SIGAR

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

SIGAR 17-19 Inspection Report

Sheberghan Teacher Training Facility: Electrical System Deficiencies Were Corrected, but Water Quality and Funding for Generator Fuel Remain Concerns

DECEMBER

2016

December 30, 2016

The Honorable Gayle E. Smith
Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development

Mr. Herbert B. Smith
USAID Mission Director for Afghanistan

This report discusses the results of SIGAR's follow-up inspection of the Sheberghan teacher training facility, which was funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and constructed under a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) contract. Our objectives for this inspection were to assess whether the facility (1) had been completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards, and (2) was being used.

On July 17, 2013, we reported that 4 years after construction began, the facility was still not complete, and Mercury Development—the original contractor—had walked away from the project after being paid $3.1 million, despite poor performance, the facility being incomplete, and unresolved electrical issues. We also noted that USACE dismissed Zafarkhaliq Construction Company, the second contractor, for its inability to complete the project. In addition, we reported that the facility's electrical wiring did not meet the U.S. National Electrical Code, as the contract required, and an improper entry, known as a "tap," into the electrical system exposed occupants to potential electrocution and fire hazards.

During our follow-up site visits conducted in April 2015 and September 2016, we found that the facility had been completed and was being used. We also found that although the facility's construction was substantially delayed, it was generally completed according to engineering standards and the deficiencies we identified in our first inspection report related to the electrical system had been resolved. The facility's water quality and funding for fuel to meet generator requirements remain concerns. Because the deficiencies we identified in our July 2013 inspection report have been corrected and the Afghan Ministry of Higher Education is responsible for the facility's operation and maintenance, we are not making any new recommendations.

We provided a draft of this report to USAID for comment. In its comments, USAID stated that the Sheberghan teacher training facility has been completed, and all recommendations from our July 2013 report have been resolved. With regard to water quality, the agency noted that because the facility was officially transferred to the Ministry of Higher Education, it is now the ministry's responsibility to purchase chlorine to ensure that the water treatment system works as designed. However, USAID stated that it would alert the ministry about the need for chlorine. With regard to funding the generator fuel, USAID stated that the amount of fuel required has decreased significantly because the facility is now connected to the city power grid, which is its primary source of electricity. USAID's comments are reproduced in appendix II.

SIGAR conducted this inspection under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181, as amended, and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended; and in accordance with the *Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation*, published by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

John F. Sopko
Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction

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ABBREVIATIONS

USACE	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development

In May 2008, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) entered into an agreement requiring USACE to provide contract administration, construction management, and related services for the design and construction of education facilities at institutes of higher learning in Afghanistan.[1] In accordance with this agreement, USACE was to construct three teacher training facilities located in Sheberghan, Jowzjan province; Maymana, Faryab province; and Mazar-e Sharif, Balkh province. The Sheberghan facility, designed to accommodate 422 students, consisted of a 2-story main building, with 10 classrooms, 4 laboratories, administration rooms, a library, a director's office, a reception room, a water well house, and a room for an electrical transformer and a canopy for a power generator and a fuel tank.

This is a follow-up to our initial inspection of the Sheberghan teacher training facility,[2] which we reported on in July 2013.[3] Our objectives for this inspection were to assess whether the facility (1) had been completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards, and (2) was being used.

We conducted our work in Kabul, Afghanistan, and at the Sheberghan teacher training facility in Jowzjan province from November 2014 through December 2016, in accordance with the *Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation*, published by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. The engineering assessment was conducted by our professional engineer in accordance with the National Society of Professional Engineers' *Code of Ethics for Engineers*. Appendix I contains a detailed discussion of our scope and methodology.

BACKGROUND

On February 7, 2009, USACE Afghanistan Engineer District-North awarded Mercury Development, an Iraqi company, a $2.9 million firm fixed-price contract to complete three teacher training facilities in Sheberghan, Maymana, and Mazar-e Sharif by January 12, 2010.[4] After nine modifications, USAID increased the contract's price to $3.4 million and extended the completion date to June 19, 2011. However, between September and November 2011, Mercury Development defaulted on the contract and abandoned the project sites. At that time, approximately 92 percent of the overall construction had been completed with the Sheberghan facility having the most work still outstanding.

