SIGAR

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

SIGAR 20-38 Inspection Report

Afghan National Army and Train Advise Assist Command–Air Joint Air Force Hangar I Complex: Construction and Renovation Generally Met Requirements and Standards

MAY
2020

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WHAT SIGAR REVIEWED

On July 3, 2014, the Taliban fired several rockets at the military section of North Kabul International Airport, hitting a storage hangar for the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Train Advise Assist Command–Air (TAAC-Air) Joint Air Force (JAF) I. The attack resulted in extensive damage to the hangar and an attached building.

The Afghan Air Force's list of its top ten priorities included repairing the hangar complex because of its importance as an inspection and maintenance facility for ANA aircraft. On September 20, 2016, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Transatlantic Afghanistan Engineer District awarded a firm-fixed-price contract for approximately $2.5 million to Assist Consultants Inc. (ACI), an Afghan company, to demolish the damaged hangar and build a new one at the same location. The contract also included renovating the attached building and supporting infrastructure.

USACE issued ACI a notice to proceed on October 21, 2016, with a completion date of April 14, 2018. After eight modifications, the contract's value increased by $353,461 to approximately $2.9 million, and the completion date was extended to June 30, 2019. USACE determined that the attached building and the hangar were complete on May 14, 2019, and June 18, 2019, respectively. On July 18, 2019, USACE transferred the complex to the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A), which requested and funded the project. CSTC-A then transferred it to the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD) on September 23, 2019.

The objectives of this inspection were to determine whether (1) the construction and renovation were completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards, and (2) the facilities are being used and maintained.

May 2020

Afghan National Army Train Advise Assist Command–Air Joint Air Force Hangar I Complex: Construction and Renovations Generally Met Requirements and Standards

SIGAR 20-38 INSPECTION REPORT

WHAT SIGAR FOUND

SIGAR found that the ANA TAAC-Air JAF I hangar complex construction and renovation work generally met contract requirements and applicable standards. For example, ACI demolished the existing hangar and replaced it with a new one, and painted the walls and replaced the ceilings in the attached building. However, ACI finished the project 430 days (about 14 months) later than initially scheduled, and SIGAR noted six deficiencies resulting from ACI's noncompliance with the contract that raise concerns about the quality of the work at the complex. Among the deficiencies SIGAR identified were non-functional exterior lights and several holes that needed to be patched in the exterior wall of a room on the lower floor.

During site visits to the hangar complex, SIGAR observed that ANA staff and contractors were occupying the hangar and its attached building. According to the Afghan Air Force Construction Facility Department manager, who is responsible for managing the complex, 150 to 200 people—mostly helicopter maintenance staff and pilots—work in the complex. SIGAR also saw helicopters in the hangar. The complex appeared to be clean and in good condition. For example, the floors appeared to have been swept, the bathrooms were clean, and equipment appeared to be working.

However, SIGAR has concerns regarding whether the complex is being operated and maintained to allow it to function as intended. CSTC-A told us that when it turned the complex over to the MOD on September 23, 2019, "the MOD was properly notified of their responsibility to properly maintain the facilities that have been officially transferred as well as how to request repairs for issues that are covered by the one-year warranty." Consequently, since September 2019 when CSTC-A transferred the project, the MOD should have been responsible for operation and maintenance (O&M), including routine activities necessary to maintain the complex and equipment. However, in February 2020, the facility department manager said the MOD's O&M contract begins once the final 1-year warranty ends in June 2020.

In addition, the ANA did not have O&M manuals in Dari, the language in which most of the staff read, or fuel in or near the emergency generator used to operate the hangar doors during power outages.

USACE still has the opportunity to hold ACI accountable for correcting the deficiencies because USACE is withholding almost $110,393 in payments to ACI, and the warranty expires on the building and hangar in May and June 2020, respectively.

WHAT SIGAR RECOMMENDS

To ensure that the ANA TAAC-Air Joint Air Force Hangar I complex meets all contract requirements and construction standards, SIGAR recommends that the USACE Commanding General and Chief of Engineers take the following actions and report the results back to SIGAR within 60 days:

1. **Direct ACI to fix the six outstanding deficiencies it was notified to correct during the warranty periods but has not yet corrected.**
2. **Continue to withhold $110,392.68, consisting of a 10 percent retainage plus $92,979 still unbilled, until ACI corrects all identified deficiencies.**
3. **Require ACI to give the ANA O&M manuals for the complex in Dari.**

To make sure the MOD and the ANA are performing O&M during the warranty period and the emergency generator can be used as intended, SIGAR recommends that the CSTC-A Commander take the following action and report results back to SIGAR within 60 days:

4. **Reiterate to MOD and senior ANA officials and require them to acknowledge in writing (a) their responsibility for operating and maintaining the hangar complex during the warranty period, and (b) the importance of storing fuel in or near the emergency generator to operate the hangar doors quickly in case of emergency.**

SIGAR provided a draft of this report to the U.S. Department of Defense for review and comment. UASCE and CSTC-A provided written comments. USACE partially concurred with recommendation 1, did not concur with recommendation 2, and concurred with recommendation 3. For recommendations 1 and 2, USACE stated that ACI had fixed all six deficiencies identified in the draft report and provided supporting documentation. USACE requested that SIGAR close recommendation 1 as implemented, and delete recommendation 2 because ACI corrected the deficiencies. We commend USACE for quickly directing ACI to fix the deficiencies. However, when SIGAR visited the site again in May 2020, three of the deficiencies remained uncorrected. Therefore, the recommendations will remain open until USACE provides evidence that ACI has fixed the three remaining deficiencies. For recommendation 3, USACE provided documentation that ACI gave a Dari language O&M manual to the ANA. SIGAR confirmed this with the ANA facility manager. As a result, upon issuance of this report, SIGAR will close recommendation 3 as implemented.

CSTC-A partially concurred with recommendation 4, agreeing that it is important that MOD and senior ANA officials understand their responsibility for operating and maintaining the hangar complex during the warranty period. CSTC-A provided the project transfer document to the MOD as evidence that CSTC-A informed the ministry of its responsibilities. CSTC-A said fuel availability is an internal issue for the MOD and ANA, and the ANA elected not to keep fuel in the generator until it is required. As a result, upon issuance of this report, SIGAR will close recommendation 4 as implemented.

