“Budgets and Bullets: Taking Stock of the Afghan Security Forces”
Good morning. It is a great pleasure to be here with you this morning at CSIS. I want to thank Dr. Cordesman for the opportunity to talk about taking stock of Afghanistan’s security forces, understanding their capabilities, and determining their prospects for long-term sustainability. Tony’s timing for such a discussion is impeccable as usual as the summer fighting season is now in full swing in Afghanistan.
I have known Tony for almost as long as I have been in Washington, first meeting him when I worked for Senator Sam Nunn around the corner from Tony who worked for newly elected Senator John McCain in the Russell Senate Office Building. My SIGAR staff and I are also well acquainted with Dr. Cordesman’s work on Afghanistan. His latest paper, on transition in Afghanistan and the lessons learned over the last 14 years, demonstrates again that he is one of the most important scholarly voices on Afghanistan and U.S. and Coalition efforts there.
Like Tony, but not for the same reasons, I am often the bringer of bad news (or, at least, that is sometimes the perception). As the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, rarely, if ever, does an office or agency head say, “Good news everyone, Sopko is coming to see us and I bet he will tell us what a wonderful job we are doing.”
I get it. But that is my job description: to look for waste, fraud, and abuse and determine what is working and what is not, and what could be improved. For truly bad actors, SIGAR’s staff includes people with badges, guns and arrest warrants which they have used on hundreds of occasions. The badges and warrants that is, not the guns… thank heavens.
When President Obama appointed me as Special Inspector General, I knew my job was not to make friends, but to seek facts and aggressively protect the U.S. taxpayer’s enormous investment in Afghanistan. It is not to be a cheerleader but to speak truth to power. But, it is also a mission strongly supported by many in the Administration and Congress who understand the importance of good oversight. From Senator John McCain who just last week released his “America’s Most Wasted” report highlighting waste in the Pentagon to Senator Claire McCaskill who set up the Wartime Contracting Commission, there are many who want the truth, even if it is sometimes painful to hear.
So it is always a welcome respite from my usual doom and gloom to start on a positive note. First, I am very encouraged by the U.S. military leadership’s approach to reconstruction and oversight in Afghanistan. General John F. Campbell, commander of the Resolute Support Mission, Major General Todd Semonite, commander of the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (or CSTC-A for short), and his deputy Major General Kirk Vollmecke understand the enormous challenges facing the Afghan security forces and the role well-coordinated oversight can play in determining where best to focus reconstruction efforts. These generals are under extreme pressure on many fronts but are aggressively pursuing innovative solutions to the situation they face in Afghanistan. I encourage Congress to listen carefully to them and provide the resources and oversight they need to accomplish their important mission.
The leadership of President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah also encourages me. They are willing partners and truly understand the American people’s massive investment of both blood and treasure in the future of their nation. In his March address to Congress, President Ghani spoke of the “profound debt” his people have to the United States, “whose generous support for [his] country,” he said, “has been of such immense value in advancing the cause of freedom.” These leaders are actively engaged and working closely with the United States as well as reaching out to regional actors such as Pakistan and India. I have met with both and my staff is regularly working with them and their senior leaders on fighting corruption and reforming their government ministries.
These are promising developments that permit me to be more optimistic than I have since being appointed three years ago.
At the same time, the capability of Afghanistan’s security institutions is a topic of great importance to me, as I know it is to you in the audience, and has been the focus of much of SIGAR’s oversight work. The success of the Afghan Army and Police—collectively called the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces or ANDSF—has long been regarded as a key factor in determining Afghanistan’s future. Last December, my office released a High-Risk List to identify issues that are
- essential to the success of the reconstruction effort;
- at risk of significant and large-scale failure due to waste, fraud, or abuse;
- part of ongoing or planned reconstruction efforts; and
- subject to the control or influence of the U.S. government.
It is no surprise then that the capacity and capabilities of the ANDSF were one of the seven issues SIGAR identified as at risk. Clearly, developing a capable ANDSF is essential to the success of the reconstruction effort and to the Afghan government’s prospects in any peace talks. Considering the effect a lack of security has on good governance, rule of law, and economic and social development, it may be the most important issue; although certainly corruption is also high on the list.