On January 23, 2012, USACE Afghanistan Engineer District-North awarded a $153,000 contract to Zafarkhaliq Construction Company, an Afghan firm, to complete the Sheberghan facility.[5] However, on December 1, 2012, USACE terminated its contract with Zafarkhaliq because the work was not performed correctly.[6] In January 2013, USAID ended its agreement with USACE, and in April 2014 directly entered into a $1.5 million contract

[1] The agreement, known as a participating agency program agreement, is a type of interagency agreement under Section 632(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act that USAID uses when another federal agency is expected to implement a program with little USAID oversight and the other agency's functions mostly will be performed at some place other than at USAID (see USAID Automated Directives System, Chapter 306, "Interagency Agreements," section 306.3.2.10).

[2] The official name is the Sheberghan Faculty of Higher Education. During our first inspection, we referred to it as the Sheberghan teacher training facility. To be consistent with that report, we use Sheberghan teacher training facility, which we sometimes shorten to "facility," in this report.

[3] See SIGAR, *Sheberghan Teacher Training Facility: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Paid Contractors and Released Them from Contractual Obligations before Construction Was Completed and Without Resolving Serious Health and Safety Hazards*, SIGAR Inspection 13-9, July 17, 2013.

[4] The contract number is W917PM-09-C-0017, and the contract award included $1,252,300 for the Sheberghan facility.

[5] The contract number is W5J9JE-12-C-0043. Zafarkhaliq was required to correct the faulty electrical wiring and complete the facility, including the water and sewage systems, within 30 days of the contract's award.

[6] In an August 2012 project status report, USACE stated that 8 months after the contract was awarded, Zafarkhaliq had completed only about 65 percent of the required work and the faulty electrical wiring had not been corrected.

with Perez, A Professional Corporation, a U.S. company, to complete the three facilities.[7] Perez completed the work at the Sheberghan facility on December 17, 2014, and USAID transferred it to the Afghan Ministry of Higher Education at the end of that month.

In our July 2013 inspection report on the Sheberghan facility, we found that 4 years after construction began, it was still not finished and that Mercury Development had walked away from the project after being paid $3.1 million, despite poor performance, the facility being incomplete, and unresolved problems with the electrical system. We also noted that USACE dismissed Zafarkhaliq for its inability to complete the project. In both cases, USACE inexplicably closed out the contracts and released the contractors from further liability.

During our November 2012 site visit to the Sheberghan facility, we found electrical wiring issues that affected the building's safety. USACE officials had identified electrical problems as early as February 2011 and reported them to Mercury Development. For example, on February 8, 2011, USACE sent a written notification to the company expressing concern that it was not completing the electrical work in conformance with the U.S. National Electrical Code, as the contract required. During that visit, the USACE resident engineer told us the electrical wiring needed to be replaced.

We also found a potentially dangerous situation in one of the facility's laboratories where an electrical line was improperly tapped into an electric junction box to supply electricity to a power strip.[8] Generally, any unauthorized taps into an electrical system raise safety concerns, and, in this situation, those concerns were more serious because the wiring installed did not conform to the U.S. National Electric Code.[9] We could not inspect the facility's other major components, such as the water and heating systems, because they were not completed at the time of our site visit. However, we did find an issue with the septic field's close proximity to the well house and water lines.

In our July 2013 report, we made five recommendations. We recommended that the Commanding General, USACE, direct the Commander, USACE, Afghanistan Engineer District-North, to:

1. Determine the following:
    a. Why its contractors were released from their contractual obligations despite poor performance;
    b. Why contract closeout files stated that the contractors completed all work and all outstanding issues had been resolved despite unfinished construction and electrical problems;
    c. Why it released one contractor, Mercury, from any outstanding claims, remediation, and warranty items; and
    d. The identity of USACE contracting officers(s) involved in the decision to pay the contractor and release it of all contractual liability. After determining why the contractor was paid and released of all liability before completing the project, determine what disciplinary action is appropriate, if any, against the contracting officer(s) responsible for making the decision.