May 28, 2020

The Honorable Dr. Mark T. Esper
Secretary of Defense

General Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr.
Commander, U.S. Central Command

General Austin Scott Miller
Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan and
Commander, Resolute Support

Lieutenant General Todd T. Semonite
Chief of Engineers and Commanding General
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Lieutenant General E. John Deedrick Jr.
Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan

This report discusses the results of SIGAR's inspection of the construction and renovation of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Train Advise Assist Command–Air (TAAC-Air) Joint Air Force (JAF) I storage hangar and attached building at North Kabul International Airport. On September 20, 2016, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Transatlantic Afghanistan Engineer District awarded a firm-fixed-price contract for approximately $2.5 million to Assist Consultants Inc. (ACI), an Afghan company, to demolish the old hangar, build a new one at the same location, and renovate its attached two-story building and related infrastructure.

We found that ACI generally met contract requirements. However, we found six outstanding deficiencies: three resulting from ACI's noncompliance with the contract that USACE identified in previous inspections but ACI had not yet fixed, and three that USACE did not previously identify and that had not been fixed. We also observed that the hangar and attached building were occupied by ANA staff and contractors, and the complex appeared to be clean and in good condition. Despite this, we have concerns regarding whether the complex is being operated and maintained to allow it to function as intended.

We are making four recommendations in this report and request responsible officials to provide an update on the recommendations to SIGAR within 60 days. We recommend that the USACE Commanding General and Chief of Engineers (1) direct ACI to fix the six outstanding deficiencies it was notified to correct during the warranty periods but has not yet corrected; (2) continue to withhold $110,392.68, consisting of a 10 percent retainage plus $92,979 still unbilled, until ACI corrects all identified deficiencies; and (3) require ACI to give the ANA operation and maintenance (O&M) manuals for the complex in Dari. We also recommend that the Commander of the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A) (4) reiterate to the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD) and senior ANA officials and require them to acknowledge in writing (a) their responsibility for operating and maintaining the hangar complex within the warranty period, and (b) the importance of storing fuel in or near the emergency generator to operate the hangar doors quickly in case of an emergency.

We provided a draft of this report to the U.S. Department of Defense for review and comment. USACE and CSTC-A provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendices IV and V, respectively. USACE partially concurred with recommendation 1, did not concur with recommendation 2, and concurred with recommendation 3. CSTC-A partially concurred with recommendation 4.

For recommendations 1 and 2, USACE stated that ACI fixed the six deficiencies identified in this report and provided supporting documentation. USACE requested that we close recommendation 1 as implemented, and delete recommendation 2 because ACI corrected the deficiencies. However, when we returned to the site in May 2020, after receiving USACE's comments, we found that ACI still had not fixed three of the deficiencies. As a result, we will keep both recommendations open until USACE provides evidence that ACI has fixed the remaining three deficiencies.

For Recommendation 3, USACE provided documentation that ACI gave a Dari language O&M manual to the ANA. We confirmed this with the ANA facility manager. As a result, upon issuance of this report, we will close recommendation 3 as implemented.

CSTC-A partially concurred with recommendation 4, agreeing that it is important that MOD and senior ANA officials understand their responsibility for operating and maintaining the hangar complex during the warranty period. CSTC-A gave us the project transfer document to the MOD as evidence that CSTC-A informed the ministry of its responsibilities. CSTC-A said fuel availability is an internal issue for the MOD and ANA, and the ANA elected not to keep fuel in the generator until it is required. As a result, upon issuance of this report, we will close recommendation 4 as implemented.

SIGAR conducted this work under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181, as amended, and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended; and in accordance with the *Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation*, published by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

John F. Sopko
Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACI	Assist Consultants Incorporated
ANA	Afghan National Army
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan
HVAC	heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
HVLS	high-volume, low-speed
JAF	Joint Air Force
MOD	Ministry of Defense
O&M	operation and maintenance
TAAC-Air	Train Advise Assist Command–Air
USACE	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

On July 3, 2014, the Taliban fired rockets at the military section of North Kabul International Airport, hitting the storage hangar for the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Train Advise Assist Command–Air (TAAC-Air) Joint Air Force (JAF) I. The attack caused extensive damage, as shown in photos 1 and 2. The impact and subsequent fire affected the entire hangar, including its electrical and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems, and damaged the top floor of the attached two-story building used by operation and maintenance personnel. In a report issued in October 2015, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) determined that the explosions caused irreparable structural damage to the hangar.

This inspection focuses on the construction and renovation of the ANA TAAC-Air JAF I hangar and attached building at the North Kabul airport.

Photo 1 - Damaged Rafters in the JAF I Hangar

Source: USACE contract documents, October 25, 2015

Photo 2 - Damaged Office Ceiling in the Attached Building

Source: USACE contract documents, October 25, 2015

The Afghan Air Force's list of its top 10 priorities included repairing the hangar complex because of its importance as an inspection and maintenance facility for ANA aircraft.[1] On July 13, 2016, the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A) requested funding from the NATO ANA Trust Fund to renovate the complex to support the ANA. CSTC-A is responsible for working with USACE to meet the fund's reporting requirements and ultimately transferring the finished project to the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD). As the contracting agency, USACE performs procurement, management, support, and quality assurance for projects paid for by the trust fund.[2]

On September 20, 2016, the USACE Transatlantic Afghanistan Engineer District awarded a firm-fixed-price contract for approximately $2.5 million to Assist Consultants Incorporated (ACI), an Afghan company, to demolish the hangar and build a new one at the same location that could house 16 MD-530F helicopters.[3] The contract also included renovating the hangar's attached building and supporting infrastructure, such as plumbing, electrical, and HVAC systems, and installing a new generator to run the motors on the hangar doors during power outages.[4]

[1] The Afghan Air Force is part of the ANA and both are part of the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD).

[2] The Transatlantic Afghanistan Engineer District is the executing agency for construction contracts USACE awards in Afghanistan.

[3] The contract number is W5J9JE-16-C-0019.