Getting a clear picture of ANDSF force strength and capability has long been a challenge. Optimistic assessments of progress often tell only part of the story and downplay long-standing problems such as high attrition rates, questionable capability reporting, and unverified personnel counts. Many of the problems we face today are the same problems we faced last year, or even three years ago. Since its creation, SIGAR has—through its audit work and quarterly reports—expressed its serious concern about the capability of the ANDSF and its long-term sustainability.
To date, Congress has appropriated nearly $110 billion for Afghan reconstruction. Adjusting for inflation, this amount exceeds the value of the entire Marshall Plan effort to rebuild Western Europe after World War II. Moreover, unlike the Marshall Plan, most of our reconstruction funding in Afghanistan has gone to building a modern security apparatus. Actually, of the $110 billion, $62.5 billion has been set aside to develop Afghanistan’s security institutions. Even now, with a reduced U.S. presence, $7.6 billion of the $15 billion remaining in the financial pipeline—appropriated but not yet spent—is to support Afghan security institutions. Billions more are expected to be appropriated every year for the foreseeable future.
CSTC-A has long been the steward for the vast majority of this funding. Without a doubt, CSTC-A has had some remarkable successes, especially considering the challenges and volatility always present in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a war zone. It is not a safe or an easy place to work. All those, military and civilian, who put their lives on the line to work there, deserve our gratitude and respect.
It is with no disrespect whatsoever for their accomplishments or sacrifice that I submit to you this morning a critique of the more than 13 years of U.S.-led efforts to build a capable and sustainable Afghan security force. It is an unvarnished look at past efforts to help current military personnel in Afghanistan and Washington learn from the past and develop sound strategies for the future.
In particular, I want to look at three areas today:
- ANDSF capability,
- the number of ANDSF personnel, and
- the prospects for long-term ANDSF sustainability.
ANDSF Capability
Assessments of Afghan Army and Police capability are key indicators of the effectiveness of U.S. and Coalition efforts to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANDSF. Moreover, they help us answer important questions. Can the ANDSF fight? Do they have the resources to defeat a weakened yet determined insurgency? Can they keep the civilian population safe? Will they be able to manage and sustain themselves without Coalition assistance?
SIGAR has long voiced its concern about ANDSF capability and the methodology used to assess it. Since 2005, the system used to assess the ANDSF has changed four times. In a June 2010 audit report of the first system, called the Capability Milestone rating system, SIGAR found that top-rated ANDSF units—that is, units deemed capable of operating independently—did not have the capacity to sustain the gains they had made. In other words, the system was not working. In fact, it overstated ANDSF unit capability.
During that audit, we found significant levels of regression, or backsliding, in the capability levels of fielded army and police units. Specifically, between February 2009 and January 2010, 39% of top-rated ANA units and 71% of top-rated police districts had regressed at least one rating level. This was due, in part, to the fact that once a unit achieved a top rating, coalition forces withdrew assistance, such as force protection, supplies, and expertise.
Before we issued our report, the International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, changed its system for rating the ANDSF to the Commander’s Unit Assessment Tool, or CUAT. With a new system in place, the number of top-rated ANDSF units fell to zero. None. Nada.
Moreover, the new system’s top rating was no longer “fully capable.” It changed over time from “effective with advisors” to “independent” to, eventually, “independent with advisors.” Although the standards supporting each rating level generally remained consistent, the thresholds for key indicators such as equipment levels were lowered in some cases.
In July 2012, GAO raised concerns that changing the highest rating level from “independent” to “independent with advisors” was, in part, responsible for the increasing numbers of ANDSF units being rated at the highest level. This suggested that achieving independence had proved too difficult, whereas achieving independence “with advisors” was an attainable goal.
Between February 2013 and February 2014, we audited the CUAT system. Unlike the previous assessment system, the CUAT included quantitative and qualitative, or rather subjective, rating criteria. We found, however, that the new system’s Standard Operating Procedure did not provide specific criteria defining the level of detail necessary to support a unit’s assigned rating level. It also failed to adequately explain what exactly the subjective portions of the assessment should contain. ISAF agreed that the system was inconsistent and not particularly useful.