We also recommended that the USAID Mission Director for Afghanistan:

2. Coordinate with USACE to review project documentation, and conduct a site inspection to determine whether the sanitary sewer lines were improperly placed in relation to the water well and pose a health risk to the faculty and students. If so, determine and take the appropriate actions required to remediate the situation.

[7] The contract number is AID-306-TO-14-00003. The contract includes $512,794 allocated for the Sheberghan facility.

[8] A junction box is an enclosure that protects a connection (the junction) of two or more wires carrying electrical current. This level of protection is needed to prevent fires and to maintain solid, reliable connections.

[9] The American National Standards Institute approved the U.S. National Electrical Code, which is the benchmark for safe electrical design, installation, and inspection to protect people and property from electrical hazards. Mercury's contract required that all electrical design and installation work conform to the code.

3. Take appropriate measures to minimize existing health and safety risks, including accidents that could arise from the faculty and students' continued unauthorized use of the facility.
4. Complete the construction of the Sheberghan teacher training facility and expedite its official turnover to the Afghan government.
5. Provide adequate oversight to ensure that the facility is properly completed before paying for contractor services.

In response to our first recommendation, USACE stated that it terminated its contract with Mercury Development. To effect its termination, USACE issued a modification in November 2011 to de-scope remaining contract work; the modification included a credit to the government for the de-scoped work and assessed liquidated damages against the contractor. USACE further noted that, based on information known at the time, the contracting officers had made appropriate decisions in administering the Sheberghan contracts and no disciplinary action was required.

In response to our second recommendation, USAID noted that it, along with USACE, reviewed documentation that showed distances between the well house, septic field, and water lines, and concluded that all distances were within approved specifications.

In response to our third recommendation, USAID stated that it issued letters to the Ministry of Higher Education and the Ministry of Finance in June 2013 requesting that the facility be evacuated. USAID also tasked its third-party monitoring contractor to visit the facility in July and August 2013 to verify that it was not inhabited.

In response to our fourth recommendation, USAID noted that it was in the process of awarding a contract to complete the remaining work on the Sheberghan facility. The agency stated that the target date for finishing construction was September 2014.

In response to our fifth recommendation, USAID stated that it would assign a contracting officer's representative to monitor ongoing construction work. It also stated that it would hire a third-party contractor to monitor construction until the facility was completed and that payments would be made only when all activities were finished.

Based on these written responses, we determined that both USACE and USAID had taken appropriate corrective action to address all five recommendations, and we closed them in November 2013.

SHEBERGHAN FACILITY HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND GENERALLY MET CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS, BUT WATER QUALITY ISSUES EXIST

We conducted follow-up site visits to the Sheberghan facility from April 6 through 9, and 23, 2015, and September 24 through 26, 2016. During our April 2015 visit, we found that the facility had been completed and was transferred to the Ministry of Higher Education on December 31, 2014, more than 3 and a half years after the June 2011 extended completion date. During these inspections, we found that although the construction was substantially delayed, it was generally completed according to contract requirements and the electrical deficiencies we noted in our initial inspection report had been resolved.

Electrical Wiring Deficiencies Were Corrected

In March 2013, a USACE engineer told us the faulty electrical wiring in the Sheberghan facility had still not been replaced. In addition, USAID officials told us they were aware of the electrical problems and were planning to award a new contract to a local firm to address the problems. During our April 2015 visit, we found that Perez, the new contractor, had corrected the wiring deficiencies. We did not identify any improper taps into the electrical system or any problems with its functionality, safety, or compatibility other than minor defects in some of the light fixtures. Specifically, Perez took the following actions to correct the wiring deficiencies:

- checked the electrical systems room by room and circuit by circuit, and corrected any defects related to the electrical wiring in the corridors and electrical systems located inside classrooms;
- replaced faulty electrical wiring and redistributed the wiring in new tubing in the building's corridors to comply with U.S. National Electrical Code and National Fire Protection Association requirements; and
- replaced damaged wires and light fixtures.