[4] According to the Afghan Air Force Construction Facility Department Manager, the new TAAC-Air JAF I hangar complex primarily receives power from Afghanistan's national grid. If the power supply from the national grid is interrupted, power to

USACE issued ACI a notice to proceed on October 21, 2016, with a completion date of April 14, 2018. As of March 2020, USACE and ACI had modified the contract eight times, which increased the contract's value by $353,461 to approximately $2.9 million and extended the completion date to June 30, 2019.[5]

USACE performed the pre-final inspection of the renovated building on May 7, 2019, and the final inspection on May 14, 2019. These actions started the building's 1-year warranty period before all construction was complete.[6] USACE performed the pre-final inspection of the hangar on June 22, 2019, and the final inspection on June 30, 2019. Based on the final inspection, USACE determined that the hangar was "substantially complete" on June 18, 2019, ending ACI's performance period and starting the hangar's 1-year warranty. USACE transferred the project to CSTC-A on July 18, 2019, and CSTC-A then transferred it to the MOD on September 23, 2019.

The objectives of this inspection were to determine whether (1) the construction and renovation was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards, and (2) the facilities are being used and maintained.

We conducted our work in Kabul, Afghanistan, from October 2018 through May 2020, in accordance with *Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation* published by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Our professional engineers conducted the engineering assessment in accordance with the National Society of Professional Engineers' *Code of Ethics for Engineers*. Appendix I has a detailed discussion of our scope and methodology.

ACI FINISHED THE PROJECT MORE THAN A YEAR LATER THAN INITIALLY SCHEDULED AND DID NOT MEET ALL CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS AND STANDARDS

We made eight site visits to the ANA TAAC-Air JAF 1 hangar complex from July 2019 to February 2020, and found that ACI generally built and renovated the facilities according to contract requirements and applicable standards. For example, ACI demolished the existing hangar, replaced it with a new one, and renovated the attached building, installed new plumbing and electrical equipment, and a new HVAC system and generator.

However, ACI finished the project 430 days (about 14 months) later than initially scheduled because of delays in getting materials, problems accessing the site, and changes to the design. In addition, ACI did not fix three construction deficiencies that USACE identified during its inspections, deficiencies which were the result of ACI's noncompliance with the contract. We identified six additional construction deficiencies during our eight inspections that USACE did not identify. We provided USACE a list of the outstanding construction deficiencies and relevant documentation on October 12, 2019, so ACI could make all repairs while the complex was still under warranty. USACE officials told us that they then directed ACI to fix those deficiencies. As of February 2020, three of the six deficiencies we identified and three deficiencies USACE identified were still not fixed.

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the hangar comes from the ANA base's power plant. The hangar also has an emergency generator to provide power if the power plant is also disabled.

[5] One administrative modification established the notice to proceed and there were three cost adjustment modifications that added electrical work, de-scoped the contract's original HVAC system, and added a decentralized HVAC system, which extended the contract's period of performance. There was also one no-cost, no-time modification to the hangar design, and three no-cost modifications that added time associated with customs and import delays for construction parts and problems ACI had getting access to the site.

[6] USACE's contractor quality control requirements call for USACE to perform a pre-final inspection to verify that the facility is complete and ready to be occupied. USACE may develop a pre-final deficiency list because of this inspection, and the contractor must ensure that the items on the list are addressed before the final inspection. Finally, contractor and USACE personnel are to perform a final inspection to ensure that any previously identified items and all remaining work performed under the contract are complete and acceptable.

According to the project's warranty management plan, at the request of the U.S. government, ACI must perform 4- and 9-month warranty inspections after turning the complex over to the MOD, and correct any identified deficiencies. ACI conducted the 4-month warranty inspection on October 21, 2019; none of the deficiencies we identified in this report were recorded during the 4-month warranty inspection. ACI conducted the 9-month warranty inspection on March 21, 2020. Even though the building warranty expired on May 14, 2020 and hangar warranty expires on June 18, 2020, USACE can still require ACI to fix all outstanding deficiencies since USACE requested ACI to correct during the warranty period.

Delivery Delays, Site Accessibility Problems, and a Design Change Caused the Project to Finish 430 Days after Its Initially Scheduled Completion Date

Initially, ACI was supposed to complete the JAF I hangar complex in 540 days, from October 21, 2016, to April 14, 2018. However, USACE extended the completion date three times and finally accepted ACI's work on June 18, 2019. As a result, ACI completed the project 430 days later than initially scheduled. (See appendix II for a list of the project's milestones.)

USACE changed the dates for several reasons. First, ACI had trouble getting materials through customs in Karachi, Pakistan, and eventually rerouted some through other countries. Due to these delays, USACE extended the completion date by 120 days from April 14, 2018, to August 12, 2018.

The second extension occurred because ACI could not access the construction site; the doors were locked, and ACI did not have the security permit it needed from the Afghan government to work at the complex. The contractor first reported this problem to USACE on October 21, 2016, and continued to report it daily until USACE resolved the issue on February 26, 2017. Because of these delays, on April 8, 2017, ACI asked USACE to extend the completion date. More than 14 months later, USACE agreed and extended the date by 83 days, from August 12, 2018, to November 3, 2018.[7]

USACE extended the completion date a third time because of changes to the project's requirements. According to ANA officials, the previous hangar had a centralized HVAC system, and the contract initially required ACI to repair that system. However, after assessing the existing HVAC system, ACI discovered that most of the parts were "either missing or beyond reasonable repair due to fire damage and corrosion."[8] In October 2017, USACE concluded,

> Because the cost to repair the existing HVAC system for the hangar will exceed the cost to provide a new HVAC system, it is in the best interest of the [U.S.] Government to de-scope this contract's requirement to provide air-conditioning and heating for the JAF I hangar, and instead provide a new HVAC system under a separate contract.[9]

USACE removed the requirement for ACI to refurbish the existing HVAC system from the contract in a modification on March 5, 2018, which reduced the contract amount by $100,000. Instead of issuing the separate contract for a new system as planned, USACE modified ACI's existing contract on June 25, 2018, to install a decentralized HVAC system. This increased the contract amount by $400,000 and extended the completion date by 120 days from November 3, 2018, to March 3, 2019.

Even with these extensions, USACE expressed concerns about ACI's slow progress. According to a letter USACE sent ACI on December 24, 2016, the contractor was more than 34 days behind schedule in meeting several requirements, such as preparing and submitting the project's topographical detail survey. On March 31, 2019, USACE sent ACI another letter, which stated that the contractor did not complete the project by the March 3,

[7] USACE contract modification, June 23, 2018.