During the course of our audit, ISAF again changed its system, replacing the CUAT with the Regional ANSF Status Report or RASR.
The RASR provided significantly less granularity on the capability of the ANDSF. Unlike the previous two assessment systems that rated kandaks or battalions, the RASR assessed units at the higher brigade level. ISAF correctly noted that the change was needed, as it had lost the ability to advise and observe lower-level units due to the drawdown of Coalition forces. Since operational and tactical details of the RASR were appropriately classified, SIGAR was provided with an executive summary of aggregate-level data on ANDSF capabilities for public reporting purposes.
However, in October 2014, ISAF decided to classify the executive summary of the RASR, which effectively ended SIGAR’s ability to publicly report on ANDSF capability for two quarters in a row. As Dr. Cordesman noted in his recent piece on Transition, “The end result of this gross over-classification is that there is now far too little transparency. . . to make a full assessment of the [ANDSF] from the unclassified data now available.” SIGAR, several members of Congress, editorial boards, and others also protested the classification of aggregated data that had been reported for years with no apparent harmful results.
While RASR reports remain classified, in March 2015, the U.S. military provided SIGAR with the fourth iteration of an ANDSF assessment report—this one unclassified—called the Monthly ANSF Assessment Report, or MAAR. The MAAR follows Resolute Support Mission’s advise and assist model whereby the ANDSF is assessed on its ability to carry out certain Essential Functions. It remains to be seen if the MAAR will be a useful tool for the Resolute Support Mission and the ANDSF in determining Afghan security force capability.
But after 10 years of assessments where ANDSF ratings have yo-yoed with every new system, I cannot help be skeptical.
Moreover, in 2015, again after 10 years of reporting, including times when ANDSF units had been rated as “independent,” it is troubling that the MAAR found that the Afghan Army has not achieved the highest rating level of “sustaining” in any category assessed.
I am also worried that the Afghan ministries aren’t, in any way, ready to stand on their own. Senior U.S. military leaders in Afghanistan told me that it will take years for the Afghans to master their essential functions, and that they will not master any of them by the time the U.S. shrinks its military presence at the end of 2016.
The most recent assessments of the Ministries of Defense and Interior seem to confirm these concerns. In October 2014, only four offices at those ministries were deemed “capable of autonomous operations” while 21 were “capable of executing functions with Coalition oversight only.”
A new assessment system was implemented in December 2014. The ministries are now assessed on their ability to reach milestones in eight “essential function” areas. Neither the Ministry of Defense nor the Ministry of Interior had achieved the top rating of “Sustaining Capability” or the second highest rating of “Fully Capable” in performing any of those essential functions.
While the new ministerial assessment system is very different from the old system, the fact remains that the ministries are clearly not where one would expect them to be after 13 years of capacity building, advising, and mentoring. The Resolute Support Mission forecasts that both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior will achieve 50% of their sustainability milestones by the end of fiscal year 2016.
Again, I must confess to skepticism. Why would one expect to see faster progress now rather than at any point during the 13-year reconstruction effort, when the number of U.S. and Coalition personnel available to train, advise, and assist is so greatly reduced? Are the people there now really so much smarter or more capable than their many predecessors? Setting high goals can be a good thing, but not always. We have seen ambitious goals set in the past often followed by the moving of goalposts when those goals seemed increasingly out of reach. It is more important that ANDSF capabilities are accurately tracked, assessments are based on real measurable criteria, and goals are realistic and attainable.
ANDSF Personnel Numbers
I want to turn now to our concerns about the current number of personnel serving in the ANDSF. The importance of accurate and reliable Afghan Army and Police personnel data to the U.S. and Afghan governments, Resolute Support, UNDP, and other donor nations cannot be overstated. Professional military and police forces around the world begin each day with “roll call” by identifying how many personnel are present for duty and what abilities the force has, such as numbers of trained soldiers, patrolmen, medics, and mechanics. This data enables commanders to determine operational capabilities.