However, we could not verify that all wiring passing through the facility's corridors had been replaced with code-compliant wiring because most of it was concealed inside interior walls.

Although Concrete Testing Generally Met Strength Requirements, Water Testing Found Problems with Facility's Water Supply

During our April 2015 and September 2016 site visits, we conducted tests to determine the quality of the facility's concrete and water supply system. We focused our testing on them because the samples collected could be analyzed locally. The National Engineering Services for Rehabilitation of Afghanistan, an Afghan engineering laboratory, conducted the tests, while our inspectors observed.[10] The inspectors found that two of three concrete samples met technical requirements; the facility's water and wastewater systems were operational and sufficiently separated; and the water met applicable standards. However, we have concerns about the water's quality without filtration.

Concrete Testing Found Two of Three Core Samples Met Requirements

Three concrete core samples, two from ground-floor slabs and one from the sidewalk, were taken from the Sheberghan facility for testing to determine their compressive strength.[11] Core samples that do not meet strength requirements may indicate that poor-quality or substandard materials were used in the concrete or that it had not properly cured after it was poured. The test results showed that the samples from the ground-floor slab on the facility's west side and from the sidewalk met compressive strength requirements, while the sample taken from the slab on the south side did not.[12]

Although the sample taken from the slab on the south side did not meet minimum compressive strength requirements, we determined that this would not cause a serious threat to the building. However, we were concerned that other elements within it, such as columns, beams, and foundations, may have low compressive strengths. Because of our concern, we revisited the facility in September 2016 to examine the floors and walls for cracks. Cracks could indicate structural problems caused by low compressive strength of the concrete. We did not find any cracks or holes in the floors or any cracks or settlement in the walls, indicating that any issues with the concrete's strength would not constitute a threat to the structural integrity of the building.

Testing Showed Water Does Not Meet Some Quality Standards without Filtration

In November 2012, USACE expressed concern that the sewage lines at the Sheberghan facility might be located too close to the water well, and, as a result, could affect the quality of the water supply and the health of the faculty and students, an issue we raised in the 2013 report. During our September 2016 site visit, we found that the septic tank and the water wells were approximately 100 feet apart, which exceeds Centers for

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[10] National Engineering Services for Rehabilitation of Afghanistan is a registered company with the Afghanistan Investment Support Agency and USACE in Afghanistan.

[11] The compressive strength of a structure is its capacity to bear loads under pressure.

[12] The ground-floor slab on the west side and the sidewalk were deemed acceptable at 226.6 and 290.7 kilograms per square centimeter, respectively, and the ground-floor slab on the south side was deemed deficient at 145.3 kilograms per square centimeter. Technical specifications for concrete require a minimum compressive strength of 210 kilograms per square centimeter 28 days after being poured. Some factors that may affect the concrete's strength are poor quality or substandard use of materials such as cement, gravel, sand, and water; the water/cement ratio; maximum allowed size of gravel; air temperature during mixing; and lack of proper curing of the poured concrete.

Disease Control standards that septic tanks should be located at least 50 feet from water wells to avoid contamination.

In April 2015, an Afghan engineering laboratory tested the facility's water quality, and our inspectors examined the water and waste water systems. The tests found that the water's electrical conductivity and total dissolved solids were high and did not meet the World Health Organization's acceptable parameters. However, the tests also found that both factors met acceptable parameters for Afghanistan's national water quality standards.[13] High electrical conductivity may indicate high levels of dissolved solids, which can cause a mineral taste in drinking water as well as corrosion in plumbing, hot water heaters, and toilet flushing mechanisms. In addition, the tests showed that sulfate, nitrate, and sodium levels were above the acceptable limits set by the World Health Organization and Afghanistan's national water quality standards; high levels of these elements can affect water quality and taste.

During our September 2016 site visit, Sheberghan staff told us they use the facility's well water for cooking and drinking and believe it is safe. They said that although the well water is still not chlorinated, no illnesses had been reported that could be attributed to water quality issues. We retested the facility's water in September 2016 and found that, according to Afghanistan's water quality standards, it is acceptable. The lab that conducted the test for us stated although the water met those standards, it recommended a water disinfection treatment.[14] Although we found that a water chlorination injection system had been installed as required under the contract, Sheberghan officials said it is not being used because the facility does not have funding to provide chlorine.