[8] USACE Transatlantic District, Kabul Resident Office, "Request Letter of Direction (LOD) to De-Scope the Contract Requirement to Provide Heating Ventilation Air-Conditioning (HVAC) for the JAF I Hangar," Memorandum to CSTC-A CJ-ENG, October 5, 2017, p. 1.

[9] USACE Transatlantic District, Kabul Resident Office, Memorandum to CSTC-A CJ-ENG, p. 1.

2019, required completion date. In a letter sent the following week, USACE said it performed a quality assurance assessment of the project because of TAAC-Air's "immediate need" to use the building and found "a lack of safety and incomplete construction activities."[10] Finally, on June 11, 2019, USACE told ACI it would withhold a 10 percent retainage fee because of the contractor's unsatisfactory performance, which caused USACE to deliver the complex to CSTC-A late.

On August 4, 2019, USACE stated that it intended to extend ACI's contract by 96 days from March 3, 2019, to June 7, 2019. However, in November 2019, USACE told us that ACI challenged this decision and negotiated a 119-day extension instead, extending the contract completion date to June 30, 2019. USACE finally issued the eighth contract modification on March 30, 2020, almost 8 months after USACE first agreed to modify the contract, extending the completion date to June 30, 2019.

USACE continues to withhold a retainage amount of $17,413.68. USACE informed us there is an additional $92,979 that the contractor has not yet billed. As a result, USACE is withholding a total of $110,392.68 and, as of late April 2020, has not yet made the final payment to ACI.

ACI Did Not Fix Three Deficiencies USACE Identified

USACE performed the pre-final inspection of the ANA TAAC-Air JAF I hangar's attached building on May 7, 2019, and USACE and ACI performed the final inspection on May 14, 2019. Their punch list identified 36 and 14 construction deficiencies, respectively, 10 of which were carried over from the pre-final list to the final list.[11]

USACE performed the pre-final inspection of the hangar on June 22, 2019, and USACE and ACI performed the final inspection on June 30, 2019, and identified 12 and 4 construction deficiencies, respectively, on the punch lists; 3 were carried over from the pre-final punch list to the final list.

USACE then transferred the complex to CSTC-A on July 18, 2019. The transfer form signed that day identified three outstanding construction deficiencies in the hangar and attached building.

During our site visits, we inspected the previously identified deficiencies to determine whether ACI fixed them since the attached building's warranty started on May 14, 2019, and the hangar's warranty started on June 18, 2019. We found that ACI still had not corrected three construction deficiencies USACE had identified.

ACI Did Not Install Door Closers on All Exterior Doors and Installed Noncompliant Door Closers on Fire-Rated Doors

The contract required door closers for the hangar complex's 17 exterior doors. Additionally, the contract required the 12 fire doors on the 2-hour-rated firewall dividing the hangar and its attached building to have fire-rated door closers that met fire code requirements.[12]

Both the pre-final and final hangar punch lists stated that door closers were missing on all the exterior doors. Additionally, the pre-final and final attached building punch lists stated that non-fire-rated door closers were installed on the fire doors. USACE documented these issues again on the transfer form on July 18, 2019. During our October 2019 site visits, we found that door closers were still missing on 13 exterior doors, and ACI had not replaced the noncompliant door closers on the fire-rated doors.

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[10] USACE, Letter of Concern to ACI, April 8, 2019, p.1.

[11] A punch list is a document prepared near the end of a construction project listing work not conforming to the contract that the contractor must complete prior to final payment.

[12] A 2-hour-rated firewall is designed to withstand a fire for 2 hours before it is structurally compromised. Fire doors and assemblies, including door closers, must also be rated to protect the integrity of the fire-rated wall to restrict the spread of smoke and fire.

ACI Did Not Fix Open Holes in Exterior Wall

The contract specified renovation work for both floors of the attached building. At the May 7, 2019, pre-final inspection, USACE and ACI identified several holes that needed to be patched in the exterior wall of one of the rooms on the lower floor, and included these holes on the punch list. USACE recorded the holes again on the May 14, 2019, final inspection punch list.

In our July and October 2019 inspections, we found the holes still had not been patched. However, USACE did not mention them in its transfer documents to CSTC-A, indicating that USACE did not confirm that ACI successfully resolved the deficiency recorded on the punch list.

Some Exterior Doors Did Not Have Enough Weather Stripping

According to the May 7, 2019, pre-final inspection punch list for the attached building, none of the exterior doors had weather stripping. This deficiency was recorded again on the May 14, 2019, final punch list, which directed ACI to install weather-stripping on all of the hangar complex's 17 exterior doors.

During our site visits, we found that 11 of the exterior doors still did not have enough weather stripping to keep dust and moisture from seeping inside facilities around the edges of the doors. Some had weather stripping on only one or two sides of the door. In three locations, the gap around the exterior doors were so wide that daylight could be seen through the doors even when they were closed. The weather stripping deficiency was not listed in USACE's transfer form to CSTC-A, again indicating that USACE did not confirm that ACI addressed the deficiency recorded on the punch list.

SIGAR Identified Three Additional Deficiencies that Have Not Been Addressed

During our eight inspections of the ANA TAAC-Air JAF I, we identified six additional deficiencies that USACE and CSTC-A did not include in their final inspections and transfer documents. As of February 2020, ACI corrected three of them. ACI purchased and installed new hose bibs with anti-siphon devices,[13] fixed a broken sensor on a hangar door, and filled the open piping penetrations through the firewalls.[14] On February 19, 2020, USACE told us it was working with ACI to fix the three remaining deficiencies, specifically (1) the installation of required cable identification tags in manholes; (2) the installation of required safety measures around a transformer;[15] and (3) the installation of working exterior lights. However, as of February 2020, USACE had not provided evidence that these deficiencies were fixed.

ACI Did Not Install Cable Identification Tags in Manholes

The contract required ACI to install cable identification tags for each power cable in the site's two manholes outside the hangar. These tags need to be visible without disturbing any cabling or wiring in the manholes. (See photo 3 for an example of correctly tagged cables in a manhole from another ACI contract at North Kabul International Airport). Cables without identifying tags could be a safety hazard for maintenance staff who need to identify and troubleshoot a cable when a problem occurs.

However, we found that ACI did not install any identification tags in either manhole (see photo 4). On February 3, 2020, USACE told us that during the forthcoming 9-month warranty inspection in March 2020, it would verify whether ACI installed the required identification tags.

