rahmat	Pudenz, Adam Jeff Julias	Jamil, Omar K.
	Green, Robert Warren	Rawat, Ashita
	Mayberry, Teresa	Casellas, Luis Ramon
	Addas, James	
	Advanced Ability for U-PVC	

APPENDIX E

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACRONYM OR ABBREVIATION	DEFINITION
AAF	Afghan Air Force
ABP	Afghan Border Police
ACAP	Afghan Civilian Assistance Program
ACD	Afghan Customs Department
ACE	Agricultural Credit Enhancement
ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADF	Agricultural Development Fund
AFMIS	Afghan Financial Management Information System
AFN	afghani (currency)
AGO	Attorney General's Office
AHRIMS	Afghan Human Resource Information Management System
AIAT	Army Institutional Advisory Team
AIF	Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund
AITF	Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund
ALP	Afghan Local Police
AML/CFT	Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANCOP	Afghan National Civil Order Police
ANDSF	Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
ANP	Afghan National Police
APFM	Afghanistan Public Financial Management program
APRP	Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program
AROC	Afghanistan Resources Oversight Council
ARTF	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
ASFF	Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
AUAF	American University of Afghanistan
AUP	Afghan Uniform Police
AWDP	Afghanistan Workforce Development Program
BAF	Bagram Airfield
BELT	Basic Education, Literacy, and Technical-Vocational Education and Training
BBG	Broadcasting Board of Governors
BPHS	Basic Package of Health Services
CCC	Central Complaints Commission or Commodity Credit Corporation
CCI	Community Cohesion Initiative
CENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
CERP	Commander's Emergency Response Program
CHAMP	Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing Program
CIGIE	Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency

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ACRONYM OR ABBREVIATION	DEFINITION
CMS	case-management system
CN	counternarcotics
CNCE	Counter Narcotics Community Engagement
CNG	compressed natural gas
CNPA	Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan
CoreIMS	Core Information Managemet System
CPD	Central Prisons Directorate
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
CSSP	Corrections System Support Program
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
CTA	Central Transfer Account
DABS	Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration (U.S.)
DFID	Department for International Development
DI	Democracy International
DOD	Department of Defense (U.S.)
DOD CN	Department of Defense Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities fund (U.S.)
DOD IG	Department of Defense Office of Inspector General
DOJ	Department of Justice (U.S.)
DVIDS	Defense Video & Imagery Distribution System
ECC	Electoral Complaints Commission
EF	essential function
EMIS	Education Management Information System (Afghan)
EPHS	Essential Package of Hospital Services
EQUALS	Engineering, Quality Assurance, and Logistical Support
EQUIP	Education Quality Improvement Project
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
ESF	Economic Support Fund
FATF	Financial Action Task Force
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation (U.S.)
FY	fiscal year
GAGAS	Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards
GAO	Government Accountability Office (U.S.)
GDP	gross domestic product
GDPDC	General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Centers
GIROA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GLE	Governor-Led Eradication
GPI	Good Performer's Initiative
HEMAYAT	Helping Mothers and Children Thrive
HMMWV	high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle
HOO	High Office of Oversight for Anti-Corruption (Afghan)
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDLG	Independent Directorate of Local Governance

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APPENDICES

ACRONYM OR ABBREVIATION	DEFINITION
IEC	Independent Election Commission (Afghan)
IED	improvised explosive device
IG	inspector general
IIU	Intelligence Investigation Unit
IJC	ISAF Joint Command
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INCLE	International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account (U.S)
INL	Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (U.S.)
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
JCMB	Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board
JRD	Juvenile Rehabilitation Directorate
JSSP	Justice Sector Support Program (State)
JTTP	Justice Training Transition Program (State)
JWIP	Judicial Wire-intercept Unit
KBR	Kabul Bank Receivership
KFZ	Kandahar Food Zone
LLP	Lessons Learned Program
LOTFA	Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan
MACCA	Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan
MAIL	Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (Afghan)
MCN	Ministry of Counter Narcotics (Afghan)
MCTF	Major Crimes Task Force
MEC	Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee
MFNDU	Marshal Fahim National Defense University
MIDAS	Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability
MISTI	Measuring Impacts of Stabilization Initiatives
MOCIT	Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (Afghan)
MOD	Ministry of Defense (Afghan)
MOE	Ministry of Education (Afghan)
MOF	Ministry of Finance (Afghan)
MOI	Ministry of Interior (Afghan)
MOI HQ & IS	Ministry of Interior Headquarters and Institutional Support (Afghan)
MOMP	Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (Afghan)
MOPH	Ministry of Public Health (Afghan)
MOWA	Ministry of Women's Affairs
MPD	MOI and Police Development project (LOTFA)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NMS	National Maintenance Strategy
NDAP	National Drug Action Plan
NDS	National Directorate of Security (Afghan)
NEPS	Northeast Power System
NGO	nongovernmental organization

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ACRONYM OR ABBREVIATION	DEFINITION
NIU	National Interdiction Unit
NPA	National Procurement Authority
NSOCC-A	NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan
NSP	National Solidarity Program
O&M	operations and maintenance
OCIE	organizational clothing and individual equipment
OCO	overseas contingency operations
OIG	Office of the Inspector General
OPPD	Office of Program and Project Development (USAID)
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense (U.S.)
OSD-CN	Office of the Secretary of Defense-Counter-Narcotics (U.S.)
OTA	Office of Technical Assistance (U.S. Treasury)
PM/WRA	Bureau of Political-Military Affairs' Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (U.S.)
POAM	Plan of Action and Milestones
PTEC	Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity
PTSD	post-traumatic stress disorder
QCG	Quadrilateral Coordination Group
RADP	Regional Agriculture Development Program
RC	recurrent cost
RLEC	regional law enforcement center
RNIFC	regional narcotics interagency fusion cell
RS	Resolute Support
SASC	Senate Armed Services Committee
SEPS	Southeast Power System
SGDP	Sheberghan Gas Development Program
SGGA	Sheberghan Gas Generation Activity
SIGAR	Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SIU	Sensitive Investigation Unit
SMAF	Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework
SMS	short-message service or "text message"
SMW	Special Mission Wing (Afghan)
SOM	Senior Officials Meeting
SPM	Support to Payroll Management project (LOTFA)
State	Department of State (U.S.)
State OIG	Department of State Office of the Inspector General
TAA	Train, Advise, and Assist
TAPI	Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline project
TFBSO	Task Force for Business and Stability Operations in Afghanistan
TMAF	Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees

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ACRONYM OR ABBREVIATION	DEFINITION
UNMACA	UN Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan
UNODC	UN Office on Drugs and Crime
USAAA	U.S. Army Audit Agency
USACE	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USAID OIG	USAID Office of the Inspector General
USDA	U.S. Department of Agriculture
USFOR-A	U.S. Forces-Afghanistan
USIP	U.S. Institute of Peace
UXO	unexploded ordnance
WTO	World Trade Organization

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Afghan officials, professional women, students, and civil-society representatives observe International Women's Day in Laghman City. (UNAMA photo by Fardin Waezi)

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