SHEBERGHAN FACILITY IS BEING USED AND MAINTAINED

During our April 2015 site visit, we found that the faculty and students were using the Sheberghan facility. Although it was designed to accommodate 422 students split between morning and afternoon classes, we found that about 600 students were using the facility. When we visited again in September 2016, that number had increased, with more than 1,500 students using the facility in three shifts. Despite being over its capacity, we found the facility was generally in good condition. The majority of the faculty and students we talked to expressed satisfaction with the quality of the facility and education.[15]

University officials told us they assumed that the U.S. government would continue to provide funding to fuel the facility's generator after USAID turned the facility over to the Afghan government. The amount of fuel required was reduced in December 2014 after Perez constructed the transformer house and connected it to the city power grid, which became the primary source of electricity. However, fuel is still needed to operate the generator as a backup power source. As a result, a funding source is needed to purchase fuel for the backup generator so that the electrical supply will not be at risk if the grid is not available to provide power.

CONCLUSION

Although completed nearly 5 years late using three different contractors, the Sheberghan teacher training facility is now finished and in use. Most notably, wiring that did not adhere to the U.S. National Electrical Code

[13] According to Fondriest Environmental Inc., an environmental monitoring company, water conductivity is one of the most useful and commonly measured water quality parameters. A sudden change in a body of water's conductivity can indicate pollution. Agricultural runoff or a sewage leak will increase conductivity due to additional chloride, phosphate, and nitrate ions.

[14] Drinking water sources are subject to contamination and require appropriate treatment to remove disease-causing agents. To provide safe water, public water systems use various methods such as filtration and disinfection.

[15] We randomly selected and interviewed 6 faculty members and 14 students of both genders from all 11 departments of the education school. Of the 20 interviewees, 16, or 80 percent, expressed satisfaction with the quality of the construction, and 17, or 85 percent, expressed satisfaction with the lecturers.

and improper taps, which we previously reported on, have been corrected, reducing the risk that the facility's occupants will be exposed to potential electrocution and fire hazards. However, the lack of funds required to operate the chlorination injection system to treat the facility's water and to obtain fuel for the backup generator remain concerning.

Because the deficiencies we identified in our July 2013 inspection report have been corrected and the Ministry of Higher Education is now responsible for the facility's operation and maintenance, we are not making any new recommendations.

AGENCY COMMENTS

USAID provided written comments on a draft of this report that are reproduced in appendix II. In its comments, USAID noted that the Sheberghan teacher training facility has been completed, and all recommendations from our July 2013 report on the facility have been resolved.

With regard to the water quality issues we raised in this report, USAID stated that it provided the facility with a limited supply of chlorine to use in the water treatment system. The agency also stated that because the facility was officially transferred to the Ministry of Higher Education, it is now the ministry's responsibility to purchase chlorine to ensure that the system works as designed. USAID noted that it would alert the ministry that the facility needs chlorine.

With regard to purchasing fuel to operate the generator, USAID stated that the amount of fuel required decreased significantly because the facility is now connected to the city's power grid. As part of its comments, USAID provided documentation showing that the facility was connected to the grid in December 2014, and the grid now serves as the primary source of electricity. Although the generator is no longer the primary source, because no additional U.S. funding is expected, USAID should notify the Ministry of Higher Education that it needs to buy fuel to operate the generator as a backup power source when the city power grid is not available.

APPENDIX I - SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This report provides the results of SIGAR's follow-up inspection of the Sheberghan teacher training facility in Jowzjan province. To determine whether the facility had been completed and used, and the extent to which project implementation achieved intended outcomes, we:

- reviewed contract documents, technical specifications, and other relevant project documentation;
- conducted an engineering evaluation of the mechanical, electrical, and water and sewage systems, including tests of the facility's concrete and water;
- interviewed Afghan government officials concerning the facility's construction and use; and
- conducted on-site inspections from April 6 through 9, and 23, 2015; and from September 24 through 26, 2016.