In his testimony before Congress in February 2015, General John F. Campbell, Commander of Resolute Support and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, noted that the ANDSF still have capability gaps and would benefit from sound leadership and strict accountability. Without a clear understanding of operational capability, the gaps noted by General Campbell can be greatly exacerbated.
At the strategic level, ANDSF personnel data has a range of uses. The number of assigned personnel is a key indicator of the Afghan government’s ability to defend against the insurgency, keep its population secure, and prevent terrorists from staging new attacks from Afghan soil. In addition, this data is used as a basis for determining other requirements, such as recruiting, equipment needs, salaries, and medical care. Data on assigned ANDSF personnel also helps U.S. and coalition partners determine the appropriate pace of withdrawal while ensuring the ANDSF is able to achieve its objectives.
Moreover, until the Afghan government is able to fully fund and sustain its own security forces—which, given Afghanistan’s poverty and history of anemic revenue collection, remains a distant prospect—it is vital that accurate ANDSF personnel and payroll data is available to the United States and coalition nations for determining the amount of funding needed to keep the ANDSF up and running.
SIGAR has long been concerned about the accuracy of ANDSF personnel numbers. We have all heard the number 352,000 as the standard force strength of the ANDSF used by top U.S. government officials and reported in the media. This number is also used to determine the amount of funding that Congress appropriates every year to support the ANDSF—including determining amounts set aside for ANDSF personnel salaries.
It is, however, important to understand what that number is and what is not. It is the authorized number of ANDSF personnel. In other words, it is simply a goal. The ANDSF’s actual assigned strength—while close at times—has never been that high.
Although SIGAR had raised concerns before, we became increasingly worried about this number when, in July 2012, shortly after I took over SIGAR, we began seeing anomalies in the data, including the counting of civilians toward ANDSF force strength. At that time we also found that Afghan Army personnel categorized as “Other ANA” appeared to have been tallied indirectly, using a formula whereby the number of personnel in the main combat corps was subtracted from the goal of 187,000 to create the “Other ANA” datum as a residual. Clearly this was not a sound method for accurately tracking personnel.
While adding to the body of work that SIGAR and other oversight agencies have done, our latest audit reports have confirmed our cause for skepticism about the accuracy of ANDSF personnel numbers.
As it stands right now, weaknesses in the process for collecting and verifying ANDSF personnel and payroll data continue to call the accuracy of that data into question. In recent years, SIGAR, the DOD Inspector General (DODIG), the Department of State (State) Inspector General (IG), and GAO have identified numerous weaknesses in fundamental ANDSF data-collection practices. These weaknesses include limited U.S. and Afghan oversight of data-collection processes, little or no physical verification of ANDSF personnel existence and daily attendance, and lack of controls over payroll processes. Over the years, examples include the following:
- In November 2006, DOD IG and State IG reported that ANP personnel totals were unreliable and personnel numbers were “inflated.”
- In June 2008, GAO reported ANA personnel accountability problems, specifically that numbers of personnel present-for-duty may differ from trained and assigned personnel numbers because of attrition, absenteeism, and casualties, and that roughly 20 percent of combat personnel were not present for duty.
- During a 2011 audit of ANP personnel systems, SIGAR found a discrepancy of 13,444 police personnel and that CSTC-A, UNDP, and the Ministry of Interior faced difficulties verifying personnel and payroll data. We also found that CSTC-A and MOI were experiencing difficulty implementing an electronic human resources system.
- In February 2012, DOD IG found poor visibility into ANA data at the local levels due to infrequent and insufficiently detailed payroll audits. DOD IG also reported that some ANA personnel had perpetrated payroll fraud by altering reports to shift money into the accounts of corrupt officials.
Which brings us to SIGAR’s latest work on ANDSF personnel data. Despite these audits performed by multiple oversight agencies going back as far as 2006, little has changed.