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[13] The contract required ACI to remove 12 existing hose bibs on the interior hangar walls and install new ones. The contract specifications required backflow prevention or anti-siphon devices, such as vacuum breakers, to be installed on the new hose bibs to prevent non-potable substances from flowing back into the potable water system, in accordance with the International Plumbing Code.

[14] The contract required a fire seal around pipes that passed through the 2-hour-rated firewalls to limit the spread of fire and smoke through the openings.

[15] The modification required ACI to install a new transformer to provide power for the new decentralized HVAC system at the hangar complex. A transformer converts electricity's input and output voltage.

Photo 3 - Example of Correctly Tagged Cables in a Manhole at the North Kabul International Airport

Source: SIGAR, July 4, 2018

Photo 4 - Cables in a Manhole Outside the JAF I Hangar Were Untagged

Source: SIGAR, October 1, 2019

Transformer Did Not Have Warning Signs

The contract required ACI to install high-voltage warning signs on each side of the complex's new transformer to warn personnel that the equipment is dangerous. We did not find any warning signs installed on the transformer during our October 2019 site visits. On February 3, 2020, USACE said it would verify during the March 2020, 9-month warranty inspection whether ACI had installed the signs.

Exterior Lights Did Not Work

ACI was required to replace the complex's eight exterior lights. During our site visits in October 2019, we found that ACI had not replaced any of the lights, and the existing ones did not work. USACE did not note this deficiency during any of its daily, pre-final inspection, final inspection, or its 4-month warranty inspection with ACI.

The ANA TAAC-Air JAF I hangar complex is in an area of North Kabul International Airport used by the military, and equipment in the hangar may be needed at any time. Exterior lighting is important to make the complex visible and give staff light when they work outside at night. On February 3, 2020, USACE said it would verify during the March 2020, 9-month warranty inspection whether ACI had fixed the lights.

THE ANA TAAC-AIR JAF I HANGAR COMPLEX WAS BEING USED, BUT OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE ISSUES EXIST AND FANS WERE NOT WORKING AS INTENDED

During our visits to the complex from October 2019 through February 2020, we saw ANA staff and contractors working in the hangar and attached building. According to the facility manager, 150 to 200 people—mostly helicopter maintenance staff and pilots—work in the complex. We also observed helicopters in the hangar. The complex appeared to be clean and in good condition. For example, the floors appeared to have been swept, the bathrooms were clean, and equipment appeared to be working. However, we identified two operation and maintenance (O&M) issues that should be addressed to ensure the hangar is fully functional. In addition, the fans USACE approved ACI to install in the hangar were not working as intended.

SIGAR Identified Two O&M Issues at the Complex

In January 2020, CSTC-A provided us transfer documentation showing that, as of September 23, 2019, it advised MOD that it "is now responsible for site security, services, operations, and maintenance" of the JAF I hangar complex.[16] In its response to a review of our preliminary findings for this report, CSTC-A stated, "The MOD has been properly notified of their responsibility to properly maintain the facilities that have been officially transferred as well as how to request repairs for issues that are covered by the one-year warranty." However, we found two O&M issues at the complex.

In February 2020, the Afghan Air Force Construction Facility Department manager, the person responsible for managing the complex, said the MOD's O&M contract begins once the 1-year warranty expires in May and June, 2020. However, according to the warranty, ACI is responsible only for fixing deficient work and equipment related to its contract for 1 year. Therefore, the MOD should have been responsible for O&M that includes routine activities necessary to maintain the complex and equipment since CSTC-A transferred the project in September 2019.

To that end, the contract required ACI to give the ANA O&M manuals in English and Dari. During our October site visits, we found that the ANA had the manuals only in English, which ANA officials said most O&M staff cannot read. USACE's submittal log showed when ACI provided the English version, but not when it provided the Dari version. In response to our preliminary findings, USACE provided us a transfer sheet, signed by the facility manager, stating that ACI provided O&M manuals in English and Dari to the Afghan National Air Force on July 16, 2019. However, the Afghan facility manager said he did not receive the Dari manuals. As a result, we cannot determine why the ANA does not have the manuals in Dari, and we are concerned that proper O&M may not be reasonably assured because responsible personnel cannot refer to O&M manuals written in a language they cannot read.

The second issue we found was that the ANA did not keep the hangar's emergency generator stocked with fuel in case of a power outage, even though outages occur frequently in Afghanistan. We first identified this issue when we tried to inspect the generator in July 2019, and ANA JAF I hangar staff did not have any fuel available to operate it. We brought 10.5 gallons of fuel with us to test the generator in October 2019 and determined that it worked. At that time, the facility manager told us the ANA fuel supply office was processing a request for more fuel.

In comments to our preliminary findings, CSTC-A stated that "fuel supply is an internal MOD issue," and "due to the dual source of electricity available to the JAF I complex, the lack of fuel present for emergency generators does not pose a significant impact to the ability of the MOD to utilize their facility." When we followed up in February 2020, the facility manager told us the fuel request was approved, but the ANA does not keep fuel in the emergency generator until it is required. Without fuel readily available in or near the emergency generator, the hangar doors cannot be opened in an emergency to bring aircraft in for protection or take them out to quickly support ANA missions.

The Fans USACE Approved Were Too Small and Installed Too High to Be Effective

USACE's June 25, 2018, contract modification required ACI to design and provide a decentralized HVAC system. The contract modification required ACI to install high-volume, low-speed (HVLS) ceiling fans in the hangar in lieu of the original design for ductwork and diffusers from a central HVAC unit. HVLS fans are designed to operate in large industrial spaces with high ceilings like hangars and warehouses.

According to CSTC-A, USACE approved ACI to install small ceiling fans instead of the HVLS fans because the larger fans cost more to repair and replace, and were available only from a limited number of manufacturers (see photo 5). In response to our preliminary findings to this report, CSTC-A stated that "prior to approving the

[16] CSTC-A, "Asset Recognition and Transfer Letter," September 23, 2019, p. 1.

substitution, the expected air circulation of the alternative fans was calculated to be equivalent to the originally proposed fans and therefore would be considered an acceptable alternative." However, when we asked for the airflow calculations for the 88 small fans installed instead of the HVLS fans, USACE officials said they could not find the documents with the calculations. Additionally, nothing in ACI's design documents or USACE review comments indicated that the smaller fans USACE approved would meet the original requirement for HVLS fans.