We did not rely on computer-processed data in conducting this inspection. However, we considered the impact of compliance with laws and fraud risk.

In December 2014, SIGAR entered into a cooperative agreement with Afghan civil society partners. Under this agreement, our Afghan partners conduct specific inspections, evaluations, and other analyses. In this regard, Afghan engineers inspected the Sheberghan facility in April 2015 and September 2016 to follow up on the findings from our July 2013 inspection report, and to evaluate the facility's construction since that report was issued.[16] We developed a standardized engineering evaluation checklist covering items required by the contract and design/specification documents for the facility. Our checklist required our partners to analyze the contract documents, scope of work, technical specifications, and design drawings.

We compared the information our Afghan civil society partners provided to accepted engineering practices, relevant standards, regulations, laws, and codes for quality and accuracy. In addition, as part of our monitoring and quality control process, we:

- met with the Afghan engineer to ensure that the approach and planning for the inspection were consistent with the objectives of our inspection and the terms of our cooperative agreement;
- met with our partners and conducted our normal entrance and exit conferences with agency officials;
- discussed significant inspection issues with them;
- referred any potential fraud or illegal acts to SIGAR's Investigations Directorate, as appropriate;
- monitored our partners' progress in meeting milestones and revised contract delivery dates as needed; and
- conducted oversight of them in accordance with SIGAR's policies and procedures to ensure their work resulted in impartial, credible, and reliable information.

We conducted our work in Kabul, Afghanistan, and at the Sheberghan teacher training facility in Jowzjan province from November 2014 through December 2016. This work was conducted in accordance with the *Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation*, published by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. The engineering assessment was conducted by our professional engineer in accordance with the National Society of Professional Engineers' *Code of Ethics for Engineers*. We conducted this inspection under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181, as amended, and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.

[16] See SIGAR, *Sheberghan Teacher Training Facility: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Paid Contractors and Released Them from Contractual Obligations before Construction Was Completed and without Resolving Serious Health and Safety Hazards*, SIGAR Inspection 13-9, July 17, 2013.

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FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

MEMORANDUM

DATE: **December 17, 2016**

TO: John F. Sopko
Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)

FROM: Herbert Smith, Mission Director, USAID/Afghanistan

SUBJECT: Mission Response to Draft SIGAR Inspection Report titled "Sheberghan Teacher Training Facility: Electrical System Deficiencies Were Corrected, but Water Quality and Funding for Generator Fuel Remain Concerns" (SIGAR Report 17-XX under Code I-024)

REF: 1. SIGAR Transmittal email dated 12/01/2015
2. SIGAR Inspection 13-9 dated 07/17/2013

USAID thanks SIGAR for the opportunity to review SIGAR's draft Inspection Report titled, "Sheberghan Teacher Training Facility: Electrical System Deficiencies Were Corrected, but Water Quality and Funding for Generator Fuel Remain Concerns." USAID expresses appreciation to SIGAR for working collaboratively and cooperatively with USAID personnel.

The draft inspection report has documented that USAID has completed the facility and all deficiencies identified in SIGAR Inspection Report #13-9 have been satisfactorily resolved.

In regards to the water chlorination system, USAID provided the facility with a limited supply of chlorine for initial use. However, as the facility was officially transferred to the Ministry of Education, it became the responsibility of the Ministry to purchase chlorine to ensure the water treatment system works as designed. As such, USAID will alert the Ministry.

In regards to the ability for the school to purchase fuel for the generator, the facility was connected to the public power grid on December 17, 2014 and no longer uses the generator as the primary source of electricity, significantly reducing the amount of fuel required. (Attachment#1)

Attachments:
1. Verification for electrical connection to the public power utility.

UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX III - ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Steven Haughton, Senior Inspection Manager

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This inspection was conducted
under project code SIGAR-I-024.

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The mission of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) is to enhance oversight of programs for the reconstruction of Afghanistan by conducting independent and objective audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of taxpayer dollars and related funds. SIGAR works to provide accurate and balanced information, evaluations, analysis, and recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, U.S. agencies, and other decision-makers to make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions to:

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