In audit reports released in January and April of this year on the processes used to collect and verify the accuracy of ANDSF personnel and payroll data, we found that there is still no assurance that the data is accurate. Although all entities involved in tracking and reporting this data—specifically, Resolute Support, CSTC-A, UNDP, and the Afghan government—have been working to develop effective ANDSF personnel and payroll processes, those processes continue to exhibit extensive internal control deficiencies. This is due to:
- Weak controls and limited oversight over the ANA’s and ANP’s daily unit-level attendance collection processes;
- Weaknesses in personnel and payroll data systems; and
- A lack of documented procedures for verifying and reconciling ANA and ANP personnel and payroll data
We identified problems with the collection and oversight of ANA and ANP attendance data, which forms the basis of all ANDSF personnel and payroll data. The only control in place at the unit level to ensure accurate day-to-day attendance reporting was a sign-in sheet, or roster, which was not consistently used. For example, we found that officers used the rosters, but enlisted personnel did not. In addition, neither U.S., UN, nor Afghan ministry officials observed the completion of daily rosters or reconciled the rosters against other personnel or payroll data.
It is the responsibility of the Afghan government to accurately track the number of personnel in its security forces. CSTC-A does not have the personnel to oversee all aspects of this process. However, considering the ongoing investment of billions of dollars by the United States and others in the ANDSF, it is critical that we have some ability to verify the accuracy of personnel numbers to ensure funds are used as intended.
While I remain skeptical about the numbers, I am very encouraged by recent U.S. military efforts to implement a verifiable, centralized personnel and payroll system to accurately track ANDSF numbers. Why this was not a priority much earlier in the development of the ANDSF, I do not know. But, better late than never. Billions of dollars of U.S. taxpayer funds still hang in the balance.
ANDSF Sustainability
Finally, I want to talk about ANDSF long-term sustainability. Sustainability was also one of the key issues we identified in our High-Risk List. The evidence strongly suggests that Afghanistan lacks the capacity—financial, technical, managerial, or otherwise—to maintain, support, and execute much of what has been built or established during more than 13 years of international assistance.
Without donor contributions, the Afghan government will not be able to meet most of its operating or development expenditures. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) expects the financing gap between domestic revenue and operating expenses, including security spending, to remain about $7.7 billion on average, annually through 2018. The IMF projects that while international aid will decline as a percentage of GDP, the annual assistance required to sustain gains made in Afghanistan will continue to increase.
To make the cost of sustaining the ANDSF more affordable, NATO has talked about reducing its size to 228,500 personnel in 2017, if security conditions permit. The estimated cost of sustaining this smaller force has been estimated at $4.1 billion annually. NATO has also said it expects that the Afghan government would begin to pay at least $500 million annually to sustain the ANSF in 2015, with the aim that it assume full financial responsibility for its own security forces by 2024. This is unlikely to happen.
Afghan officials told SIGAR that they see the Afghan government contributing 3% of GDP annually to security, growing their contribution as the economy grows. But under even the most optimistic GDP growth scenarios, this contribution would not result in the Afghan government fully funding the ANDSF by 2024.
Afghanistan has one of the lowest rates of domestic revenue collection in the world, averaging 9% of GDP from 2006 to 2013, compared to an average of around 21% in other low-income countries, according to the IMF. Expenditures are expected to continue rising, according to World Bank projections—largely due to increased spending on security, service delivery, essential infrastructure, and operations and maintenance (O&M).
Afghanistan’s recent fiscal crisis raises more concern. The Afghan government reported the crisis in December, two months after reporting a $537 million 2014 budget shortfall. Afghanistan’s Ministry of Finance reported that in 2014, total domestic revenues—tax and non-tax revenues, and customs duties—missed targets by $602 million (-35%), and fell by approximately $187 million from the same period in 2013.
These are the fiscal, budgetary, and economic realities in which we consider the prospects for long-term ANDSF sustainability. Afghan self-sustainment of its security institutions is long way away. Suffice it to say, the ANDSF will need our help for the foreseeable future. If our Afghan partners are to succeed we must accept this fact now.
I am not alone in this assessment. Some of the most salient comments on ANDSF sustainability have come, not from oversight organizations, but rather from U.S. military commanders in Afghanistan.
On March 12, 2014, General Joseph F. Dunford, then Commander of ISAF and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, warned lawmakers that the ANSF will need ongoing support if they are to succeed in their role of keeping Afghanistan secure. He told the Senate Armed Services Committee, “If we leave at the end of 2014, the Afghan security forces will begin to deteriorate. The security environment will begin to deteriorate, and I think the only debate is the pace of that deterioration.”