Photo 5 - Small, Ineffective, and Non-Functional Fans Installed in the JAF I Hangar

Source: SIGAR, July 21, 2019

Furthermore, the fan manufacturer's O&M manual, which ACI gave USACE and the ANA, specifically recommended using "extension downrods," poles that extend down from the ceiling to lower fans installed more than 8 feet above the floor. We also found that ceiling fan manufacturers, professional organizations, and independent studies recommend that ceiling fans installed more than 9 feet above a floor should use extension downrods to effectively circulate air. However, ACI's as-built drawings show the ceiling fans used in the hangar did not have the downrods despite being installed more than 31 feet above the floor. As a result, the airflow from a higher level will not be as effective, and during our site visits to the hangar, ANA staff said they could not sense any air moving from the fans.

CONCLUSION

ACI generally built the TAAC-Air JAF I hangar complex according to contract specifications, but has not fixed three outstanding construction deficiencies that USACE identified. Additionally, we found three other outstanding construction deficiencies that could affect the use of the complex. USACE still has the opportunity to hold ACI accountable for correcting the deficiencies because it is withholding almost $110,393 in payments to the contractor, and USACE notified ACI to correct the deficiencies during the warranty periods.

The complex was being used, but we have concerns about whether it is operated as intended and is being fully maintained. First, the manuals the staff had were in English, which most cannot read. Second, because the emergency generator lacks fuel, it will not operate in a power outage, and the hangar doors cannot be quickly opened in case of an emergency to bring aircraft in for protection or take them out to support ANA missions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To ensure that the ANA TAAC-Air Joint Air Force Hangar I complex meets all contract requirements and construction standards, we recommend that the USACE Commanding General and Chief of Engineers take the following actions and report the results back to SIGAR within 60 days:

1. **Direct ACI to fix the six outstanding deficiencies it was notified to correct during the warranty periods but has not yet corrected.**

2. **Continue to withhold the amount of $110,392.68, consisting of a 10 percent retainage plus $92,979 still unbilled, until ACI corrects all identified deficiencies.**

3. **Require ACI to give the ANA O&M manuals for the complex in Dari.**

To make sure the MOD and the ANA are performing O&M during the warranty period and the emergency generator can be used as intended, we recommend that the CSTC-A Commander take the following actions and report the results back to SIGAR within 60 days:

4. **Reiterate to MOD and senior ANA officials and require them to acknowledge in writing (a) their responsibility for operating and maintaining the hangar complex within the warranty period, and (b) the importance of storing fuel in or near the emergency generator to operate the hangar doors quickly in case of emergency.**

AGENCY COMMENTS

We provided a draft of this report to the U.S. Department of Defense for review and comment. USACE and CSTC-A provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix IV and V, respectively. USACE partially concurred with recommendation 1, did not concur with recommendation 2, and concurred with recommendation 3. CSTC-A partially concurred with recommendation 4.

For recommendations 1 and 2, the draft report stated that based on requirements of the National Electric Code, a protection fence should have been installed around the complex's transformer. USACE stated that the contract did not specifically require ACI to install a protection fence and asked us to delete this section from our report. Based on USACE's comments and our further examination of specific contract requirements, we removed mention of the protection fence from this report and focused on the contract requirement to install high-voltage warning signs on each side of the complex's new transformer.

For recommendation 1, USACE said ACI fixed the six deficiencies and provided supporting documentation. USACE asked us to state that it concurred with the recommendation and close the recommendations as implemented. However, when we visited the site in May 2020, three of the deficiencies still were not fixed: 13 of 17 exterior doors did not have closers, 1 door did not have weather stripping, and 6 of the 8 exterior lights did not work. We will close recommendation 1 when USACE provides evidence that ACI has corrected the three remaining deficiencies.

For recommendation 2, USACE stated that it did not concur because ACI corrected all of the remaining deficiencies, and requested that we delete the recommendation from the report. However, the recommendation will remain open until USACE provides evidence that ACI resolved the remaining deficiencies or withheld appropriate payment for those deficiencies.

For recommendation 3, USACE provided documentation that ACI gave a Dari language O&M manual to the ANA. We confirmed this with the ANA facility manager. As a result, upon issuance of this report, we will close recommendation 3 as implemented.

CSTC-A partially concurred with recommendation 4, agreeing that it is important that MOD and senior ANA officials understand their responsibility for operating and maintaining the hangar complex during the warranty period. CSTC-A provided the September 23, 2019, transfer document to the MOD as evidence that CSTC-A informed the ministry of this responsibility. CSTC-A stated that fuel availability is an internal issue for the MOD and ANA, and the ANA elected not to keep fuel in the generator until it is required. CSTC-A added

> [MOD officials'] approval of fuel availability and attentive decision not to physically stock the generator until needed establishes that they are fully aware of their responsibilities and the importance of operations and maintenance.

As a result, upon issuance of this report, we will close recommendation 4 as implemented.

APPENDIX I - SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This report provides the results of SIGAR's inspection of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Train Advise Assist Command–Air (TAAC-Air) Joint Air Force (JAF) I hangar complex. The objectives of this inspection were to determine whether (1) the construction and renovation were completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards, and (2) the facilities are being used and maintained. Specifically, we

- reviewed contract documents, design submittals, and other relevant project documentation;
- interviewed Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and ANA officials concerning the project's construction, use, and maintenance;
- made eight site visits to the JAF I hangar complex on July 21, 2019; October 1, 2, 3, 7, and 16, 2019; December 2, 2019; and February 12, 2020; and two follow-up visits on May 3 and 6, 2020; and
- tested the JAF I hangar emergency generator.

We did not rely on computer-processed data to conduct this inspection. However, we considered compliance with laws and indicators of fraud, other illegal acts, and abuse, and their potential impact.

In December 2014, SIGAR entered into a cooperative agreement with Afghan civil society partners. Under this agreement, our Afghan partners conduct specific inspections, evaluations, and other analyses. In this regard, Afghan inspectors and an engineer inspected the ANA TAAC-Air JAF I hangar complex five times between October and December 2019 and two follow-up visits in May 2020. We developed a standardized engineering evaluation checklist covering items required by the contract, design, and specification documents for the complex. Our checklist required our partners to analyze the contract documents, scope of work, technical specifications, and design drawings. SIGAR staff made three site visits in July and October 2019. The follow-up site visits were to determine whether ACI fixed all of the deficiencies identified in this report.

We compared the information our Afghan civil society partners provided to accepted engineering practices, relevant standards, regulations, laws, and codes for quality and accuracy. In addition, as part of our monitoring and quality control process, we

- met with our Afghan partner engineers to ensure that the approach and planning for the inspection were consistent with the objectives of our inspection and the terms of our cooperative agreement;
- attended periodic meetings with our partners and conducted our normal entrance and exit conferences with agency officials;
- discussed significant inspection issues with our partners;
- monitored our partners' progress in meeting milestones and revised contract delivery dates as needed; and
- conducted oversight of our partners in accordance with SIGAR's policies and procedures to ensure that their work resulted in impartial, credible, and reliable information.

We conducted our inspection work in Kabul, Afghanistan, from October 2018 through May 2020. This work was conducted in accordance with the *Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation*, published by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Our professional engineers conducted the engineering assessment in accordance with the National Society of Professional Engineers' *Code of Ethics for Engineers*. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our inspection objectives. We conducted this inspection under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181, as amended, and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.

APPENDIX II - AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY AND TRAIN ADVISE ASSIST COMMAND–AIR JOINT AIR FORCE I HANGAR COMPLEX MILESTONES

Table 1 lists the milestones and the project completion dates for the complex.

Table 1 - Project Milestone Dates

Milestone	Date Issued	Details	Project Completion Date
Notice to proceed and original completion date	October 21, 2016	Modification #1: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) issued Assist Consultants Inc. a notice to proceed with the project. The 540-day period of performance begins.	April 14, 2018
Modification to add work	January 22, 2018	Modification #2: Added $53,461 in additional electrical work to the contract. No change in time.	April 14, 2018
Modification to de-scope HVAC	March 5, 2018	Modification #3: Removed the HVAC activities from the contract and $100,000 from the contract cost. No change in time.	April 14, 2018
Modification to change hangar design	April 1, 2018	Modification #4: Changed the hangar design. No change in cost or time.	April 14, 2018
Modification to completion date	April 6, 2018	Modification #5: USACE approved a 120-day time extension for customs delays. No change in cost.	August 12, 2018
Modification to completion date	June 23, 2018	Modification #6: USACE approved an 83-day time extension for security permit and access delays at site. No change in cost.	November 3, 2018
Modification to completion date	June 25, 2018	Modification #7: USACE approved a $400,000 contract cost increase and a 120-day time extension to add a decentralized HVAC system.	March 3, 2019
Date of sufficient completion and warranty start date for building	May 17, 2019	USACE deemed the work on the attached building “sufficiently complete.”	May 14, 2019
Date of substantial completion and warranty start date for hangar	July 3, 2019	USACE deemed the work on the hangar “substantially complete.”	June 18, 2019
Modification to completion date	March 30, 2020	Modification #8: USACE approved a 119-day time extension for customs delays. No change in cost.	June 30, 2019

Source: SIGAR analysis of relevant contract documents, including modifications.

APPENDIX III - DEFICIENCES IDENTIFIED AT AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY AND TRAIN ADVISE ASSIST COMMAND–AIR JOINT AIR FORCE I HANGAR COMPLEX

Tables 2 and 3 list six construction deficiencies that we or the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) identified.

Table 2 - Deficiencies Identified in Building

Deficiency	Pre-Final Punch List	Final Punch List	DD Form 1354	SIGAR Site Visits
Noncompliant door closers installed on fire-rated doors*	√	√	√	√
Open holes in exterior walls	√	√		√
Exterior doors missing weather stripping	√	√		√

Source: USACE punch lists dated May 7 and 14, 2019; DD form 1354, "Transfer and Acceptance of DOD Real Property," July 18, 2019; and SIGAR site visits, July 2019 through February 2020.

* The deficiency for "closers" was identified in both the attached building and the hangar. Therefore, we are counting "closers" as one deficiency in the report but listing it in both Table 2 and Table 3.

Table 3 - Deficiencies Identified In and Around Hangar

Deficiency	Pre-Final Punch List	Final Punch List	DD Form 1354	SIGAR Site Visits
Missing door closers on exterior doors*	√	√	√	√
No cable identification tags in manholes				√
Transformer missing warning signs				√
Exterior lights do not work				√

Source: USACE's punch lists dated June 22 and 30, 2019; DD form 1354, "Transfer and Acceptance of Real Property," July 18, 2019; and SIGAR visits, July 2019 through February 2020.

* The deficiency for "closers" was identified in both the attached building and the hangar. Therefore, we are counting "closers" as one deficiency in the report but listing it in both Table 2 and Table 3.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
TRANSATLANTIC DIVISION
201 PRINCE FREDERICK DR.
WINCHESTER, VA 22602

CETAD-CDR

24 APR 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR Jeffrey C. Brown, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Audits and Inspection (Crystal City), SIGAR, 1550 Crystal Drive, Suite 900, Arlington, VA 22202

SUBJECT: Response to Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) Draft Report, I-57, Afghan National Army and Train Advise Assist Command–Air Joint Air Force Hangar I Complex: Construction and Renovation Generally Met Requirements and Standards

1. This is the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Transatlantic Division (TAD) response to the SIGAR Draft Report, Afghan National Army (ANA) and Train Advise Assist Command (TAAC) –Air Joint Air Force Hangar I Complex: Construction and Renovation Generally Met Requirements and Standards. This report contains three recommendations for the Commander of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and one recommendation for the Commander of U.S. Forces – Afghanistan. USACE will only address the recommendations made to the Commander of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

2. SIGAR made the following recommendations to the Commander of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers:

"To ensure that the ANA TAAC-Air Joint Air Force Hangar I complex meets all contract requirements and construction standards, SIGAR recommends that the USACE Commanding General and Chief of Engineers take the following actions and report the results back to SIGAR within 60 days:

1. Direct ACI to fix the six deficiencies it has not corrected before the warranty for the attached building expires on May 14, 2020, and the warranty for the hangar expires on June 18, 2020.

2. Continue to withhold $110,392.68, consisting of a 10 percent retainage plus $92,979 still unbilled, until ACI corrects all identified deficiencies.