That is not an abstract concern. News reports from Afghanistan are noting record casualty levels in the ANDSF. We have heard of the Afghan army clearing an area of insurgents and handing it over to the police, who then find they cannot stand up to insurgents on their own.
Meanwhile, as counterinsurgency writers have long noted, insurgents have some inherent advantages. They don’t have to hold territory. They can avoid pitched battles. They can force the government to defend everything while they scout for weaknesses. If pressed, they can fade into the population. They can concentrate on slowly attritting the government’s forces and undermining its popular support with random acts of terrorism. And they can wait.
Like government forces in Iraq, Vietnam, and Algeria, the ANDSF faces a serious challenge even if fully staffed, trained, and equipped. General Dunford identified several areas where the ANDSF will need ongoing assistance. He told lawmakers that they will, I quote, “still need assistance in maturing the systems, the processes and the institutions necessary to support a modern national army and police force. They also need continued support in addressing capability gaps in aviation, intelligence and special operations. To address these gaps a ‘train, advise and assist’ mission will be necessary. . . to further develop Afghan self-sustainability.”
Decision makers might do well to heed the general’s warning. Although not exactly comparable, we must recall that the Soviet-client regime in Kabul collapsed in 1992 less than a year after the Soviets stopped cash and fuel deliveries. South Vietnam fell to North Vietnamese regulars in April 1975 after a drastic reduction of U.S. aid.
We have all heard observations that are intended to be encouraging, such as that the Taliban cannot seize and hold Afghan provincial capitals. That may be true, but I would note that the Viet Cong and their North Vietnamese allies never took and held a provincial capital in South Vietnam until January 1975—nearly 30 years into their campaign to reunify the country as a communist state. Less than four months later, in April 1975, North Vietnamese tanks clattered onto to the grounds of the presidential palace in Saigon, and the long war was over. When we try to assess the capabilities and prospects of the ANDSF, we need to be careful of our metrics.
Conclusion
Reconstructing a poor country like Afghanistan while its government is fighting a tough and highly motivated insurgency calls for a long view, deep pockets, and patience. The “train, advise, and assist” role for Afghanistan’s international partners has now taken the form of the Resolute Support Mission. Commanders like General Campbell and Major General Semonite have a tough job ahead of them in creating the conditions that will help the ANDSF become self-sustaining. It will not happen overnight. We have seen too often the consequences of setting lofty goals on unrealistic timelines with inadequate resources.
I think it is worth mentioning that military tours in Afghanistan are short by design. People show up, are briefed by the people they are replacing, and then scramble to figure out what they need to do to ensure progress is maintained. It can take months just to get the lay of the land. References to things that happened only a few years ago—say 2012—might as well be references to the last ice age. I worry sometimes that this, as much as anything else, is why we see this pattern of constantly changing assessment systems, personnel goals, and sustainment milestones—changes which do not always translate into meaningful progress.
For this and other reasons, my office is developing a series of Lessons Learned reports to draw on the lessons of the past to inform future decision-making. To do this, we have brought some very bright people to SIGAR with a wealth of on-the-ground experience in Afghanistan to conduct interviews and research. In the meantime, I hope those who are either in Afghanistan or on their way there will take the time to read some of SIGAR’s audits and quarterly reports as well as Dr. Cordesman’s considerable body of work on the subject of ANDSF assessments and capabilities. After 13 years and billions spent, we have plenty of examples of what works and what does not.
Lastly, I want to say that I strongly believe in the U.S. mission in Afghanistan. A strong, secure, and self-sustaining Afghanistan is important for stability in the region, the wellbeing of 30 million Afghans, and ultimately the security of the United States. It is my goal, and the goal of SIGAR, to support U.S. efforts there to ensure this becomes a reality.
Now more than ever with President Ghani and CEO Abdullah as new willing partners and the energetic and aggressive U.S. military leadership of General Campbell and Major General Semonite, we should all be cautiously optimistic about a brighter future for Afghanistan.
Thank you.