3. Require ACI to give the ANA O&M manuals for the complex in Dari."

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SUBJECT: Response to Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) Draft Report, I-57, Afghan National Army and Train Advise Assist Command–Air Joint Air Force Hangar I Complex: Construction and Renovation Generally Met Requirements and Standards

USACE partially concurs with recommendation 1, non-concurs with recommendation 2, and concurs with recommendation 3.

Recommendation 1: *Direct Assist Consultants Inc. (ACI), an Afghan Company, to fix the following six deficiencies before the warranty for the attached building expires on May 14, 2020, and the warranty for the hangar expires on June 18, 2020.*

Deficiencies Identified in Building

1. *Noncompliant door closers installed on fire-rated doors.
2. Open holes in exterior walls,
3. Exterior doors missing weather stripping.

Deficiencies Identified In and Around Hangar

1. *Missing door closers on exterior doors.
2. No cable identification tags in manholes.
3. Transformer missing warning signs and protection fence.
4. Exterior lights do not work.

*The deficiency for "closers" was identified in both the attached building and the hangar. Therefore, SIGAR counted "closers" as one deficiency in the report but listed it under both building and hangar.

USACE Partially Concurs: In October 2019, USACE directed ACI to correct the aforementioned deficiencies. ACI corrected the following:

Deficiencies Corrected in Building

1. Door closers installed on fire-rated doors.

2. Holes in exterior walls.

3. Exterior doors weather stripping.

Deficiencies Corrected In and Around Hangar

1. Door closers on exterior doors.

2. Cable identification tags in manholes.

3. Transformer warning signs.

4. Exterior lights.

ACI did not install a transformer protection fence as it was not within the scope of the contract. Consequently, no further action can be taken regarding the protection fence. USACE provided supporting documentation to SIGAR on 19 February 2020 detailing corrections taken on all deficiency items listed above, except for the protective fence. Therefore, we request that in the final report, SIGAR drops the protective fence as a deficiency and annotates all other recommendation as concurred with by USACE, as well as closed and implemented.

Recommendation 2: *Continue to withhold $110,392.68, consisting of a 10 percent retainage plus $92,979 still unbilled, until ACI corrects all identified deficiencies.*

USACE non-concurs with SIGAR's recommendation. ACI has corrected all identified deficiencies with one exception, the protective fence. As addressed in the USACE response to recommendation 1, USACE does not concur with installing a protection fence around the transformer as it was NOT included in the contract. Therefore, USACE requests that SIGAR delete Recommendation 2 from the final report.

Recommendation 3: *Require ACI to give the ANA O&M manuals for the complex in Dari.*

USACE concurs with SIGAR's recommendation and directed ACI to provide the O&M manual on March 22, 2020. ACI submitted to USACE in RMS submittal 01 78 23, O&M

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Manual, Dari Version to USACE on 14 April 2020. USACE will ensure the ANA was also provided with the O&M Manual, Dari version, and report back to SIGAR within 60 days.

4. Point of contact for this response is Mr. Keith Sullivan, Internal Review Auditor at Keith.P.Sullivan@usace.army.mil or 540-665-3712.

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APPENDIX V - COMMENTS FROM COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND–AFGHANISTAN

UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS RESOLUTE SUPPORT
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND-AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO, AE 09320

CSTC-A 25 April 2020

MEMORANDUM THRU

United States Forces – Afghanistan DCDR-S, APO AE 09356
United States Central Command (CCIG), MacDill Air Force Base, FL 336211

FOR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), 2530 Crystal Drive, Arlington, VA 22202-3940

SUBJECT: Response to Draft Report for SIGAR project code I-057, "Inspection of the Demolition and Construction of a Hangar at the Afghan National Army and Train Advise Assist Command–Air's Joint Aircraft Facility I".

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to provide the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) response to the SIGAR draft report for project code I-057, "Inspection of the Demolition and Construction of a Hangar at the Afghan National Army and Train Advise Assist Command–Air's Joint Aircraft Facility I" Recommendation 4.

2. SIGAR directed Recommendation 4 to the CSTC-A Commander to take action and report results back to SIGAR within 60 days. CSTC-A appreciates SIGAR's inspection of Joint Aircraft Facility I and the opportunity to respond and provide feedback for the following recommendation:

a. *Recommendation 4: Reiterate to MOD and senior ANA officials and require them to acknowledge in writing (a) their responsibility for operating and maintaining the hangar complex during the warranty period, and (b) the importance of storing fuel in or near the emergency generator to operate the hangar doors quickly in case of emergency.*

3. Management Response for Recommendation 4.

a. CSTC-A partially concurs with Recommendation 4. We agree that it is important that MoD and senior ANA officials know their responsibility for operating and maintaining the hangar complex during the warranty period. That is why CSTC-A provided official notification in the 23 September 2019 Asset Recognition and Transfer Letter (enclosure 1) that MoD would assume normal operations and maintenance requirements, including the warranty period.

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CSTC-A
SUBJECT: Response to Draft Report for SIGAR project code I-057, "Inspection of the Demolition and Construction of a Hangar at the Afghan National Army and Train Advise Assist Command–Air's Joint Aircraft Facility."

b. Additionally, fuel availability is an internal MoD and ANA requirement and according to your report, the facility manager had processed and received approval for fuel. Also stated in your report, the ANA elected not to keep fuel in the generator until it is required, is an attentive decision by the ANA, most likely based on facts that long-term storage of fuel increases the potential for fuel contamination, which could damage the generator when not used for long period.

c. As shown in the referenced enclosure, CSTC-A provided official notification to MoD of their responsibility of normal operations and maintenance. In addition, their approval of fuel availability and attentive decision not to physically stock the generator until needed, establishes that they are fully aware of their responsibilities and the importance of operations and maintenance. CSTC-A believes the recommendation has been answered and respectfully requests closure of Recommendation 4.

4. Point of Contact is Matthew A. Norton, CSTC-A, External Audits, Kabul, Afghanistan, DSN 318-449-4738, matthew.a.norton18.civ@mail.mil.

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Encl
As

KENNETH W. LETCHER
Colonel, USA
CSTC-A, Director of Staff

APPENDIX VI - ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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Wilhelmina Pierce, Professional Engineer

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Shahanshah Shirzay, Civil Engineer

This inspection was conducted
under project code SIGAR-I-057.

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- advance U.S. interests in reconstructing Afghanistan.

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